JUDGMENT : Moushumi Bhattacharya, J. 1. This appeal arises from a Judgment and order dated 31st March, 2016 passed in a writ petition filed by the respondent. The subject-matter of challenge in the writ petition was an order of punishment dated 17th May, 2010 issued by the Joint Municipal Corporation and Disciplinary Authority as well as an order passed by the Appellate Authority dated 17th November, 2012. By the impugned Judgment and order, both the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority/Joint Municipal Commissioner as well as the Appellate Authority were set aside. 2. The appellants Kolkata Municipal Corporation and the Municipal Commissioner are hence before us. 3. Before we deal with the basis for challenge of the impugned judgment as stated, which is the case of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC), the facts in brief leading to the writ petition are required to be briefly stated. 4. The writ petitioner was appointed as Block Sarkar by the KMC in January 1984. A charge of corruption was brought by the KMC against the petitioner concerning an alleged act of cheating while the petitioner was in service in connection with distribution of arrear pay to lorry mazdoors. A First Information Report was lodged by KMC for initiation of a criminal proceeding against the petitioner. During the pendency of the criminal proceeding, the petitioner was placed under suspension in March 1995 by an order of the Joint Municipal Commissioner as the Disciplinary Authority. The petitioner was paid subsistence allowance for the first three months of suspension until the order of suspension was withdrawn in October 1996. The petitioner challenged the order of suspension in this court during the pendency of which the suspension order was withdrawn by the Disciplinary Authority. The writ petition being C.O. No.21278(W) of 1995 thus became infructuous. A disciplinary proceeding was thereafter initiated against the petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority (Joint Municipal Commissioner) upon issuing a charge-sheet dated 17th January, 1996. The order of suspension was withdrawn after issue of the charge-sheet on 4th October, 1996 and the petitioner was re-instated in service. The petitioner disputed the charges made against him and thereafter participated in an inquiry initiated against him. The KMC also lodged a criminal complaint with the police authorities against the petitioner pursuant to which criminal proceedings were initiated before the learned First Special Court, Alipore. The petitioner contested the criminal proceedings. The petitioner disputed the charges made against him and thereafter participated in an inquiry initiated against him. The KMC also lodged a criminal complaint with the police authorities against the petitioner pursuant to which criminal proceedings were initiated before the learned First Special Court, Alipore. The petitioner contested the criminal proceedings. The learned Judge First Special Court, Alipore passed an order of acquittal in favour of the petitioner on 4th September, 2008 holding that the petitioner was not guilty in respect of the charges framed against him. The Disciplinary Authority thereafter issued an order of punishment dated 17th May, 2010 withholding two increments of the petitioner with cumulative effect. 5. In the writ petition, the petitioner has stated loss of service benefits, including loss of career advancement opportunities and other financial benefits including loss of seniority/promotion. Aggrieved by the order of the Disciplinary Authority, the petitioner preferred an appeal under the provisions of The Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 before the Appellate Authority (The Municipal Commissioner). The petitioner participated in the hearings before the Municipal Commissioner. By an order dated 17th November, 2012, the Appellate Authority confirmed the order of the Disciplinary Authority. The petitioner filed the writ petition challenging the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority which resulted in the impugned judgment and order dated 31st March, 2016. 6. The case of the appellant KMC is that the facts involved in the departmental and criminal proceedings are different. Counsel appearing for the KMC submits that the basis of the impugned order is that the learned Single Judge was of the view that the facts involved in both the proceedings were the same and that such finding is not supported by any analysis or reasons. The primary contention of counsel is that the charges of both the proceedings are dissimilar. 7. Relying on the above, counsel assails the findings in the impugned judgment, particularly that the petitioner/respondent had been honourably acquitted from the criminal charges. For the expression “Honourable acquittal”, counsel relies on Deputy Inspector General of Police Vs. S. Samuthiram reported in (2013)1 SCC 598 and contends and S. Bhaskar Reddy Vs. Superintendent of Police reported in (2015) 2 SCC 365 , where it was held, inter alia, that a decision of the Appellate Authority cannot be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Counsel relies on Ajay Kumar Singh Vs. S. Samuthiram reported in (2013)1 SCC 598 and contends and S. Bhaskar Reddy Vs. Superintendent of Police reported in (2015) 2 SCC 365 , where it was held, inter alia, that a decision of the Appellate Authority cannot be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Counsel relies on Ajay Kumar Singh Vs. Flag Officer, Commanding-in Chief reported in AIR 2016 SC 3528 , for the point that acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising its powers in accordance with the relevant Regulations. It is argued that acquittal in a criminal case does not entitle a person to automatic reinstatement and that it would be open to the competent authority to take a decision whether disciplinary action should be taken under the relevant Rules. 