JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India whereby and whereunder the writ in the nature of certiorari has been sought to be issued for :- (i) quashing of the order dated 26.08.2015 passed in Confiscation Case No.16 of 2015 by Authorized Officer-cum-Divisional Forest Officer, West Forest Division by which truck bearing Registration No.JH-02R-9666 loaded with 18 tons of coal (forest produce) has been confiscated under Section 52(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927; (ii) for quashing of the order dated 11.04.2017 passed in Confiscation Appeal No.07 of 2015 by the Court of Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh, by which appeal preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed; (iii) for quashing of the order dated 12.06.2018 passed in Revision Case No.77 of 2017 by the Revisional Authority-cum-Additional Chief Secretary, Forest, Environment & Climate Change Department, Government of Jharkhand, by which the revision petition preferred against the Appellate order has been dismissed. 2. The brief facts of the case of the petitioner as per the pleadings made in the writ petition is that a prosecution has been initiated by the forest officials on 11.05.2015 of an allegation of illegal mining of coal from Jordag Notified Protected Forest Area and by the raiding party when the vehicle bearing registration No.JH-02R-9666 while intercepted the driver of the said truck did not stop rather with a very high speed the driver turned his vehicle towards Barkagaon- Hazaribagh Main Road. Patrolling party chased the said vehicle and wanted to take side but they have not succeeded in intercepting the vehicle, even on the forest check post, vehicle was not stopped rather dashed with a wooden pole and when searched out it was found to be loaded with coal and therefore, a prosecution was initiated for commission of forest offences under Section 33, 41 and 42 of Indian Forest Act, the vehicle was seized along with the coal and were brought to the range office for save custody. Seizure report was prepared and the prosecution report was sent before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribagh. Seizure report was prepared and the prosecution report was sent before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribagh. A copy of the said prosecution report has also been sent before the competent authority to initiate a confiscation proceeding, in pursuance thereto, the confiscation proceeded has been initiated by the Authorized Officer-cum-Divisional Forest Officer, Hazaribagh in which the various documents have been produced along with the documents issued by the Central Coal Fields Ltd. showing the purchase of coal and thereafter the authorized officer has passed the order confiscating the vehicle along with the coal loaded therein against which appeal has been preferred which has been declined to be interfered with that the order passed by the authorized officer, against which the revision has been filed but the revisional authority has also declined to interfere and therefore, the instant writ petition has been filed assailing all the three orders inter alia on the ground that the authorized officer has not appreciated the genuineness of the documents pertaining to the purchase of coal which has been found to be genuine on its examination by the Range Officer of Forest and ignoring the said document merely on account of the fact that the driver has accelerated the speed of the vehicle and not stopped the same and in stead of travelling through the shortest route, travelled through the longest route of 165 k.m. for coming to Ranchi. The order of confiscation has been passed and therefore, the ground has been urged that the allegation levelled against the vehicle is that there is transportation of coal which was illegally being mined and hence, the authorized officer ought to have taken into consideration the genuineness of the documents pertaining to the purchase of coal from the Central Coal Fields Ltd., having not done so rather deviated with the issue of travelling through the different routes and taking into consideration the conduct of the driver, the order of confiscation of the vehicle as also the loaded coal is highly improper and the finding is perverse. This aspect of the matter has been raised before the Appellate as well as Revisional Authority but without appreciating this aspect of the matter, both the authorities have declined to interfere with the original order passed by the authorized officer. 3. Per contra, Mr. This aspect of the matter has been raised before the Appellate as well as Revisional Authority but without appreciating this aspect of the matter, both the authorities have declined to interfere with the original order passed by the authorized officer. 3. Per contra, Mr. Manoj Kumar No.3, learned counsel appearing for the State of Jharkhand has vehemently opposed the submission, ground and the reason of establishing the order as not sustainable by the petitioner on the ground that the authorized officer before taking the decision of confiscation of the vehicle and the coal loaded therein has taken into consideration the conduct of the driver who has accelerated the speed and stopped the vehicle and not only that, he has taken the longest route of 165 k.m. in stead of travelling 75 k.m. for reaching to its destination, these facts shows that some misdeed has been committed by the driver and therefore, the authorized officer while passing the order finding the charge levelled against the aforesaid vehicle to be true by coming to the conclusion that the ingredient of the violation of the necessary provisions of law as under Indian Forest Act, 1927 has been attracted. 