ORDER : Petitioners claiming to be owners of the subject properties that are allegedly in their occupation have knocked at the doors of writ court, regardless of varying texts of their prayers, seeking invalidation of the subject acquisition of the year 1964 inter alia on the ground that, the “physical possession” of the lands in question has not been taken over till date and therefore, their ownership over the land is protected u/S.24(2) of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereafter “2013 Act”). 2. After service of notice, the official Respondents have entered appearance through the learned AGA Smt. Veena Hegde; other Respondents have entered appearance through their respective Panel Counsel. Statement of Objections have also been filed. 3. All the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners vehemently contend that, the Preliminary Notification was issued in the month of January, 1962 followed by the Final Notification in the month of March, 1964; the General Awards were passed in the year 1971 comprising in all 113 acres of land of which the physical possession to the extent of 71 acres has been taken, the remaining 42 acres having been continued in the occupation of these Petitioners; that being so, the acquisition has lapsed u/S.24(2) of the 2013 Act; they also mention about earlier rounds of litigations as well. 4. Learned State Counsel and other Counsel appearing for the Respondents together submit that, admittedly the acquisition is of the year 1962; for the purpose of Karwar Court; since a very large extent of land was acquired (i.e. 113 acres 33 guntas), actual possession of 71 acres & 33 guntas has been taken and that, the symbolic possession of remaining 42 acres has also been taken; compensation has already been paid which fact the Petitioners have suppressed; the alternate sites too have been allotted to the ‘Khatadars’ of the property in acquisition; matter is res judicata inasmuch as in the earlier rounds of litigations, Petitioners have suffered Judgments and Orders both in Writ Petitions and in Writ Appeals; therefore, no relief can be granted to them. 5. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners and the learned counsel representing the Respondents. I have perused the petition papers and the Statement of Objections; I have looked into the Original File containing some records concerning the subject acquisition. 5. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners and the learned counsel representing the Respondents. I have perused the petition papers and the Statement of Objections; I have looked into the Original File containing some records concerning the subject acquisition. I have also adverted to the Rulings cited at the Bar. 6. Admittedly, the acquisition of land was initiated under the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the Preliminary Notification dated 29.01.1962; Final Notification was issued on 04.03.1964; the General Awards came to be passed on 31.03.1971; the compensation has already been paid to the persons whose names figured as ‘Khatadars’ at the time of acquisition; actual possession of land measuring 71 Acres & 33 Guntas was taken; however, in respect of remaining 42 Acres only symbolic possession was taken, so that the ‘Khatadars’ would continue in the occupation till the alternate sites are allotted to them. 7. Earlier 59 persons had filed W.P.No.22344/2005 connected with W.P.No.41376/2003 seeking quashment of the entire acquisition. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide Judgment dated 27.06.2007 at Annexure-R8 to the Statement of Objections in Writ Petition No.109718/2016 dismissed the same observing as under: “9. The material on record shows that these lands were acquired in accordance with law. The compensation paid. Possession taken and it is used for the purpose for which it is acquired. In addition to the compensation paid to the petitioners, they have been provided with a site and land in terms of the rehabilitation scheme. Under those circumstances, case of the petitioners that they continued to be in possession of the land and the land is not used for the purpose for which it is being acquired, has no substance. It is to be noticed that acquisition is of the year 1962 and it is challenged after 40 years. This speaks for itself. There is an inordinate delay in approaching this Court. Hence, viewed from any angle, I do not find any merit in the said writ petitions. Accordingly, they are dismissed.” 8. The above matter was taken in Writ Appeal No.1649/2007 disposed off by the Division Bench vide Judgment dated 26.10.2007, at Annexure-J to the Writ Petition No.109718/2016. This speaks for itself. There is an inordinate delay in approaching this Court. Hence, viewed from any angle, I do not find any merit in the said writ petitions. Accordingly, they are dismissed.” 8. The above matter was taken in Writ Appeal No.1649/2007 disposed off by the Division Bench vide Judgment dated 26.10.2007, at Annexure-J to the Writ Petition No.109718/2016. The relevant parts of the Judgment read as under: “No doubt, as per the objection statement of the State, they have stated that out of 113 acres, possession of 40 acres could not be physically taken as there were several residential houses and only a symbolic possession was taken ……. The learned Single Judge opined mainly based on the fact that, these appellants having kept quite for the last 40 years are questioning the acquisition and without asking for implementation of the rehabilitation scheme, could not have approached this Court at this stage. Even otherwise, in the absence of anyone trying to be dislodged from the place, we do not find any good ground to interfere with the opinion of the learned Single Judge for the simple reason that, if the possession of the Appellants is disturbed, they can always defend their possession based on the precedents declared by the Apex Court and this Court. Accordingly, we do not find any good ground to entertain the appeal. Hence, the appeal is dismissed.” 9. The above observations have to be construed as giving a right to the occupants of the acquired land to seek protection of the same. In other words, even if their occupation is not juridical, they cannot be thrown away except by due process of law as held by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s. Patil Exhibitors (P) Ltd. Vs. Corporation of the City of Bangalore, ILR 1985 Kar. Page 3700, which declared the law that even a tress passer in a settled possession of the property cannot be removed by physical force except by the procedure established by law. Thus, the Petitioners are only in the “permissive occupation” of the land acquired and that, the same cannot be equated to “physical possession” within the meaning of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, which reads as under: “24. Thus, the Petitioners are only in the “permissive occupation” of the land acquired and that, the same cannot be equated to “physical possession” within the meaning of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, which reads as under: “24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases: (1) xxxxx (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act” (Proviso being not relevant to us, is not reproduced) 10. Possession consists of two ingredients which Salmond on jurisprudence (7th ed.) page 297-308 mentions