8. The primary argument of learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/respondent is that the charges in both the criminal and the departmental proceeding were similar. Counsel also puts emphasis on the failure of the prosecution to prove the charges against the petitioner which resulted in an honourable acquittal by the order of the First Special Court, Alipore, on 4th September, 2008. Counsel further submits that the Disciplinary Authority had proceeded in accordance with Note 1 under Rule 8 of CMC Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1985, which is set out below; “Note-1. In all cases of fraud, embezzlement, or similar offence the disciplinary authority shall take steps to institute departmental proceeding against all the delinquents and conduct them with strict adherence to the regulations upto the point at which prosecution of any of the delinquents begins. At that stage it must be specifically considered whether further conduct of the departmental proceeding against any of the remaining delinquents is practicable, and if so, it shall continue as far as possible (which will not, as a rule, include finding and sentence). At that stage it must be specifically considered whether further conduct of the departmental proceeding against any of the remaining delinquents is practicable, and if so, it shall continue as far as possible (which will not, as a rule, include finding and sentence). If the accused is convicted, the departmental proceedings against him shall be resumed and formally completed either by dismissing removing the person from Corporation service or by reducing him in the rank on the ground of his conviction immediately without waiting for the expiry of the time for preferring an appeal against the order of conviction by the first trying court of the decision on appeal preferred before higher court against the conviction, provided there is no prohibitory order of the court to the contrary, final action to pass orders of dismissal, etc, should proceed in accordance with the order of the court. If the accused is not convicted, the departmental proceedings against him should be dropped unless the authority competent to the disciplinary action is of opinion that the facts of the case disclosed adequate grounds for taking departmental action against him. In either case the proceedings against the remaining delinquents shall be resumed and completed as soon as possible after the termination of the proceedings in Court. Explanation-Departmental proceedings shall not as a rule be initiated on the same charges or on charges substantially similar to those of which a Corporation employee is acquitted in consequence of or by a decision of a Court of Law. Discharge by the Court on the submission of final report by the police does not, however, amount to acquittal and there is no bar to departmental proceedings being initiated after such discharge either on the same charges or on charge substantially similar to those leading to the discharge.” Counsel relies on State of West Bengal Vs. Vidyasagar Pandey reported in (2011)1 CHN (CAL) 84 and Sanatan Bahadur Vs. Paschimbanga Grameen Bank reported in AIR 2015 (Calcutta) 368. On the point that acquittal on the basis of inadequate investigation by Police authorities cannot be said to be Honourable which is not case of the writ petitioner in the present proceedings. Counsel complains that the enquiry was conducted in a manner which not only caused serious prejudice to the petitioner but was in violation of the principles of natural justice. 9. Counsel complains that the enquiry was conducted in a manner which not only caused serious prejudice to the petitioner but was in violation of the principles of natural justice. 9. We have considered the submissions of counsel appearing for the appellant KMC and the writ petitioner and have perused the materials-on-record. 10. We are of the view that the entire dispute centres on the similarity/dissimilarity of the charges made in the criminal and the disciplinary proceedings. This is because the law as laid down by the Supreme Court is also grounded on the aforesaid consideration governing the conclusion in several of the cases cited, namely, whether the departmental proceedings should continue after a person has been exonerated from criminal charges. 11. Before we look into the reasons of the impugned judgment passed by the learned First Court, the three main orders forming the subject-matter of the writ petition which gives rise to the argument of similarities/dissimilarities between the criminal and the disciplinary proceedings, needs to be briefly stated. (i) By an order dated 4th September, 2008 passed by the First Special Court, Alipore, the respondent (accused person no.3 before the court) along with two other accused persons were found to be not guilty in respect of the charge punishable under specific sections of the Indian Penal Code and were hence acquitted by the court. The finding of the learned Judge was that, inter alia, the prosecution has failed to make out any case through substantive evidence and that witness nos. 2, 4 and 7 have not supported the prosecution’s story despite