4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and upon hearing and looking into the pleadings made by the parties in the writ petition as also the counter affidavit and the reason recorded in the impugned orders, this Court deem it fit and proper first to look into the provision of law under which the allegation of commission of offence has been levelled i.e., Section 33, 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act (Amended Act, 1989). Section 33 of the said Act reads hereunder as:- “33. Section 33 of the said Act reads hereunder as:- “33. Penalties for acts in contravention of notification under Section 30 or of rules under Section 32.—(1) Any person who commits any of the following offences, namely:— (a) fells, girdles, lops, taps or burns any tree reserved under Section 30, or strips off the bark or leaves from, or otherwise damages, any such tree; (b) contrary to any prohibition under Section 30, quarries any stone, or burns any lime or charcoal or collects, subjects to any manufacturing process, or removes any forest-produce; (c) contrary to any prohibition under Section 30, breaks up or clears for cultivation or any other purpose any land in any protected forest; (d) sets fire to such forest, or kindles a fire without taking all reasonable precautions to prevent its spreading to any tree reserved under Section 30, whether standing fallen or foiled, or to say closed portion of such forest; (e) leaves burning any fire kindled by him in the vicinity of any such tree or closed portion; (f) fells any tree or drags any timber so as to damage any tree reserved as aforesaid; (g) permits cattle to damage any such tree; (h) infringes any rule made under Section 32, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. (2) Whenever fire is caused wilfully or by gross negligence in a protected forest, the State Government may, notwithstanding that any penalty has been inflicted under this section, direct that in such forest or any portion thereof the exercise of any right of pasture or to forest-produce shall be suspended for such period as it thinks fit.” Section 41 of the said Act reads hereunder as:- “41. Power to make rules to regulate transit of forest produce.—(1) The control of all rivers and their banks as regards the floating of timber, as well as the control of all timber and other forest-produce in transit by land or water, is vested in the State Government, and it may make rules to regulate the transit of all timber and other forest-produce. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power such rules may— “(a) prescribe the routes by which alone timber or other forest-produce may be imported exported or moved into, from or within the State; (b) prohibit the import or export or moving of such timber or other produce without a pass from an officer duly authorised to issue the same, or otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of such pass; (c) provide for the issue, production and return of such passes and for the payment of fees therefor; (d) provide for the stoppage, reporting, examination and marking of timber or other forest-produce in transit, in respect of which there is reason to believe that any money in payable to the Government on account of the price thereof, or on account of any duty, fee, royalty or charge Government on account of the price thereof, or on account of any duty, fee, royalty or charge due thereon, or, to which it is desirable for the purposes of this Act to affix a mark; (e) provide for the establishment and regulation of depots to which such timber or other produce shall be taken by those in charge of it for examination, or for the payment of such money, or in order that such marks may be affixed to it, and the conditions under which such timber or other produce shall be brought to, stored at and removed from such depots; (f) prohibit the closing up or obstructing of the channel or banks of any river used for the transit of timber or other forest-produce, and the throwing of grass, brushwood, branches or leaves into any such river or any act which may cause such river to be closed or obstructed; (g) provide for the prevention or removal of any obstruction of the channel or banks of any such river, and for recovering the cost of such prevention or removal from the person whose acts or negligence necessitated the same; (h) prohibit absolutely or subject to conditions, within specified local limits, the establishment or sawpits, the converting, cutting, burning, concealing or making of timber the altering or effacing of any marks on the same, or the possession or carrying of marking hammers or other implements used for marking timber; (i) regulate the use of property marks for timber, and the registration of such marks; prescribe the time for which such registration shall hold good; limit the number of such marks that may be registered by any one person, and provide for the levy of fees for such registration.” (3) The State Government may direct that any rule made under this section shall not apply to any specified class of timber or other forest-produce or to any specified local area. Section 42 of the said Act reads hereunder as:- “42. Penalty for breach of rules made under Section 41.—(1) The State Government may by such rules prescribe as penalties for the contravention thereof imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or both. (2) Such rules may provide that penalties which are double of those mentioned in sub-section (1) may be inflicted in cases where the offence is committed after sunset and before sunrise, or after preparation for resistance to lawful authority, or where the offender has been previously convicted of a like offence.” Section 33 attracts the provision of penalties for acts in contravention of notification under Section 30 or rules under Section 32. Section 30 speaks about the power to issue notification reserving trees, etc which reads hereunder as:- “30. Power to issue notification reserving trees, etc.