Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 88 (GUJ)

Bhimabhai Sejabhai Chavda v. State Of Gujarat

2019-02-01

A.S.SUPEHIA

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. By way of the present writ application, the applicants seeks quashing of the order dated 15.05.2017 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ahmedabad (Rural) below application Exh.1, whereby the Magistrate has directed the police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “the Code”) and further to register M. Case No.1 of 2017 at Sola High Court Police Station, Dist. Ahmedabad, for the offences punishable under Sections 465, 467, 468, 471, 193 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “the IPC”). 2. The facts of the case as mentioned in the memo of the application are as under: 2.1. An F.I.R. was registered at Sola High Court Police Station being C.R.No.120 of 2017 dated 20.01.2017 for the offences punishable under Sections 365, 323, 294(b), 506(1) and 114 of the IPC. The accused persons named therein were arrested and were produced before the concerned Magistrate. Pursuant to the said F.I.R., an application seeking regular bail was preferred by the accused therein before the Magistrate who, vide order dated 23.01.2017, released the accused on regular bail by imposing certain conditions, which were complied with by the accused persons, however, the complainant has questioned the genuineness of the solvency certificates being produced by the accused persons as per the order passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate. An application was filed by respondent no.2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court. The Magistrate, having received the copy of the said application, passed an order below the said application Exh.1 to register such application as inquiry case and to call for the report of the concerned authority. 2.2 Thereafter, the Magistrate has called for the inquiry report in Criminal Inquiry Case No.150 of 2017. The inquiry was initiated and the statements of the relevant witnesses were recorded by the concerned authorities and a report was submitted before the Magistrate. Considering the report, the Chief Judicial Magistrate found that bogus, forged and fabricated documents in the nature of the solvency certificates have been produced to fulfill the condition of the bail. By an order dated 15.05.2017, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, by invoking provisions of Section 156(3) of the Code, ordered the concerned Investigating Officer to register the offence and to carry out the police investigation against the accused persons. By an order dated 15.05.2017, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, by invoking provisions of Section 156(3) of the Code, ordered the concerned Investigating Officer to register the offence and to carry out the police investigation against the accused persons. The Chief Judicial Magistrate also passed an order to complete the investigation and to file a final report within a period of 90 (ninety) days before the concerned court and the accused persons were ordered to be taken into judicial custody by seizing the cash deposit of Rs.50,000/and the application to accept the fresh solvency certificate was rejected. Pursuant to the aforesaid order, a complaint has been registered being M. Case No.1 of 2017 before the Sola High Court Police Station, Ahmedabad, for the offences punishable under Sections 465, 467, 468, 471, 193 and 114 of the IPC. 3. Learned advocate Mr.Khambholja appearing for the applicants has submitted that the Magistrate has misread the provisions of Sections 200 and 156(3) of the Code. He has submitted that taking cognizance of an offence has not been defined in the Code and the same can be taken as per the provision set out in clauses (1), (b) and (c) of Section 190(1) of the Code. He has further submitted that in the present case, the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence and has passed an order to register the complaint and to initiate inquiry by calling a report from the concerned authority. Thus, it can be said that the Magistrate has taken cognizance on the application preferred by the complainant. 3.1 Learned advocate Mr. Khambolja has asserted that after the inquiry report was submitted before the Magistrate, he switched back to precognizance stage and directed the police to register the offence under Section 156(3) of the Code and to file a report within a period of 90 (ninety) days. Thus, he has submitted that as per Chapter XV of the Code, the Magistrate said to have been taken cognizance of the offence within the meaning of Section 190(1)(a) of the Code and he cannot revert back to the provisions of Section 156(3) of the Code and order investigation by the police. Thus, he has submitted that as per Chapter XV of the Code, the Magistrate said to have been taken cognizance of the offence within the meaning of Section 190(1)(a) of the Code and he cannot revert back to the provisions of Section 156(3) of the Code and order investigation by the police. A Magistrate can only order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code before taking cognizance under the provisions of Chapter-XIV of the Code and is not entitled in law to order any investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code, in the cases not falling within the Proviso to Section 202 of the Code. A Magistrate can order an investigation by the police which would be in the nature of an inquiry as contemplated by Section 202 of the Code. He has referred to the provisions of Section 156(3) of the Code occurs in Chapter-XII and Section 202(1) of the Code. It is submitted by him that the powers under the said provisions operate in distinct spheres at different stage. The first is exercisable at the precognizance stage; the second at the post-cognizance stage when the Magistrate is in seisin of the case, that is to say in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the power under Section 156(3) of the Code can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under section 190(1)(a) of the Code. It is further contended that if the Magistrate once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter-XV of the Code, the Magistrate is not competent to switch back to the precognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3) of the Code. 3.2 Learned Advocate Mr.Khabolja has further submitted that an order made under subsection (3) of Section 156 of the Code is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156(1) of the Code. Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under Section 156 of the Code. On the other hand, Section 202 of the Code comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter-XV of the Code, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. On the other hand, Section 202 of the Code comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter-XV of the Code, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. In such a situation, the Magistrate is empowered under Section 202 of the Code to direct, within the limits circumscribed by that Section, an investigation “for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding.” Thus, the object of an investigation under Section 202 of the Code is not to initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceedings already instituted upon a complaint before the Magistrate. In support of his submissions, the learned advocate has placed reliance on the judgment dated 26.07.2011 rendered by this court in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.8546 of 2011 (in the case of Jyotindra Devendra Kamli vs. State of Gujarat & Anr.) as well as the judgment reported in the case of Parshottambhai Karshanbhai Surani & Ors. Vs. Chandrikaben Karshanbhai Surani & Anr. 2008 (4) G.L.R. 3122 . Thus, he has submitted that the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside. 4. A fortiori learned advocate Mr.Aditya Choksi appearing for the respondent no.2 has submitted that the impugned order passed by the Magistrate does not require any interference since the same is passed, keeping in mind the provisions of Sections 200 and 190 of the Code. He has submitted that as such the order passed by the Magistrate dated 06.03.2017, registering the application filed by the respondent no.2 and calling for the report cannot fall under the provision of Section 202 of the Code as the Magistrate had only called for the report from the concerned authority and not from the police and as per the order of the Magistrate, the concerned Mamlatdar was summoned to produce report about the authentication of the solvency certificates produced by the applicant. He has submitted that thereafter, Criminal Inquiry Case No.150 of 2017 was registered after detailed examination of the report, the Magistrate has passed an appropriate order directing the investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. 4.1 Learned advocate Mr. He has submitted that thereafter, Criminal Inquiry Case No.150 of 2017 was registered after detailed examination of the report, the Magistrate has passed an appropriate order directing the investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. 4.1 Learned advocate Mr. Choksi appearing for the respondent no.2 has also invited the attention of this Court to the provisions of Section 200 of the Code and has submitted that as per the aforesaid section, it is mandatory that after the Magistrate takes cognizance, he has to examine the complainant and the witnesses on oath and the same is required to be reduced in writing and is to be signed of the complainant and the witnesses. It is submitted that in the present case no such procedure was followed by the Magistrate and hence, it cannot be said that the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the application filed by respondent no.2. In support of his submissions, learned advocate Mr.Choksi has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dilawar Singh Vs. State of Delhi, 2007 (12) S.C.C. 641 . Thus, he has submitted that it cannot be said that after taking cognizance by the Magistrate, he has reverted to the proceedings under Section 163 of the Code by directing the police for investigation. 5. Learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Amin appearing for the respondent-State has very succinctly invited the attention of this Court to the provisions of Sections 340 and 190 of the Code. He has submitted a perusal of the application filed by the respondent no.2 clearly indicates that he had prayed for taking action against the applicant under the provision of Section 340 read with Section 190 of the Code and thereafter, to pass appropriate order for registering the offence under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC. 6. The learned Public Prosecutor has submitted that in fact the real issue involved in the writ application is whether the Magistrate is said to have taken cognizance by passing the impugned order as per Section 340 of the Code. He has submitted that the provisions of Section 340 of the Code mandates that the Magistrate can only take cognizance of the offence mentioned under Section 190 of the Code, if any complaint is made in writing by the public servant. He has submitted that the provisions of Section 340 of the Code mandates that the Magistrate can only take cognizance of the offence mentioned under Section 190 of the Code, if any complaint is made in writing by the public servant. He has submitted that in the present case unquestionably no such application has been made by the public servant for taking cognizance of the offence under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC and hence, it cannot be said that by the impugned order dated 06.03.2017, the Magistrate has taken cognizance of application filed by the respondent no.2. He has submitted that in Criminal Inquiry Case No.150 of 2017 after considering the report, the Magistrate was justified in passing the order dated 15.05.2017 directing the police to investigate under the provision of Section 156(3) of the Code. It is thus, submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that in fact it cannot be held that the Magistrate has reverted to the provision of Section 156(3) of the Code after taking cognizance of the application filed by the respondent no.2 under Section 200 of the Code. 7. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned advocates for the respective parties. The documents as pointed out by them are also perused. 8. In the present case, it is not in dispute that on the application made by respondent no.2, questioning the genuineness of the solvency certificates produced by the present applicants; the Magistrate passed an order below Exh.1 on 06.03.2017 which reads as under: “Application be register as inquiry and call for the report of concern authority”. 9. Thereafter, the reports of City Mamlatdar were called for verifying the authenticity of the solvency certificates. Pursuant to the inquiry statements of the relevant witnesses were recorded by the concerned authorities and a report was submitted before the Magistrate. After threadbare analysis of the report and the statements of the witnesses the Magistrate the applicants had filed bogus, forged and fabricated documents in the nature of the solvency certificates to fulfill the condition of the bail. Vide order dated 15.05.2017 the Magistrate, by invoking provisions of Section 156(3) of the Code ordered the concerned Investigating Officer to register the offence and to carry out the police investigation against the accused persons. Vide order dated 15.05.2017 the Magistrate, by invoking provisions of Section 156(3) of the Code ordered the concerned Investigating Officer to register the offence and to carry out the police investigation against the accused persons. The Chief Judicial Magistrate also passed an order to complete the investigation and to file final report within a period of 90 (ninety) days before the concerned court and the accused persons were ordered to be taken into judicial custody by seizing the cash deposit of Rs.50,000/and the application to accept the fresh solvency certificate was rejected. Pursuant to the aforesaid order, a complaint has been registered being M. Case No.1 of 2017 before the Sola High Court Police Station, Ahmedabad, for the offences punishable under Sections 465, 467, 468, 471, 193 and 114 of the IPC. 10. Thus, the core issue which needs deliberation is whether the Chief Judicial Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance under section 195 read with section 340 of the Code on the application filed by the respondent no.2 by passing the order dated 06.3.2017. 11. The respondent no.2 had filed an application before the Magistrate to undertake the procedure under section 340 read with section 195 of the Code for the offences punishable under sections 467, 468, 471 of the IPC against the present applicants. 12. 11. The respondent no.2 had filed an application before the Magistrate to undertake the procedure under section 340 read with section 195 of the Code for the offences punishable under sections 467, 468, 471 of the IPC against the present applicants. 12. I may first endevour to deliberate on the provisions of section 340 and section 195 of the Code, which are incorporated as below: “SECTION 340 : Procedure in cases mentioned in section 195 (1) When upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary, (a) record a finding to that effect; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing; (c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance for the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate. (2) The power conferred on a Court by subsection (1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a complaint under subsection (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of subsection (4) of section 195. (3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed, (a) where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint; [(b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court or by such officer of the Court as the Court may authorise in writing in this behalf.] (4) In this section, “Court” has the same meaning as in section 195. SECTION 195 : Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence (1) No Court shall take cognizance (a) (i) of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), or (ii) of any abetment of, attempt to commit, such offence, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate; (b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), namely, sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or (ii) of any offence described in section 463, or punishable under section 471, section 475 or section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in subclause (i) or subclause (ii), [except on the complaint in writing of that Court or by such officer of the Court as that Court may authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate]. (2) Where a complaint has been made by a public servant under clause (a) of subsection (1) any authority to which he is administratively subordinate may order the withdrawal of the complaint and send a copy of such order to the Court; and upon its receipt by the Court, no further proceedings shall be taken on the complaint: Provided that no such withdrawal shall be ordered if the trial in the Court of first instance has been concluded. (3) In