being the best persons to say whether they received less payment. The learned Judge was of the view that the substantive evidence did not support the case made out by the prosecution and hence corroborative evidence cannot disprove the defence. (ii) On 17th May, 2010, the disciplinary authority after noting that the respondent had been “finally acquitted” on 4th September, 2008 by the First Special Court, Alipore, the report of the Inquiry/Enquiry Officer was accepted and punishment was meted out to the respondent in terms of the order. (iii) On 17th November, 2012, the Appellate Authority found the findings of the Inquiry/Enquiry Officer to be proper and concluded that the order of the disciplinary authority dated 17th May, 2010 stood confirmed. (iii) On 17th November, 2012, the Appellate Authority found the findings of the Inquiry/Enquiry Officer to be proper and concluded that the order of the disciplinary authority dated 17th May, 2010 stood confirmed. The Appellate Authority, however, was of the view that the benefits withheld from the respondent such as career advancement, arrear payments, etc. may be released, if found admissible under the rule. 12. In both the orders of the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority, the reason for proceeding with the disciplinary proceedings despite the respondent having been acquitted from the criminal charges, was that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has distinguished the approach and objectives of disciplinary proceedings as opposed to criminal proceedings in terms of standard of proof, the mode of inquiry and the trial. The Appellate Authority was of the view that the petitioner was acquitted since the prosecution failed to produce material evidence before the criminal court while, on the other hand, the prosecution witnesses had categorically stated the charge and hence there was no basis for the departmental proceeding to be dropped. 13. The reason why the orders passed in the three proceedings have been enumerated above is not only to throw light on the chronology but to explain why the disciplinary proceedings were resumed against the respondent two years after the respondent was acquitted from the criminal charges. There is no dispute that all three proceedings were founded on the charge of misappropriation of money by the respondent for the purpose of cheating the lorry mazdoors of the KMC. The specific allegation was that the respondent and two others made one arrear payment to the mazdoors on 20th February, 1995 which was less than the actual amount which was due to the mazdoors. 14. The learned First Court, upon an exhaustive evaluation of the relevant decisions forming the law on the subject, formulated the issue for consideration as; “What is the effect of a criminal proceeding resulting in the acquittal of the accused employee? On this basis is it obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to exonerate the accused of the charges in the departmental proceedings? Or should the disciplinary proceeding continue with full vigour in spite of the acquittal of the accused? On this basis is it obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to exonerate the accused of the charges in the departmental proceedings? Or should the disciplinary proceeding continue with full vigour in spite of the acquittal of the accused? Should the acquittal in the criminal proceedings impel the disciplinary authority to consider whether to exonerate the accused or not?” Having narrowed down the scope of inquiry, the learned Single Judge considered a large number of decisions on whether departmental proceedings can survive criminal proceedings once the latter has resulted in an acquittal. The decisions which we have considered on the aforesaid print include; S. Bhaskar Reddy Vs. Superintendent of Police reported in (2015) 2 SCC 365 , State of West Bengal reported Versus Vidyasagar Pandey in (2011) 1 CHN (CAL) 84, Sanatan Bahadur Vs. Paschimbanga Grameen Bank reported in AIR 2015 (Calcutta) 368, Ajay Kumar Singh Vs. Flag Officer, Commanding-in chief reported in AIR (2016) SC 3528, Deputy Inspector General of Police Vs. S. Samuthiram reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598 , Subrata Roy Sahara Vs. Union of India reported in (2014) 8 SCC 470 , Bistupada Das Vs. State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur reported in (2011) 5 CHN (CAL) 14, Arun Kumar Sarswat Vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2009) 3 CHN 76 , Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 , Samar Bahadur Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2011) 9 SCC 94 and Pandiyan Roadways Corpn. Ltd. Vs. N. Balakrishnan reported in (2007) 9 SCC 755 . 15. From the above decisions, the following principles emerge; (a) Acquittal in a criminal proceeding cannot be said to be “honourable” and have a bearing on the punishment imposed on a delinquent in a disciplinary proceeding if the acquittal was not on the same set of facts or evidence. (b) The effect of difference in the standard of proof in a criminal trial and that of a disciplinary proceeding to be taken into account and whether the delinquent officer was charged with something more than the subject-matter of the criminal case. (reference: Pandiyan Roadways Corpn. Ltd. Vs. N. Balakrishnan; (2007) 9 SCC 755 ). 16. The fundamental basis for not permitting disciplinary proceedings to continue after exoneration of criminal charges is identity/similarity of the charges and the evidence taken in both the proceedings. (reference: Pandiyan Roadways Corpn. Ltd. Vs. N. Balakrishnan; (2007) 9 SCC 755 ). 