JUDGMENT : A.S. Supehia, J. 1. During the pendency of the writ petition, the respondent No. 1 - Dashrathlal Kodarlal Upadhyay has passed away and he is represented by his legal heirs. 2. The present petition has been filed, inter alia, seeking following prayers: "(a) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit the present petition. (b) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ of certiorari or a writ in the nature of mandamus or certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 29th October 2007 passed by the learned Gujarat Primary Education Tribunal, Ahmedabad, in Application No. 205 of 1995 [Annexure "A"]. (c) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ of certiorari or a writ in the nature of mandamus or certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction declaring that the communication/order dated 30.6.1995 passed by respondent No. 2 [Annexure "I"] is null and void and non-est and, thereby this Honourable Court may be pleased to quash and set aside the communication/order dated 30.6.1995 passed by respondent No. 2 [Annexure "I"]. (d) xxx xxx xxx (i) xxx xxx xxx (ii) xxx xxx xxx (e) xxx xxx xxx (f) xxx xxx xxx" 3. The facts of the case are that respondent No. 1 was appointed as Assistant Teacher in the petitioner No. 2-School on 03.09.1984. Petitioner No. 2-School receives the grant-in-aid from the State Government and the salary of the teachers was being paid from such grant. 3.1. It is the case of the petitioners that the respondent No. 1-teacher engaged himself in various misconducts by remaining absent from the school. Subsequently, it was found by the petitioners that the respondent No. 1-teacher received fees from the students, but did not deposit the same with the petitioner No. 2-School. It was further found that the respondent No. 1-teacher also charged cost for sending results to the respective students by post, despite that, the results were never sent to such students. Hence, the petitioners issued a show-cause notice dated 05.07.1994 along with all relevant documents to the respondent No. 1-teacher. In view of the aforesaid irregularities, the respondent No. 1-teacher was suspended with immediate effect i.e. on 05.07.1994. Hence, the petitioners issued a show-cause notice dated 05.07.1994 along with all relevant documents to the respondent No. 1-teacher. In view of the aforesaid irregularities, the respondent No. 1-teacher was suspended with immediate effect i.e. on 05.07.1994. The petitioners also sent the order of suspension for approval to respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer, which was also approved vide communication/order dated 18.08.1994. The aforesaid order of suspension was also confirmed by the Gujarat Primary Education Tribunal, Ahmedabad (‘the Tribunal’) in Application No. 201 of 1994, as the respondent no. 1-Teacher had challenged the same. 3.2. Thereafter, on 29.07.1994, a charge-sheet was issued to the respondent no. 1-teacher for holding a departmental inquiry. The inquiry officer held all the charges proved against the respondent no. 1. 3.3. Thereafter, a second show-cause notice was issued to the respondent No. 1-teacher on 10.04.1995 asking as to why an appropriate action should not be taken against him and, ultimately, the petitioners decided to terminate the service of the respondent No. 1-teacher and, accordingly, they sent a proposal to respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer on 19.05.1995. 3.4. Thereafter, the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer vide order dated 30.06.1995 held that while passing the order of suspension against the respondent No. 1-teacher, since no hearing was given to him, the order his termination cannot be sanctioned and, therefore, no approval was granted. 3.5. Thereafter, since without hearing, such communication was issued, on the very next day i.e. on 01.07.1995, the petitioner No. 1-trust requested the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer to hear the parties and, thereafter, a decision was requested to be made. Even the respondent No. 1-teacher also requested the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer vide communication dated 30.06.1995 to fix the hearing. Thereafter, considering the same, the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer fixed the hearing on the said proposal made by the petitioners on 13.07.1995 and a notice for hearing was issued on 03.07.1995. 3.6. The petitioners participated in the hearing held on 13.07.1995, pursuant to the notice issued by the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer dated 03.07.1995, whereas the respondent No. 1-teacher remained absent on the date of hearing. 