viz., (i) corpus possessionis and (ii) animus possidendi. The former, he says, comprises of both the power to use the thing possessed and the existence of grounds for the expectation that the possessor’s use will not be interfered with; the later consists of an intent to appropriate to oneself the exclusive use of the thing possessed. Learned Author P.J.Fitzgerald who edited ‘Salmond on Jurisprudence’ 12th edition (at page 272) states “(i) The distinction between animus and corpus was made in Roman law: Dig.41.2.3.1., and has been accepted by such jurists as Savigny, Thering, Pollock, Salmond and Holmes”. Apex Court too in the case of Poonaram Vs. Motiram AIR 2019 SC 813 at paragraph 9 has considered this aspect quoting Salmond. The Apex Court at paragraph 13 observes as under: “13. The crux of the matter is that a person who asserts possessory title over a particular property will have to show that he is under settled or established possession of the said property. But merely stray or intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. Settled possession means such possession over the property which has existed for a sufficiently long period of time, and has been acquiesced to by the true owner. But merely stray or intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. Settled possession means such possession over the property which has existed for a sufficiently long period of time, and has been acquiesced to by the true owner. A casual act of possession does not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force. Settled possession must be (i) effect, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. There cannot be a straitjacket formula to determine settled possession. Occupation of a property by a person as an agent or a servant acting in the instance of the owner will not amount to actual legal possession. The possession should contain an element of animus possidendi…… “ 11. There is a certain juridical difference between ‘possession’ and ‘occupation’. Ramnath Aiyer in his “The Law Lexicon” 3rd Edition 2012 writes: “Possession and occupation: Bare occupation and possession are two different things. The concept of possession, at any rate as it is understood in legal terminology, is a complex one which need not include actual occupation. It comprises rather the right to possess, and the right and ability to exclude others from possession and control coupled with a mental element, namely, the animus possidendi, that is to say, knowledge of these rights and the desire and intention of exercising them if need be. The adverse possession of which the law speaks does not necessarily denote actual physical ouster from occupation but an ouster from all those rights which constitute possession in law. It is true that physical occupation is ordinarily the best and the most conclusive proof of possession in this sense but the two are not the same. It is also true that there must always be physical ouster from these rights but that does not necessarily import physical ouster from occupation especially when this is of just a small room or two in a house and when this occupation is shared with others. The nature of the ouster and the quantum necessary naturally varies in each case. AIR 1941 Nag 357.” 12. The nature of the ouster and the quantum necessary naturally varies in each case. AIR 1941 Nag 357.” 12. If we keep the inner voice of Jurist Ramnath Aiyer’s version above and of the Apex Court observations, the occupation of the Petitioners over the acquired land that too after receiving the compensation and further after taking an alternate site under the rehabilitation scheme, cannot be termed as “possession” at all; it is only a “permissive occupation” of more or less a licensee and therefore, Section 24(2) is uninvocable; an argument to the contrary cannot be sustained except by disregarding a long settled legal position that a land owner cannot challenge its acquisition once he acquiesces therein by receiving the compensation and other incidental benefits. This having happened in the present writ petitions, the decision of the Apex Court in Shree Balaji Nagar Residential Association Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2015) 3 SCC 353 does not come to the aid of Petitioners. 13. The reliance of the learned counsel for the Petitioners on the decision of High Court of Panjab and Hariyana in the case of Sunita Sahrawat and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana and Ors. (MANU/PH/1130/2015) does not much come to their aid. The ratio arguably laid down in the said decision interpreting Section 24(2) to the effect that, the acquisition lapses even in cases where, the land owner having accepted the compensation and having acquiesced in acquisition process, but continues in possession of the land is very difficult to subscribe to. The consistent view of this Court and of the Apex Court that, a land owner acquiesces in the acquisition by accepting compensation without protest and therefore, such a person cannot lay a challenge thereto repels such a submission even if it is assumed that such a ratio is laid down in the said decision. Here, the case of the Petitioners is still worse since the ‘Khatadars’ have not only received compensation but have been granted compassionate sites under the rehabilitation scheme. 14. Here, the case of the Petitioners is still worse since the ‘Khatadars’ have not only received compensation but have been granted compassionate sites under the rehabilitation scheme. 14. Invalidating the acquisition nearly after half a century virtually amounts to placing premium on illegality because: (a) the land owners would retain the compensation already paid to them which finding is a res judicata, (b) they would retain with them the alternate sites granted under the rehabilitation scheme in addition to compensation which again is a res judicata, and (c) they would also retain the petition land, as well. This very idea is abhorrent to the notion of Justice and Equity ; it also would strike at law, at reason and at justice. No Court in general and no Writ Court in particular would permit anyone to use the law as an instrument of fraud. In the above circumstances, these writ petitions being devoid of merits fail and accordingly they are dismissed. No costs. 11.04.2019 Order in W.P. NOS.110545-110549/2017 C/W W.P. NOS.102160-102183/2017, W.P. NOS.109872-109882/2016, W.P. NOS.109718/2016 & 109781-783/2016, W.P. NOS.109163-109171/2016, W.P. NOS.103208-103216/2017 & W.P. NOS.100410-100440/2017 After pronouncement of the judgment, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Mr. F.V.Patil and Mr. G.I.Gachhinamath submit that the parties are likely to lay a challenge to this judgment; they had the benefit of the interim order throughout the proceedings’ pendency and therefore, they may be given some breathing time so that the petitioners are not removed from the occupation of the land in question. This prayer is vehemently opposed by the learned Additional Government Advocate, Smt. Veena Hegde. Keeping in view the observations with regard to the status of the petitioners as permissive occupants of the property, it is a fit case to grant temporary protection to them. In the above circumstances, the status quo with regard to occupation of the property shall be maintained for a period of thirty days, to enable the petitioners to pursue the remedies.