16. The fundamental basis for not permitting disciplinary proceedings to continue after exoneration of criminal charges is identity/similarity of the charges and the evidence taken in both the proceedings. The logic appears to be that since a higher standard of proof is required for establishing guilt in a criminal case “beyond all reasonable doubt”; the same charges involving a lower standard “preponderance of probabilities”, should not continue to the detriment of the delinquent. This issue has been visited in several decisions of this court, including in Vidyasagar Pandey Vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2011) 1 CHN (CAL) 84, which was taken note of by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment. In that decision, both criminal and departmental proceedings were initiated against the accused on an identical charge which prompted a Division Bench of this court to follow the dictum of G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446 which held that where the accused has been honourably acquitted by a competent court on the same set of facts and evidence and the order of dismissal is also based on the same set of facts and evidence, the disciplinary proceedings/punishment is liable to be set aside in the interest of justice. 17. In order to give an opportunity to counsel to establish the similarity or the perceptible differences in the two proceedings, we have considered the statements handed up in support of the stand taken on behalf of the appellant and the respondent. The chart relied on by counsel for the appellant predictably seeks to show that the charges framed against the writ petitioner in the two proceedings were entirely different. From the perusal of the said statement, there is little doubt that the proceedings arise from the same alleged offence, namely, of making arrear payment to the lorry mazdoors of the KMC. The statement shows that in the criminal proceedings, the offence also related to misappropriation of government money and forgery under various provisions of the IPC. The only perceptible difference from the statement is the number of witnesses examined which was higher in the criminal proceeding compared to the disciplinary proceeding. The statement shows that in the criminal proceedings, the offence also related to misappropriation of government money and forgery under various provisions of the IPC. The only perceptible difference from the statement is the number of witnesses examined which was higher in the criminal proceeding compared to the disciplinary proceeding. The other statement handed up by counsel for the appellant related to the findings and observations in both the proceedings did not convey any meaningful difference since the observations have been reproduced from the orders in both the proceedings and have merely been placed side by side. 18. For a better understanding of whether the charges framed in the criminal proceedings and the departmental proceedings are the same, the relevant portions of the proceedings are extracted below; • “The case of the prosecution can be stated in brief thus, that on 9.3.95 a complaint was lodged by Shri T. Bhattacharjee, Asstt. Engineer (Maintenance), Calcutta Municipal Corporation, (hereinafter called as the CMC) with the Entally P.S. giving rise to Entally P.S.Case no. Q1 60 dtd. 10.02.95 against Dulal Chand Kayal, Pradip Kr. Dutta and Goutam Bhattacharjee, all employees of the CMC. The allegation against the accd. persons as depicted in the FIR can be stated in brief that one arrear payment was made to the labour mazdoors of the CMC on 20.2.95 which was less than that of their actual claim.” • “In the said bill, the names of Sri Chhotelal and 128 others were included. The said Sri Bhattacharjee along with Sri Kayal as aforesaid made less payment to the said Lorry Mazdoors than the amount as noted against their names. Sri Bhattacharjee kept such money tactfully managed from such less payment with himself and on 12.3.95, an amount of Rs. 17,360/- only was recovered from his possession by the police with the bills and documents.” • “In the said bill, the names of Sri Chhotelal and 128 others were included. The said Sri Bhattacharjee along with Sri Kayal as aforesaid made less payment to the said Lorry Mazdoors than the amount as noted against their names. Sri Bhattacharjee kept such money tactfully managed from such less payment with himself and on 12.3.95, an amount of Rs. 17,360/- only was recovered from his possession by the police with the bills and documents. Sri Bhattacharjee kept such money tactfully managed from such less payment with himself and on 12.3.95, an amount of Rs. 17,360/- only was recovered from his possession by the police with the bills and documents. The said money was nothing but a part of money tactfully managed by him from such less payment to the Lorry Mazdoors vide bill no. 494/94-95 as aforesaid. He failed to give any account of the said money to the police at the time of seizure of the same.” 19. It is evident from the above that the same charges were framed the basis of both the proceedings, namely, of disbursing less payment to the lorry mazdoors. The observations made in the texts of the judgments of the criminal court and those of the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority are substantially similar and are bound to be since there was no difference at all in the charges framed and/or in the alleged offence committed by the respondent and two