3.6. The petitioners participated in the hearing held on 13.07.1995, pursuant to the notice issued by the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer dated 03.07.1995, whereas the respondent No. 1-teacher remained absent on the date of hearing. The respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer considered the record and held that ample opportunity of hearing is given to the respondent No. 1-teacher and, after considering the facts and circumstances of the matter and seriousness of the charges leveled against the respondent No. 1-teacher ultimately, the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer granted approval to the proposal sent by the petitioners. 3.7. Thereafter, the respondent No. 1-teacher preferred Application No. 205 of 1995 against the aforesaid approval of the proposal by the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer before the Tribunal. The Tribunal passed an order, whereby an injunction was granted to the effect that the respondent No. 1-teacher should be permitted to perform his duty and the order of termination passed by the management, which was subsequently approved by the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer, has been stayed. 3.8. The petitioners filed Special Civil Application No. 1285 of 1996 against the aforesaid interim order/injunction of the Tribunal before this Court, wherein on 27.06.1996 this Court issued Rule and granted interim relief. Subsequently, the matter was finally heard and decided on 09.08.2002, whereby the interim relief granted earlier in the said writ petition was made absolute till final disposal of Application No. 205 of 1995 before the Tribunal. 3.9. Pursuant to the order passed by this Court dated 09.08.2002, the Tribunal heard and decided the matter after hearing the parties on 29.10.2007. The Tribunal, without entering into the proceedings of the disciplinary inquiry, considered the only issue whether the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer has the power to put his own order under abeyance and could have taken a fresh decision or not. The Tribunal further held that once the decision is rendered vide communication dated 30.06.1995, the respondent no. 2- District Primary Education Officer becomes functus officio and, therefore, the subsequent order granting approval to the order of termination is held to be inoperative and only on such ground, the impugned order dated 29.10.2007 has been passed by the Tribunal in Application No. 205 of 1995, whereby the respondent No. 1-teacher was reinstated with full back wages and other consequential benefits. By way of the present petition, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 29.10.2007 passed by the Tribunal in Application No. 205 of 1995 and the communication dated 30.06.1995 passed by the respondent No. 2. 4. Learned advocate Mr. Baiju Joshi appearing for the petitioners has submitted that so far as the communication/order dated 30.06.1995 passed by the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer is concerned, the same is nullity in the eyes of law, in view of the fact that when the respondent No. 1-teacher was suspended, the petitioners sent the order of suspension to the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer for approval and the District Primary Education Officer expressly granted the approval to the decision of the management to suspend the respondent No. 1-teacher vide communication/ order dated 18.08.1994. Therefore, the communication/order dated 30.06.1995 passed by the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer is illegal and on such ground the District Primary Education Officer ought not to have refused to grant the approval. 4.1. Learned advocate Mr. Joshi has submitted that the provision of the Section 40(B) of the Gujarat Primary Education Act, 1947, ("the Act") does not provide for any opportunity of hearing to the delinquent before suspending him. He has submitted that even the respondent No. 1-teacher never challenged the order of suspension approved by the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer and, therefore, the communication/ order dated 30.06.1995 is nothing but nullity in the eyes of law and hence, non est on the face of record. He has submitted that the decision of the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer to keep the communication/order dated 30.06.1995 in abeyance and then to issue a notice of hearing to the parties is absolutely just, legal, proper and valid. Even otherwise, the authority has inherent powers to correct its own mistake and accordingly, the same was corrected and, thus, the impugned order dated 29.10.2007 passed by the Tribunal allowing Application No. 205 of 1995 of respondent No. 1-teacher in toto on such ground is also illegal, improper, unjust, unlawful and, therefore, the impugned order dated 29.10.2007 deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4.2. Learned advocate Mr. 4.2. Learned advocate Mr. Joshi has submitted that under the provisions of the Act, the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer is empowered to decide within a period of 45 days from the date of proposal and, therefore, unless and until the period of 45 days comes to an end, the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer does not become functus officio. It is submitted that at this stage that