— The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,— (a) declare any trees or class of trees in a protected forest to be reserved from a date fixed by the notification; (b) declare that any portion of such forest specified in the notification shall be closed for such term, not exceeding thirty years, as the State Government thinks fit, and that the rights of private persons, if any, over such portion shall be suspended during such terms, provided that the remainder of such forest be sufficient, and in a locality reasonably convenient, for the due exercise of the right suspended in the portion so closed; or (c) prohibit, from a date fixed as aforesaid, the quarrying of stone, or the burning of lime or charcoal, or the collection or subjection to any manufacturing process, or removal of, any forest produce in any such forest, and the breaking up or clearing for cultivation, for building, for herding cattle or for any other purpose, of any land in any such forest.” Section 32 speaks about the power to make rules for protected forests which reads hereunder as:- “32. Power to make rules for protected forests.— The State Government may make rules to regulate the following matters, namely:— (a) the cutting, sawing, conversion and removal of trees and timber, and the collection, manufacture and removal of forest-produce, from protected forests; (b) the granting of licences to the inhabitants of towns and villages in the vicinity of protected forests to take trees, timber or other forest-produce for their own use, and the production and return of such licences by such persons; (c) the granting of licences to persons felling or removing trees or timber or other forest-produce from such forests for the purposes of trade, and the production and return of such licences by such persons; (d) the payments, if any, to be made by the persons mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) for permission to cut such trees, or to collect and remove such timber or other forest-produce; (e) the other payments, if any, to be made by them in respect of such trees, timber and produce, and the places where such payment shall be made; (f) the examination of forest-produce passing out of such forests; (g) the clearing and breaking up of land for cultivation or other purposes in such forests; (h) the protection form fire of timber lying in such forests and of trees reserved under Section 30; (i) the cutting of grass and pasturing of cattle in such forests; (j) hunting, shooting, fishing, poisoning water and setting traps or snares in such forests and the killing or catching of elephants in such forests in areas in which the Elephants’ Preservation Act, 1879 (6 of 1879), is not in force; (k) the protection and management of any portion of a forest closed under Section 30; and (l) the exercise of rights referred to in Section 29.” The ingredient of Section 33 inflicting penalties for acts in contravention of notification under Section 30 or of rules under Section 32 would come if there is any violation of the rules made thereunder pertaining to the protected forests. Section 41 stipulates the provisions containing power to make rules to regulate transit of forest-produce under which it has been provided that the control of all rivers and their banks as regards the floating of timber, as well as the control of all timber and other forest-produce in transit by land or water, is vested in the State Government, and it may make rules to regulate the transit of all timber and other forest-produce. Sub-Section 2 stipulates the provisions containing power which may:- (a) prescribe the routes by which alone timber or other forest-produce may be imported exported or moved into, from or within the State; (b) prohibit the import or export or moving of such timber or other produce without a pass from an officer duly authorised to issue the same, or otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of such pass; (c) provide for the issue, production and return of such passes and for the payment of fees therefor; (d)provide for the stoppage, reporting, examination and marking of timber or other forest-produce in transit, in respect of which there is reason to believe that any money in payable to the Government on account of the price thereof, or on account of any duty, fee, royalty or charge Government on account of the price thereof, or on account of any duty, fee, royalty or charge due thereon, or, to which it is desirable for the purposes of this Act to affix a mark; (e) provide for the establishment and regulation of depots to which such timber or other produce shall be taken by those in charge of it for examination, or for the payment of such money, or in order that such marks may be affixed to it, and the conditions under which such timber or other produce shall be brought to, stored at and removed from such depots; (f) prohibit the closing up or obstructing of the channel or banks of any river used for the transit of timber or other forest-produce, and the throwing of grass, brushwood, branches or leaves into any such river or any act which may cause such river to be closed or obstructed; (g) provide for the prevention or removal of any obstruction of the channel or banks of any such river, and for recovering the cost of such prevention or removal from the person whose acts or negligence necessitated the same; (h) prohibit absolutely or subject to conditions, within specified local limits, the establishment or sawpits, the converting, cutting, burning, concealing or making of timber the altering or effacing of any marks on the same, or the possession or carrying of marking hammers or other implements used for marking timber; (i) regulate the use of property marks for timber, and the registration of such marks; prescribe the time for which such registration shall hold good; limit the number of such marks that may be registered by any one person, and provide for the levy of fees for such registration.” Section 42 contains the provision of penalty for breach of rules made under Section 41. 5. In the light of this specific provision, the factual aspect involved in this case has been examined by this Court. 