others. This aspect of the matter has been categorically stated in the impugned judgment where the learned Single Judge upon considering the relevant case law in the matter has concluded the following; “Therefore, the law on the subject is this. If the alleged facts on which a criminal proceeding has been started are the same as those on the basis of which a departmental disciplinary proceeding is also commenced, the evidence in the criminal proceeding and in the disciplinary proceeding is more or less the same and the criminal proceeding is terminated by an honourable acquittal of the accused employee, then the departmental proceedings cannot be continued. The employee has to be exonerated. In this case, there is no dispute whatsoever that the facts which gave rise to departmental proceedings were the same as those which gave rise to the criminal proceeding against the accused employee. The charges which were framed in the criminal trial arose out of those facts. The evidence which was led in the criminal court was substantially the same as that which was before the disciplinary authority.” 20. The learned Judge also extracted a part of the order of the First Special Court, Alipore which made specific observations on the inability of the second Inquiry Officer to improve the case of the prosecution which failed to prove its case through substantive evidence. The learned Judge also extracted a part of the order of the First Special Court, Alipore which made specific observations on the inability of the second Inquiry Officer to improve the case of the prosecution which failed to prove its case through substantive evidence. The order in the criminal proceedings reflects gaps in the manner of receiving and recording of evidence and the reports of hand-writing experts. On the relevant portion of the judgment in the criminal proceedings, the learned Single Judge concludes that; “It is quite plain that on the self-same facts, after consideration of the same evidence, as in the departmental proceeding, in detail, the learned Judge came to the finding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case. In my opinion, the acquittal of the accused was honourable. Therefore, the disciplinary authority, before which the proceeding had been concluded, had the duty to exonerate the petitioner.” 21. The above brings us to the issue of “honourable acquittals” and whether such acquittals are a pre-requisite for jettisoning the disciplinary proceedings. The expression “honourable acquittal” was discussed by the Supreme Court in Deputy Inspector General of Police Vs. S. Samuthiram reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598 , where it was held that mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service. The Supreme Court was of the view that an acquittal would be honourable where the prosecution has failed to prove its case on evidence and in law. The Supreme Court was of the view that an accused can be said to be honourably acquitted when despite having every legal and evidentiary opportunity to prove its case, the prosecution fails to establish the charges framed against the accused. Deputy Inspector General of Police Vs. S. Samuthiram has been quoted in a number of decisions, including in a decision by one of us ( Biswanath Somadder, J) in Sanatan Bahadur Vs. Paschimbanga Grameen Bank reported in AIR 2015 Calcutta 368 where the acquittal was found to be less than honourable on account of the shoddy evidence put forth by the prosecution. For a balance of perspectives, there are several decisions where the concerned person was not permitted to have the benefit of an acquittal in a criminal proceeding in matters of reinstatement. For a balance of perspectives, there are several decisions where the concerned person was not permitted to have the benefit of an acquittal in a criminal proceeding in matters of reinstatement. We have also considered such cases and found that the acquittal was not considered to be a clean exoneration since the court found serious flaws in the manner of rejecting the case of the prosecution. A few examples of a less than honourable acquittal would be Bistupada Das, Sanatan Bahadur and Ajay Kumar Singh where the courts found either the evidence led by the prosecution to be shoddy (Sanatan Bahadur) or the acquittal to be on technicalities (Bistupada Das) or where the evidence of witnesses was not taken into consideration (Ajay Kumar Singh). In Samar Bahadur Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2011) 9 SCC 94 , the Supreme Court noted that the accused did not participate in the departmental proceedings. 22. The decision of the Supreme Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 , which held against departmental proceedings where criminal and departmental proceedings were based on an identical set of facts and where the delinquent had been acquitted by judicial pronouncement with findings was followed in S. Bhaskar Reddy Vs. Superintendent of Police reported in (2015) 2 SCC 365 . In that case, the Supreme Court held that an honourable acquittal of the accused from criminal offence meant that they are acquitted for want of evidence. The Court also found on facts that the charges in the criminal case and the disciplinary proceedings were similar. The Supreme Court relied on G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446 in coming to the aforesaid conclusion. G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446 was followed in State of West Bengal Vs. Vidyasagar Pandey reported in (2011)1 CHN (CAL) 84 which found the decision of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority to be unsustainable in view of the accused being admitted in the criminal case arising out of the same set of facts. 