clause (b) of subsection (1), the term “Court” means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. (3) In clause (b) of subsection (1), the term “Court” means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. (4) For the purposes of clause (b) of subsection (1), a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court, or in the case of a Civil Court from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies, to the principal Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction within whose local jurisdiction such Civil Court is situate: Provided that (a) where appeals lie to more than one Court, the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate; (b) where appeals lie to a civil and also to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed.” 13. Section 340 of the Code instructs the procedure to be followed in the cases mentioned in section 195 of the Code. Section 195 of the Code creates a bar of taking cognizance of offence prescribed there in except on a complaint given in writing by the public servant or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate. Thus, section 195 of the Code mandates that no Court can take cognizance of the offence mentioned therein except on a written complaint given by a public servant. In the present case, unquestionably there is no complaint presented in writing by a public servant before the Magistrate, hence it cannot be presumed that by passing the order dated 06.03.2017, registering the application made by the respondent no.2 as “inquiry” and calling for a report from the concern authority; the Magistrate has taken the cognizance under section 202 of the Code. Thus, the submissions advanced by the learned advocate for the applicants does not merit acceptance in wake of the fact that the mandatory provision of section 195 of the Code of filing a written complaint by a public servant is conspicuously missing. As a consequence, the writ application deserves to be dismissed. 14. Thus, the submissions advanced by the learned advocate for the applicants does not merit acceptance in wake of the fact that the mandatory provision of section 195 of the Code of filing a written complaint by a public servant is conspicuously missing. As a consequence, the writ application deserves to be dismissed. 14. There is yet another issue raised in the present writ application which necessitates observation. Learned advocates for the respective parties have premised their submissions on the provisions of sections 156, 200 and 202 of the IPC. It is contended by the applicants that the Magistrate has reverted to the provisions of section 156(3) of the Code after taking cognizance under section 202 of the Code on the application made by the respondent no.2 which is impermissible in law. 15. There can be no cavil on the legal proposition that if the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence and has passed an order for police inquiry under section 202 of the Code, it is not open for him to switch back to the precognizance stage and direct the investigation by the police under section 156(3) of the Code. 16. For appreciating the contentions raised by the respective parties, the relevant provisions are incorporated as under: (17) Chapter 12 of the Code sets down the powers of the police to investigate. The same reads as under: “SECTION 156 : Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as abovementioned.” 18. Chapter 15 of the Code prescribes the procedure on the complaints made to the Magistrates. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as abovementioned.” 18. Chapter 15 of the Code prescribes the procedure on the complaints made to the Magistrates. The same reads as under: “SECTION 200 : Examination of complainant A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate: Provided that, when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses (a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a Court has made the complaint; or (b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under section 192: Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case to another Magistrate under section 192 after examining the complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not reexamine them. SECTION 202 : Postponement of issue of process (1) Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under section 192, may, if he thinks fit, [and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction] postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding: Provided that no such direction for investigation shall be made (a) where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions; or (b) where the complaint has not been made by a Court, unless the complainant and the witnesses present (if any) have been examined on oath under section 200. (2) In an inquiry under subsection (1), the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witness on oath: Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. (3) If an investigation under subsection (1) is made by a person not being a police officer, he shall have for that investigation all the powers conferred by this Code on an officer in charge of a police station except the power to arrest without warrant.” 19. The Supreme Court in the case of Dilwar Singh (supra) after threadbare examination of the provisions of sections 156 and 202 of the Code has observed thus: “Sec. 156 falling within Chapter XII, deals with powers of police officers to investigate cognizable offences. Investigation envisaged in Sec. 202 contained in Chapter XV is different from the investigation contemplated u/s. 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 13. Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. contains provisions relating to “information to the police and their powers to investigate”, whereas Chapter XV, which contains Sec. 202, deals with provisions relating to the steps which a Magistrate has to adopt while and after taking cognizance of any offence on a complaint. Provisions of the above two chapters deal with two different facets altogether, though there could be a common factor i.e. complaint filed by a person. Sec. 156, falling within Chapter XII deals with powers of the police officers to investigate cognizable offences. True, Sec. 202, which falls under Chapter XV, also refers to the power of a Magistrate to “direct an investigation by a police officer”. But the investigation envisaged in Sec. 202 is different from the investigation contemplated in Sec. 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code . 14. The various steps to be adopted for investigation u/s. 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code have been elaborated in Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C.. Such investigation would start with making the entry in a book to be kept by the officer in charge of a police station, of the substance of the information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The investigation started thereafter can end up only with the report filed by the police as indicated in Sec. 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The investigation started thereafter can end up only with the report filed by the police as indicated in Sec. 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The investigation contemplated in that chapter can be commenced by the police even without the order of a Magistrate. But that does not mean that when a Magistrate orders an investigation u/s. 156(3) it would be a different kind of investigation. Such investigation must also end up only with the report contemplated in Sec. 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code. But the significant point to be noticed is, when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII he does so before he takes cognizance of the offence . 15. But a Magistrate need not order any such investigation if he proposes to take cognizance of the offence. Once he takes cognizance of the offence he has to follow the procedure envisaged in Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C. A reading of Sec. 202(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code makes the position clear that the investigation referred to therein is of a limited nature. The Magistrate can direct such an investigation to be made either by a police officer or by any other person. Such investigation is only for helping the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further. This can be discerned from the culminating words in Sec. 202(1) i.e. “or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding” 16. This is because he has already taken cognizance of the offence disclosed in the complaint, and the domain of the case would thereafter vest with him. 17. The clear position therefore is that any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation u/s. 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all, registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer in charge of the police station as indicated in Sec. 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation u/s. 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complaint because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. only thereafter.” 20. The Supreme Court in the aforementioned decision has held that the investigation under section 156 of the Code falling within Chapter XII of the Code is different from the investigation contemplated under section 202 of the Code. Once the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence under section 200 of the Code, he has to follow the procedure envisaged in Chapter XV of the Code. Thus, once the Magistrate takes cognizance of offence on the complaint filed before him, it is mandatory for him to follow the procedure prescribed under section 200 of the Code, which prescribes examination of the complainant and the witnesses, upon oath and substance of such examination which shall be reduced in writing and signed by the complainant and the witnesses and also by him. In the present case, on the application made by the respondent no.2, the Magistrate has ordered to register the same and has called for the report from the concerned authority. Neither the applicant-respondent no.2 nor any witness is examined on oath by him. Thus, no procedure as envisaged under section 200 of the Code is followed by the Magistrate. Hence, it can be safely concluded that no cognizance under Chapter-XV of the Code is taken by the Magistrate. 21. Neither the applicant-respondent no.2 nor any witness is examined on oath by him. Thus, no procedure as envisaged under section 200 of the Code is followed by the Magistrate. Hence, it can be safely concluded that no cognizance under Chapter-XV of the Code is taken by the Magistrate. 21. The upshot of the aforementioned analysis and observations is that the Magistrate has not taken any cognizance under section 200 of the Code on the application made by the respondent no.2 and thus, he has not passed any order of inquiry under section 202 of the Code. By passing the impugned order dated 15.05.2017, directing the police to undertake investigation under section 156(3) of the Code, the Magistrate has not committed any illegality and the same is passed in conformity with the provisions of the Code. Thus, the contention advanced by the petitioners that the Magistrate, after taking cognizance under section 202 of the Code, has thereafter reverted to the provisions of section 156(3) of the Code fails legal scrutiny, and is hereby rejected. 22. Resultantly, the writ application, being sans merits, stands dismissed. Interim relief stands vacated. RULE is discharged.