JUDGMENT : MOHAMMAD YAQOOB MIR, J. 1. By medium of these instant two applications, delay of 642 days and 387 days respectively in preferring two separate appeals against the order dated 09-02-2017 passed in WP(C).No. 8 of 2017 and against order dated 21-09-2017 passed in WP(C).No. 262 of 2017 is sought to be condoned. 2. Respondents has filed objection. 3. It is trite that the expression "sufficient cause" for condoning the delay has to be construed liberally so as to advance the cause of justice because seeker of the condonation will never derive any benefit in not having recourse to available remedy within the time prescribed. By condoning the delay, worst that can happen is that the appeals can be decided on the merits. Various principles have been evolved to be adhered to for condoning or not condoning the delay which includes to look into the merit of the case also. 4. It is also settled that if total negligence or indolence beyond the proportions is attributable to the seeker, then law of limitation has to be applied even if it may harshly operate against the interest of the seeker. In this behalf it shall be quite advantageous to quote paras 11 and 12 of the judgment rendered by the Honble Apex Court in the case of Basawaraj and Another versus Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81 wherein it has been held that: "11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal (2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100 and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao (2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201 .) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute." 5. For appreciating the matter in its right perspective, the precise factual background is necessary to be noticed so as to ascertain as to whether total negligence or indolence is attributable to the petitioner and as to otherwise there is any merit in the appeal. 6. The petitioner admittedly was appointed as a Cook temporarily in the District Jail, Shillong on 09-07-2008. Before completion of one year of his service, he was allegedly involved in the jail break which occurred on 31-05-2009, he was allegedly to have facilitated the escape of seven UTPs (Under Trial Prisoners) from the District Jail, Shillong in connection therewith he is separately facing trial before the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Shillong in a case registered as G.R.Case No. 140(S) of 2009 as is specifically made mention of by the respondents in their objection. 7. The petitioner has been terminated from service vide order dated 02-06-2009. He challenged the order of termination by medium of WP(C). No. 415 of 2016, due to formal defects was withdrawn and liberty was given to the petitioner to file afresh. Thereafter, he filed Writ Petition No. 8 of 2017, learned Single Judge noticing that in view of the incident of jail break, the service of the petitioner was dispensed with and after a lapse of eight years petition has been filed, therefore, in view of inordinate delay and inexcusable lapses vide judgment dated 09-02-2017 declined to exercise discretionary jurisdiction. 8. Thereafter, he filed Writ Petition No. 8 of 2017, learned Single Judge noticing that in view of the incident of jail break, the service of the petitioner was dispensed with and after a lapse of eight years petition has been filed, therefore, in view of inordinate delay and inexcusable lapses vide judgment dated 09-02-2017 declined to exercise discretionary jurisdiction. 8. Petitioner instead of challenging the said judgment, what the petitioner did is that while concealing the filing and disposal of Writ Petition No. 8 of 2017, filed another Writ Petition No. 262 of 2017. During the course of hearing of the said petition, learned Single Judge while noticing that the petitioner had concealed the important fact of the earlier filed writ petition has dismissed the petition with cost quantified at Rupees Eleven thousand, vide his judgment dated 21-09- 2017, which amount according to the petitioners counsel has been deposited. 9. Petitioner has now proposed to avail the remedy of appeal against both the orders dated 09-02-2017 passed in Writ Petition No. 8 of 2017 and order dated 21-09-2017 passed in Writ Petition No. 262 of 2017 by medium of two separate appeals but after a delay of 642 days and 387 days respectively. It has been projected in the said applications that the petitioner had financial crisis, in addition, he was arrested in connection with the jail break case on 02-06-2009, therefore, could not avail the remedy of appeal within the time prescribed. 10. The petitioner, before completing his one year of service being on probation as his appointment was temporary, got allegedly involved in the jail break where he was working as a Cook, allegedly had facilitated the escape of seven Under Trial Prisoners, therefore, was arrested and consequently his service was dispensed with. 11. The petitioner did not challenge the order of termination for eight long years, then filed Writ Petition No. 8 of 2017 which was dismissed on 09-02-2017. Concealing the dismissal of that petition, filed another Writ Petition No. 262 of 2017 which for concealment of facts was dismissed with cost, then has slept over the matter and now after a lapse of time as referred above, seeks condonation of delay for filing the appeals. 12. Concealing the dismissal of that petition, filed another Writ Petition No. 262 of 2017 which for concealment of facts was dismissed with cost, then has slept over the matter and now after a lapse of time as referred above, seeks condonation of delay for filing the appeals. 12. The aforestated position clearly indicates as to how the petitioner has been indolent in working out remedies right from the very beginning i.e., right from the date he was terminated from service. Such type of indolence is totally beyond proportions. The negligent attitude of the petitioner leaves no scope for construing the words "sufficient cause" in a manner so as to render/operation of the Limitation Act as itios. 13. Liberal construction of the expression "sufficient cause" is not to be such which may arm the indolent/negligent seeker of condonation to challenge the orders at will and choice. Every case has to be considered, for condonation, in the background of its own facts and circumstances as straitjacket formula for liberally construing the words "sufficient cause" is not permissible. It has to be construed in the background of a particular case. 14. The present case clearly suggests that the petitioner has been absolutely indolent and negligent at every stage, therefore, to condone the delay is impermissible. In the background of the stated facts, circumstances and the law there is no scope for condoning the delay, therefore, both the applications are dismissed. As a necessary corollary thereto, the two separate appeals as filed against the two referred judgments passed in WP(C). No. 8 of 2017 and WP(C). No. 262 of 2017 dated 09-02-2017 and 21-09-2017, memorandum of which is annexed with these two applications shall stand dismissed as barred by limitation. 15. No order as to costs. Copy of the order be placed on each file.