23. A recent decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Sitaram Mishra.; (2019) SCC Online SC 881 considered the effect of an acquittal in the criminal proceedings on a decision taken by the Disciplinary Authority. 23. A recent decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Sitaram Mishra.; (2019) SCC Online SC 881 considered the effect of an acquittal in the criminal proceedings on a decision taken by the Disciplinary Authority. The facts of that case involved a constable in the CRPF (the first respondent before the Supreme Court) who was posted in the 41st Battalion at West Tripura. It was alleged that on 18th February, 1998, while the constable was cleaning the barrel of his loaded 9 M.M. carbon in the barracks, he proceeded to clean the carbon without removing the magazine as a result of which eight rounds were fired and one of the bullets hit a co-constable who was present in the barracks. The co-constable died as a result of the injuries. The commandant initiated a disciplinary proceeding against the constable with a charge under Rule 27(a) of the CRPF Rules, 1955 and after conclusion of the disciplinary enquiry, the constable was found to be guilty of misconduct by the Disciplinary Authority based on the enquiry report of 12th March, 1999 with the penalty of dismissal from service imposed under Section 11(1) of the CRRP Act, 1949 read with Rule 27(a) of the CRPF Rules, 1955. The constable was also tried under Section 304 of the IP, 1960 and was acquitted by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Agartala, Tripura West on 5th January, 2002. The writ petition filed by the constable/first respondent was dismissed by a learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of this court set aside the decision of the First Court on the ground that the charge of misconduct was not established. The Division Bench considered the depositions of PW 5 and PW 6 in the disciplinary proceedings and came to the finding that the 9 MM carbon was disassembled and hence the charge of misconduct was belied by the depositions of PW 5 and PW 6. The Supreme Court allowed the Special Leave Petition and set aside the judgment of the Division Bench on primarily two grounds. The first was that the Division Bench was in error of re-appreciating the evidence which was adduced during the disciplinary enquiry and second, that a disciplinary enquiry is governed by a different standard of proof than that of a criminal case. The first was that the Division Bench was in error of re-appreciating the evidence which was adduced during the disciplinary enquiry and second, that a disciplinary enquiry is governed by a different standard of proof than that of a criminal case. The Supreme Court was of the view that the purpose of a disciplinary enquiry is to enable the employer to determine whether an employee has committed a breach of the service rules which was adverted to by the First Court. The relevant passage of the decision in Union of India Vs. Sitaram Mishra; (2019) SCC Online SC 881 is set out below; “14. It is undoubtedly correct that the charge in the criminal trial arose from the death of a co-employee in the course of the incident resulting from the firing of a bullet which took place from the weapon which was assigned to the first respondent as a member of the Force. But the charge of misconduct is on the ground of the negligence of the first respondent in handling his weapon and his failure to comply with the departmental instructions in regard to the manner in which the weapon should be handled. Consequently, the acquittal in the criminal case was not a ground for setting aside the penalty which was imposed in the course of the disciplinary enquiry. Hence, having regard to the parameters that govern the exercise of judicial review in disciplinary matters, we are of the view that the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court is unsustainable.” 24. Since Union of India Vs. Sitaram Mishra.; (2019) SCC Online SC 881 is one of the recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court on a issue which is central to the matter before us, we deem it necessary to compare the rival facts in that decision and those in the appeal before us. In Union of India Vs. Sitaram Mishra, the charge framed in the disciplinary proceeding was the negligence of the constable (Sitaram Mishra) in his capacity as a member of the CRPF under a specific section of the CRPF Act, 1949 read with the CRPF Rules, 1955 under which the penalty of dismissal from service was imposed. In Union of India Vs. Sitaram Mishra, the charge framed in the disciplinary proceeding was the negligence of the constable (Sitaram Mishra) in his capacity as a member of the CRPF under a specific section of the CRPF Act, 1949 read with the CRPF Rules, 1955 under which the penalty of dismissal from service was imposed. From a careful reading of Sitaram Mishra we find that one of the significant considerations which weighed with the Supreme Court was the error on the part of the Division Bench of the High Court in re-visiting and re-appreciating the evidence which was adduced during the disciplinary enquiry. The Supreme Court was of the view that in the exercise of judicial review against a finding of misconduct in a disciplinary enquiry, a Court can only interfere where the finding is not based on any evidence. Quoting