under the provisions of the Gujarat Primary Education Act, once a proposal is sent to the Authority under the Act, it is to be decided within 45 days, or else it is to be treated as "deemed approval" but since the proposal for dismissal of the respondent No. 1-teacher was made on 19.05.1995, period of 45 days came to an end on 4/5.7.1995. Therefore, on 06.07.1995, the petitioner No. 1-trust informed the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer that looking to the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, since period of 45 days has come to an end, the proposal for dismissal of the respondent No. 1-teacher is "deemed approval" by the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer. 5. In response to the aforesaid submissions, learned advocate Ms. Tejal Vashi for respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 1.3 has submitted that the impugned order of the Tribunal does not require any interference since admittedly, the order dated 30.06.1995 passed by the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer refusing to grant approval to the petitioner-trust was illegal and hence, the subsequent order, which was set aside by the Tribunal imposing the penalty of dismissal to the respondent No. 1-teacher, is justified and the same does not require any interference. 5.1. Learned advocate Ms. Vashi has submitted that the impugned order of dismissal is de hors the provisions of Section 40(B) of the Act, more particularly, the provisions of sub-rule (B) thereof are violated. Thus, she has submitted that the present petition may not be entertained. 6. I have heard the learned advocates for the respective parties. The impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal dated 29.10.2007 is also perused. The documents as pointed out by the learned advocates for the respective parties are also examined. 7. The established facts are that: (a) The respondent No. 1-teacher was suspended vide order dated 05.07.1994 in view of the departmental proceedings initiated against him. The impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal dated 29.10.2007 is also perused. The documents as pointed out by the learned advocates for the respective parties are also examined. 7. The established facts are that: (a) The respondent No. 1-teacher was suspended vide order dated 05.07.1994 in view of the departmental proceedings initiated against him. (b) A charge-sheet was already issued to the respondent No. 1-teacher on 29.07.1994. (c) The aforesaid order of suspension was approved by the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer by the communication/order dated 18.08.1994. (d) A three members committee, who were appointed to hold the inquiry, submitted a report dated 01.03.1995 holding the charges proved against the respondent No. 1-teacher. (e) Thereafter, a second show cause notice was issued to the respondent No. 1-teacher on 10.04.1995 calling upon him to show cause as to why penalty of dismissal should not be imposed upon him. Accordingly, the petitioners thereafter, sent a proposal to the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer on 19.05.1995 seeking approval of dismissal of the respondent No. 1-teacher. (f) The District Primary Education Officer vide communication dated 30.06.1995 refused to grant approval to the dismissal of respondent No. 1 for the reason that the initial action of suspending the respondent No. 1-teacher was in violation of the provisions of Sections 40(B)(4) of the Act, since no opportunity of hearing was given to the respondent No. 1-teacher. 8. Thus, the District Primary Education Officer did not approve the proposal sent by the petitioner trust on 19.05.1995 for dismissing the respondent No. 1-teacher from service by falling back on the suspension order, though the departmental inquiry was already concluded and proposal to dismiss the respondent no. 1-teacher was also sent for approval. 9. On the next day vide communication dated 30.06.1995, the respondent No. 1-teacher requested the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer to re-decide the proposal sent by the petitioner No. 1-trust, after giving an opportunity of hearing to both sides. Thus, the respondent No. 1-teacher himself requested the District Primary Education Officer not to take any decision on the proposal sent by the petitioner No. 1-trust and he requested to decide the same after giving an opportunity of hearing to him. 10. By the communication dated 01.07.1995, the petitioner No. 1-trust also requested the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer to hear the parties. 10. By the communication dated 01.07.1995, the petitioner No. 1-trust also requested the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer to hear the parties. Thus, the respondent No. 1-teacher and the petitioners jointly requested the District Primary Education Officer to afford opportunity of hearing to both of them and to re-consider the order dated 30.06.1995, whereby the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer refused to grant approval to the petitioner No. 1-trust. 