6. The factual aspect of this case is that a vehicle bearing registration No.JH-02R-9666 (truck) has been tried to be intercepted by the patrolling party belong to the forest department but the driver instead of stopping the vehicle has accelerated the vehicle and taken the longest route and even on the check post the vehicle has not been stopped rather dashed in a wooden pole and thereafter on search it was found that the truck was loaded with coal to the tune of 18 tons and thereafter a prosecution report was prepared, sent before the concerned Chief Judicial Magistrate as also before the Forest Officer to initiate a confiscation proceeded alleging therein the commission of forest offence under Sections 33, 41 and 42 of Indian Forest Act by initiating a proceeding under Section 52(3) of the Indian Forest Act (Amended Act 1989) . 7. The full fledged proceeding has been initiating, the parties have been noticed, they have appeared and produced the relevant document. 8. The petitioner has produced the papers issued by the CCL related with the seized coal along with the seized vehicle while the prosecution report contains the contention about the commission of the forest offences to the effect that the vehicle in question has been found to be loaded with the coal, the witnesses have been examined. The witnesses who are the party to the raiding party has been examined although they have corroborated the prosecution story. 9. The document pertaining to the coal has been produced before the forest officer and basis upon the oral as well as documentary evidence the following issues were raised:- (1) Whether the seized truck was involved in Forest Offence. (2) Whether the seized coal was taken out from the forest area and it is a forest produce. (3) Whether the paper related with coal issued from C.C.L. authorities is correct/genuine. (4) Whether the seized truck has to go Ranchi or Ramgarh or Hazaribagh. (5) Whether the truck was seized on Badkagaon check post or Diversion site present on Badkagaon Hazaribagh road. (6) Whether the truck loaded with the coal was seized by Forest Officer/staff malafidly. (3) Whether the paper related with coal issued from C.C.L. authorities is correct/genuine. (4) Whether the seized truck has to go Ranchi or Ramgarh or Hazaribagh. (5) Whether the truck was seized on Badkagaon check post or Diversion site present on Badkagaon Hazaribagh road. (6) Whether the truck loaded with the coal was seized by Forest Officer/staff malafidly. The first issue pertains to “Whether the seized truck was involved in Forest Offence” and second pertains to “Whether the seized coal was taken out from the forest area and it is a forest produce” and third pertains to “Whether the paper related with the coal issued from C.C.L. authorities is correct/genuine” and thereafter the other issues have been framed regarding the route of transportation of the seized truck since the seized truck has to go Ranchi or Ramgarh or Hazaribagh but was seized at Badkagaon check post. 10. The relevant consideration for looking to the legality and proprietory or the order would be for adjudicating the ingredient of Section 30, 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act would be that if the seized truck was found to be involved in the forest offence which can only be ascertained from the documents/challans pertaining to the coal loaded over the truck in question. If the document will be found to be not genuine so far as it pertains to the loaded coal over the truck in question, the ingredient of offence under Section 30, 41 and 42 will be attracted and the situation would be vice-versa and therefore, this Court has examined this issue on the basis of the finding recorded by the Forest Officer wherefrom it is evident that the petitioner has produced the original document issued by the CCL Piperwar in support of the genuineness of the coal loaded over the truck in question and when produced, the same has been directed to be verified from the issuing authority of the CCL Piperwar in order to assess the genuineness of the said document and it is evident from the finding recorded by the Authorized Officer that it has specifically been recorded, the same is being referred hereunderas for ready reference and from its perusal it is evident that the paper related with the seized coal, submitted by the owner of the vehicle along with show cause was issued from CCL Piperwar, the inquiry done Range Officer of Forest regarding the said paper has also indicated that it is a genuine paper. “........During inquiry, the B.O. Badkagaon also found the presence of two illegal pits in plot no.1 of Jordag forest. The photographs attached with the prosecution report also shows the presence of illegal pits, presence of debris of coal near the said pits, faint sign of vehicle tyres near the pits. All the PR (WS) supported the prosecution report in which it is clearly mentioned that the seized coal was taken out illegally from Jordag forest area and loaded over the seized truck. At the time of seizure the non-production of any paper related with the coal, also proves, that the seized coal was taken illegally from Jordag forest area. The papers related with seized coal (Submitted by the owner of the vehicle along with the showcause) was issued from CCL Piperwar. At the time of seizure the non-production of any paper related with the coal, also proves, that the seized coal was taken illegally from Jordag forest area. The papers related with seized coal (Submitted by the owner of the vehicle along with the showcause) was issued from CCL Piperwar. There is no doubt the inquiry done by R.O.F. regarding the said paper indicate that it is genuine paper.” Thus, it is evident that the document pertaining to the loaded coal over the truck in question has been found to be genuine on its verification from the issuing authority and as such so far as the ingredient of Section 30 or 41 or 42 is not attracted if the coal loaded over the truck in question is genuine, the changing of the route will amount to attracting the ingredient subject to the condition that if the vehicle is carrying out the coal or the other restricted item as stipulated either under Section 30 or 32 of the Indian Forest Act then the route can be taken into consideration by the Forest Officer, otherwise, if there is any violation of the route and if it is found that any vehicle is transporting the vehicle contrary to the transport permit it is the such subject to be looked into by the transport authority for alleged violation of the provision of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 or Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 but certainly it will not come under the domain of the forest officials in exercise of power conferred under the provision of Indian Forest Act. 11. 11. The Forest Officer, even though, being satisfied with the genuineness of the document travelled beyond his jurisdiction by assuming the power of the transport authority and merely on presumption that why the document has not been presented on the date of interception of the driver or why the longest route has been taken by the said driver but even accepting this fact to be true the same was not to be looked by the forest officer if the coal having been found to be genuinely purchased from the CCL Piperwar, therefore, the finding recorded by the Forest Officer can be said to be based upon perversity and exceeding his jurisdiction by assuming the power of transport authority even though the coal loaded over the truck in question has been found to be genuinely purchased from the CCL Piperwar, he by travelling beyond it has passed the order of confiscation merely on the ground that the vehicle has taken the long route and document has not been produced by the driver, in view thereof, the order passed by the Authorized Officer-cum-Divisional Forest Officer is not standing on its leg on the legal ground as per the reason narrated hereinabove. 12. The Appellate Authority has also not given any finding to that effect and on the basis of the prima facie view and recording the reason recorded by the Forest Officer has rejected the appeal likewise the Revisional Authority after reiterating the finding recorded by the Forest Officer in its order and without applying its quasi judicial mind with respect to the finding recorded by the Forest Officer regarding the genuineness of the Challan pertaining to the purchase of the coal rejected the revision by dismissing it. 13. 13. It is not in dispute that in case of concurrent finding based upon the evidence the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not supposed to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in exercise of power of judicial review by re-appraising the evidences by assuming the power of Appellate Court but simultaneously it is also settled position of law that the power of judicial review is to be exercised by the High Court if the recording of the authorities is based upon the perverse finding or the order has been passed on wrong appreciation of the factual aspect in order to avoid the miscarriage of justice, the power of judicial review needs to be exercised. 14. It is also in dispute that the jurisdiction conferred to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India under which provision the representation has been filed to look into the finding is very limited as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. Radhakrishnan reported in AIR 1964 477 Supreme Court wherein at paragraph no.7 their Lordships have been pleased to held as follows:- “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors. reported in 1955 Supreme Court 233 wherein at Paragraph-21, which is quoted hereinbelow :- “With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Sawarn Singh Vrs. State of Punjab reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In another judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Heinz India (P) Ltd. Vrs. State of U.P. Reported in (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordhsips have been please to hold at paragraph no.66 and 67 as under:- “66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangahara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. 67. In Dharangahara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” In the case of Thansingh Vrs. Supdt. of Taxes reported in AIR 1964 1419 Supreme Court, Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court does not jointly determine question which requires elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. In another judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey reported in (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference with the finding of the tribunal has been please to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para 17 has held as under:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: …...... The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: …...... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasijudicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 15. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 15. In the facts and circumstances of the case as per the reason recorded therein and basing upon the judgments referred above, according to the considered view of this Court the finding recorded by the Authorized Officer-cum-Divisional Forest Officer has not been passed by properly appreciating the documents pertaining to the challans of the coal and its genuineness having been obtained by the authorities of the Forest Officer from the CCL Piperwar, it can be said to be a pervese finding and it is a perverse finding, therefore, the order passed by the Forest Officer needs interference by this Court in exercise of power of judicial review as also the appellate and the revisional authority has not appreciated this aspect of the matter in exercise of power of appeal or the revision rather they have reiterated the finding in their orders as has been recorded by the Authorized Officer which does reflect that they have passed the order mechanically and without applying the quasi judicial mind, in view thereof and for the reason recorded therein, the orders dated 26.08.2015, 11.04.2017 and 12.06.2018 are not sustainable in the eye of law, accordingly quashed. 16. In the result, writ petition stands allowed.