an extract from the statement made by the constable, the Supreme Court found that the statement amounted to an admission that the death of the co-constable resulted from the bullets fired as a result of the handling of the weapon. In the matter before us, the learned Single Judge has not adverted to the evidence either pertaining to the disciplinary proceedings or to the criminal trial concerning the respondent and neither do we propose to do so. The only extract relied upon in the judgment impugned before us, is the finding of the First Special Court, Alipore on the basis of which the writ petitioner/respondent was found to be not guilty in respect of the charges framed under the IPC. Further, from the facts referred to by the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Sitaram Mishra.; (2019) SCC Online SC 881, it is also evident that the charge framed in the disciplinary proceeding was under specific provisions of the CRPF Act and Rules which necessarily made it specific and distinguishable from the findings under Section 304 of the IPC, which deals with punishment for death caused by any person by or negligence not amounting to culpable homicide. The paragraph from the decision set out above assumes significance with reference to this case. The paragraph from the decision set out above assumes significance with reference to this case. In the facts of this case, from the punishment framed by the Joint Municipal Commissioner/Disciplinary Authority (appearing from Annexure II of the Memorandum dated 17th January, 1996), it is evident that the charge relied entirely to disbursing of arrear bills for a specified period to lorry mazdoors without obtaining Revenue Stamps, that is the respondent making money from paying less to the lorry mazdoors The charge in the criminal case as noted in the judgment (referred to FIR) of the First Court Special Court, Alipore dated 4th September, 2008 is identical; namely arrear payment to the lorry mazdoors and interpolation of arrear bills. We do not find any order of the Disciplinary Authority or that of the Appellate Authority that any charge were framed against the respondent which was distinct from or in addition to the charges framed in the FIR. In our view, therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court in Sitaram Mishra cannot assist the appellant. 25. The most recent decision on the subject is a decision of the Supreme Court delivered on 1st August, 2019 in Shashi Bhusan Prasad Vs. Inspector General Central Industrial Security Force in Civil Application no. 7130 of 2009, where the decision of the Orissa High Court was set aside on the ground that the decision in Capt. M. Paul Anthony and in G.M. Tank were not applicable since the criminal case and the departmental enquiry were based on different set of facts and further that the evidence in both the proceedings did not have any nexus. In that decision, the appellant while serving as a constable in the Central Industrial Security Force (C.I.S.F) in Rourkela had provided a country-made revolver to one Subash Chandra Agarwalla, who murdered his aunt with it. A criminal case was initiated against the appellant under Section 25(1) of the Arms Act and the appellant was arrested on 30th November, 1992. At the same time, disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the appellant by a charge-sheet dated 9th February, 1993 for gross misconduct committed by the appellant in discharge of his duties. After a disciplinary enquiry, the Enquiry Officer recorded a finding of guilt and the charge against the appellant was proved. At the same time, disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the appellant by a charge-sheet dated 9th February, 1993 for gross misconduct committed by the appellant in discharge of his duties. After a disciplinary enquiry, the Enquiry Officer recorded a finding of guilt and the charge against the appellant was proved. The Disciplinary Authority concurred that the finding of the Inquiry Officer and the appellant was dismissed from service by an order dated 21st May, 1994. The appellant was acquitted of the criminal case by a judgment of a competent authority dated 12th September, 1995. The appeal before the Appellate Authority was rejected on 24th April, 1996 and the Revisional Authority also rejected the appellant’s case. The High Court of Orissa dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant by a judgment dated 17th July, 2008. The appellant went before the Supreme Court. Upon consideration of the facts before it, the Supreme Court expressed the view that criminal and departmental proceedings were entirely different and that the degree of proof for a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary for recording the commission of delinquent conduct. The Supreme Court was further of the view that in criminal law, the burden of proof is on the prosecution, which has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt while in a departmental enquiry penalty can be imposed on the basis of preponderance of probability. The Supreme Court distinguished the decision in Capt. M. Paul Anthony and G.M. Tank on the basis that these two decisions involved the same sets of facts and evidence. On a careful consideration of the decision in Shashi Bhusan Prasad, we find that the primary reason for the Supreme Court in dismissing the appeal was that both the departmental and criminal proceedings were grounded on the same set of facts. This has specifically been recorded in paragraphs 16 and 22 of the decision. The other