11. It is pertinent to note that on the aforesaid requests made by the petitioners and the respondent no. 1-teacher, vide order dated 03.07.1995, the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer suspended the order dated 30.06.1995. Thereafter, the petitioner No. 1-trust was heard by the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer and by the order dated 13.07.1995, since the respondent No. 1-teacher remained absent and the proposal sent by the petitioner No. 1-trust for dismissing the respondent No. 1-teacher was approved. 12. The aforesaid facts suggest that on the joint request made by the teacher as well as the petitioner No. 1-trust, in order to remove the lacuna of hearing, the respondent No. 2- District Primary Education Officer himself suspended the order dated 30.06.1995, whereby the approval of the petitioner No. 1-trust was rejected. The respondent no. 1 did not remain present on the day of hearing, though he had requested. After hearing both the petitioners, the District Primary Education Officer thereafter vide order dated 13.07.1995 granted the approval to the proposal of dismissal sent by the petitioner No. 1-trust. Hence, the respondent no. 1-teacher was dismissed from service. 13. The entire exercise of the petitioners and the respondent No. 2 District Primary Education Officer has been set aside by the Tribunal by the order dated 29.10.2007 on the ground that the initial action of suspending the respondent no. 1-teacher was in violation of the provisions of section 40(B)(4) of the Act since no opportunity of hearing was granted. 13. The entire exercise of the petitioners and the respondent No. 2 District Primary Education Officer has been set aside by the Tribunal by the order dated 29.10.2007 on the ground that the initial action of suspending the respondent no. 1-teacher was in violation of the provisions of section 40(B)(4) of the Act since no opportunity of hearing was granted. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 40(B) the Act, which reads as under: "(4) Where a teacher of private primary school is suspended by the manager of the school pending any inquiry proposed to be held against him, the fact of his suspension together with the grounds therefore shall be communicated within a period of seven days, after such suspension by the manager to the administrative officer of the school board in the jurisdiction of which the school is situated, and such suspension shall be subject to ratification by the administrative officer within a period of forty five days from the date of receipt of communication in this behalf by the administrative officer and if such ratification is not communicated to the manager by the administrative officer within such period, the suspension of such teacher shall cease to have effect on the expiry of the said period: Provided that a teacher shall, during the period of suspension, be entitled to such subsistence allowance, and on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed." 14. A perusal of the aforesaid section indicates that no opportunity of hearing is required to be granted to the teacher of private primary school before suspending him. The order of suspension is required to be approved by the District Primary Education Officer. The order dated 30.07.1995 passed by the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer is de hors the provisions of Section 40(B)(4) of the Act since there is no requirement of giving any opportunity of hearing either to the teacher or to the management. The provisions mandate that the suspension of the private primary teacher has to be sent within a period of seven (7) days to the Administrative Officer. The facts which are established are that the suspension order dated 05.07.1994 was approved by the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer on 18.08.1994. The provisions mandate that the suspension of the private primary teacher has to be sent within a period of seven (7) days to the Administrative Officer. The facts which are established are that the suspension order dated 05.07.1994 was approved by the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer on 18.08.1994. Thus, the action of suspending the respondent No. 1-teacher was approved by the District Primary Education Officer within a period of 45 days as required under sub-section (4) of Section 40(B) of the Act. Such suspension is subject to ratification by the Administrative Officer within a period of 45 days from the date of receipt of the communication. The section does not suggest any opportunity of hearing to be afforded either to the private primary teacher or the school management before approving such action. Thus, the order dated 30.06.1995 itself can be said to have been nullity and the same could not have been passed by the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer. In fact, there was no occasion for passing such order as the matter had considerably progressed and the departmental inquiry was already over and the petitioner No. 1-trust had already forwarded the order of dismissal to the respondent No. 2- District Primary Education Officer on 19.05.1995 for approval after holding the departmental proceedings and preparation of the Inquiry Officer's report. 