notable feature in the decision is that the Supreme Court came to a finding that the order of acquittal passed by the court in the criminal proceedings was based on the two main witnesses being declared hostile apart from the other material witnesses who were also declared hostile. The other notable feature in the decision is that the Supreme Court came to a finding that the order of acquittal passed by the court in the criminal proceedings was based on the two main witnesses being declared hostile apart from the other material witnesses who were also declared hostile. This was the reason for which the criminal court came to the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the appellant thereby acquitting him by the judgment dated 12th September, 1995. Moreover, the charge against the appellant was under Section 25(1) (a) of the Arms Act, which was entirely different from that of the criminal-proceeding. It may be mentioned that this section relates to possession or carrying any prohibited arms in contravention of Section 7 of the Act carrying a punishment of imprisonment of five to ten years together fine. In the present case, as discussed above, the charges in the departmental and criminal proceedings were identical and emanating from the same alleged offence of arrear payment to the lorry mazdoors of K.M.C. Further, the order of suspension pursuant to a charge-sheet issued in the disciplinary proceeding was withdrawn on 4th October, 1996 and the petitioner was reinstated in service. After the order of acquittal in the criminal proceedings on 4th September, 2008 the disciplinary proceedings were revived on 17th May, 2010. The notable feature is that the petitioner was acquitted on a clear finding of being found not guilty in respect of the charges and on the basis that the prosecution had failed to make out a case through substantive evidence. It was also found that several witnesses did not support the prosecution’s case including the witnesses who were crucial to the matter. Therefore, unlike Shashi Bhusan Prasad, this is not a case where the accused had to be acquitted by reason of witnesses turning hostile. For these reasons, Shashi Bhusan Prasad cannot assist the appellant. 26. The learned First Court took account of Note 1 under Rule 8 of the CMC Services (Classification Control and Appellate) Regulations, 1985 and concluded that under the said Rule, if an accused is discharged in a criminal proceeding, disciplinary proceedings cannot continue save and except where the competent authority was of the opinion that the facts of the case called for departmental action against the employee. In this case, although both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority have taken note of the order of the criminal court, there is a perceived resistance to the impact of such verdict and a marked reluctance to consider the order of acquittal. The order of the Appellate Authority in fact reflects a complete misconstruction of the judgment of the criminal court and the effect of a prosecution failing to prove its case. The Appellate Authority misdirected itself in pushing for a reopening and reiteration of the witnesses confirming the charge totally disregarding that such witnesses were discredited in the criminal proceedings. No new or additional charge and/or evidence has been referred to either by the disciplinary authority or by the Appellate Authority which would warrant the continuation of the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. The fact that both the authorities are part of a domestic forum of enquiry is also in our view a material factor in noting the eagerness of these authorities to proceed in the manner they considered fit. 27. We find that the learned First Court has exhaustively referred not only to the relevant law on the subject namely the effect of an acquittal on disciplinary proceedings but has also considered the issue of similarity of the parallel proceedings. Upon reading the Judgment in the criminal case, we are unable to come to a different conclusion. It is evident from the Judgment and the report set out in the impugned order of the First Court that the prosecution, despite having its ammunition at hand, was unable to establish its case against the accused. Our conclusion (and that of the learned Single Judge) may have been different had there been technical flaws in the prosecution’s case or the prosecution had put up an incomplete case or if the evidence had been ignored by the Special Court. The acquittal, therefore, by the criminal court is nothing if not complete and honourable. We therefore find no infirmity in the order of the learned First Court in concluding that the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority had completely misdirected themselves in imposing the punishment on the respondent two years after the order of acquittal. The reasons given by both the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority betray their determination to proceed against the delinquent (respondent) despite the settled proposition in law being to the contrary. 28. The reasons given by both the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority betray their determination to proceed against the delinquent (respondent) despite the settled proposition in law being to the contrary. 28. For the above reasons, the impugned judgment dated 31st March, 2016 is confirmed and the present appeal is dismissed without there being any order as to costs. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on a priority basis.