15. Thus, the order dated 30.07.1995 passed by the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer of refusing to grant approval to the dismissal order on such ground that his original suspension was illegal, is erroneous and de hors the provision of sub-section (4) of Section 40(B) of the Act. The respondent no. 1-teacher neither challenged his suspension nor the approval granted by the District Primary Education Officer. Thus, he accepted his suspension and accordingly further departmental inquiry was conducted which culminated into the inquiry officer's report holding the respondent no. 1-teacher guilty of the charges. However, the District Primary Education Officer suo motu resurrected the issue of suspension and held the same to be invalid vide order dated 30.06.1995 when the petitioners requested to approve the dismissal of respondent no. 1 since the charges were proved against him. Such an action of the District Primary Education Officer is impermissible and travels beyond the scope of the issue which was before him. 1 since the charges were proved against him. Such an action of the District Primary Education Officer is impermissible and travels beyond the scope of the issue which was before him. Once the suspension had become final, it was not open for the District Primary Education Officer to refuse the approval for dismissal on the ground that the initial suspension was bad that too at the stage of finalization of disciplinary proceedings. 16. The Tribunal has set aside the order of dismissal as well as the order dated 13.07.1995 on the ground that the same is without jurisdiction. Such an approach of the Tribunal can be said to be erroneous since the order dated 30.06.1995 rejecting the proposal of dismissal was itself suspended by the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer on 03.07.1995. The proposal was sent by the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer on 19.05.1995 and the same was to either approved or disapproved within 45 days. The period of 45 days would come to an end on 4/5.7.1995. Vide communication dated 06.07.1995, the petitioner No. 1-trust had informed that the aforesaid proposal can be said to have been deemed to be approved by the District Primary Education Officer as 45 days have come to an end. Thus, when the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer had suspended the order dated 30.06.1995 vide order dated 03.07.1995, the proposal sent by the petitioner No. 1-trust on 19.05.1995 would have been deemed to be approved on 05.07.1995 on completion of 45 days in view of the provisions of Section 40(B)(2) of the Act, which reads as under: "(2) Where the administrative officer fails to communicate either approval or disapproval within a period of forty five days specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1), the proposed action shall be deemed to have been approved by the administrative officer on the expiry of the said period." 17. Thereafter, at the request of both the petitioner No. 1-trust as well as the respondent No. 1-teacher, the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer passed an order dated 13.07.1995, which was beyond the period of 45 days. Even if the aforesaid order is termed as illegal in view of the provision of the Section 40(B)(2) of the Act, the earlier order dated 30.06.1995, which was suspended vide order dated 03.07.1995 was passed within a period of 45 days. Even if the aforesaid order is termed as illegal in view of the provision of the Section 40(B)(2) of the Act, the earlier order dated 30.06.1995, which was suspended vide order dated 03.07.1995 was passed within a period of 45 days. The moment, the order dated 30.06.1995 was suspended vide order dated 03.07.1995 i.e. within a period of 45 days, the proposal sent by the petitioner No. 1-trust can be said to have been deemed to have been accepted even if there is no communication from the respondent No. 2-District Primary Education Officer either for approval or disapproval in view of the aforenoted provisions of section 40(B)(2) of the Act. This vital aspect has been totally ignored by the Tribunal. 18. On the bedrock of the foregoing observations, it can be safely concluded that the judgment and order of the Gujarat Primary Education Tribunal, Ahmedabad dated 29.10.2007 passed in Application No. 205 of 1995 is erroneous and is replete with impropriety, hence the same calls for interference of this Court by exercising the powers conferred under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The impugned judgment and order dated 29.10.2007 passed by the Tribunal in Application No. 205 of 1995 requires to be quashed and set aside. Accordingly, the same is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute.