JUDGMENT : Ajay Kumar Mittal, J. Through the instant petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner - Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda, former Chief Minister, Haryana prays for a direction to respondent No.1 - State of Haryana to produce the report of the Commission of Inquiry dated 31.8.2016, authored and submitted by respondent No.3 - Mr. Justice S.N.Dhingra (Retd.) before this Court in a sealed cover and not to publish the same in any manner without the specific permission of this Court. Prayer has also been made for quashing the report dated 31.8.2016 in so far as observations/remarks have been made therein in relation to the petitioner in violation of principles of natural justice and Section 8B of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (in short “the Act”) and directing respondent No.1 to refrain from relying upon, referring to or taking any action pursuant to such observations or remarks. Direction has also been sought for quashing the order dated 13.5.2015, Annexure P.1 passed by respondent No.2, notification dated 14.5.2015, Annexure P.2 and amended notification dated 18.8.2015, Annexure P.4 issued by respondent No.1 in exercise of power under Section 3 of the Act appointing and setting the terms of reference for the Justice Dhingra Commission being malafide and contrary to the provisions and scheme of the Act. 2. A few facts relevant for the decision of the controversy involved as narrated in the petition may be noticed. The petitioner is a resident of District Rohtak in the State of Haryana. He has been in public life for more than four decades. He served as Chief Minister of Haryana. He began his public life as member and Chairman of Panchayat Samiti in the year 1980 and came to be elected to the Lok Sabha, as a member of Parliament from the Rohtak Parliament Constituency in 1991. The petitioner was re-elected as Member Parliament from Rohtak Parliament Constituency successfully in the years 1996, 1998 and 2004 as a Congress party candidate. The petitioner came to be elected and appointed as Chief Minister of Haryana with effect from 5.3.2005. The petitioner was again elected as a member of Legislative Assembly and leader of the House leading to his appointment as Chief Minister of the State of Haryana for the second time in the year 2009 and continued to serve as such upto October 2014. The petitioner was again elected as a member of Legislative Assembly and leader of the House leading to his appointment as Chief Minister of the State of Haryana for the second time in the year 2009 and continued to serve as such upto October 2014. During the tenure of the Congress government in the State of Haryana with the petitioner being its Chief Minister for two terms, large tracts of land came to be urbanized across the State by granting licences to the owners/tillers of the land in terms of Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975. The development of commercial and residential areas took place in the Districts of Faridabad, Gurgaon and Sonepat at an unprecedent and rapid pace. In the last assembly elections in the State of Haryana, Bhartiya Janta Party managed to get a majority in the Haryana Legislative Assembly with 47 members in a House of 90. The petitioner resigned from the office of Chief Minister of the State of Haryana in the month of October 2014. Respondent No.2 being a member of the Legislative Assembly came to be elected as a leader of the House and consequently appointed as Chief Minister on 26.10.2014. According to the petitioner, since the formation of BJP government in the State of Haryana, instead of focussing on administration and welfare of the State, respondent No.2 and his Council of Ministers have been engaging in witch hunting and vendetta politics. They have been waging a vicious campaign to damage the public image of the petitioner in particular. The attempt is to eliminate the political threat posed by the petitioner to the ruling party. On 13.5.2015, an order was passed for appointing a Commission of Inquiry in the name of the Government of Haryana. According to the petitioner, it was in reality passed by respondent No.2 at his own instance promoted solely by malice and to pursue his party's political vendetta with a clear intention of portraying the petitioner in bad light and without there being any reference to him from any department or Minister. As per averments in the petition, while passing the impugned order, none of the government functionaries was taken into confidence nor any government record was taken into consideration. Further, no such record was available with respondent No.2 or his office on the date the said order was passed. As per averments in the petition, while passing the impugned order, none of the government functionaries was taken into confidence nor any government record was taken into consideration. Further, no such record was available with respondent No.2 or his office on the date the said order was passed. The order is vague as to the matters into which inquiry was to be conducted and contains no reference to any objective materials or complaints and does not even set out any definite allegations for which a Commission of Inquiry was directed to be formed. No conclusion was arrived at that a definite matter of public importance had arisen for inquiry in terms of Section 3 of the Act which is sine qua non for appointing Commission of Inquiry. After the passing of the order dated 13.5.2015, the Government of Haryana issued notification dated 14.5.2015 in undue haste appointing Mr. Justice S.N.Dhingra (Retd.), former Judge of Delhi High Court as Commission of Inquiry. It has also been pleaded that the notification is equally lacking in particulars and does not disclose any definite matter of public importance for which the Commission was directed to be set up. The petitioner asserts that some matters were curiously inserted in the notification which were not part of the order dated 13.5.2015. As per the order dated 13.5.2015, the only matter to be enquired into was relating to the grant of commercial licence to some entities in Sector 83, Gurgaon. There was no apparent reason or basis for expanding the scope of inquiry in this manner which further shows complete lack of application of mind and indicates the malafide intent. Respondent No.3 on its own motion vide letter dated 10.8.2015 suggested changes to the terms of reference of the Commission. The petitioner claims that the Commission ostensibly sought an amendment to the notification in respect of substitution of the reference to Section 83 with the names of four villages on the ground that the relevant parcels of land fell within other sectors as well and amendment to the reference in the notification to commercial licences as even in residential areas, commercial licences had been granted. The proposed amendment effectively sought to expand the scope of the inquiry. Accordingly, the Government issued amendment to the terms of reference vide notification dated 18.8.2015, Annexure P.4. The proposed amendment effectively sought to expand the scope of the inquiry. Accordingly, the Government issued amendment to the terms of reference vide notification dated 18.8.2015, Annexure P.4. Vide notice dated 11.3.2016, Annexure P.5, the petitioner was asked to appear before the Commission of Inquiry on 21.3.2016. The date of appearance of the petitioner was subsequently rescheduled at his request for 25.3.2016 instead of 21.3.2016. As per the petitioner, the notice did not contain any indication that any inquiry was being made or was sought to be made with respect to his conduct. It did not contain any particulars as to the nature of evidence or assistance sought from the petitioner. The notice did not contain any particulars as to the licences or CLUs or even the period for which the petitioner was required to depose. Accordingly, the petitioner sought information relating to the material particulars in order to effectively assist the Commission and defend himself if necessary by way of a detailed representation to respondent No.3 on 25.3.2016. Vide order dated 25.3.2016, Annexure P.7, respondent No.3 rejected the petitioner's representation. According to the petitioner, in the order dated 25.3.2016, respondent No.3 stated that no specific complaint was to be put to the petitioner and that if some specific complaints were to be put, the same would have been sent to him. Infact, the notice sent by respondent No.3 on 11.3.2016 was not a notice under Section 8B of the Act. If at all, a complaint was made against the petitioner or the conduct of the petitioner was under scrutiny, the Commission was obliged to issue the requisite notice under Section 8B of the Act. However, no such notice was issued to the petitioner. In its order dated 25.3.2016, respondent No.3 sought to explain that the purpose of summoning respondent No.3 was only to understand the modus operandi of the petitioner as the then Minister in charge of the Town and Country Planning Department in granting concurrence or refusal to applications for licences with reference to some sample cases. Thereafter, the petitioner was never called by respondent No.3. The tenure of the Commission of Inquiry was extended by respondent No.1 for a further period of six months i.e. from 8.12.2015 to 7.6.2016 vide notification dated 7.12.2015, Annexure P.8. Thereafter, the petitioner was never called by respondent No.3. The tenure of the Commission of Inquiry was extended by respondent No.1 for a further period of six months i.e. from 8.12.2015 to 7.6.2016 vide notification dated 7.12.2015, Annexure P.8. On 30.6.2016, respondent No.3 did not submit his report and he just at the last moment sought an extension for a further period of six weeks. Before applying for extension, respondent No.3 had claimed that the report was ready in all respects and that he was seeking time from respondent No.2 for submitting the same. The cause for seeking further extension as stated by respondent No.3 to ABP news on 2.7.2016 was that some unnamed persons had given him certain documents and that he needed some time to examine the impact of the documents on the report which was already complete. Accordingly, the Government of Haryana granted a further extension of eight weeks till 31.8.2016. According to the petitioner, now respondent No.3 has submitted his report to the Government on 31.8.2016 which has not been made public so far. The petitioner refers to a statement of respondent No.3 published in Amar Ujala news paper on 2.7.2016 which showed that the tone and tenor of respondent No.3 was apparently threatening and demeaning towards the petitioner. The petitioner submits that respondent No.2 has been making such derogatory statements attacking the personal integrity of the petitioner after the report of inquiry submitted by respondent No.3. It has been further asserted that the respondents are trying to get certain portions of the report which point to the present government's wrongdoings, changed as such portions are likely to embarrass the present government and it is for this reason that the report of the Commission of Inquiry is being kept secret. According to the petitioner, whenever the Commission of Inquiry considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct of any person or it is of the opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially effected by the inquiry, procedural safeguards as postulated in Sections 8B and 8C of the Act have to be meticulously complied with. Neither the order passed by respondent No.2, Annexure P.1 nor the terms of reference even remotely suggest that the conduct of the petitioner as Chief Minister or Minister Incharge was to be inquired into by the Commission of Inquiry. Neither the order passed by respondent No.2, Annexure P.1 nor the terms of reference even remotely suggest that the conduct of the petitioner as Chief Minister or Minister Incharge was to be inquired into by the Commission of Inquiry. Respondent No.3 at no stage of the inquiry ever indicated that the Commission was looking into the petitioner's conduct as Chief Minister. Respondent No.3 in his order dated 25.3.2016 clearly stated that there was no complaint against the petitioner before the Commission of Inquiry. Further, no notice under Section 8B of the Act was ever served on the petitioner. The petitioner relies upon various pronouncements of the Supreme Court to submit that he like any other citizen of the country has a right to protect his reputation. According to the petitioner, a perusal of the order dated 25.3.2016 showed that the Commission was not only examining the files granting licences in four villages namely Sihi, Shikohpur, Sikanderpur Bada and Kherki Daula but was also examining issues in respect of development plan of Gurgaon GMUC 2021 and change of land use, which were outside the terms of reference contained in the impugned notification. The terms of reference in the impugned notification does not indicate as to whether conduct of some of the officers, who had been dealing with the files in respect of grant of licences in the above said four villages and that of the petitioner being minister incharge was to be looked into while carrying out the inquiry by respondent No.3. Hence the instant petition by the petitioner with the prayers as mentioned above. 3. A short reply dated 12.12.2016 has been filed by respondent No.1 through Neerja Sekhar, Secretary to Government Haryana, Personnel Department wherein it has been inter alia stated that the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 is a self contained code. It has submitted its report after conducting its inquisitorial exercise for consideration of the State Government. The said report has neither been made public nor the same has been placed before the Haryana Legislative Assembly and therefore, no cause of action has arisen for the petitioner to file the present petition. It has been further stated that a definite matter of public importance that is to say the issue concerning grant of licences by the department of Town and Country Planning came to the notice of the State Government. It has been further stated that a definite matter of public importance that is to say the issue concerning grant of licences by the department of Town and Country Planning came to the notice of the State Government. The facts narrated in the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, the Memorandum submitted by Indian National Lok Dal to the Governor of the State and other material specifically made out that the issue involves the definite matter of public importance. The said issue which concerns probity in public life was also debated on the floor of the Haryana Legislative Assembly in detail. The Chief Minister, Haryana considering the public importance involved, gave an assurance on the floor of the House to get all facts examined by a Commission of Inquiry which is recorded in the proceedings of the Assembly dated 4.11.2014. The formation of opinion by the Chief Minister was based upon the objective materials that are part of contemporaneous record. Though the petitioner is a member of the State Assembly and was present on the said date, which fact is suppressed in the petition. On the basis of objective facts available on record, after application of mind, in public interest, to ensure probity in public life and to honour the commitment made on the floor of the Assembly, a decision dated 13.5.2015 was taken by the Chief Minister, Haryana who was competent to take the said decision under the Rules of business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India. The said decision was approved by the Council of Ministers though such an approval was not mandatory. It has also been submitted that the notification dated 18.8.2015 was merely clarificatory in nature without changing either the basis, scope or foundation upon which the terms of reference were initially formulated in the notification dated 14.5.2015. The entire subject matter upon which the Commission was to enquire into related to four villages namely Sihi, Shikohpur, Kherkidaula and Sikandarpur Bada and all licences were granted mentioning the said four villages comprising the area which subsequently came to be known as Sector 83, Gurgaon. The Commission submitted its report to the State Government on 31.8.2016 after which the Government of Haryana passed a statutory order directing that the term of Commission of Inquiry shall come to an end w.e.f 31.8.2016. The Commission submitted its report to the State Government on 31.8.2016 after which the Government of Haryana passed a statutory order directing that the term of Commission of Inquiry shall come to an end w.e.f 31.8.2016. All the contentions which the petitioner raised in the present petition were raised by him in the memorandum, submitted on 29.6.2016 to the Governor of Haryana which was forwarded to the State Government. The petitioner has suppressed the said fact. It has been stated that decision taken to appoint a Commission of Inquiry was bonafide and to ensure probity in public life. On these premises, on the ground of delay, latches, suppression of material facts and acquiescence, prayer for dismissal of the petition has been made. 4. Affidavit dated 6.4.2017 was filed by Nitin Kumar Yadav, Secretary to Government of Haryana, Personnel Department on behalf of respondent No.1 wherein it has been stated that the order dated 13.5.2015 passed by the Chief Minister, Haryana was received in the office on 14.5.2015 alongwith the material having flag written as `X' which was placed in file cover and now page numbered as pages 22 to 127. The material contained the following documents:- (i) Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Social, General and Economic Sectors (Non-Public Sector Undertakings) for the year ended 31.3.2014; (Page 22-32) (ii) News report of CAG regarding Vadra; (Page 34-40) (iii) Opposition party Indian National Lok Dal submitted charge sheet to Governor of Haryana on 16.8.2014; (Page 41-45) (iv) Various News report item with regard to irregularities and illegalities committed by the then Ruling Government regarding grant of licence to Mr. Vadra.(Pages 46-50) (v) News item regarding disruption of Parliament. The BJP demanded SIT probe; (Page 51-53) (vi) Damad Shree complete booklet published by BJP regarding Vadra; (Page 54-61) (vii) Various news report items with regard to government inaction hounding Mr. Ashok Khemka to expose this corruption and others.(Page 62-97) (viii) Typed pages of debate in Haryana Legislative Assembly on 4.11.2014. In this proceeding, the issue of grant of illegal licence to Mr. Vadra was raised by leader of opposition and the Government gave assurance to the Assembly that they will get the matter enquired into. Even Bhupender Singh Hooda had agreed to face every probe. In this proceeding, the issue of grant of illegal licence to Mr. Vadra was raised by leader of opposition and the Government gave assurance to the Assembly that they will get the matter enquired into. Even Bhupender Singh Hooda had agreed to face every probe. (Page 98-127) It has been further stated that Annexure `X' mentioned in the memorandum is the photo copy of the material which was placed at flag X, and Annexure Y mentioned in the memorandum is the notification dated 14.5.2015. Both the Annexures were circulated in the meeting of the Council of Ministers alongwith the memorandum for their detailed consideration and approval. The Chief Minister passed the orders after careful perusal of the material contained in pages 22 to 127 which is part of the file. As per practice, the noting portion is kept separate from the correspondence, notifications, orders and other materials. Though no notice has been issued, yet respondent No.2 - the Chief Minister, Haryana has filed the short written reply dated 30.01.2017 by way of his affidavit. It has inter alia been claimed that the decision to constitute Commission of Inquiry was bonafide and honest decision based on objective material which was personally examined, read, perused and understood for the purpose of formation of opinion regarding existence of an important issue involving a definite matter of public importance. The decision on 13.5.2015 was taken by him after careful examination of the objective material in depth and on being satisfied that it would be essential to have an independent Commission of Inquiry whose report can be considered by the State government. The allegations of malafide have been specifically denied in the affidavit. 5. In the reply dated 19.04.2017 to the affidavit dated 6.4.2017, the petitioner inter alia asserts that the affidavit contains no details whatsoever to support the position that the material alleged to have been considered by the Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers was actually before the Chief Minister or considered by him on or before 13.5.2015. Reference to material marked as flag `X' first appears in the file notings as late as 29.5.2015 which is made completely out of context and appears to have been made as an afterthought. Reference to material marked as flag `X' first appears in the file notings as late as 29.5.2015 which is made completely out of context and appears to have been made as an afterthought. Further the affidavit is extremely vague and lacking in particulars as to the manner in which the materials were made part of the Government records and as to the specific departments of the Government of Haryana that were involved in placing the materials in the file. The Statement in the affidavit that on 14.5.2015 material having flag written as `X' was also received alongwith the order dated 13.5.2015 is blatantly false and completely unsubstantiated by records of the Government of Haryana. The file notings pertaining to 13.5.2015 and 14.5.2015 make no reference whatsoever to any material accompanying the order of 13.5.2015. It has been further stated that there is no mention as to which “office” allegedly “received” the order and materials from which Department such order and materials were received and the procedure by which the materials were placed in the said file cover as well as the departments involved in the same. The memorandum that was allegedly circulated to the Council of Ministers was nowhere to be found alongwith the contemporaneous file notings and further that even the separate file cover only had a photo copy of the memorandum and not the original. Further, there was no mention of materials being placed before the Council of Ministers, purportedly marked as Annexure `X' in the numerous file notings which pertained to seeking approval from the Council of Ministers. Thus, the petitioner suspects that the separate file cover referred to in the affidavit is a mere eyewash and has been fabricated to create an impression that the decision to constitute a Commission of Inquiry was based on some material. The statement that page numbering in the file cover was done at a later stage when the office was flooded with RTI requests lacks credibility because the page numbering of the file cover and the copies received by the petitioner through RTI are entirely different. The petitioner suspects that respondent No.1 belatedly collected material in an attempt to justify constitution of the Commission of Inquiry which was then inserted in a separate file cover. It has been further stated by the petitioner that the order of the Chief Minister was passed on 13.5.2015 and not on 14.5.2015. The petitioner suspects that respondent No.1 belatedly collected material in an attempt to justify constitution of the Commission of Inquiry which was then inserted in a separate file cover. It has been further stated by the petitioner that the order of the Chief Minister was passed on 13.5.2015 and not on 14.5.2015. On these premises, prayer has been made by the petitioner that the affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No.1 may be rejected. 6. Lastly, in the pleadings, affidavit of respondent No.1 through Pankaj Agarwal, Secretary to Government of Haryana, personnel Department dated 17.4.2018 has been filed. It has been inter alia stated therein that the Commission of Inquiry under the Act is merely for the purpose of gathering the facts. It is not deciding any lis between any parties or individuals. The very purpose and object of constituting the Commission of Inquiry is to ensure that an independent body examines the record with the Government and gather the facts to be placed in the form of a report with regard to a definite matter of public importance. The sufficiency of material or the subjective satisfaction reached while constituting a Commission of Inquiry under Section 3 of the Act is not and cannot be a subject matter of judicial review considering the very limited scope of the constitution and functioning of the Commission of Inquiry. Further, the State Government had before it cogent material based upon which the opinion can be formed to constitute a Commission of Inquiry. The material and subject matter of constitution of Commission of Inquiry involve a definite matter of public importance. Thus, this court may not go into the adjudication of the facts mentioned either in the petition or in the additional affidavit. The averment that the petitioner sought record pertaining to constitution of Commission of Inquiry through RTI, has been denied. It has been stated that the petitioner never applied under the RTI for supply of the said record. The contention of the petitioner that draft reference of the department of Town and Country Planning was wilfully and deliberately withheld is incorrect. The Chief Minister being the Minister in charge of the said department had not approved the draft reply to the CAG report which was very much in his competency. The contention of the petitioner that draft reference of the department of Town and Country Planning was wilfully and deliberately withheld is incorrect. The Chief Minister being the Minister in charge of the said department had not approved the draft reply to the CAG report which was very much in his competency. It has been further stated that the contention of the petitioner to the extent that there is no original memorandum dated 29.5.2015 which was circulated to the Council of Ministers is incorrect apart from being unnecessary at this belated stage when the report is already prepared and submitted. The original memorandum dated 29.5.2015 is very much on record. Lastly it has been stated that the averment of the petitioner giving response to the allegations of Indian National Lokdal in which it terms charge sheet as irrelevant since it is not the function of the Chief Minister while taking a decision to constitute the Commission of Inquiry to sit on the judgment and adjudicate the contents of the allegations. 7. Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner inter alia made the following submissions:- (i) Under Section 3 of the Act, the State Government is required to form an opinion that it is necessary to appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any “definite matter of public importance”. Such opinion has to necessarily be formed by the Council of Ministers. In this case, the decision to set up a Commission of Inquiry was without any decision of the Council of Ministers, but based on note signed by Chief Minister on 13.5.2015 which cannot be sustained under the provisions of the Act. Reliance was placed on judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R.Tendolkar and others, AIR 1958 SC 538 . (ii) It is incumbent upon the State Government to duly apply its mind to relevant and objective materials in order to form an opinion under Section 3 of the Act. Terms of reference read alongwith the decision of the Chief Minister show complete non application of mind as the essential requirements of Section 3 of the Act are not satisfied. Perusal of the record of the Government does not reveal any relevant, cogent or objective materials or application of mind by the State Government. Terms of reference read alongwith the decision of the Chief Minister show complete non application of mind as the essential requirements of Section 3 of the Act are not satisfied. Perusal of the record of the Government does not reveal any relevant, cogent or objective materials or application of mind by the State Government. Support was drawn from the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Arjun Singh, (1993) 1 SCC 51 and this Court in Bansi Lal MLA v. State of Haryana and others, 2003 (2) RCR (Civil) 99. (iii) A Commission of Inquiry has to be constituted to inquire into a definite matter of public importance and a fishing and roving inquiry is not contemplated. The terms of reference however, suffer from vagueness and inaccuracy and hence appointment of a Commission to inquire into such matters do not meet the conditions of the statute as held by the Supreme Court in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and another, AIR 1967 SC 122 wherein it has been laid down that the word `definite' in Section 3 shows that the matters for inquiry cannot be vague. (iv) Amendment to the terms of reference at the instance of Justice Dhingra Commission is not permissible under the Act and further manifests complete non application of mind on the part of the State government. The Commission of Inquiry after it was set up advised the Government as to what the terms of reference should be, vitiates the entire process. (v) Under Section 8B of the Act, if the Commission is of the opinion that the reputation of a person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry, it is bound to give such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard and present evidence in his defence. In the present case, the petitioner has been commented upon adversely as is clear from the order of the Inquiry without any notice under Section 8B of the Act which is mandatory. Reference was made to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry and another, (1989) 1 SCC 494 and State of Bihar v. Lal Krishna Advani, (2003) 8 SCC 361 discussing the importance of Section 8B of the Act with regard to safeguarding a person's reputation. Reference was made to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry and another, (1989) 1 SCC 494 and State of Bihar v. Lal Krishna Advani, (2003) 8 SCC 361 discussing the importance of Section 8B of the Act with regard to safeguarding a person's reputation. Additionally, judgments in Sri K. Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1996 AP 62 and Sanjay Gupta v. State of UP (2015) 5 SCC 283 were also relied upon. (vi) The action of the Government right from constitution of the Commission of Inquiry to the manner in which proceediSngs were conducted is tainted with malafide. 8. On the other hand, Shri Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India, appearing on behalf of the State of Haryana, inter alia raised the following contentions:- (i) The scope of judicial review in the matters pertaining to the appointment, functioning and ultimate report of a Commission under the Act is very limited in view of law enunciated in Dr. Harekrishna Mehtab v. Chief Minister of Orissa, 1970 SCC Online Ori 35, Vijaylakshmi Shanmugam v. Chief Secretary, 2012(1) CTC 14 (ii) The material, sufficient or otherwise considered by the appropriate Government while exercising powers of appointing Commission of Inquiry under Section 3 of the Act cannot be a subject matter of judicial review as held in P.Janardhana Reddy v. state of AP, 2001(6) SCC 50 , P.R.Nayak v. Union of India, ILR (1973) 1 Del 747, State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Bakshi Gulam Mohammad, AIR 1967 SC 122 . (iii) On the basis of judgments in Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development Authority, (2010) 7 SCC 129 , State of J and K and others v. M/s Trehan Industries Pvt. Limited, AIR 2005 J&K 13 , it was contended that the material considered by the competent authority for appointing a Commission of Inquiry in the present case is sufficient to form an opinion and arrive at a valid conclusion for exercise of powers under Section 3 of the Act on the ground that there existed definite matter of public importance. (iv) For the purpose of appointment of Commission of Inquiry under the Act, the Chief Minister is the competent authority under the Rules of Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India. (iv) For the purpose of appointment of Commission of Inquiry under the Act, the Chief Minister is the competent authority under the Rules of Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India. (v) Assuming for academic discussion, it is only Council of Ministers who can take the decision as contemplated under Section 3 of the Commission of Inquiry, a subsequent approval/ratification by the Council of Ministers is sufficient compliance. When the approval/ratification by Council of Ministers is much prior to the Commission started functioning, the decision to appoint a Commission of Inquiry in the present case has to be treated as a decision taken by the Council of Ministers in view of law in Ram Krishna Dalmia's case (supra). (vi) The petitioner cannot contend violation of Section 8B of the Act as proper notice was given to him. The technical objections raised by the petitioner were dealt with by the Commission vide order dated 25.3.2016 which has not been challenged by the petitioner. (vii) The Commission of Inquiry has answered only those questions/issues which were referred to it. Even in a given case, if a Commission of Inquiry makes recommendations beyond the scope of the terms of reference, the same would not be bad in law as laid down in V.Narayana Rao v. State of AP, AIR 1987 AP 53 , Col.Jagmohan Singh v. State of Manipur, AIR 2006 Gauhati 33. (viii) The plea of legal malafide was stoutly controverted; (ix) The petitioner has all the documents available on the file pertaining to the subject matter as admitted by himself. He has however deliberately and wilfully suppressed many of the crucial facts with a view to raise unsustainable legal grounds to challenge the prayer for the reliefs prayed for. (x) The petitioner is guilty of gross and unexplained delay and latches and the petition is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. Reliance was placed on the judgment in P.D.Dinakaran (1) v. Judges Inquiry Committee, (2011) 8 SCC 380 . 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 10. Broadly, from the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, the following issues emerge for consideration:- (I) Whether the action of the respondent-State Government in setting up Commission of Inquiry against the petitioner is legal and valid as per the provisions of Section 3 of the Act? 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 10. Broadly, from the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, the following issues emerge for consideration:- (I) Whether the action of the respondent-State Government in setting up Commission of Inquiry against the petitioner is legal and valid as per the provisions of Section 3 of the Act? (II) Whether proper notice under Section 8B of the Act was issued to the petitioner? If not, its effect? 11. Taking up first broad issue noticed above, the following facets of the matter require to be answered:- (I) Whether there was relevant, cogent or objective material before the State Government to form an opinion under Section 3 of the Act for constituting a Commission of Inquiry involving “definite matter of public importance”? (II) Whether ex post facto approval granted by the Council of Ministers was valid and constitution of the Commission of Inquiry was not vitiated; (III) Whether amendment to the terms of the reference at the instance of Justice Dhingra Commission is permissible under the Act? (IV) Whether the action of the Government in setting up Commission of Inquiry is malafide? 12. Before examining the facet (I) under first broad issue arising in the present case, it would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant statutory provisions of Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. It reads thus:- Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 “Section 2. (a) “Appropriate Government” means - (i) The Central Government, in relation to a Commission appointed by it to make an inquiry into any matter relatable to any of the entries enumerated in List 1 or List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, and (ii) The State Government, in relation to a Commission appointed by it to make an inquiry into any matter relatable to any of the entries enumerated in List II or List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. (b) “Council” means Council of Ministers constituted under Article 163; (c) “Department” means a department specified in the Business of the Haryana Government (Allocation) Rules, 1974. Section 3 “3. (b) “Council” means Council of Ministers constituted under Article 163; (c) “Department” means a department specified in the Business of the Haryana Government (Allocation) Rules, 1974. Section 3 “3. Appointment of Commission - (1) Save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayukta Act, 2013, the appropriate Government may, if it is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, and shall, if resolution in this behalf is passed by each House of Parliament or, as the case may be, the Legislature of the State, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and performing such functions and within such time as may be specified in the notification, and the Commission so appointed shall make the inquiry and perform the functions accordingly - Provided that where any such Commission has been appointed to inquire into any matter: (a) by the Central Government, no State Government shall, except with the approval of the Central Government, appoint another Commission to inquire into the same mater for so long as the Commission appointed by the Central Government is functioning; (b) by a State Government, the Central Government shall not appoint another Commission to inquire into the same matter for so long as the Commission appointed by the State Government is functioning, unless the Central Government is of opinion that the scope of the inquiry should be extended to two or more States. (2) The Commission may consist of one or more members appointed by the appropriate Government, and where the Commission consists of more than one member, one of them may be appointed as the Chairman thereof. (3) The appropriate Government may, at any stage of an inquiry by the Commission fill any vacancy which may have arisen in the office of a member of the Commission (whether consisting of one or more than one member). (4) The appropriate Government shall cause to be laid before each House of Parliament, or, as the case may be, the Legislature of the State, the report, if any, of the Commission on the inquiry made by the Commission under sub section (1) together with a memorandum of the action taken thereon, within a period of six months of the submission of the report by the Commission to the appropriate Government.” 13. The purpose of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 is to provide for the appointment of Commissions of Inquiry and for vesting such Commissions with certain powers. Section 3 of the Act empowers the appropriate Government in certain circumstances therein mentioned to appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any “definite matter of public importance” and performing such functions within such time as may be specified in the notification. In other words, Section 3 of the Act indicates that the appropriate Government can appoint a Commission of Inquiry only for the purpose of making an enquiry into any definite matter of public importance. The appropriate government by virtue of the said provision is not empowered to appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of holding an enquiry into any other matter. The subject matter of the inquiry can only be a definite matter of public importance. There must exist a definite matter of public importance into which an inquiry is in the opinion of the appropriate government, necessary so to do or is required by a resolution in that behalf passed by the House of the People or the Legislative Assembly of the State. 14. The Commission of Inquiry is a fact finding body meant only to instruct the mind of the Government without producing any document of a judicial nature and that the findings of the Commission of Inquiry are not definite like a judgment. The Commission has no power to enforce its findings and recommendations. The inquiry or report cannot be looked upon as a judicial enquiry. In such matters, the appropriate Government has of necessity to act upon the information available with it. It is the best Judge of the reliability of the source of information and if it acts in good faith on the materials brought to its notice and honestly comes to the conclusion that a definite matter of public importance calls for an enquiry with a view to devise measures for preventing the recurrence of such evil, the Court would then be slow to adjudge the executive action to be bad or illegal. Formation of opinion depends on the subjective satisfaction of an appropriate government but should be based on an objective or real material and not merely on some vague allegations or hearsay evidence or to making fishing enquiry. 15. Formation of opinion depends on the subjective satisfaction of an appropriate government but should be based on an objective or real material and not merely on some vague allegations or hearsay evidence or to making fishing enquiry. 15. Whether the subject matter of Inquiry is relating to definite matter of public importance varies from case to case depending upon factual matrix in individual case. No strait jacket formula could be evolved to adjudge whether there is definite matter of public importance in constituting a Commission of Inquiry. 16. We, now proceed to examine the relevant case law as to what constitutes “definite matter of pubic importance”. Orissa High Court in Dr. Harekrishna Mehtab v. Chief Minister of Orissa, 1970 Orissa 35, dealing with scope of Section 3 of the Act opined as under:- “12. The question may now be examined in the context of the Act. Section 3 of the Act so far as material states that the appropriate Government may, if it is of opinion, that it is necessary so to do, xx xx xx, appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an enquiry into any definite matter of public importance xx xx. It has now been authoritatively pronounced by the Supreme Court that the formation of the opinion of the State Government is subjective and the ultimate conclusion reached is not justiciable unless the same was arrived at mala fide. In AIR 1958 SC 538 (Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar) their Lordships observed that the only power that the Commission has is to enquire and make a report and embody there in its recommendation. The Commission has no power of adjudication in the sense of passing an order which can be enforced proprio vigore. The Commission is merely to investigate, record its findings and recommendations without having any power to enforce them.” 17. In Vijaylakshmi Shanmugam v. Chief Secretary, 2012(1) CTC 14 , a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dealing with ambit of Section 3 of the Act recorded that commission of Inquiry cannot be ordered arbitrarily and without any prima facie materials. Where statutory authority exercises power conferred by statute and supported by materials, then it would not amount to malafide exercise of power. Appropriate government should satisfy itself prima facie by considering relevant materials before ordering for Commission of Inquiry. Where statutory authority exercises power conferred by statute and supported by materials, then it would not amount to malafide exercise of power. Appropriate government should satisfy itself prima facie by considering relevant materials before ordering for Commission of Inquiry. Power of judicial review cannot be extended to find out as to sufficiency of materials placed before appropriate Government for ordering Commission of Inquiry. Power of judicial review cannot be extended to find out as to sufficiency of materials placed before appropriate Government for ordering Commission of Inquiry. It was held thus: “13. As the role of the Commission of Inquiry is only to investigate and record its findings and recommendations without having any power to enforce them, such an inquiry or report cannot be looked upon as a judicial inquiry. Nevertheless, invoking the provisions of Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act for appointing a Commission of Inquiry cannot be arbitrary or for that matter, unsupported by prima facie materials. In the event a statutory authority exercises the power conferred by a statute unsupported by materials, it would amount to a mala fide exercise of power in the eye of law or in other words, exercise of power by a statutory authority other than a purpose for which it was intended by the Legislature. Whether the exercise of power by a statutory authority is arbitrary and unsupported by materials or mala fide depends upon the facts of each case. 14 to 16 xxxxxxxx 17. The report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India for the year ended 31 March 2010 as to the civil work opined that the work of construction of the temporary dome was entrusted to a firm without calling for tenders at a cost of Rs.3.28 crore and the construction of the temporary dome proved wasteful. The report also pointed out that as per the original agreement, the length of piles was to be measured for payment purposes from the top of the pile shoe to the bottom of the pile cap. The report also pointed out that as per the original agreement, the length of piles was to be measured for payment purposes from the top of the pile shoe to the bottom of the pile cap. However, while changing the design of the pile foundation, the nomenclature of the work was changed in the supplementary agreement to effect payment for the length of the pile up to the natural ground level instead of up to the bottom of the pile cap, which resulted in the over payment to the contractor for the portion of the pile length over the bottom of pile cap level to the tune of Rs.2.46 crore. In D.O. Letter dated 31.8.2010, the Deputy Accountant General (Works), Office of the Principal Accountant General (Civil Audit), Tamil Nadu and Puducherry, Chennai had called for remarks in regard to the planning aspect pointing out that there were deviations from standard guidelines for procurement of architectural services and consequent avoidable expenditure, lack of planning, non-inclusion of a penal clause in the RFP/agreement to restrict uneconomical design/defective design, inadequate planning in construction of public plaza circle, avoidable expenditure due to engagement of separate consultant for environmental impact Assessment Studies and failure to include Green Building concept in the scope of consultant. In regard to the funding pattern, release and utilization aspect, it was pointed out that there were inadequate performance guarantee and undue benefit to contractor due to advance payment of material cost. In regard to the execution aspect, it was pointed out that there were delay in completion of work and inadequate planning resulting in wasteful expenditure, avoidable expenditure due to change of design, over payment to the contractor due to change in specification, undue benefit of Firm-A due to nonusage of MS liners, avoidable liability towards procurement of Facade Access System, avoidable expenditure on procurement of Excess Transformer and avoidable expenditure due to non-utilisation of Fly Ash Bricks. By Letter No.31484/Y1/2010-1 dated 30.11.2010, the Principal Secretary to Government, Public Works Department, while addressing the Deputy Accountant General (Works), Office of the Principal Accountant General (Civil Audit), Chennai, had offered his remarks to each of the above and requested to drop the report. 18. By Letter No.31484/Y1/2010-1 dated 30.11.2010, the Principal Secretary to Government, Public Works Department, while addressing the Deputy Accountant General (Works), Office of the Principal Accountant General (Civil Audit), Chennai, had offered his remarks to each of the above and requested to drop the report. 18. His Excellency the Governor of Tamil Nadu made his address on the floor of the assembly on 3.6.2011 indicating the decision of the Government to constitute a Commission of Inquiry headed by a retired Judge of the High Court into the alleged irregularities like excess expenditure, inordinate delay and deficiency in standards of construction. On the basis of the above materials, the files were placed before the Cabinet, which approved for the constitution of the Commission of Inquiry to inquire into the alleged irregularities like excess expenditure, inordinate delay and deficiency in standards of construction and on that basis a decision was taken for appointing one-man Commission of Inquiry on 17.6.2011. Consequent upon the said decision, the impugned Government Order came to be issued. This Court, in exercise of power of judicial review, could only find out as to whether any materials were available before the Government and those materials were taken into consideration before a commission of inquiry is constituted. Power of judicial review cannot be extended to find out as to the sufficiency of materials. These materials, in our opinion, would suffice for the Government to exercise the power under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act for constituting the commission and as such the impugned order of the Government is not bad. Hence, point no.(iii) is answered accordingly.” 18. In P.Janardhana Reddy v. State of A.P., 2001(6) SCC 50 , it was held by the Supreme Court that a statement made on the floor of the House is per se enough evidence manifesting existence of a definite matter of public importance for which the competent authority is fully empowered to constitute a Commission of Inquiry under Section 3 of the Act. The relevant observations read thus:- “The question that arises for consideration is whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the High Court was right in quashing the notification appointing the Commission of Inquiry on the sole ground that the State Government had not formed an opinion as required under Section 3 of the Act before issuing the notification. The relevant observations read thus:- “The question that arises for consideration is whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the High Court was right in quashing the notification appointing the Commission of Inquiry on the sole ground that the State Government had not formed an opinion as required under Section 3 of the Act before issuing the notification. It is the settled position that appointment of a Commission is a matter at the discretion of the appropriate Government; such an appointment is meant primarily for the purpose of information of the Government; the Commission does not adjudicate on any matter; its report has no value per se excepting giving advice and providing guidance to the Government. It is mandated in Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act that the appropriate Government may if it is of the opinion that it is necessary so to do, appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and performing such functions and within such time as may be specified in the notification and the Commission so appointed shall make the inquiry and perform the functions accordingly. The matter stands on a different footing if a resolution in this behalf is passed by each House of Parliament or State Legislature, as the case may be, in which case the appropriate Government shall appoint the Commission for the purpose. On a plain reading of the statutory provision it is clear that there is no prescribed form or particular manner for the appropriate Government to express its opinion that it is necessary to appoint a Commission of Inquiry. Such opinion may be expressed in any manner by which the public would get the information about such appointment. When the Chief Minister of the State expressed on the floor of the State Legislature that he has no objection to appointment of a Commission of Inquiry under the Act to inquire into the serious allegations regarding irregularities in payment of compensation for the acquired land, it is reasonable to presume that he had given necessary thought to the matter and on being satisfied that it is necessary so to do express his agreement for appointment of a Commission of Inquiry under the Act. The statement was made on behalf of the State Government. The statement was made on behalf of the State Government. This was followed by the categorical statement of the Advocate-General representing the State before the High Court that the requisite notification will be issued without delay and indeed such notification was issued. It is relevant to note that it was not the case of the writ petitioners that the subject matter of inquiry was not a definite matter of public importance or that no inquiry into such matter was necessary. Indeed, there is little scope for doubt that the controversy is a matter of public importance and it is but appropriate that the State Government wanted a detailed inquiry in the matter for its information and guidance.” 19. In State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Bakshi Gulam Mohammad, AIR 1967 SC 122 , it was held by the Apex Court that the cleanliness of public life in which the public should be vitally interested must be a definite matter of public importance and, therefore, enough for the purposes of formation of an opinion under Section 3 of the Act. The relevant portion of the said judgment is quoted below:- “It was said that the object of inquiry was to collect material for the prosecution of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and, therefore, the matters to be inquired into were not of public importance. This contention is, in our view, fallacious. It is of public importance that public men failing in their duty should be called upon to face the consequences. It is certainly a matter of importance to the public that lapses on the part of the Ministers should be exposed. The cleanliness of public life in which the public should be vitally interested, must be a matter of public importance. The people are entitled to know whether they have entrusted their affairs to an unworthy man. It is said that the Notification did not mention anything about the steps to be taken to prevent recurrence of the lapses in future. But that it could not do. Before the facts were found steps could not be thought of, for the steps had to suit the facts. The inquiry proposed in this case will, in the course of finding out the lapses alleged, find out the process as to how they occurred and it is only after the process is known that steps can be devised to meet them.” 20. The inquiry proposed in this case will, in the course of finding out the lapses alleged, find out the process as to how they occurred and it is only after the process is known that steps can be devised to meet them.” 20. In Manohar Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1970 Delhi 178, it was held by the Delhi High Court:- “14. The Supreme Court, had on two occasions, pointed out that a Commission of Inquiry appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry act was for fact finding purposes and that the report of the Commission had no force proprio vigore : vide State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Bakshi Gulam Mohammad, AIR 1967 SC 122 and P.V.Jagannath Rao v. State of Orissa, AIR 1969 SC 215 . 16. It is thus clear that the Commission was only asked to make the recommendations, which were made by that Commission. The Commission's report, therefore, could have no force proprio vigore, to use the expression adopted by the Supreme Court in both the above said decisions.” 21. In G.S.Harnal v. Union of India, ILR (1971) 2 Delhi 129, the Delhi High Court expressed as under:- “Admittedly the inquiry by the Commission in the present case was only a fact finding inquiry. It was not a disciplinary inquiry. The general rules is well established that the purpose of the fact finding inquiry is merely to collect material for the information of the Government or the authority concerned......” 22. In Bhagwat Dayal Sharma v. Union of India, ILR (1974) 1 Delhi 847, it was reiterated by the Delhi High Court as under:- “As a matter of construction of sub section (1) of section 3 of the said Act, the appropriate Government is under a statutory obligation to appoint a Commission of Inquiry in a case where a resolution in that behalf is passed by the 'House of the People or, as the case may be, the Legislative Assembly of the State and the appropriate Government has no option or discretion in the matter. In the absence of such a resolution, the power to appoint a Commission is optional and discretionary even it there is any definite matter of public importance. A Commission may be appointed by the appropriate Government if it is of the opinion that it is necessary so to do. This opinion is, by the words of the section, subjective. In the absence of such a resolution, the power to appoint a Commission is optional and discretionary even it there is any definite matter of public importance. A Commission may be appointed by the appropriate Government if it is of the opinion that it is necessary so to do. This opinion is, by the words of the section, subjective. In other words, even if there is any definite matter of public importance, the appropriate Government may not appoint a Commission of Inquiry if it is of opinion that it is not necessary so to do. (8) It has been observed by the Supreme Court in Shri Ram Kishan Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & others: (1959) Supreme Court Reports 279(1) that- “The only power that the Commission has is to inquire and make a report and embody therein its recommendations. The Commission has no power of adjudication in the sense of passing an order which can be enforced proprio vigore..................... Therefore, as the Commission we are concerned with is merely to investigate and record its findings and recommendations without having any power to enforce them, the inquiry or report cannot be looked upon as a judicial inquiry in the sense of its being an exercise of judicial function properly so called. In our view the recommendations of a Commission of Inquiry are of great importance to the Government in order to enable it to make up its mind as to what legislative or administrative measures should be adopted to eradicate the evil found or to implement the beneficial objects it has in view”. It is, therefore, clear that an inquiry under the said Act is not a judicial inquiry and the object of constituting a Commission of Inquiry under the Act is to enable the Government to make up its mind as to what legislative or administrative measures should be adopted to eradicate the evil found or to implement the beneficial objects it has in view. It is marely a fact finding body for the benefit of the Government and that is why even where there may be a definite matter of public importance, a Commission of Inquiry is appointed under the said Act only if it is necessary in the opinion of the appropriate Government to do so.” 23. It is marely a fact finding body for the benefit of the Government and that is why even where there may be a definite matter of public importance, a Commission of Inquiry is appointed under the said Act only if it is necessary in the opinion of the appropriate Government to do so.” 23. We pass on to consider the question, i.e. whether the power was exercised by the State Government for a purpose akin to the statute. The factual matrix in the present case needs to be examined. In terms of the order dated 14.9.2018, the original record had been produced in court. The same was perused. Herein, serious issues of public concern relating to the grant of licences for developing commercial colonies by the Department of Town and Country Planning, Government of Haryana, to some entities in Section 83, Gurgaon and their subsequent transfer/disposal, allegations of private enrichment, ineligibility of the beneficiaries under the rules and/or other matter incidental thereto and connected therewith had been raised and as there was a need to go into these issues and to recommend measures which might be adopted to meet the ends of justice particularly with a view to taking corrective action to prevent loss of revenue to the public exchequer and prevention of private enrichment in such cases in future, the matter was considered by the Government. In the year 2013-14, a report was submitted by Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) highlighting several illegalities and irregularities committed by the Government headed by the petitioner as Chief Minister while granting licenses in Sector 83 of Gurgaon. There were large number of allegations against the petitioner pertaining to grant of change of land use in Sector 83 Gurgaon. On 16.8.2014, a memorandum was submitted to the Governor of Haryana by the Indian National Lok Dal containing allegations of illegalities committed by the petitioner as Chief Minister while granting commercial licenses upon valuable lands in Gurgaon to a particular company. On 16.8.2014, a memorandum was submitted to the Governor of Haryana by the Indian National Lok Dal containing allegations of illegalities committed by the petitioner as Chief Minister while granting commercial licenses upon valuable lands in Gurgaon to a particular company. Further, a debate on the first session on the floor of the House during the Haryana Legislative Assembly was held on 04.11.2014 in which all these illegalities were debated and the State Government through respondent No.2 gave an assurance on the floor of the House while answering questions by the leader of the opposition to take appropriate action on the memorandum submitted by the leader of opposition to the Governor of Haryana. The petitioner was present and participated in the assembly proceedings. He agreed to face the inquiry. 24. As per affidavit dated 6.4.2017 filed by Nitin Kumar Yadav, Secretary to Government of Haryana, Personnel Department on behalf of respondent No.1, the order passed by the Chief Minister, Haryana on 13.5.2015 ordering appointment of Mr. Justice S.N.Dhingra (Retd.), former Judge of Delhi High Court as Commission of Inquiry to inquire into these and related issues under the provisions of Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 was received in their office on 14.5.2015 alongwith the material having flag written as `X' which was placed in file cover and then page numbered as pages 22 to 127 which contains the following documents:- (i) Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Social, General and Economic Sectors (Non-Public Sector Undertakings) for the year ended 31.3.2014; (Page 22-32) (ii) News report of CAG regarding Vadra; (Page 34-40) (iii) Opposition party Indian National Lok Dal submitted charge sheet to Governor of Haryana on 16.8.2014; (Page 41-45) (iv) Various News report item with regard to irregularities and illegalities committed by the then Ruling Government regarding grant of licence to Mr. Vadra.(Pages 46-50) (v) News item regarding disruption of Parliament. The BJP demanded SIT probe; (Page 51-53) (vi) Damad Shree complete booklet published by BJP regarding Vadra; (Page 54-61) (vii) Various news report items with regard to government inaction hounding Mr. Ashok Khemka to expose this corruption and others.(Page 62-97) (viii) Typed pages of debate in Haryana Legislative Assembly on 4.11.2014. In this proceeding, the issue of grant of illegal licence to Mr. Ashok Khemka to expose this corruption and others.(Page 62-97) (viii) Typed pages of debate in Haryana Legislative Assembly on 4.11.2014. In this proceeding, the issue of grant of illegal licence to Mr. Vadra was raised by leader of opposition and the Government gave assurance to the Assembly that they will get the matter enquired into. Even Bhupender Singh Hooda had agreed to face every probe. (Page 98-127) The said material examined by respondent No.2 for the purpose of arriving at the satisfaction regarding existence of contingencies for exercise of power under Section 3 of the Act was sufficient. Thus, it is clear that objective material was available with the State Government for appointment of the Commission. There was application of mind by the State Government for the appointment of Commission and setting out its terms of reference. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the documents in the record were not in chronological manner and not reliable, cannot be accepted. It has been stated in the affidavit dated 6.4.2017 that pages 22 to 127 now kept in a separate file cover were perused before constituting the Commission of Inquiry. The same would not lose its significance when the genuineness of these documents cannot be doubted. Further, it was urged on behalf of the petitioner that objections to the report of CAG were prepared and, therefore, CAG report could not form the basis of inquiry. The objections by itself would not mitigate the effect of that report for the purposes of constituting Commission of Inquiry, moreso when the draft reply to the CAG report was not approved by the Chief Minister and it was only to examine the allotments made during the tenure of the previous government in Sector 83, Gurgaon and thereafter advise and recommend to the Government remedial measures relating to the allotment of land and grant of change of land use. 25. Still further, a Chief Minister, no doubt, holds a public office. His acts are necessarily public acts if they arise out of his office. If they are grave enough, they would be definite matters of public importance. Where there are allegations regarding allotment of land and grant of change of land use during his tenure, there cannot be any issue that it is not a definite matter of public importance. His acts are necessarily public acts if they arise out of his office. If they are grave enough, they would be definite matters of public importance. Where there are allegations regarding allotment of land and grant of change of land use during his tenure, there cannot be any issue that it is not a definite matter of public importance. The cleanlineass of public life in which the public should be vitally interested, must be a definite matter of public importance. The purpose of the enquiry as stated in the preamble to the notification states that the allotment of land and grant of change of land use during the tenure of previous government requires to be probed. 26. Accordingly, the order dated 13.5.2015 was passed by the Chief Minister, Haryana which reads thus:- “Whereas serious issues of public concern relating to the grant of licence/s for developing commercial colonies by the Department of Town & Country Planning, Government of Haryana, to some entities in Sector 83, Gurgaon and their subsequent transfer/disposal, allegations of private enrichment, ineligibility of the beneficiaries under the rules and/or other matters incidental thereto and connected therewith have been raised and because there is a need to go into these issues and to recommend measures which may be adopted to meet the ends of justice, particularly with a view to taking corrective action to prevent loss of revenue to the public exchequer and also prevention of private enrichment in such cases in future, I order the appointment of Mr. Justice SN Dhingra (Retd.) former Judge of the Delhi High Court as Commission of Inquiry to inquire into these and related issues under the provisions of the Commission of Inquiries Act, 1952. The Commission will give its report within a period of six months. The notification to this effect be issued immediately.” Consequently, notification appointing Mr. Justice S.N.Dhingra (Retd.) as Commission of Inquiry was issued on 14.5.2015 for inquiring into the issues concerning the grant of licence for developing commercial colonies by the Department of Town and Country Planning. 27. It is well settled that scope of judicial review in matters pertaining to Commission of Inquiry is very limited. The formation of opinion by the Government to constitute a commission of inquiry is subjective and ultimate conclusion reached by the State is not justiciable. The power of judicial review cannot be extended to find out sufficiency of materials. 27. It is well settled that scope of judicial review in matters pertaining to Commission of Inquiry is very limited. The formation of opinion by the Government to constitute a commission of inquiry is subjective and ultimate conclusion reached by the State is not justiciable. The power of judicial review cannot be extended to find out sufficiency of materials. It had ample material on the basis of which the opinion was formed that the act and conduct of the petitioner constituted a definite matter of public importance which required a full enquiry. Upto this stage, there is no question of legal proof of the allegations against the petitioner as in a Court of law. The only question is : Do those allegations, if honestly believed, constitute a definite matter of public importance? We are unable to say that they do not. 28. Adverting to Facet (II) as noticed above, the relevant provisions are referred which read as under:- Constitution of India “Article 166 :. Conduct of business of the Government of a State - (1) All executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor; (2) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor, and the validity of an order on instruction which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the Governor; (3) The Governor shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business in so far as it is not business with respect to which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion.” 29. In exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (2) and (3) of Article 166 of the Constitution of India, the Governor of Haryana vide order dated 30.8.1974 promulgated Business of the Haryana Government (Allocation) Rules, 1974. In exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (2) and (3) of Article 166 of the Constitution of India, the Governor of Haryana vide order dated 30.8.1974 promulgated Business of the Haryana Government (Allocation) Rules, 1974. Under Rule 2 ibid, it has been provided that the Business of the Government of the State of Haryana shall be transacted in the departments specified in the Schedule annexed to these rules and shall be classified and distributed among those departments as laid down therein. Clause 4 of the Schedule for General Administration Department provides for appointment of Commission of Enquiry. The relevant portion of the said Schedule is quoted below:- “GENERAL ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT (Through the Chief Secretary) (A) Political 1 to 3.xxxxxxxxxxx 4. Commission of Enquiry -Appointment of 5 to 26.xxxxxxxx (B) to (F) Xxxxxxxxxxxxxx” 30. Further, Clause 44 of the Schedule for Administration of Justice Department deals with references relating to Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. It reads thus:- “THE SCHEDULE (Allocation of Business among Departments) (See Rule 2) ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE DEAPRTMENT (Through the Secretary to Government, Haryana, Home Department) 1 to 43 xxxxxxxx 44. References relating to Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952.” 31. According to the State, the portfolio for the General Administration Department and the Department for Administration of Justice was held by the Chief Minister. 32. Further, the Governor of Haryana, in exercise of powers conferred by Clauses (2) and (3) of Article 166 of the Constitution of India made Rules of Business of the Government of Haryana, 1977. The relevant rules are quoted below:- “Rules of Business of the Government of Haryana, 1977 Rule 2. In these rules unless the context otherwise requires:- (b) “Council” means Council of Ministers constituted under Article 163. (c) “Department” means a department specified in the Business of the Haryana Government (Allocation) Rules, 1974. Part I - Disposal of Business Rule 4. The Council shall be collectively responsible for all executive orders issued in the name of the Governor in accordance with these rules whether such orders are authorised by an individual Minister on a matter pertaining to his portfolio or as a result of discussion at a meeting of the council or howsoever otherwise. Rule 5. The Council shall be collectively responsible for all executive orders issued in the name of the Governor in accordance with these rules whether such orders are authorised by an individual Minister on a matter pertaining to his portfolio or as a result of discussion at a meeting of the council or howsoever otherwise. Rule 5. Subject to the orders of the Chief Minister under rule 11, all cases referred to in the Schedule shall be brought before the Council in accordance with provisions of the rules contained in Part II. Provided that no case in regard to which the Finance Department is required to be consulted under Rule 7 shall save in exceptional circumstances and under the directions of the Chief Minister be discussed by the council unless the Finance Minister has had an opportunity for its consideration. Rule 6. Without prejudice to the provisions of Rule 4, the Minister in Charge of a Department shall be primarily responsible for the disposal of the business pertaining to that department. Provided that representations against adverse remarks recorded in the Confidential Roll of a member of All India Services by a Minister shall be considered by the Cabinet Sub committee consisting of the Chief Minister, the Home Minister and the Finance Minister. The sub committee will cooperate the Minister, if he happens to be other than the Chief Minister, Home Minister and the Finance Minister, against whose remarks the representation is made. The said sub committee shall exercise the powers of Government in such cases. 7 to 9 xxxxxxxxx Part II - Procedure of the Council Rule 10 xxxxxxxxxxxxx Rule 11. All cases referred to in the Schedule shall be submitted to the Chief Minister after consideration by the Minister in charge with a view to obtaining his orders for circulation of the case under rule 12 or for bringing it up for consideration at a meeting of the Council. Rule 12(1) the Chief Minister may direct that any case referred to in the Schedule may instead of being brought up for discussion at a meeting of the council be circulated to the Ministers for opinion, and if all the Ministers are unanimous and the Chief Minister thinks that a discussion at a meeting of the council is unnecessary, the case shall be decided without such discussion. If the Ministers are not unanimous or if the chief Minister thinks that a discussion at a meeting is necessary, the case shall be discussed at a meeting of the council. (2) If it is decided to circulate any case to the Ministers, copies of all papers relating to such case which are circulated among the Ministers shall simultaneously be sent to the Governor. Where such a case is circulated in original to the Ministers it should be circulated to the Governor also after all the Ministers have seen. Xxxxxxx Part III - Departmental Disposal of Business Rule 29. Where in any case the Governor considers that any further action should be taken otherwise than in accordance with the orders passed by Minister-in-charge, the Governor may require the case to be laid before the council for consideration whereupon the case shall be so laid: Provided that the notes, minutes or comments of the Governor in any such case shall not be brought on the Secretariat record unless the Governor so directs. SCHEDULE (See Rules 5 and 11) Xxxxxxx Xxxxxx 18. Reports of the Committees of Inquiry appointed in pursuance of a Resolution passed by the State Legislature. Xxxxxxxx 20. Cases required by the Governor or the Chief Minister to be brought before Council.” 33. Part I of the Business Rules provides for disposal of business. The term `department' under Rule 2(c) of the Business Rules is defined to mean and include the department specified in the Allocation Rules. Rule 4 provides that Council shall be collectively responsible for all executive orders issued in the name of the Governor and whether such orders are authorised by individual minister on a matter pertaining to his portfolio or as a result of discussion at a meeting of Council. According to Rule 5, all the cases referred to in the Schedule shall be brought before the Council and shall be dealt with by the Council. Under Rule 6, the Minister-in-charge of the Department shall be primarily responsible for the disposal of the business pertaining to that department. Rule 11 stipulates that all cases referred to in the Schedule are required to be submitted to the Chief Minister after consideration by the Minister-in-charge with a view to obtaining his orders for circulation of the case under Rule 12 or is to be considered by the Council. Rule 11 stipulates that all cases referred to in the Schedule are required to be submitted to the Chief Minister after consideration by the Minister-in-charge with a view to obtaining his orders for circulation of the case under Rule 12 or is to be considered by the Council. Rule 12 postulates that the Chief Minister wherever thinks that any case instead of being brought up for discussion at a meeting of the Council be circulated to the Ministers for opinion and where all the Ministers are unanimous and the Chief Minister considers discussion at a meeting of the Council to be unnecessary, it may be decided without such discussion. Where the Ministers are not unanimous or if the Chief Minister thinks discussion at a meeting to be necessary, it shall be discussed at a meeting of the Council. Under Rule 29, whenever the Governor considers necessary that any action is required to be taken otherwise with the orders passed by Minister-in-charge, the Governor may require it to be considered by the Council. The Entry 18 of the Schedule requires Reports of the Committees of Inquiry appointed in pursuance of a Resolution to be brought before the Council in pursuance of Rule 11 ibid, whereas under Entry 20, the cases required by the Governor or the Chief Minister to be brought before Council. 34. Thus, from a perusal of Rule 5 of the Business Rules, it is clear that only the cases referred to or prescribed in the Schedule to the Business Rules have to be referred to the Council which are required to be disposed of in accordance with the manner provided in Part II of the Business Rules. 35. As per Clause 18 of the Schedule framed under Rule 5, only reports of the Committee of Inquiry appointed in pursuance of the resolution passed by the State Legislature are required to be placed before the Council for the purpose of its disposal in accordance with the provisions contained in Part II. There is no provision in the said Business Rules prohibiting the Minister-in-charge from referring a matter to the Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of an independent probe and fact finding exercise. 36. There is no provision in the said Business Rules prohibiting the Minister-in-charge from referring a matter to the Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of an independent probe and fact finding exercise. 36. In the instant case, both the departments of General Administration and Administration of Justice were held by the Chief Minister and therefore, under the Business Rules read with the Schedules to the Allocation Rules, only the Chief Minister was empowered and competent to refer a matter and appoint Commission of Inquiry. 37. The Chief Minister who was the Minister-in-Charge of the General Administration Department and Administration of Justice Department had appointed Mr. Justice S.N.Dhingra (Retd.), Judge, Delhi High Court as Commission of Inquiry vide order dated 13.5.2015 for probing the allotment of land and grant of change of land use in Sector 83, Gurgaon during the tenure of the previous government and in pursuance thereto, notification was issued on 14.5.2015. As the said matter does not relate to report of a Committee of Inquiry/Commission of Inquiry appointed in pursuance of a resolution passed by the State Legislature, there was no requirement for the Chief Minister to present the said matter before the Council of Ministers for the purpose of making a reference and appointing a Commission of Enquiry. Thus, no challenge can be made on the exercise of said power on the ground that prior to referring of matter to Commission of Inquiry, permission of Council of Ministers was not taken since the said procedure is not contemplated under Business Rules more particularly under Rule 5, Schedule and Part II of the Business Rules. However, the Chief Minister considered it appropriate and placed the matter before the Council of Ministers in its meeting held on 1.6.2015, which was approved. Thereafter, the Government passed order dated 3.6.2015 fixing the terms and conditions of the Commission of Inquiry. In such a situation, the appointment of Commission of Inquiry cannot be challenged to be vitiated on account of seeking ex post facto approval of the Council of Ministers. 38. Thereafter, the Government passed order dated 3.6.2015 fixing the terms and conditions of the Commission of Inquiry. In such a situation, the appointment of Commission of Inquiry cannot be challenged to be vitiated on account of seeking ex post facto approval of the Council of Ministers. 38. The issue before the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in State of J&K and others v. M/s Trehan Industries Pvt. Limited, AIR 2005 J&K 13 was where the business rules do not mandate any approval from the Cabinet, then no challenge can be made on the ground that the decision of the Chief Minister was bad in law for want of approval by the Cabinet. The High Court observed as under:- “11. Learned Advocate general submitted that the State government never took the decision to hand over the power house to the respondents. Under the Business Rules framed under Section 43 read with Section 45(2) of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir (corresponding to Article 166 of the Constitution of India), the matter should have been laid before the Cabinet. Even the order of the Chief Minister was in anticipation of Cabinet's approval..... 15. The moot question is, it was submitted, whether cabinet approval was required at all in law. There being no such requirement, according to the counsel, it was just an act of discretion on the part of the Chief Minister to seek approval of the cabinet. Referring to the Government order dated 30.1.2002, it was submitted that there was nothing in the order which required approval of the cabinet. Reference was made to relevant provision of the Business Rules. 21. In our opinion, in the instant case, it is not necessary to go into larger questions as we are satisfied that the matter in hand did not require approval of the cabinet in terms of the business rules. The Business Rules, as indicated above, have been formed for more convenient transaction of the business of the government under Section 43 and Section 45(2) of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. Section 43 provides that Governor shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business. Section 43 provides that Governor shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business. Section 45(2) provides that orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor or of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir shall be authenticated in such a manner as may be specified in the rules to be made by the Governor and the validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the Governor or as the case may be, by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir.” 39. The Supreme Court in Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development Authority, (2010) 7 SCC 129 , recorded that decision to constitute Commission of Inquiry was legally valid under the business rules of the respondent where ex post facto sanction was accorded by the Cabinet in the following terms:- “But the appellants would contend having regard to the provisions of the Karnataka Government Transaction of Business Rules, 1977, the sanction for the scheme under Section 18(3) could validity be given only by a decision of the Cabinet; and that in these cases, the decision of the Government was based on the order of the Chief Minister and not the Cabinet, and therefore, sanction was not a valid sanction in law. ...... The contention that the sanction is void, is untenable. As noticed above, Rule 12 requires that the matter should ordinarily be considered at a meeting of the Cabinet. This itself shows that there can be exceptional circumstances where it will not be possible to place it before the Cabinet. The approval granted by the Chief Minister, subject to the ratification of the Cabinet was treated by the Urban Development Department as approval for the sanction under Section 18(3) and a Government order was made on 21.2.2004 in the name of the Governor granting sanction under section 18(3) of the BDA Act. The State Government also issued a final declaration under Section 19(1) of BDA Act. It is thus evident that the State Government proceeded on the basis that the order of approval of the Chief Minister for the sanction, was sufficient for grant of sanction. The State Government also issued a final declaration under Section 19(1) of BDA Act. It is thus evident that the State Government proceeded on the basis that the order of approval of the Chief Minister for the sanction, was sufficient for grant of sanction. Even if it is to be assumed that such approval was irregular as it was made subject to ratification, as the ratification was subsequently made, the challenge for want of proper approval of the Cabinet for the sanction cannot be accepted.” 40. Taking up IIIrd Facet of the first broad issue, the Chief Minister who was the Minister-in-Charge of the General Administration Department and Administration of Justice Department had appointed Mr. Justice S.N.Dhingra (Retd.), Judge, Delhi High Court as Commission of Inquiry vide order dated 13.5.2015 for probing the allotment of land and grant of change of land use in Sector 83, Gurgaon during the tenure of the previous government and in pursuance thereto, notification was issued on 14.5.2015. The said matter was placed before the Council of Ministers in its meeting held on 1.6.2015, which was approved. Thereafter, the Government passed order dated 3.6.2015 fixing the terms and conditions of the Commission of Inquiry. On 8.6.2015, the charge was assumed by the Commission of Inquiry. The Commission after examining the record noticed that the notification dated 14.5.2015 regarding constitution of the Commission issued by the Government referred to Sector 83, Gurgaon and to Commercial license. Since licenses were not applied for Sector 83, Gurgaon and were applied giving the names of villages, Khasra numbers and sizras, it was felt that the notification should contain the names of the villages for which licenses were applied and issued. The entire subject matter upon which the Commission was to enquire into related to four villages namely Sihi, Shikohpur, Kherki Daula and Sikandarpur Bada and all licenses were granted mentioning the said four villages comprising the area which came to be subsequently known as Sector 83, Gurgaon. Thus, it was considered appropriate that the notification issued by the Government of Haryana required to be modified/amended so as to include the names of four Villages i.e. Sihi, Shikohpur, Kherki Daula and Sikandarpur Bada as in these areas, the licenses which were issued included development of commercial area which were falling in residential area. 41. Thus, it was considered appropriate that the notification issued by the Government of Haryana required to be modified/amended so as to include the names of four Villages i.e. Sihi, Shikohpur, Kherki Daula and Sikandarpur Bada as in these areas, the licenses which were issued included development of commercial area which were falling in residential area. 41. Accordingly, on 10.8.2015, (Annexure P.3), the Secretary to the Commission of Inquiry addressed a communication to the Government seeking clarification in the notification dated 14.5.2015, the contents of which are as under:- “Justice (Retd.) S.N.Dhingra Commission of Enquiry 321/18, Civil Lines, Gurgaon Haryana -122001 0124-2222400 Email: sec83gurgaoncoe@gmail.com Dated: 10.8.2015 No.96 To The Chief Secretary, (Political Branch) Government of Haryana, Chandigarh. Subject: Modification in the Notification dated 14th May, 2015. I have been directed by the Hon'ble Justice of the Commission to request you as under:- “While going through the files of licenses granted in respect of Sector 83, it is noted that no license was applied mentioning Sector 83 as the area in which land fell. Every licensee applied for license mentioning the names of four villages namely Sihi, Shikohapur, Kherki Daula and Sikandarpur Bada. It is also seen that whosoever applied for plotted colony was also allowed to develop 4% of the area as commercial. DTCP had permitted the plotted area colony license and commercial license within the same area. Similarly in case of group housing colony, 0.5% of area was permitted for commercial use and in case of every application, separate license fee was charged for commercial use area and group housing area. In the commercial belt, no residential use was permitted but in residential belt, commercial use was permitted and commercial licenses were granted. The applications for commercial licenses in residential belt were not made separately but the applications were made for development of the colony which included development of commercial area. The notification dated 14th May, 2015, regarding constitution of the Commission issued by the government refers to Sector 83 and refers to commercial license. Since licenses were not applied for Sector 83 and were applied giving the names of villages, Khasra numbers and sizras, it is felt that the notification should contain the names of the villages for which licenses were applied and issued. In case of most of the licenses applied, the land fell partly in one sector and partly in other. No license was issued sector wise. In case of most of the licenses applied, the land fell partly in one sector and partly in other. No license was issued sector wise. Licenses were issued application-wise and each license used to refer to the land of villages for which license was granted. The village land used to fall in two or three sectors. As per Haryana Urban Development Act, even if the land was divided by sector road, it was to be considered as a compact land. Therefore, in applications, mostly the sector roads were dividing the applied land but the land was considered one compact land and one license was granted for development of colony even if the land fell in two or three sectors. Under these circumstances, this Commission considers that the notification issued by the government of Haryana needs to be modified/amended so as to include the names of four villages, Sihi, Shikohapur, Kherki-Daula and Sikandarpur-Bada as the areas the licenses of which are to be considered and it also needs to be modified in respect of nature of license as even in residential licenses, commercial licenses were granted. Therefore, the notification should be in respect of licenses granted in above four villages whether residential, commercial or composite. It is hoped that the necessary modification in the notification constituting the Commission shall be made at the earliest. The issuance of public notice shall be done in the names of villages for which licenses were issued after the amendment to the notification is done.” It is requested to take necessary action please. Sd/- Secretary Justice (Retd.) S.N.Dhingra Commission of Enquiry.” 42. As per record, after obtaining legal opinion, the draft with necessary clarification was prepared and amended notification was put up before the Chief Minister on 14.8.2015 for approval which was followed by further approval by the Council of Ministers on 15.8.2015. It was thereafter that modified notification dated 18.8.2015 (Annexure P.4) was issued making following amendments:- “Haryana Government Gazette EXTRA ORDINARY Published by Authority Government of Haryana 146-2015/Ext. CHANDIGARH, TUESDAY, AUGUST 18, 2015 (SRAVANA 27, 1937 SAKA) HARYANA GOVERNMENT GENERAL ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT Notification The 18th August, 2015 No.44/1/2015-5Pol. It was thereafter that modified notification dated 18.8.2015 (Annexure P.4) was issued making following amendments:- “Haryana Government Gazette EXTRA ORDINARY Published by Authority Government of Haryana 146-2015/Ext. CHANDIGARH, TUESDAY, AUGUST 18, 2015 (SRAVANA 27, 1937 SAKA) HARYANA GOVERNMENT GENERAL ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT Notification The 18th August, 2015 No.44/1/2015-5Pol. - In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Commission of Enquiry Act, 1952 (Central Act 60 of 1952), the Governor of Haryana hereby makes the following amendment in the Haryana Government, General Administration Department, notification No.44/1/2015-5Pol, dated the 14th May, 2015, namely:- AMENDMENT In the Haryana Government, General Administration Department, notification No.44/1/2015-5Pol, dated the 14th May, 2015:- 1. For the words, signs and figures “Sector 83, Gurgaon”, wherever occurring, the words and signs “villages Sihi, Shikohpur, Kherki Daula and Sikandarpur Bada in District Gurgaon” shall be substituted. 2. For the words “commercial colonies”, wherever occurring, the words “colonies” shall be substituted. 3. For existing para 2, the following para shall be substituted, namely:- “2. The inquiry by the Commission shall be in regard to all irregularities, illegalities and malafides regarding grant of licenses in above referred areas and also in regard to complaints or allegations that may be made before the Commission by any individual, group of individuals, entity or association in such form, as may be specified by the Commission.” Sd/- D.S.Dhesi, Chief Secretary to Government Haryana.” 43. From the above, it is discernible that the Secretary of the Commission through communication dated 10.8.2015 had brought to the notice of the State Government that as per record, the allotment of land was made village wise and not sector wise. Accordingly, clarificatory notification was issued on 18.8.2015 and the Commission started its functioning only after the issuance of the said notification. The notification dated 18.8.2015 could only be taken to be clarificatory in nature. In such a situation, the plea on behalf of the petitioner that the terms of reference were amended at the instance of Justice Dhingra Commission and vitiated the report of the Commission of Enquiry, is untenable. 44. There was nothing to prevent the Government from issuing a fresh notification appointing a Commission of Inquiry. If that could be done, there was no reason why the same result could not be achieved by the combined effort of two notifications. 44. There was nothing to prevent the Government from issuing a fresh notification appointing a Commission of Inquiry. If that could be done, there was no reason why the same result could not be achieved by the combined effort of two notifications. In such circumstances, the amending notification taken together with the original notification may be read as a fresh notification within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act operative from the date of the later notification. In Para 20 in R.K.Dalmia's case (supra), the Supreme Court opined regarding cure of defect in the original notification by a subsequent notification in the following terms:- “20. A point was taken that the original notification was defective in that it did not fix the time within which the Commission was to complete its report and that a subsequent notification fixing a time could not cure that defect. We do not think there is any substance in this too. The third notification quoted above amended the original notification by fixing a time. There was nothing to prevent the Government from issuing a fresh notification appointing a Commission and fixing a time. If that could be done, there was no reason why the same result could not be achieved by the combined effect of two notifications. In any case the amending notification taken together with the original notification may be read as a fresh notification within the meaning of s. 3 of the Act, operative at least from the date of the later notification.” 45. Further, in view of the pronouncement of the Madras High Court in Vijaylakshmi Shanmugam v. Chief Secretary, 2012(1) CTC 14 , bias alleged by the petitioner against Justice Dhingra on the basis of certain newspaper reports was untenable in the eyes of law, wherein it was observed as under:- “31. It is the further contention of Mr.Manikandan Vathan Chettiar that the learned Judge had enjoyed a jaunt in Malaysia on the hospitality of a goonda detainee facing multiple cheating cases along with a practising lawyer sometime during the year 2000. We may point out that this allegation has been made on the basis of a newspaper report. In our opinion, the said allegation cannot ipso facto be considered till such time it is proved in the manner known to law, especially when a charge is levelled as to the integrity of the learned Judge. We may point out that this allegation has been made on the basis of a newspaper report. In our opinion, the said allegation cannot ipso facto be considered till such time it is proved in the manner known to law, especially when a charge is levelled as to the integrity of the learned Judge. We are also informed that the learned Judge had functioned as a Judge of this Court and discharged his judicial functions even after the said report. Hence, the said contention also is unacceptable and the same is rejected. For all these reasons, we are not inclined to accept the contentions of Mr.Manikandan Vathan Chettiar that the member of one-man commission of inquiry is biased and he should not have been appointed as such.” 46. In V. Narayana Rao v. State of AP, AIR 1987 AP 53 , the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that just because the Commission gave certain recommendations beyond its purview, the acceptance of the said recommendations by the Government would not per se be illegal or unlawful. The relevant portion reads thus:- “32. But, the question is not whether the M.R. Commission exceeded its purview, but whether the Government can be said to have acted illegally in accepting and implementing the said recommendations. On this aspect, it is well to remember that appointment of a Commission is not obligatory before making a special provision, or before providing for reservations under Arts. 15(4) and 16(4). Even apart from the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, the executive power of the State extends to appointing a person or a Committee by whatever name it may be called to investigate the social and educational backwardness of any classes or groups in the State, and to act upon the report submitted by such person or Committee. Indeed, it may even be open to the Government to make its own investigation and take appropriate measures. It, therefore, cannot be said that just because the M. R. Commission made certain recommendations beyond its purview, the acceptance of the said recommendations by the Government is per se illegal or incompetent. It is another matter to say that the recommendations of the Commission are not based upon relevant material, or to say that the Government blindly accepted the said erroneous recommendations without any further investigation. It is another matter to say that the recommendations of the Commission are not based upon relevant material, or to say that the Government blindly accepted the said erroneous recommendations without any further investigation. This aspect we shall deal with presently, but, so far as the first contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is concerned, it is not possible to agree, that the Government acted illegally in accepting, or acting upon the said recommendations because those recommendations were outside the purview of the Commission.” 47. The next contention is that the notification is bad, because the action of the Government in issuing it was malafide and amounted to an abuse of power. No substantial ground in support of this point has been brought before us and we are not satisfied that the circumstances referred to in the notification and the affidavits filed on behalf of the State Government and respondent No.2 cannot form the basis of a further inquiry into the matter. It was for the Commission to have inquired into the allegations and come to its own findings and make its report containing its recommendations. It would, thus, not be appropriate to express anything more on this point. All that we need to say is that the charge of malafide has not been brought home against the government or respondent No.2. 48. Negativing the plea of malafide due to political rivalry where definite matter of public importance existed, it was recorded in Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's case (supra) as under:- “The next attack on the Notification was that it had been issued mala fide. One of the learned Judges of the High Court expressly rejected this contention and the others also seem to have been of the same view for they did not accept it. We find no reason to accept it either. In that view of the matter, we consider it unnecessary to discuss this aspect of the case in great detail. We have set out the broad events of the case and it is on them that the case of mala fide is based. It is not in dispute that for some time past there was political rivalry between Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and G. M. Sadiq. We have set out the broad events of the case and it is on them that the case of mala fide is based. It is not in dispute that for some time past there was political rivalry between Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and G. M. Sadiq. It was also said that there was personal animosity because G.M. Sadiq wanted to advance the interest of his relatives and followers by ousting persons belonging to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's group in various fields. This allegation of personal animosity cannot be said to have been established. It is really on the political rivalry and the events happening since September 21, 1964 that the allegation of male fide is founded. It was said that the steps taken since the arrest of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad down to the setting up of the Commission of Inquiry were all taken with the intention of driving him out of the political life so that G. M. Sadiq would have no rival as a political leader. First, as to the arrest. The case of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was that the arrest was mala fide. On the other side, it was said that since about July 1964 various allegations of abuse of power by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad some of which formed the subject matter of inquiry, had come to the notice of the Government and thereupon investigations were started by the Criminal Investigation Department at the instance of the Government. In order to stop the investigation Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and his followers started dowdyism and other form of breaches of law and order endangering public safety and maintenance of public order. It was pointed out that the situation in Kashmir had not been easy for some time past due to the hostile intentions of Pakistan and China and breach of law and order added to the seriousness of the position. It was said that for these reasons Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad had to be arrested and detained under the Defence of India Rules. it was said on behalf of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad that prior to the arrest, a no confidence motion had been sponsored and had actually gathered in volume and the arrest was made to stultify it. What support the no confidence motion had we do not know. it was said on behalf of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad that prior to the arrest, a no confidence motion had been sponsored and had actually gathered in volume and the arrest was made to stultify it. What support the no confidence motion had we do not know. It would appear however that the Criminal Investigation Department had been making inquiries against Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's acts for some time past and the situation in Kashmir was inflammable. In those circumstances, it cannot be said that Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's arrest was mala fide. He was no doubt released from arrest after a petition had been moved for his release and before the petition was heard. It was said that he was released because the Government found that the petition was bound to succeed. We have no material before us on which we can say that the petition was bound to succeed. On behalf of G. M. Sadiq and D. P. Dhar it was said that he was released because of ill-health. This does not appear to have been denied. It was also said on behalf of G. M. Sadiq that the investigation having been completed there was no cause for Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad to instigate breaches of law and order and therefore it was not necessary to keep him in detention any longer. On the evidence before us, we are unable to say that the case made by G. M. Sadiq cannot be accepted. As to the prorogation of the Assembly, it is said by the appellants that it was necessary because it was apprehended that if the Assembly met, there might have been trouble inside the House created by Bakshi Ghufam Mohammad's followers who resented the arrest. On the materials before us, we are unable to say that this apprehension was pretended. It was also said by the appellants that the prorogation had been decided upon before the arrest of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad but the order could not be passed because the Sadar-i-Riyasat was out of Srinagar from before September 15, 1964 when both the arrest and prorogation had been decided upon and did not return there till some time on September 21, 1964. The fact that the Sadar-i-Riyasat returned on that date is not denied. As we have said, the arrest and the prorogation took place on the next day, that is, September 22, 1964. The fact that the Sadar-i-Riyasat returned on that date is not denied. As we have said, the arrest and the prorogation took place on the next day, that is, September 22, 1964. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was released on December 15, 1964 and the Notification challenged was issued on January 30, 1965. On these facts, we are unable to hold that Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad has been able to establish that the inquiry had been set up mala fide owing to political rivalry.” 49. Supreme Court in P.V.Jagannath Rao v. State of Orissa, (1968) 3 SCR 789 , expressly held that malafide and political rivalry are no ground to challenge Commission of Inquiry if otherwise objective material for constitution of Commission of Inquiry exist. The relevant portion of the judgment reads thus:- “The main ground of attack on behalf of the appellants was that the notification was illegal because the Government exercised the statutory power mala fide and for collateral purpose and that the object of appointing the Commission of Inquiry was to get rid of Sri Biju Patnaik and Sri Biren Mitra and to drive them out of the political life of Orissa. The High Court held that the allegation of the appellants was not made out and upheld the legal validity of the notification dated October 26, 1967 issued by the Orissa Government. It is well-settled that if a statutory authority exercises its power for a purpose not authorised by the law the action of the statutory authority is ultra vires and without jurisdiction. In other words it is a mala fide exercise of power in the eye of law; i.e., an exercise of power by a statutory authority for a purpose other a that which the Legislature intended (See The King v. Minister of Health) (1). But the question arises as to what is the legal position if an administrative authority acts both for an authorised purpose and for an unauthorised purpose. In such a case where there is a mixture of authorised and unauthorised purpose, what should be the test to be applied to determine the legal validity of the administrative act ? The proper test to be applied in such a case is as to what is the dominant purpose for which the administrative power is exercised. In such a case where there is a mixture of authorised and unauthorised purpose, what should be the test to be applied to determine the legal validity of the administrative act ? The proper test to be applied in such a case is as to what is the dominant purpose for which the administrative power is exercised. To put it differently, if the administrative authority pursues two or more purposes of which one is authorised and the, other unauthorised, the legality of the administrative act should be determined by reference to the dominant purpose. This principle was applied in Rex v. Brighton Corporation ex parte Shoosmith....... Applying the test to the present case, we are of opinion that the dominant purpose of setting up the Commission of Inquiry was to promote measures for maintaining purity and integrity of the administration in the political life of the State and not “the character assassination” of Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra and their group. .......... We pass on to consider the next question arising in these appeals, namely, whether the power was exercised by the State Government for a purpose alien to the statute. It was contended by Mr. Asoke Sen that there was a bitter political rivalry between the appellants on the one hand and Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Harekrishna Mehtab, Shri. Singh Deo and the other persons who are at present in-charge of the Orissa administration. Reference was made by Mr. Asoke Sen to the political history of the State of Orissa from 1947 up to the General Elections, 1967 and in particular to the rivalry between Sri Biju Patnaik and Sri Singh Deo who was the leader of Opposition in the previous Government and also to the internal rivalry between the two political groups in the Congress Legislative party, one led by Shri Harekrushna Mahtab and the other led by Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra. It was urged that the Commission was set up by the present Orissa Government not in the public interest but for a collateral purpose, namely, for getting rid of Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra and driving them out of the political life of Orissa. Mr. It was urged that the Commission was set up by the present Orissa Government not in the public interest but for a collateral purpose, namely, for getting rid of Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra and driving them out of the political life of Orissa. Mr. Asoke Sen said that the object of the enquiry was character assassination of Shri Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra and so the Commission was set up for a collateral purpose and the notification must be struck down as illegal and ultra vires. It is not possible, in our opinion, to accept this argument as correct. It is admitted that there is political rivalry in Orissa between the appellants and the present Chief Minister of Orissa, Shri R.N. Singh Deo and also as between the appellants and the group of Congress dissidents led by Shri Harekrushna Mahtab, Shri Nabakrushna Choudhury, Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan, Shri Santanu Kumar Das and Shri Surendranath Patnaik. But we do not think that the existence of political rivalry is in itself sufficient to hold that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry is illegal. Having perused the affidavits of the appellants and Also those filed by the respondents in this case we are of opinion that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry was not due merely to the existence of political rivalry of the parties but was impelled by the desire to set up and maintain high standards of moral conduct in the political administration of the State. As we have already pointed out, the object of appointing the Commission is stated in the notification itself as “the rectification and prevention of recurrence of such lapses and securing the ends of justice and establishing a moral public order in future”. In the affidavit of Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan it is stated that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry was one of the items of the common programme on which the Jana Congress and the Swatantra Party contested the General Elections of 1967. In the affidavit of Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan it is stated that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry was one of the items of the common programme on which the Jana Congress and the Swatantra Party contested the General Elections of 1967. As a result of the popular mandate the Swatantra Party and the Jana Congress coalition took charge of the reins of Government and in accordance with the solemn promise made by those parties to the people of Orissa the Government decided to appoint a Commission of Inquiry in order to investigate the widespread corruption practiced by the persons named in the Schedule to the impugned notification. The decision to appoint a Commission was also announced in the first address of the Governor to the Orissa Legislative Assembly after the 1967 General Elections. In paragraph 17 of the affidavit, Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan has further said that the object of the Jana Congress and the Swatantra Party was “to set up a clean administration, so that the State's resources should not go into the pockets of the corrupt group led by Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra but should be used for giving a better life to the people of the State”. In para 6 of the affidavit Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan further states : “I have always believed and still believe that politics is not for the purpose of serving the selfish ends and to satisfy the greed of any politician or any person or any group of persons. Politics is for the service of the people and involves sacrificing one's life and comforts for raising the living standard of the overwhelming poverty-stricken people of our State and our country so that they may enjoy a good life and hold up their heads with pride.” In para 5 he has denied that there was any intention on his part to carry on character assassination of Shri Biju Patnaik, Shri Biren Mitra and their group. It is true that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry may have been made partly on account of the political rivalry between the parties but having perused the affidavits filed by the appellants and the respondents in this case, we are satisfied that the main object of the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry was not to satisfy the political rivalry of the politicians at present in power in Orissa but to promote measures for maintaining purity and integrity of the administration in future in the Orissa State. We are accordingly of the opinion that Mr. Asoke Sen is unable to make good his argument that the impugned notification is a mala fide exercise of the statutory power and it should be struck down as illegal.” 50. In Krishna Ballabh Sahay v. Commission of Inquiry, AIR 1969 SC 258 , it was held as under:- “Finally it is argued that the action is mala fide. This can only be decided if it can be held that the allegations were false. The Commission will first find the facts. Whether they lead to the conclusion that the inquiry was justified or it was malicious, cannot be said just now, when there are only allegations and recriminations but no evidence. If the charges have been made maliciously or falsely, we are sure the Commission will say so, where necessary. We cannot anticipate the inquiry and hold one ourselves. These reasons impelled us to order the dismissal of the appeal which order we formally pronounced earlier.” 51. In all fairness to learned counsel for the petitioner, we proceed to examine the case law and the relevant portion therein relied upon by him in respect of his submissions on various propositions/contentions. With regard to the proposition that the opinion of the state government under Section 3 of the Act has to necessarily to be formed by the Council of Ministers and the appropriate government is to act objectively and independently, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the policy as laid down by the Act is that a statutory commission of inquiry may be constituted to inquire into definite matters of public importance and no other matter. Formation of such opinion is a condition precedent for appointing a Commission of Inquiry. No ex post facto approval can validate appointment of a Commission without such collective opinion. Formation of such opinion is a condition precedent for appointing a Commission of Inquiry. No ex post facto approval can validate appointment of a Commission without such collective opinion. Reliance was placed upon judgment of the Apex Court in Ram Krishna Dalmia's case (supra). In Ram Krishan Dalmia's case (supra), the issue was with regard to the constitutionality of the legislation empowering the Government to appoint a commission. Further, legality of the notification setting up the commission and conferring powers thereupon was also questioned. In exercise of the powers conferred upon it by Section 3 of the Act, the Central Government by a notification appointed a commission to inquire about certain companies and the interest which certain persons named in the notification exercised over these companies. After considering the relevant statutory provision, it was observed :- “5. It will be convenient to advert to a few minor objections urged before us on behalf of the petitioners in support of their appeals before we come to deal with their principal and major contentions. The first objection is that the notification has gone beyond the Act. It is pointed out that the Act, by Section 3 empowers the appropriate Government in certain eventualities to appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and for no other purpose. The contention is that the conduct of an individual person or company cannot possibly be a matter of public importance and far less a definite matter of that kind. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. Widespread floods, famine and pestilence may quite easily be a definite matter of public importance urgently calling for an inquiry so as to enable the Government to take appropriate steps to prevent their recurrence in future. The conduct of villagers in cutting the bunds for taking water to their fields during the dry season may cause floods during the rainy season and we can see no reason why such unsocial conduct of villagers of certain villages thus causing floods should not be regarded as a definite matter of public importance. The conduct of villagers in cutting the bunds for taking water to their fields during the dry season may cause floods during the rainy season and we can see no reason why such unsocial conduct of villagers of certain villages thus causing floods should not be regarded as a definite matter of public importance. The failure of a big bank resulting in the loss of the life savings of a multitude of men of moderate means is certainly a definite matter of public importance but the conduct of the persons in charge -and management of such a bank which brought about its collapse is equally a definite matter of public importance. Widespread dacoities in particular parts of the country is, no doubt, a definite matter of public importance but we see no reason why the conduct, activities and modes operandi of particular dacoits and thugs notorious for their cruel depredations, should not be regarded as definite matters of public importance urgently requiring a sifting inquiry. It is needless to multiply instances. In each case the question is: is there a definite matter of public importance which calls for an inquiry ? We see no warrant for the proposition that a definite matter of public importance must necessarily mean only some matter involving the public benefit or advantage in the abstract, e.g., public health, sanitation or the like or some public evil or prejudice, e.g., floods, famine or pestilence or the like. Quite conceivably the conduct of an individual person or company or a group of individual persons or companies may assume such a dangerous proportion and may so prejudicially affect or threaten to affect the public well-being as to make such conduct a definite matter of public importance urgently calling for a full inquiry. Besides, Section 3 itself authorises the appropriate Government to appoint a Commission of Inquiry not only for the purpose of making an inquiry into a definite matter of public importance but also for the purpose of performing such functions as, may be specified in the notification. Therefore, the notification is well within the powers conferred on the appropriate Government by s.3 of the Act and it cannot be questioned on the ground of its going beyond the provisions of the Act. 6 & 7. Xxxxxxxx 8. Therefore, the notification is well within the powers conferred on the appropriate Government by s.3 of the Act and it cannot be questioned on the ground of its going beyond the provisions of the Act. 6 & 7. Xxxxxxxx 8. While we find ourselves in partial agreement with the actual conclusion of the High Court on this point, we are, with great respect, unable to accept the line of reasoning advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners, which has been accepted by the High Court for more reasons than one. In the first place neither Parliament nor the Government has itself undertaken any inquiry at all. Parliament has made a law with respect to inquiry and has left it to the appropriate Government to set up a Commission of Inquiry under certain circumstances referred to in s. 3 of the Act. The Central Government, in its turn, has, in exercise of the powers conferred on it by the Act, set up this Commission. It is, therefore, not correct to say that Parliament or the Government itself has undertaken to hold any inquiry. In the second place the conclusion that the last portion of cl. (10) is bad because it signifies that Parliament or the Government had usurped the functions of the judiciary appears to us, with respect, to be inconsistent with the conclusion arrived at in a later part of the judgment that as the Commission can only make recommendations which are not enforceable proprio vigore there can be no question of usurpation of judicial functions. As has been stated by the High Court itself in the latter part of its judgment, the only power that the Commission has is to inquire and make a report and embody therein its recommendations. The Commission has no power of adjudication in the sense of passing an order which can be enforced proprio vigore. A clear distinction must, on the authorities, be drawn between a decision which, by itself, has no force and no penal effect and a decision which becomes enforceable immediately or which may become enforceable by some action being taken. The Commission has no power of adjudication in the sense of passing an order which can be enforced proprio vigore. A clear distinction must, on the authorities, be drawn between a decision which, by itself, has no force and no penal effect and a decision which becomes enforceable immediately or which may become enforceable by some action being taken. Therefore, as the Commission we are concerned with is merely to investigate and record its findings and recommendations without having any power to enforce them, the inquiry or report cannot be looked upon as a judicial inquiry in the sense of its being an exercise of judicial function properly so called and consequently the question of usurpation by Parliament or the Government of the powers of the judicial organs of the Union of India cannot arise on the facts of this case and the elaborate discussion of the American authorities founded on the categorical separation of powers expressly provided by and under the American Constitution appears to us, with respect, wholly inappropriate and unnecessary and we do not feel called upon, on the present occasion, to express any opinion on the question whether even in the absence of a specific provision for separation of powers in our Constitution, such as there is under the American Constitution, some such division of powers-legislative, executive and judicial-is, nevertheless implicit in our Constitution. In the view we have taken it is also not necessary for us to consider whether, had the Act conferred on the appropriate Government power to set up a Commission of Inquiry with judicial powers, such law could not, subject, of course, to the other provisions of the Constitution, be supported as a law made under some entry in List I or List III authorising the setting up of courts read with these two entries, for a legislation may well be founded on several entries. 9. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, who are appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 456 and 457 of 1957, goes as far as to say that while the Commission may find facts on which the Government may take action, legislative or executive, although he does not concede the latter kind of action to be contemplated, the Commission cannot be asked to suggest any measure, legislative or executive, to be taken by the appropriate Government. We are unable to accept the proposition so widely enunciated. We are unable to accept the proposition so widely enunciated. An inquiry necessarily involves investigation into facts and necessitates the collection of material facts from the evidence adduced before or brought to the notice of the person or body conducting the inquiry and the recording of its findings on those facts in its report cannot but be regarded as ancillary to the inquiry itself, for the inquiry becomes useless unless the findings of the inquiring body are made available to the Government which set up the inquiry. It is, in our judgment, equally ancillary that the person or body conducting the inquiry should express its own view on the facts found by it for the consideration of the appropriate Government in order to enable it to take such measure as it may think fit to do. The whole purpose of setting up of a Commission of Inquiry consisting of experts will be frustrated and the elaborate process of inquiry will be deprived of its utility if the opinion and the advice of the expert body as to the measures the situation disclosed calls for cannot be placed before the Government for consideration notwithstanding that doing so cannot be to the prejudice of anybody because it has no force of its own. In our view the recommendations of a Commission of Inquiry are of great importance to the Government in order to enable it to make up its mind as to what legislative or administrative measures should be adopted to eradicate the evil found or to implement the beneficial objects it has in view. From this point of view, there can be no objection even to the Commission of Inquiry recommending the imposition of some form of punishment which will, in its opinion, be sufficiently deterrent to delinquents in future. From this point of view, there can be no objection even to the Commission of Inquiry recommending the imposition of some form of punishment which will, in its opinion, be sufficiently deterrent to delinquents in future. But seeing that the Commission of Inquiry has no judicial powers and its report will purely be recommendatory and not effective proprio vigore and the statement made by any person before the Commission of Inquiry is, under s.6 of the Act, wholly inadmissible in evidence in any future proceedings, civil or criminal, there can be no point in the Commission of Inquiry making recommendations for taking any action “as and by way of securing redress or punishment” which, in agreement with the High Court, we think, refers, in the context, to wrongs already done or committed, for redress or punishment for such wrongs, if any, has to be imposed by a court of law, properly constituted exercising its own discretion on the facts and circumstances of the case and without being in any way influenced by the view of any person or body, howsoever august or high powered it may be. Having regard to all these considerations it appears to us that only that portion of the last part of cl. (10) which calls upon the Commission of Inquiry to make recommendations about the action to be taken “as and by way of securing redress or punishment”, cannot be said to be at all necessary for or ancillary to the purposes of the Commission. In our view the words in the latter part of the section, namely, “as and by way of securing redress or punishment”, clearly go outside the scope of the Act and such provision is not covered by the two legislative entries and should, therefore, be deleted. So deleted the latter portion of cl. (10) would read and the action which in the opinion of the Commission should be taken......... to act as a preventive in future cases “ 10 to 15. Xxxxxxxxxx 16. The point which is next urged in support of these appeals and which has given us considerable anxiety is that the petitioners and their companies have been arbitrarily singled out for the purpose of hostile and discriminatory treatment and subjected to a harassing and oppressive inquiry. to act as a preventive in future cases “ 10 to 15. Xxxxxxxxxx 16. The point which is next urged in support of these appeals and which has given us considerable anxiety is that the petitioners and their companies have been arbitrarily singled out for the purpose of hostile and discriminatory treatment and subjected to a harassing and oppressive inquiry. The provisions of Art. 14, it is contended, protect every person against discrimination by the State, namely, against the law as well as the executive action and this protection extends to State action at all its stages. The petitioners' grievance is that the Government had started discrimination even at the earliest stage when it conceived the idea of issuing the notification. Reference is made to the Memorandum filed by the Bombay Shareholders' Association before the Bhaba Committee showing that the same or similar allegations had been made not only against the petitioners and their companies but against other businessmen and their companies and that although the petitioners and their companies and those other persons and their companies were thus similarly situate, in that allegations had been made against both, the Government arbitrarily applied the Act to the petitioners and their companies and issued the notification concerning them but left out the others from its operation. It is true that the notification primarily or even solely affects the petitioners and their companies but it cannot be overlooked that Parliament having left the selective application of the Act to the discretion of the appropriate Government, the latter must of necessity take its decision on the materials available to it and the opinion it forms thereon. The appropriate Government cannot in such matters be expected to sit down and hold a judicial inquiry into the truth of the materials brought before it, and examine the informants on oath in the presence of the parties who are or may be likely to be affected by its decision. In matters of this kind the appropriate Government has of necessity to act upon the information available to it. In matters of this kind the appropriate Government has of necessity to act upon the information available to it. It is the best judge of' the reliability of its source of information and if it acts in good faith on the materials brought to its notice and honestly comes to the conclusion that the act and conduct of the petitioners and the affairs of their companies constitute a definite matter of public importance calling for an inquiry with a view to devise measures for preventing the recurrence of such evil, this Court, not being in possession of all the facts will, we apprehend, be slow to adjudge the executive action to be bad and illegal. We are not unmindful of the fact that a very wide discretionary power has been conferred on the Government and, indeed, the contemplation that such wide powers in the hands of the executive may in some cases be misused or abused and turned into an engine of oppression has caused considerable anxiety in our mind. Nevertheless, the bare possibility that the powers may be misused or abused cannot per se induce the court to deny the existence of the powers. It cannot be overlooked that Parliament has confided this discretion, not to any petty official but to the appropriate Government itself to take action in conformity with the policy and principle laid down in the Act. As this Court 'has said in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari (1), “a discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power and that abuse of power is not to be easily assumed where the discretion is vested in the Government and not in a minor official. “ We feel sure, however, that if this law is administered by the Government “with an evil eye and an unequal hand” or for an oblique or unworthy purpose the arms of this Court will be long enough to reach it and to strike down such abuse with a heavy hand. What, then, we inquire, are the salient facts here ? The Central Government appointed investigators to scrutinise the affairs of three of the petitioners' concerns. Those investigators had made their reports to the Central Government. The Central Government had also the Bhaba Committee Report and all the Memoranda filed before that Committee. What, then, we inquire, are the salient facts here ? The Central Government appointed investigators to scrutinise the affairs of three of the petitioners' concerns. Those investigators had made their reports to the Central Government. The Central Government had also the Bhaba Committee Report and all the Memoranda filed before that Committee. It may also have had other information available to it and on those materials it formed its opinion that the act and conduct of the petitioners and the affairs of their companies constituted a definite matter of public importance which required a full inquiry. Up to this stage there is no question of legal proof of the allegations against the petitioners as in a court of law. The only question is: do those allegations if honestly believed, constitute a definite matter of public importance ? We are unable to say that they do not. 17 & 18. Xxxxx 19. The next contention is that the notification is bad, because the action of the Government in issuing it was mala fide and amounted to an abuse of power. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, who is the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 455 of 1957, makes it clear that no personal motive or illwill against the petitioners is imputed to any one, but he points out that the Bhaba Committee had been set up and the Companies Act has been remodeled and, therefore, the present Commission was not set up for any legitimate purpose. The main idea, according to learned counsel, was to obtain information which the Government could not get by following the ordinary procedure under the Code of Criminal Procedure and this ulterior motive clearly makes the governmental action mala fide. This point has been further emphasized by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, who are appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 456 and 457 of 1957. He has drawn our attention to the affidavits filed by his clients and contends that it was well-known to the Government that none of them was concerned in promoting or managing any of the companies and their position being thus well-known to the Government, their inclusion in the notification was both outside the power conferred by the Government and also constituted a mala fide exercise of the power conferred on it. No substantial ground in support of this point has been brought before us and we are not satisfied that the circumstances referred to in the notification and the affidavits filed on behalf of the Union of India, may not, if true, be the basis of a further inquiry into the matter. It will be for the Commission to inquire into the allegations and come to its own findings and make its report containing its recommendations. It is not desirable that we should say anything more on this point. All that we need say is that the charge of mala fides has not been brought home to the Government.” 52. With regard to the second proposition that it is incumbent upon the State Government to duly apply its mind to relevant and objective materials in order to form an opinion under Section 3 of the Act, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that formation of an opinion under Section 3 of the Act has to be supported by relevant, objective and cogent material which if honestly believed and appreciated bonafide would lead to the inference that an inquiry is necessary into a definite matter of public importance. Learned counsel placed reliance on judgment in Bansi Lal's case (supra). It was held by this Court that the government must be of a definite opinion that a matter of definite public importance requires to be enquired into. Though the writ court cannot sit as a court of appeal in the matters of inquiry as to whether the decision of the Government was based on proper consideration of sufficient material and application of mind but the court can certainly ask the government to produce the material considered and look into the same to lift the veil. The relevant portion relied upon reads thus:- “53. The Legislature has provided a word of caution by promulgation of this provision that such opinion formed should be tested once all over again. The persons who are allowed to sit at the helms of affairs of the State, constitutionally, their work and conduct can also be subjected to scrutiny by way of exercising the powers as envisaged under section 3 of the Act. The invocation of this power has been clearly and categorically subjected to the constraints provided by the legislature i.e. formation of opinion on the basis of the information derived from the documents or otherwise. The invocation of this power has been clearly and categorically subjected to the constraints provided by the legislature i.e. formation of opinion on the basis of the information derived from the documents or otherwise. This opinion has to be further subjected to the test and the appropriate recommendation would be available from the Commission of Inquiry It has been seen over the years that the recommendation made by the Commission may not be binding upon the concerned quarters but may be kept in the files to be considered as a piece of education for the future. However, recommendations may be received which ultimately may enable the prescribed authority to take action against those who have abused their power while being at the helm of the affairs of the state. This usage of power for such action must be under checks and balances, therefore, forming of opinion by the government in this regard is absolutely necessary. 54. Opinion is definitely a brief stronger than an impression, less strong than positive knowledge, a conclusion or judgment held with confidence but falling short of positive knowledge. Thus, there is no scope for probabilities or conjectures. In a way, opinion may suffer from uncertainty till it grows into absolutism on the basis of evidence produced in support thereof. Generally, a judgment is also termed as an opinion but a conclusion is drawn on the basis of a judgment. Thus, minus the conclusion the judgment would be of no consequence vice versa conclusion alone would be meaningless till it is supported by a judgment. 55. It needs to be mentioned that on the basis of some facts elicited and disclosed an impression may be formed, but such impression if it cannot be properly appreciated on the basis of corroborative material it does not reach the strength of an opinion. An opinion is conviction which must be primarily based upon the facts and the material complimentary to each other for the purpose of coming to a conclusion. Whereas impression is a fancy or lodgement in the mind which is not based upon the testimony and that the existence of the same cannot be traced to proof. Thus, forming an impression or forming an opinion would be quite different from each other. Thus, for forming subjective opinion it is necessary that to some extent some admitted accepted and acceptable material must be placed before oneself. 56. Thus, forming an impression or forming an opinion would be quite different from each other. Thus, for forming subjective opinion it is necessary that to some extent some admitted accepted and acceptable material must be placed before oneself. 56. Thus, the word opinion as has been used in Section 3 of the Act, would necessarily require that the opinion must be based upon corroborative information and not merely upon impression and conjectures. In the case at hand, a pointed allegation has been made by the petitioner that there was no material produced before the Council of Ministers while forming an opinion. This has not been effectively controverted by the respondents. Apart from this, the perusal of the record shows that no exercise had been carried out for forming such opinion, such as, report from the concerned departments, opinion of the Secretaries of the Departments or perusal of the report elicited by the petitioner at the time of revocation/withdrawal of the prohibition policy. The special secretary to Government of Haryana, Political and Services, has very fairly disclosed before this court that no such material had been received by the Cabinet Secretariat nor any report which is stated to have been relied upon by the petitioner for relocation of the prohibition policy was ever received by the Cabinet Secretariat. Resultantly, no such information or documents were placed before the Council of Ministers. He has further disclosed that the item was not contained in the agenda circulated amongst the Council of Ministers in the meeting scheduled to be held on 29.11.1999. The item was initiated with permission of the Chair and the decision was taken by the Council of Ministers then and there, which fact is evident from the perusal of the minutes of the meeting of Ministers recorded on the aforesaid date. The Commissioner, Excise and Taxation, Haryana has also disclosed that no report or communication had been sent by him to the Cabinet Secretariat or to the Minister of Excise and Taxation in this regard. Thus, it is obvious that none of the Council of Ministers was educated or duly informed for forming an opinion while agreeing to appoint Commission of Inquiry. Thus, it is obvious that none of the Council of Ministers was educated or duly informed for forming an opinion while agreeing to appoint Commission of Inquiry. Thus, the plea that the Council of Ministers being representatives of the people of State of Haryana were well versed with the facts and figures relating to the decision which was to be taken in respect of the matter, stands belied. I am afraid that for substantiating this plea, no affidavit of any of the Council of ministers has been placed on record nor respondents No.2 and 3 have disclosed as to what information was disclosed before the Council of Ministers at the time of taking relevant decisions in appointing the Commission of Inquiry. The minutes of the meeting so recorded, which have been produced before this Court, do not spell out the material which was placed before the Council of Ministers or the knowledge which was disclosed by them at the time of discussing the item sought to be included in the agenda with the permission of the Chair. It has also not been disclosed as to how this matter was initiated and by whom, as no mention has been made in the minutes so recorded. 57. The second facet which needs to be noticed is that the Commission of Inquiry can be promulgated only for the purpose of making inquiry into any definite matter of public importance. Thus, it would m an that while taking a conscious decision, the Council of Ministers must decide the status of the matter to be inquired into i.e. as to whether the said matter is a definite matter of public importance. The legislature consciously and cautiously incorporated this ingredient for the purpose that a matter may not be allowed to be inquired into in personam, lest the same may be used for and in respect of political animus and rivalry or for settling the political vendetta. It should also not reflect the colour of animus vis-a-vis the stalwarts at the helm of affairs of the government at the relevant time. The legislature was conscious of another fact that by appointing a commission of Inquiry the fiscal effect shall have to be suffered by the State Exchequer. It should also not reflect the colour of animus vis-a-vis the stalwarts at the helm of affairs of the government at the relevant time. The legislature was conscious of another fact that by appointing a commission of Inquiry the fiscal effect shall have to be suffered by the State Exchequer. Thus, it may not be that appointment of Commission of Inquiry may come under clout and the expenses so incurred may not remain explainable by those who may take such decisions.” 53. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Arjun Singh and others, (1993) 1 SCC 51 , it was held by the Supreme Court that subjective satisfaction of government should be based on objective or real material and not merely on some vague allegations, hearsay evidence or fishing enquiry. In the absence of relevant material before the Government for enlarging the scope of the existing inquiry under the original reference, the second reference was quashed by the High Court. The relevant observations read thus:- “7. In our opinion, so far as the terms of reference contained in Clauses A and B of the second reference are concerned, the same are already covered in the terms of the original reference. Neither counsel controverted this position. In this view of the matter there can be no bar to the commission to enquire into these matters under the original reference itself. Now, so far as Clause 'C' of the second reference is concerned, the original reference in term No. 1 itself covers the question as to how the affairs of the Churhat Children Welfare Society are conducted and how the share of its profit derived and the money collected through lottery has been utilised. We further make it clear that nothing precludes the commission from making an enquiry as to whether any profit derived or money collected through Churhat Lottery had been utilised for constructing the mansion/bungalow at Kerva Dam. But so far as the following portion of Clause C of the second reference is concerned, the High Court rightly quashed the same as there was no relevant material before the State Government for enlarging the scope of existing enquiry under the original reference:- the enquiry be also made as to at what cost he and his family members have acquired and built his mansion at Kerva Dam and from where they got the funds for that purpose. 8. 8. It is also made clear that this judgment does not preclude the State Government from appointing any commission of enquiry according to law after applying its mind to any fresh or further material placed before it. Such formation of opinion depends on the subjective satisfaction of an appropriate Government but should be based on an objective or real material and not merely on some vague allegations or hearsay evidence or to make fishing enquiry. The appeal is disposed of as aforestated. No order as to costs.” 54. In Bhikubhai Vithi Abhai Patel's case (supra), the issue was with regard to making substantial modifications in draft development plan submitted by Development Authority. Formation of opinion by State Government as to the necessity of the said modifications was held to be a condition precedent for setting the law in motion proposing those modifications in draft development plan. Formation of said opinion, though subjective must be based on relevant materials disclosing the necessity to make the above modifications. Intense application of mind by the state government with reference to the material available on record regarding the said necessity should be reflected in formation of the above opinion. Opinion to be formed by Government cannot be based on imaginary grounds, wishful thinking, however laudable that may be. It was recorded thus:- “22. Any opinion of the Government to be formed is not subject to objective test. The language leaves no room for the relevance of a judicial examination as to the sufficiency of the grounds on which the Government acted in forming its opinion. But there must be material based on which alone the State Government could form its opinion that it has become necessary to make substantial modification in the draft development plan. 23 to 25. xxxxxxxxx 26. The formation of the opinion by the State Government should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record that it had become necessary to propose substantial modifications to the draft development plan. 27 to 32. xxxxxxxxxxx 33. The Court is entitled to examine whether there has been any material available with the State Government and the reasons recorded, if any, in the formation of opinion and whether they have any rational connection with or relevant bearing on the formation of the opinion. 27 to 32. xxxxxxxxxxx 33. The Court is entitled to examine whether there has been any material available with the State Government and the reasons recorded, if any, in the formation of opinion and whether they have any rational connection with or relevant bearing on the formation of the opinion. The Court is entitled particularly, in the event, when the formation of the opinion is challenged to determine whether the formation of opinion is arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is always open to the court to examine the question whether reasons for formation of opinion have rational connection or relevant bearing to the formation of such opinion and are not extraneous to the purposes of the statute.” 55. As regards the issue, i.e., a Commission of Inquiry must be constituted to inquire into a definite matter of public importance and a fishing and roving inquiry is not contemplated and that amendment to the terms of reference at the instance of the Justice Dhingra Commission is not permissible under the Act, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Section 3 contemplates enquiry into a definite matter of public importance. The use of the word definite in Section 3 shows that the matters for inquiry cannot be vague. Instances of notifications issued under Section 3 demonstrate that a Commission is to be set up to inquire into a definite set of allegations or specific incidents. Further the amendment to the notification at the instance of the Commission is impressible under the Act and demonstrates complete non application of mind. Reliance was placed on judgment of the Apex Court in Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's case (supra). It was held by the Supreme Court that the use of the word `definite' in Section 3 shows that the matter for inquiry cannot be vague. It was observed in paras 11 and 13 as under:- “11. It was also contended that the inquiry was into allegations of misconduct against Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and an inquiry into allegations was not contemplated by the Inquiry Act. We are wholly unable to agree. An inquiry usually is into a question. That question may arise on allegations made. Dabnia's case(1) dealt with an inquiry ordered at least in part into allegations made against people in charge of a big mercantile enterprise. Allegations may very well raise questions of great public importance. We are wholly unable to agree. An inquiry usually is into a question. That question may arise on allegations made. Dabnia's case(1) dealt with an inquiry ordered at least in part into allegations made against people in charge of a big mercantile enterprise. Allegations may very well raise questions of great public importance. Suppose it is alleged that people in a city are suffering from ill-health and that is due- to the contaminated water supplied by the city administration. It cannot be said that these allegations about the existence of poor health and its causes are not matters of grave public importance. They would be so even if it was found that the people's health was not poor and the water was not contaminated. It cannot also be said that allegations can never be definite. They can be as definite as any existing concrete matter. It must depend on what the allegation is. 13. It was then pointed out that the Notification only mentioned that the matters were of public importance but did not say that they were definite matters of public importance. The Act, as we have earlier pointed out, requires that the matters to be inquired into shall be definite matters of public importance. But this omission of the word “definite” in the Notification does not, in our opinion, make any difference. A Court can decide whether the matters to be inquired into are definite matters of public importance. 'Definite' in this connection means something which is not vague. One of the learned Judges of the High Court held that the matters set out in the second Schedule were vague as some of the instances did not give any date or year. He also said that the note at the end of the second Schedule., to which we have earlier referred, added to the vagueness. We are unable to accede to this view. What the learned Judge had in mind was apparently the particulars of the acts. In most cases, the acts are identifiable from the particulars given in the second Schedule in respect of them. Further, it is obvious that they had to be identified at the hearing and could not be proved nor any notice taken of them unless that was done. It does not appear to have been contended before the Commission that there was any matter not so identifiable. Further, it is obvious that they had to be identified at the hearing and could not be proved nor any notice taken of them unless that was done. It does not appear to have been contended before the Commission that there was any matter not so identifiable. Neither do we think that the note drawing attention to the gravamen of the charges at the end of the second schedule indicates any indefiniteness. In most of the allegations it had been expressly stated that the act was done by the misuse of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's official position and by his permitting others to exploit that-it is this which made the matters, matters of public importance-and it was for greater safety that the note was appended so that no 5SCI-28(a) doubt was left as to the gravamen of the charge in each of the allegations made.” 56. There is no quarrel with the above propositions of law enunciated therein. Each case has to be decided on its own facts. However, the situation in the present case being different as noticed hereinbefore, the petitioner cannot derive any advantage from the said decisions. 57. Delving into second broad issue, the statutory provisions of Sections 4 and 8B of the Act require to be reproduced. Sections 4 and 8B of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 read thus:- “4. Powers of Commission.-The Commission shall have the powers of a civil court, while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely:- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person from any part of India and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of any document; (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court or office; (e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents; (f) any other matter which may be prescribed. “8B. Persons likely to be prejudicially affected to be heard - If, at any stage of the inquiry, the Commission- (a) Considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct of any person or (b) Is of opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry. The commission shall give to that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry and to produce evidence in his defence. The commission shall give to that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry and to produce evidence in his defence. Provided that nothing in this section shall apply where the credit of a witness is being impeached.” Section 4 of the Act deals with the powers of the Commission whereby powers of civil court while trying a civil suit under the Code of Civil Procedure have been conferred on it. Under clause (a), the Commission can summon and enforce the attendance of any person from any part of India and examine him on oath. The matter relating to discovery and production of any document; receiving evidence on affidavits; requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court or office; issuing Commission for the examination of witnesses or documents; or any other matter which may be prescribed have been covered under clauses (b) to (f) of this provision. As per Section 8B of the Act, if at any stage of the inquiry, the Commission considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct of any person or is of the view that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry, the Commission shall give to that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry and to produce evidence in his defence. Therefore, wherever the conclusion of the report affects the reputation of a delinquent person, the said person is required to be served with a notice under Section 8B of the Act. In other words, it is mandatory to serve notice. 58. Sections 4(a) and 8B of the Act have been subject matter of judicial scrutiny and interpretation by various courts. In Sanjay Gupta v. State of UP (2015) 5 SCC 283 , the Supreme Court held that where a notice bereft of any charges and other details was issued by a commission of inquiry, such notice was in effect a notice under section 4(a) of the Act for summoning a witness and could not be construed as a notice under Section 8B of the Act. It was observed as under:- “8. We may fruitfully refer to one of the notices sent by the Commission to one of the organizers, namely, Lakhan Tomar, respondent No. 10. The said notice reads as follows: “Sh. It was observed as under:- “8. We may fruitfully refer to one of the notices sent by the Commission to one of the organizers, namely, Lakhan Tomar, respondent No. 10. The said notice reads as follows: “Sh. Lakhan Tomar, (in Jail), Organizer, Consumer Show, Victoria Park, Meerut, Via Superintendent, District Jail, Meerut, Meerut On 10th of April, a sad incident of massive fire occurred in the 3 Pandals of Brand Consumer Show at Victoria Park, Civil Lines area of police station, District Meerut. In order to ascertain the reasons, circumstances and fixing of responsibilities, the Government of Uttar Pradesh issued notification bearing No. 2155p/Chh.p-3-2006-12(51)p/2006 dated 2 June, 2006 appointing a one member Enquiry Commission under the Commission of Inquiry Act 1952 (Government Order no. 60 of 1952) and the said Commission is in progress. The Commission is enquiring into the following issues: To find out the circumstances and causes on account of which the aforesaid accident occurred. To recommend ways and means to keep up such incidents in check in future. In respect of the aforesaid occurrence, determination of liability and fixing the same. Measures to be adopted to prevent such occurrences in future. Your presence is mandatorily required for the said Enquiry. You are hereby directed to appear before the Commission on the 27th of September 2006 at 10:30 AM and ensure the recording of your Statement. You are also required to present before the Commission all the Documents, correspondence, Acts, Rules, Government Orders, Departmental orders, if any, related to the circumstances of the incident. You are also informed that the above notice is issued under the provisions of Commission of Enquiry Act 1952 (Government Order no. 60 of 1952) and the compliance of which is necessary, mandatory and binding.” 9. Similar notices were sent to the other organizers. On a perusal of the said notice, it is limpid that the said notice is in the nature of notice requiring him to appear. It has to be construed as a notice under Section 4(a) of the Act. That apart, on a scrutiny of the list of witnesses who were examined by the Commission, we find that the respondents 10 to 12 were summoned almost after examination of 45 witnesses and the respondent- organisers were not afforded opportunity of cross-examination. It has to be construed as a notice under Section 4(a) of the Act. That apart, on a scrutiny of the list of witnesses who were examined by the Commission, we find that the respondents 10 to 12 were summoned almost after examination of 45 witnesses and the respondent- organisers were not afforded opportunity of cross-examination. The Commission, on the basis of the evidence and taking recourse to certain violation of statutory provisions, has submitted the report. 59. In Jai Prakash Associates Limited, Lucknow v. state of UP and another, 2004 All LJ 2448, in para 15, it was observed that a reasonable opportunity of being heard and opportunity to produce evidence in his defence presupposes that the person is atleast made aware of the allegations against him so that he may effectively exercise such opportunity. The relevant para reads thus:- “16. It is also relevant to note that the letter dated 12.11.2003 given by the Secretary of the Commission clarifies that on what subject matter the stand of the petitioner is required to be given. Thus in view of the above, it is clear that the notice dated 6.1.2003 issued to the petitioner was a notice under rule 5(2) and cannot be said to be opportunity as contemplated under Section 8B. Section 8B mandates the Commission to give reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry and to produce evidence in his defence. Notice dated 6.11.2003 does not even suggest that “reasonable opportunity of being heard” and “to produce evidence in his defence”. Reasonable opportunity of being heard implies making a person aware of the allegation against him and to give opportunity to him to effectively represent his case. The opportunity to produce evidence in his defence also pre-supposes that the person is at least made aware of the allegations against the said person so that he may effectively exercise. Notice dated 6.11.2003 which called on the petitioner to give its stand cannot be treated to be compliance of opportunity as contemplated by Section 8B of the Act.” 60. In Kiran Bedi v. Commission of Inquiry and another, 1989(1) SCC 494 , the Supreme Court emphasised upon the importance attached with regard to safeguarding a person's reputation. The relevant paras read thus:- “21. In Kiran Bedi v. Commission of Inquiry and another, 1989(1) SCC 494 , the Supreme Court emphasised upon the importance attached with regard to safeguarding a person's reputation. The relevant paras read thus:- “21. The reason for the importance attached with regard to the matter of safeguarding the reputation of a person being prejudicially affected in Clause (b) of Section 8-B of the Act is not far to seek. 22. The following words of caution uttered by the Lord to Arjun in Bhagwad Gita with regard to dishonour or loss of reputation may usefully be quoted: “Akirtinchapi Bhutani Kathaishyanti te-a-vyayam, Sambhavitasya Chakirtir mara- nadatirichyate.” (234) (Men will recount thy perpetual dishonour, and to one highly esteemed, dishonour exceeded death.) 23. In Blackstone's commentary of the laws of England, Vol- I, IVth Edition, it has been stated at page 101 that the right of personal security consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health and his reputation. 24. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 77 at page 268 is to be found the statement of law in the following terms: “It is stated in the definition Person, 70 C.J.S.p. 688 note 66 that legally the term “person” includes not only the physical body and members, but also every bodily sense and personal attribute, among which is the reputation a man has acquired. Blackstone in his Commentaries classifies and distinguishes those rights which are annexed to the person, jura personarum, and acquired rights in external objects, jura rerum; and in the former he includes personal security, which consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. And he makes the corresponding classification of remedies. The idea expressed is that a man's reputation is a part of himself, as his body and limbs are, and reputation is a sort of right to enjoy the goods opinion of others, and it is capable of growth and real existence, as an arm or leg. Reputation is, therefore, a personal right, and the right to reputation is put among those absolute personal rights equal in dignity and importance to security from violence. According to Chancellor Kent, “as a part of the rights of personal security, the preservation of every person's good name from the vile arts of detraction is justly included. Reputation is, therefore, a personal right, and the right to reputation is put among those absolute personal rights equal in dignity and importance to security from violence. According to Chancellor Kent, “as a part of the rights of personal security, the preservation of every person's good name from the vile arts of detraction is justly included. The laws of the ancients, no less than those of modern nations, made private reputation one of the objects of their protection. The right to the enjoyment of a good reputation is a valuable privilege, of ancient origin, and necessary to human society, as stated in Libel and Slander S. 4, and this right is within the constitutional guaranty of personal security as stated in Constitutional La S. 205, and a person may not be deprived of this right through falsehood and violence without liability for the injury as stated in Libel and Slander S. 4. Detraction from a man's reputation is an injury to his personality, and thus an injury to reputation is a personal injury, that is, an injury to an absolute personal right.” 25. In D.F. Marion v. Davis, 55 American Law Reports, page 171, it was held: “The right to the enjoyment of a private reputation, unassailed by malicious slander is of ancient origin, and is necessary to human society. A good reputation is an element of personal security, and is protected by the Constitution equally with the right to the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property.” 61. In State of Bihar v. Lal Krishna Advani, (2003) 8 SCC 361 , the importance of Section 8B of the Act had been explained in the following words by the Supreme Court:- “6. It is thus amply clear that one is entitled to have and preserve, one's reputation and one also has a right to protect it. In case any authority, in discharge of its duties fastened upon it under the law, traverses into the realm of personal reputation adversely affecting him, must provide a chance to him to have his say in the matter. In such circumstances right of an individual to have the safeguard of principles of natural justice before being adversely commented upon by a Commission of Inquiry is statutorily recognised and violation of the same will have to bear the scrutiny of judicial review. In such circumstances right of an individual to have the safeguard of principles of natural justice before being adversely commented upon by a Commission of Inquiry is statutorily recognised and violation of the same will have to bear the scrutiny of judicial review. A reference may be made to [1984] A.C. 808, Peter Thomas Mahon v. Air New Zealand Ltd & Ors.. The provision as contained under Section 8B of the Act quoted above, was brought into the statute book by Amending Act 79 of 1971. Xxxxxxxxxxxx 8. It may be noticed that the amendment was brought about, about 20 years after passing of the main Act itself. The experience during past two decades must have made the Legislature to realize that it would but be necessary to notice a person who conducts the Commission considers it necessary to inquire into during the course of the inquiry or whose reputation is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry. It is further provided that such a person would have a reasonable opportunity of being heard and to adduce evidence in his defence. Thus the principle of natural justice was got inducted in the shape of statutory provision. It is thus incumbent upon the Commission to give an opportunity to a person, before any comment is made or opinion is expressed which is likely to prejudicially affect that person. Needless to emphasise that failure to comply with principles of natural justice renders the action non-est as well as the consequences thereof.” 62. In Sri K.Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1996 AP 62 , while interpreting Section 8B of the Act, it was recorded by the Andhra Pradesh High Court as under:- “51. Section 8B postulates that depending upon the stage of enquiry at which opportunity is provided to the addressee of the notice necessary information should be furnished in the notice. No pro forma notice is prescribed under the Act. But it appears to us to be implicit that if the Commission has collected any material, either documents or statements of witnesses, on the basis of which it formed the opinion, tentatively, that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected, a reference to that material should be made in the notice. But it appears to us to be implicit that if the Commission has collected any material, either documents or statements of witnesses, on the basis of which it formed the opinion, tentatively, that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected, a reference to that material should be made in the notice. We cannot be unmindful of the fact that the person who is provided with an opportunity of being heard is given an option to produce evidence in his defence with regard to his reputation which is likely to be prejudicially affected in the enquiry so he should know and be told of the material which was the basis of forming the requisite opinion by the Commission of Inquiry because it was collected behind his back and he has to defend himself with regard to that material and has also to participate in the further enquiry. If the material which formed the basis of opinion by the Commission is not clearly indicated in the notice, the very purpose of giving a reasonable opportunity would be frustrated and the addressee of the notice will be placed in wilderness. Therefore, it becomes necessary for us to examine the following two aspects: (i) what material was taken into consideration by the Commission while forming the opinion that the reputation of the petitioners is likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry; (ii) has that material been referred to in the notices under Section 8B of the Act? 63. Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General cited pronouncements of Supreme Court reported in Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines v. Ramjee, (1977) 2 SCC 256 , Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, 2006(11) SCC 1 , Ranjan Kumar Mitra v. Andrew Yule & Co. Limited, (1997) 10 SCC 386 , Sohan Lal Gupta v. Asha Devi Gupta, (2003) 7 SCC 492 , Major G.S.Sodhi v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 382 and Daroga Singh v. B.K.Pandey, (2004) 5 SCC 26 , to controvert the plea of the petitioner relating to mandatory requirement of notice under Section 8B of the Act. Suffice it to notice, that none of the aforesaid decisions were rendered discussing the scope of Section 8B of the Act. 64. Having analysed the legal position in respect of Section 8B notice, brief factual matrix may be noticed. Suffice it to notice, that none of the aforesaid decisions were rendered discussing the scope of Section 8B of the Act. 64. Having analysed the legal position in respect of Section 8B notice, brief factual matrix may be noticed. The notice dated 11.3.2016 (Annexure P.5) sent by the Commission is reproduced herein below:- “Justice (Retd.) S.N.Dhingra Commission of Enquiry 321/18, Civil Lines, Gurgaon Haryana-122001 0124-2222400 Email:sec83gurgaoncoe@gmail.com No.DLBH-025/03/2015 Dated: 11.3.2016 To Sh.Bhupinder Singh Hooda (Ex. Chief Minister Haryana) Member of Legislative Assembly, R/o 9, Pandit Pant Marg, New Delhi - 110001. Subject: Notice for depositing before the Commission. I have been directed by the Commission to request you as under:- “Since you were the Minister Incharge of Town and Country Planning and you were also the final authority for grant/refusal of the licenses, you are requested to appear before this Commission on 21st March, 2016 at 12 noon at 321/18, civil Lines, Gurgaon to depose in respect of grant of CLUs and licenses in villages Sihi, Shikohpur, Sikanderpur Bada and Kherki Daula. You may bring along with you all such documents/records which you deem necessary. Should you require the presence of an advocate during your deposition, you may bring alongwith you your advocate. Sd/- Secretary, Justice (Retd.) S.N.Dhingra Commission of Enquiry.” 65. The petitioner filed a detailed representation seeking information relating to the material particulars, wherein, inter alia, specification of the statutory provision under which the notice had been issued to him, had been sought. The applicant had demanded the following documents/information to enable him to participate and assist the Commission of Inquiry:- “(I) Copy of the notification issued under Section 3 of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952, if any; (II) Copy of the Cabinet agenda and material/complaints leading to Haryana Govt. Cabinet decision to appoint this Commission; (III) What is the starting and ending point of inquiry in terms of period? Cabinet decision to appoint this Commission; (III) What is the starting and ending point of inquiry in terms of period? (IV) Copies of all the complaints of alleged irregularities/illegalities in granting licenses/CLUs in the area in question; (V) Copies of all the applications for the licenses/CLUs, revenue records of the land with regard to which such applications were made, letter granting licenses/CLU and noting files of directorate of Town & Country Planning granting license/CLU in the area in question alongwith the enquiry report of the director, Town & Country Planning, Haryana and his reports/recommendations; (VI) Specification of the statutory provision under which notice has been issued to the applicant; (VII) Statements of all the witnesses already recorded by this Hon'ble Commission and documents received in this inquiry till date, if any.” Respondent No.3 rejected the said representation vide order dated 25.3.2016. The plea regarding specification of the statutory provision under which notice had been issued to the applicant, was discussed as under:- “Next is specification of statutory provisions under which notice was issued. The provisions are known to Shri Hooda because in this very letter he had mentioned in detail about the commission of Enquiry Act, of which he seems to have plenty of knowledge, and has mentioned about the precedents under Commission of Enquiry Act. Since he is also having assistance of Senior Advocates, they could have also told him that a Commission of Enquiry is supposed to give notice to such persons, who, it considers necessary to examine. Statement of other witnesses already recorded by the Commission was required to be sent to him by the Commission only if the Commission wanted to confront Shri Hooda with the statements. If the commission had wanted to confront Shri Hooda with certain adverse statements, it would have definitely sent such statements to Shri Hooda to pre inform him.” A perusal of the aforesaid shows that the notice dated 11.3.2016 issued by respondent No.3 does not qualify the requirements of Section 8B of the Act and, thus, cannot be said to be falling within its ambit. In the present circumstances, the statutory right available to the petitioner under Section 8B of the Act cannot be negated on a technical plea raised on behalf of the respondent-State that order dated 25.3.2016 has not been specifically challenged by the petitioner. 66. In the present circumstances, the statutory right available to the petitioner under Section 8B of the Act cannot be negated on a technical plea raised on behalf of the respondent-State that order dated 25.3.2016 has not been specifically challenged by the petitioner. 66. Having concluded that the notice dated 11.3.2016 was not in consonance with the provisions of Section 8B of the Act, it was considered appropriate to peruse the report of the Commission. It has been produced in a sealed cover. Before proceeding further into the said issue, it would also be essential to examine whether this court would have power and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to peruse the same as learned State counsel vehemently contended that the same could not be done before presentation of the report in the assembly as required under the provisions of the Act. Mr Kapil Sibal, learned counsel for the petitioner however opposed the submission and emphasised that the State in a related matter had produced the report of the Commission in a sealed cover before the Supreme Court but had never raised any objection that the same cannot be perused by the court before it is tabled before the State Legislature. It was further submitted that in case, there was no observation made by the Commission affecting the reputation of the petitioner, this plea of the petitioner may be rejected. 67. Article 226 of the Constitution of India confers discretionary and extraordinary powers under which prerogative writs are issued by the High Court. It is also equitable jurisdiction which has been conferred upon the High Court for doing substantial justice where miscarriage of justice or failure of justice has occasioned due to some deliberate act or otherwise. The powers under the said Article exercisable by the High Court are not limited to the rights which emerge or flow under Chapter III of the Constitution of India, i.e. fundamental rights alone, whereas it can be exercised for any other purpose also. 68. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, in view of the above and in the interest of justice, we do not find any impediment to peruse the report of the Commission in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the sealed cover was opened by both of us and was examined in the presence of each other. Accordingly, the sealed cover was opened by both of us and was examined in the presence of each other. The report was again put in the sealed cover thereafter. 69. Having perused the report, we find that it touches and opines on the conduct of the petitioner and affects the reputation thereof. In such circumstances, it was essential to have issued the notice under Section 8B of the Act which has not been done as the notice which was issued did not fulfil the conditions essentially required thereunder. Accordingly, the report submitted by the Commission is held to be non est and the same shall not be published. However, it shall be open for the Commission to proceed further from the stage when notice under Section 8B of the Act was required to be issued and submit fresh report in accordance with law. The writ petition is disposed of in the manner indicated hereinbefore. 70. Let the original record and report of the Commission in sealed cover be returned to the Advocate General, Haryana by the Court Secretary. Anupinder Singh Grewal, J. - I have read the draft judgment of my esteemed brother While I agree with the reasoning and the conclusion in the judgment, I respectfully disagree with the operative part to the extent that “it shall be open for the Commission to proceed further from the stage when notice under Section 8-B of the Act was required to be issued and submit fresh report in accordance with law.” The reasons for disagreement are set out hereinafter. I would also like to elaborate on the scope and ambit of Section 8-B of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). 71. It is apposite to reproduce Section 8-B of the Act which reads as follows:- “8-B Persons likely to be prejudicially affected to be heard. I would also like to elaborate on the scope and ambit of Section 8-B of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). 71. It is apposite to reproduce Section 8-B of the Act which reads as follows:- “8-B Persons likely to be prejudicially affected to be heard. - If, at any stage of the inquiry, the Commission,- (a) Considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct of any person; or (b) Is of opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry, the Commission shall give to that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry and to produce evidence in his defence: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply where the credit of a witness is being impeached.” It is manifest from reading of Section 8-B that in the event of the Commission deeming it essential to enquire into the conduct of any person or it is of the view that reputation of the person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry then it is incumbent upon the Commission to give that person a reasonable opportunity of hearing and present evidence in his defence. 72. I would refer to the notice issued to the petitioner by the Commission on 11.03.2016 (Annexure P-5) which is reproduced hereunder:- “Justice (Retd.) S.N. Dhingra Commission of Enquiry 321/18, Civil Lines, Gurgaon Haryana - 122001 0124-2222400 Email: sec83gurgaoncoe@gmail.com No.DLBH-025/03/2015 Dated 11.03.2016 To Sh. Bhupinder Singh Hooda, (Ex. Chief Minister Haryana) Member of Legislative Assembly, R/o 9, Pandit Pant Marg, New Delhi-110001. Subject: Notice for deposing before the Commission. I have been directed by the Commission to request you as under:- “Since you were the Minister Incharge of Town and Country Planning and you were also the final authority for grant/refusal of the licences, you are requested to appear before this Commission on 21st March, 2016 at 12 noon at 321/18, Civil Lines, Gurgaon to depose in respect of grant of CLUs and licenses in villages Sihi, Shikohpur, Sikanderpur Bada and Kherki Daula. You may bring along with you all such documents/records which you deem necessary. Should you require the presence of an advocate during your deposition, you may bring along with you your advocate.” Sd/- Secretary, Justice (Retd.) S.N. Dhingra Commission of Enquiry” 73. You may bring along with you all such documents/records which you deem necessary. Should you require the presence of an advocate during your deposition, you may bring along with you your advocate.” Sd/- Secretary, Justice (Retd.) S.N. Dhingra Commission of Enquiry” 73. A bare look at the notice indicates that it does not specify the section whereunder it is issued. Even though it may not be necessary to mention the section and the nomenclature would not be conclusive as it is well settled that if the form and substance of the notice conforms to a provision of law, mere non-mention thereof, would not invalidate it. However, the true import of the notice dated 11.03.2016 appears to be that the presence of the petitioner has been sought by the Commission to depose before it as he was the Minister Incharge of Town and Country Planning and was the final authority for grant/refusal of the licences including CLUs in the four villages. 74. In response to the notice, the petitioner by his representation dated 25.03.2016 sought various documents and even clarification with regard to the nature of the notice dated 11.03.2016. He sought particulars of the allegations and statements of witnesses. It was also stated by the petitioner that observations against him were proposed and intended and he was thus entitled to receive the information sought by him. He requested that a fresh date be given after supplying the information. The Commission, while considering the representation of the petitioner passed an order on that very day i.e. 25.03.2016. It is mentioned in the order that several of the documents would be available on the net and that it was not possible to put to the witness all the files which were dealt with by him during his tenure. The Commission intended to put only sample cases to him to understand his modus operandi as the Minister Incharge of the Town and Country Planning Department in getting concurrence or refusal as well as reasons for putting comments. It is also observed in the order that no specific complaint was to be put to the petitioner and if some specific complaints were to be put to him, the same would definitely have been sent to him and he would be at liberty to refresh his memory from the files which were to be put to him by the Commission. It was further observed that it would have been necessary to send statements of other witnesses to the petitioner only if the Commission wished to confront the petitioner with adverse statements and the Commission only sought to summon the petitioner to understand his modus operandi as Minister in charge in granting approvals. The order of the Commission of Inquiry is as follows:- “Justice (Retd.) S.N. Dhingra Commission of Enquiry 25th March, 2016 ORDER The matter is listed today for recording statement of Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda, Ex. Chief Minister of Haryana and Ex. Minister in charge of Town & Country Planning Department before the Enquiry Commission. The Enquiry Commission is looking into the records in respect of grant/refusal of licenses concerning four villages Sihi, Sikohpur, Sikanderpur Bada and Kherki Daula. Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda was Minister in charge of Town & Country Planning Department during his both tenures. The record shows that Minister in Charge of T&C Department was the final authority for giving concurrence for grant of letter of intent/license for establishing commercial/residential/group housing colonies under Development Plan 2021 and subsequent development plans. Since his concurrence was necessary, he had given his approval or comments almost in all files through his Principal Secretary. Since he played a major role in grant of licenses, as his concurrence was must for grant of each and every licence, the Commission had summoned him giving following notice:- “Since you were the Minister Incharge of Town and Country Planning and you were also the final authority for grant/refusal of the licenses, you are requested to appear before this Commission on 21st March, 2016 at 12 noon at 321/18, Civil Lines, Gurgaon to depose in respect of grant of CLUs and licenses in villages Sihi, Shikohpur, Sikanderpur Bada and Kherki Daula. You may bring along with you all such documents/records which you deem necessary. Should you require the presence of an advocate during your deposition, you may bring along with you your advocate.” It was not possible to put to the witness all the files which were dealt with by him during his tenure. So only some sample cases were to be put to him so as to understand the modus operandi of the Minister in charge of T&CP Department in granting concurrence of refusal as well as reasons for putting comments. So only some sample cases were to be put to him so as to understand the modus operandi of the Minister in charge of T&CP Department in granting concurrence of refusal as well as reasons for putting comments. As is clear from notice, no specific complaint was to be put to Shri Hooda. If some specific complaints were to be put, the same would have been sent to him. Since for about 10 years Shri Hooda had been Minister in charge of the T&CP Department, it could not be considered by the Commission that his entire memory had been washed out in respect of the reasons as to why he accorded approval and why he refused approval. Moreover, he was not supposed to answer the queries without looking into the files of such cases. He was to look into the file and then only answer. He had all liberty to refresh his memory from the files which were to be put to him by the Commission. Shri Hooda instead of appearing before the Commission has chosen to stay away from the Commission. His Senior Advocate Shri Narender Kumar Hooda with Shri Deepkaran Dalal, advocate appeared before the Commission and moved a letter of Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda giving reasons for not appearing. In these reasons, it is stated by Shri Hooda that notice sent by the Commission suffers from complete vagueness, lack of specificity and absence of particularization regarding commencement and ending period for each village/each geographical area as also specific issues or queries on which the Commission is seeking information/enlightenment specifically from the notice. He also sought documents/information to participate and assist the commission in the enquiry. He sought following documents:- I. Copy of the notification issued under section 3 of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952, if any; II. Copy of the cabinet agenda and material/complaints leading to Haryana Govt. Cabinet decision to appoint this Commission; III. What is the starting and ending point of Inquiry in terms of period? IV. He sought following documents:- I. Copy of the notification issued under section 3 of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952, if any; II. Copy of the cabinet agenda and material/complaints leading to Haryana Govt. Cabinet decision to appoint this Commission; III. What is the starting and ending point of Inquiry in terms of period? IV. Copies of all the complaints of alleged irregularities/illegalities in granting licenses/CLUs in the area in question; V. Copies of all the applications for the licenses/CLUs, revenue records of the land with regard to which such applications were made, letter granting licenses/CLU and noting files of directorate of town & country planning granting licence/CLU in the area in question along with the enquiry report of the Director Town & Country Planning, Haryana and his reports/recommendations; VI. Specification of the statutory provision under which notice has been issued to the applicant. VII. Statements of all the witnesses already recorded by this Hon'ble Commission and documents received in this inquiry till date, if any. He has also stated that he did not have access to the above record and considered that the record pertaining to above matters may be in the office of Commission of Inquiry and if it was not with the Commission of Inquiry, the Commission should collect the same from the government and supply to him. Without availability of the above record, a worthwhile enquiry cannot be conducted nor the applicant would be able to render any effective assistance to the Commission. He further noted that the tone and tenor of notice and its all encompassing nature suggested that the observations and/or findings against the noticee were proposed and intended. He note that under 1952 Act (Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952) and in view of a catena of judicial precedents, the Commission was obliged to disclose all the relevant material and to act strictly in terms of the statutory provisions of the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 amended up to date. He has also stated that in absence of all above, the notice and initiation of the proceedings would be without jurisdiction, contrary to statute and violative of judicial precedents, ultra vires and hence completely non-maintainable. He further stated that apart from other legal and constitutional issues, this was a threshold issue without the curing and compliance of which the noticee would be unable to appear on 25.03.2016. He further stated that apart from other legal and constitutional issues, this was a threshold issue without the curing and compliance of which the noticee would be unable to appear on 25.03.2016. He also stated that it would severely compromise and prejudice his legal and constitutional rights. The initial notice dated 11.03.2016 was sent to Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda for appearance on 21st March, 2016. However, the Commission received a telephone from Shri Surender Singh Hooda, Advocate of Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda stating that it was not convenient for Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda to appear on 21st March, 2016 as he was busy in the assembly session. The date of 25th March, 2016 was fixed by the Commission as the next date of inquiry as per convenience of Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda despite the fact that it was a Good Friday so that the examination of Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda is done on a date of his convenience. If he was not to appear, he or his counsel could have informed the Commission immediately on receipt of notice. The documents which have been sought by Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda at Sl. No. is a notification which is available in public domain. A copy of the notification could have been downloaded for him by his any able and learned advocates by visiting web page of Govt. of Haryana. Similarly document at Sl. No.II regarding cabinet decision to appoint the Commission is also available on the net. The third document is about starting and ending point of inquiry. The inquiry could not have gone beyond the tenure of Shri Hooda as Minister in charge of Town & Country Planning Department and starting point was also available since the enquiry was in respect of development plan of Gurgaon GMUC 2021 which was approved under the chairmanship of Shri Hooda as Chief Minister and Chairman of State Development Committee. Copies of complaints and irregularities/illegalities in granting licenses/CLUs were not sent by the Commission as the Commission had not intended to put any specific complaints in respect of the specific licenses to him. In case the Commission had received any specific complaint about the conduct of Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda, the Commission would have definitely sent him the copy. The Commission is looking into the records of different licenses where approvals were granted by the Minister in Charge. In case the Commission had received any specific complaint about the conduct of Shri Bhupinder Singh Hooda, the Commission would have definitely sent him the copy. The Commission is looking into the records of different licenses where approvals were granted by the Minister in Charge. In each case, the final approval for grant of LOI was given by the Minister in charge. Copies of all applications of licenses, CLUs, revenue records of land etc. could not have been given to Shri Hooda as the entire record runs into a few lac pages as each license file contains from 500 to 2000 pages and there are around 250 such files. In case of CLUs, Shri Hooda was not the sanctioning authority. So SLU files were not required to be looked into by him unless in some CLUs he had taken personal interest. Otherwise DTCP was the final authority for granting CLUs. Next is specification of statutory provisions under which notice was issued. The provisions are known to Shri Hooda because in this very letter he had mentioned in detail about the Commission of Enquiry Act, of which he seems to have plenty of knowledge, and has mentioned about the precedents under Commission of Enquiry Act. Since he is also having assistance of Senior Advocates, they could have also told him that a Commission of Enquiry is supposed to give notice to such persons, who, it considers necessary to examine. Statement of other witnesses already recorded by the Commission was required to be sent to him by the Commission only if the Commission wanted to confront Shri Hooda with the statements. If the Commission had wanted to confront Shri Hooda with certain adverse statements, it would have definitely sent such statements to Shri Hooda to pre inform him. If Shri Hooda had desired to look into the record available with the Commission, he should have made request soon after the summons were received to him. The same were issued to him on 11th March, 2016. He had plenty of time to sent a request to the Commission for inspection of the record available with the Commission. He made no such request. His observations about tone and tenor of the notice are not required to be commented upon. The same were issued to him on 11th March, 2016. He had plenty of time to sent a request to the Commission for inspection of the record available with the Commission. He made no such request. His observations about tone and tenor of the notice are not required to be commented upon. It is obligatory on the Commission to give opportunity to the persons in respect of whom the record shows that the person acted contrary to law. The Commission also wanted to show the record of some of the licenses to Shri Hooda where his observations/orders were recorded by his Principal Secretary and wanted to know the reasons of such observations after showing him the entire license application record. If a witness/officer does not want to appear and does not explain his conduct as borne out from the record, he is at liberty to do so. Simultaneously the Commission can draw its own inferences from the record available with it. The Commission would, therefore, be free to draw inferences. (emphasis supplied) Sd/- Justice (Retd.) S.N. Dhingra 25.03.2016” 75. It is also mentioned in the order that it is obligatory on the part of the Commission to give opportunity to the persons in respect of whom the record shows that the person acted contrary to law and if a witness/officer does not appear and explain his conduct as borne out from the record, he is at liberty to do so and the Commission would draw its own inference from the record available with it. 76. Therefore, the order dated 25.03.2016 does suggest that there may be something against the petitioner in the record but it does not specify the same. The Commission does not elaborate the nature of such record nor it refers to any material or statement which would be adverse to the petitioner. 77. The notice and the order of the Commission would suggest that the notice was more in the nature of one under Section 4(a) of the Act for securing the presence of the petitioner as a witness. The vague and nebulous reference in the order to the conduct of the petitioner cannot by itself be construed to mean that the notice was under Section 8- B of the Act. The vague and nebulous reference in the order to the conduct of the petitioner cannot by itself be construed to mean that the notice was under Section 8- B of the Act. To comply with the provisions of Section 8-B, the notice would have to categorically state that the petitioner's conduct was being enquired into and the nature of conduct would have to be specified. The adverse material before the Commission which would have potential to be the foundation of the report or recommendation of the Commission affecting the reputation of the petitioner would have to be put to him to enable him to respond thereto. The complaints and the material against the petitioner was required to be put before him and he was to be granted reasonable opportunity to send his reply thereto as well as to lead evidence in his support and only thereupon after fair consideration, could an adverse finding be recorded against him. 78. It is important to note that the Legislature was aware of the importance of the report of the Commission set up under the Act and the adverse affect, its findings or observations may have, on the reputation of an individual and to safeguard the right to reputation, Section 8-B of the Act was introduced by Act No.79 of 1971. The principles of natural justice were thus recognized by the legislature and statutorily incorporated in the Act. 79. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 has contended with much vehemence that Commission is only a fact finding body and the Government may or may not accept its report or act in terms thereof. The findings per se would not prejudice anybody. However, this contention cannot be countenanced in the face of Section 8-B of the Commission of Inquiry Act. Any adverse comment, observation or finding in the report would affect the reputation of the person concerned. It is well settled that right to reputation is a facet of right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. 80. The contention of the learned State counsel that had the petitioner put in appearance before the Commission, he would have been shown the adverse material cannot also be accepted. Section 8-B of the Act is independent of Section 4 of the Act. Both Section 4 and Section 8-B operate in their own field and are mutually exclusive. 80. The contention of the learned State counsel that had the petitioner put in appearance before the Commission, he would have been shown the adverse material cannot also be accepted. Section 8-B of the Act is independent of Section 4 of the Act. Both Section 4 and Section 8-B operate in their own field and are mutually exclusive. Section 4 of the Act is essentially for securing presence and evidence of witnesses which would be required by the Commission to arrive at conclusion towards the terms of reference ascribed to it. In this regard the Commission has been entrusted with the powers of the civil Court. 81. On the other hand, Section 8-B is a valuable right to a person against whom there is alleged adverse material and the findings or observations thereon are likely to be made against him which would prejudicially affect his reputation. The reference in Section 8-B to any stage indicates that fair and proper notice under Section 8-B would be essential before the submission of the report. It could be sent at any stage of the proceedings of the Commission when material surfaces before the Commission which would be against a person and is likely to be the foundation of observations or findings of the Commission. 82. It would be desirable that a person who receives notice from Commission of Inquiry under Section 4 puts in appearance before the Commission. If a person for any reason does not appear before the Commission, the Commission would, of course, use powers of civil court under Section 4 or continue the proceedings. However, when anything adverse against that person crops up before the Commission and is likely to be the basis of any observations, comments or findings in the report having the potential to harm his reputation, it would be incumbent upon the Commission to serve a notice to the person along with the material against him and give him an opportunity to explain his conduct before recording such observations or findings. 83. An essential prerequisite of a reasonable opportunity of hearing is that the person is informed about the allegations and material against him and allowed a reasonable opportunity to rebut the same with evidence in his defence. 83. An essential prerequisite of a reasonable opportunity of hearing is that the person is informed about the allegations and material against him and allowed a reasonable opportunity to rebut the same with evidence in his defence. In the event of notice being issued to a person without specifying the allegations and complaints or material against him it would well nigh be impossible to reply thereto or produce evidence in his defence. 84. It is trite that even in absence of statutory provisions for affording an opportunity of hearing, a person who is likely to be visited with civil consequences is required to be given a fair opportunity of hearing. Section 8-B of the Act has been specifically incorporated as a safeguard against a person's reputation being affected without a reasonable opportunity to him to present his defence. 85. Learned State counsel has cited several judgments in support of his contention that adequate opportunity was afforded to the petitioner in terms of Section 8-B of the Act and as he opted not to participate in the proceedings before the Commission he now cannot turn around and allege violation of the section or denial of principles of natural justice. 86. Before adverting to these judgments, I deem it apposite to refer to Lord Denning, who while elucidating on the application of precedents, had opined :- “Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.” “Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it” 87. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it” 87. There is no denying the general principle laid down in the judgments relied upon by the counsel for respondent No.1 that principles of natural justice cannot be applied in a straightjacket formula and are not an unruly horse, or lurking landmine, nor a judicial cure all. However, all these judgments are clearly distinguishable on facts and not applicable to the case at hand. In none of these judgments was compliance of statutory provision akin to Section 8-B of the Act in question. They are also not those, in which, the affected person did not know the nature of the case including the adverse material against him. 88. In the case of The Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines and another v. Ramjee (1977) 2 SCC 256 , the respondent who was a Shot Firer in a Colliery had handed over explosive substance to an unskilled hand who fired it, injuring an employee. The Regional Inspector of Mines after enquiring into the accident and on the respondent's virtual admission recommended the cancellation of his certificate. The Board after examining the report and the material in the inquiry report cancelled the certificate. The cancellation was rejected by the High Court on ground of violation of Regulation 26 as the Regional Inspector had no power to recommend and could only send his report. The Board had to independently consider the matter. The Supreme Court held that as the respondent had been given an opportunity to explain his conduct in appeal before the Board, the order was in consonance with Regulation 26 and there was no violation of principles of natural justice. 89. In the case of Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana and others (2006) 11 SCC 1 , proceedings under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India had been initiated against Members of the Legislative Assembly, who were alleged to have voluntarily given up the membership of their party making them liable for disqualification. The Speaker while disqualifying them had considered their replies to the complaint. They were asked to watch the video recording in support of the allegation that they had voluntarily given up the membership but they refused to do so. The Speaker while disqualifying them had considered their replies to the complaint. They were asked to watch the video recording in support of the allegation that they had voluntarily given up the membership but they refused to do so. Their replies were found to be vague even in respect to the material put to them including their signatures on the register of the meeting of the Legislative Party to which they were alleged to have defected. It was recorded by the Speaker that they wanted to prolong the proceedings beyond the date for Rajya Sabha elections to enable them to vote. Therefore, it was held by the Supreme Court that there was compliance with the principles of natural justice and denial of further opportunity did not vitiate the disqualification. 90. The case of Ranjan Kumar Mitra v. Andrew Yule and Co. Ltd. And others, (1997) 10 SCC 386 pertains to an employee who had challenged his termination pursuant to an inquiry wherein he chose not to participate. It was not a case wherein the petitioner did not know the charges and evidence against him. Even otherwise the proceedings in a commission of inquiry under the Act are entirely different and cannot be equated with the disciplinary action against an employee. 91. The case of Sohan Lal Gupta and others v. Asha Devi Gupta and others (2003) 7 SCC 492 pertains to proceedings before the Arbitration Tribunal wherein it was alleged that as reasonable opportunity was not afforded a party could not be present at the time of proceedings. It was held that as the notice of the date, time and place of arbitration proceedings had been issued and the party had voluntarily failed to appear, it could not be said that there was denial of reasonable opportunity, especially when the interest of the party was not adverse to the other co-sharers, who had remained present in the proceedings. The party had also relinquished its right by withdrawing the application raising objections in this regard. 92. In the case of Major G.S. Sodhi v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 382 the petitioner had challenged the Court martial proceedings alleging lapses in constitution of court of inquiry, recording of summary evidence, issuance of charge sheet etc. The party had also relinquished its right by withdrawing the application raising objections in this regard. 92. In the case of Major G.S. Sodhi v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 382 the petitioner had challenged the Court martial proceedings alleging lapses in constitution of court of inquiry, recording of summary evidence, issuance of charge sheet etc. It was held that as he had duly participated in the proceedings and no prejudice was caused to him there was no violation of principles of natural justice. In para 34, it has also been held that there is no violation of mandatory rules and in case there was violation, the benefit would have gone to the delinquent. 93. The case of Daroga Singh and others v. B.K. Pandey, (2004) 5 SCC 26 pertains to criminal contempt wherein notice and copy of report containing the allegations had been duly sent to the contemner. He was also given an opportunity to cross examine those, who had deposed against him on affidavits but his counsel did not do so. The prayer for liberty to cross-examine at the stage of arguments, was denied and it was held that the opportunity had been granted earlier and, therefore, principles of natural justice had been complied with. 94. In the case of P.D. Dinakaran (1) v. Judges Inquiry Committee and others, (2011) 8 SCC 380 , the petitioner therein had challenged appointment of respondent No.3 therein as Member of the Committee enquiring into his conduct after almost 10 months of the appointment on the ground of bias. It was contended that respondent No.3, who was a Senior Advocate, had on an earlier occasion expressed his opinion against the petitioner in the media and therefore, there was reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of the petitioner. It was held by the Supreme Court that as the petitioner had remained silent for 10 months after the appointment, he could not turn around and challenge the same. The allegation was of personal bias against member of the Committee. No such allegation has been levelled by the petitioner against the composition of the Commission of inquiry in the case at hand. 95. On the contrary, the judgments relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner pertain to compliance of Section 8-B of the Act and underscore its importance as a mandatory statutory provision. 96. No such allegation has been levelled by the petitioner against the composition of the Commission of inquiry in the case at hand. 95. On the contrary, the judgments relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner pertain to compliance of Section 8-B of the Act and underscore its importance as a mandatory statutory provision. 96. I may refer to the judgment of the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of Jai Prakash Associates Ltd., Lucknow v. State of U.P. and another reported as 2004 SCC OnLine All 1891, wherein Commission of Inquiry had been set up in respect of alleged irregularities in Taj Expressway Project. The petitioner company, which has been assigned the construction of the project, was issued notice to clarify its stand with regard to subject matter of the inquiry. The petitioner's representative appeared and preferred an application that unless specific query is put, on which the petitioner was required to reply, it is difficult to place (sic) any stand. The Secretary of the Commission replied that the main question pertaining to contract settlement of the project would relate to the concession agreement and the bid document. The petitioner sought 15 days time which request was rejected by the Commission by passing an order wherein it was observed that it is open to petitioner to avail opportunity already granted while proceedings are still continuing. It was held by the Division Bench of the High Court while emphasizing the importance of Section 8-B of the Act that the notice could not be construed to be as under Section 8-B of the Act. The High Court held that: “16. It is also relevant to note that the letter dated 12-11-2003 given by the Secretary of the Commission clarifies that on what subject-matter the stand of the petitioner is required to be given. Thus in view of the above it is clear that the notice dated 6-11-2003 issued to the petitioner was a notice under Rule 5(2) and cannot be said to be opportunity as contemplated under Section 8-B. Section 8-B mandates the Commission to give reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry and to produce evidence in his defence. Notice dated 6-11-2003 does not even suggest that the petitioner has to give any evidence in his defence. Section 8-B uses the expression “reasonable opportunity of being heard” and “to produce evidence in his defence”. Notice dated 6-11-2003 does not even suggest that the petitioner has to give any evidence in his defence. Section 8-B uses the expression “reasonable opportunity of being heard” and “to produce evidence in his defence”. Reasonable opportunity of being heard implies making a person aware of the allegation against him and to give opportunity to him to effectively represent his case. The opportunity to produce evidence in his defence also pre-supposes that the person is at least made aware of the allegations against the said person so that he may effectively exercise. Notice dated 6-11-2003 which called on the petitioner to give its stand cannot be treated to be compliance of opportunity as contemplated by Section 8-B of the Act.” xxx xxxx xxxx “20. It is also necessary to be considered as to whether the petitioner in the facts of the present case was entitled to a notice under Section 8-B. As noted above, notice under Section 8-B is contemplated in two eventualities i.e. when it is necessary to enquire into the conduct of any person or the Commission is of the opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry. The enquiry report filed on 21-11-2003 makes various adverse observations against the petitioner. The report observes that there was some very strong under-current between the beneficiary and the various officers involved in the process. The Commission report observed:- “The bidder, with the only object of securing, illegal benefits from the project, misrepresented his financial arrangement, and the land which could be released only after arranging of finances from the Phase one, was taken as input for establishing financial arrangement.” 21. At several places in the report hidden understanding between the beneficiary and the State Government Officials and the authorities have been mentioned which gives an impression that extraneous considerations were present in the acceptance of the tender. The report further observes:- “The record shows that the dictates/command of the bidder/master for identifying and providing prime 500 acres land of NOIDA was carried out by the authorities who otherwise were responsible Officers of the TEA as well as the State Government.” 22. The various observations in the report cast aspersions on the conduct of the petitioner and also seriously prejudiced the reputation of the petitioner. The various observations in the report cast aspersions on the conduct of the petitioner and also seriously prejudiced the reputation of the petitioner. From the perusal of the Commission's report it cannot be denied that opportunity under Section 8-B was necessary in the facts of the present case. Opportunity under Section 8-B also entitles a person to exercise various rights as provided under Section 8-C of the Act. In view of what has been stated above, it is amply proved that no opportunity was given to the petitioner within the meaning of Section 8-B and submission of the report against the petitioner without giving reasonable opportunity to the petitioner of hearing and to lead evidence in his defence vitiates the enquiry report.” (emphasis supplied) It was also held that a reasonable opportunity of being heard and opportunity to produce evidence in defence pre-supposes that the person is at least made aware of the allegation against him so that he may effectively exercise such opportunity. 97. In the case of Sri K. Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, reported as AIR 1996 A.P. 62 , a Commission of Inquiry had been set up to enquire into alleged irregularities in the functioning of the State Film Development Corporation, Information and Public Relation Department and Filmanagar Cooperative Society. Notice was issued to the petitioner therein, who was a former Chief Minister, stating that his name was revealed from the files mentioned therein as important authority in the decision making process and the Commission was of opinion that his reputation is likely to be prejudicially affected while appreciating the aforesaid files and related record and with a view to provide him an opportunity of hearing, the notice was issued to him and if he desires he may participate in the inquiry and produce evidence in his defence. Notice issued to the petitioner therein is reproduced hereunder:- “To Sri K. Vijayabhaskara Reddy, M.L.A, Former Chief Minister of A.P, H. No.8-2-268. K/9, Navodaya Colony, Banjara Hills, HYDERABAD. WHEREAS the Government of Andhra Pradesh have appointed the Commission of Inquiry in G.O.Ms No.11, General Administration, I and PR Department, dated 13-1-1995 to enquire into the irregularities in the functioning of Andhra Pradesh State Film Development Corporation, I & P.R. Department and Filmnagar Co-operative Housing Society. AND WHEREAS the files have been submitted by the Government of Andhra Pradesh forming part of G.O. Rt. AND WHEREAS the files have been submitted by the Government of Andhra Pradesh forming part of G.O. Rt. No.1505 General Administration (I & PR) Department, dated 28-3-1994, G.O.Ms No.224, General Administration (I & PR) Department dated 2-4-1994, G.O. Rt. No.3871, dated 25-6-1994, G.O.Ms Nos. 311, 315, 316, General Administration (I & PR) Department, dated 25-6-1994, G.O.Ms Nos. 482, 483 and 484, General Administration (I & PR) Department, dated 24-9-1994, G.O.Ms No.382 General Administration (I & PR) Department, dated 13-7-1994, G.O.Ms No.533, General Administration (I & PR) Department, dated 12-10-1994, G.O.Ms Number 1304, Revenue (Assignment-III) Department, dated 22-12-1993 which relate to the appointment of Sistas Private Limited Publicity Agency with sanctions for payments and in relation to the sanction of loan advances to Andhra Pradesh State Film Development Corporation, approval of loan of Rs.97.50 Lakhs to Sri M.S. Reddy, Film producer,and also for allotment of extra land in favour of Sri M.S. Reddy, Film Producer (Copies of the G.Os enclosed). AND WHEREAS from the perusal of the above mentioned files, your name is revealed as being the important authority in the decision making process. AND WHEREAS the Commission of Inquiry is of the opinion that your reputation is likely to be prejudicially affected while appreciating the aforesaid files and related records. And hence with a view to provide you with an opportunity of being heard, the Commission of Inquiry has been pleased to order issuance of Notice to you. NOW THEREFORE, you may, if you so desire participate in the inquiry and to inform the willingness to produce evidence in your defence, if any, within 15 days from the date of receipt of this Notice. (NOTE: The relevant records are available in the Office of the Commission of Inquiry and they can be perused on any working day during Office hours) Dated this the 10th day of April, 1995. (BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION) Sd/- K. Satyanaravana, 10-4-1995, P.S.-Cum-Deputy Registrar, Justice G. Radhakrishna Rao Commission of Inquiry.” (emphasis supplied) 98. (NOTE: The relevant records are available in the Office of the Commission of Inquiry and they can be perused on any working day during Office hours) Dated this the 10th day of April, 1995. (BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION) Sd/- K. Satyanaravana, 10-4-1995, P.S.-Cum-Deputy Registrar, Justice G. Radhakrishna Rao Commission of Inquiry.” (emphasis supplied) 98. It was held by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court that the necessary material which is likely to prejudicially affect the reputation of the petitioner is not referred to in the notice under Section 8-B and thus, the petitioner is not informed what he has to defend and what material or record he has to rebut to safeguard his interest and reputation from being affected and therefore, the notice was not in compliance with Section 8-B of the Act. The High Court held that: “51. Section 8B postulates that depending upon the stage of enquiry at which opportunity is provided to the addressee of the notice necessary information should be furnished in the notice. No pro forma notice is prescribed under the Act. But it appears to us to be implicit that if the Commission has collected any material, either documents or statements of witnesses, on the basis of which it formed the opinion, tentatively, that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected, a reference to that material should be made in the notice. We cannot be unmindful of the fact that the person who is provided with an opportunity of being heard is given an option to produce evidence in his defence with regard to his reputation which is likely to be prejudicially affected in the enquiry so he should know and be told of the material which was the basis of forming the requisite opinion by the Commission of Inquiry because it was collected behind his back and he has to defend himself with regard to that material and has also to participate in the further enquiry. If the material which formed the basis of opinion by the Commission is not clearly indicated in the notice, the very purpose of giving a reason able opportunity would be frustrated and the addressee of the notice will be placed in wilderness. If the material which formed the basis of opinion by the Commission is not clearly indicated in the notice, the very purpose of giving a reason able opportunity would be frustrated and the addressee of the notice will be placed in wilderness. Therefore, it becomes necessary for us to examine the following two aspects: (i) what material was taken into consideration by the Commission while forming the opinion that the reputation of the petitioners is likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry; (ii) has that material been referred to in the notices under Section 8B of the Act?” xxx xxxx xxxxx xxxx xxxxx “54. From the above discussion it follows that the necessary material which is likely to prejudicially affect the reputation of the petitioners, is not referred to in the notices under Section 8B and thus the petitioners are not told of what they have to defend and what is the material on record which they have to rebut to safeguard their interest and to save their reputation being prejudicially affected. Further, when they were given notices affording opportunity of being heard granting 15 days time, the petitioners are justified in expecting that further enquiry would not go on during that period and commenting that to collect material which would prejudice the interest of the addressees of the notices till the expiry of the specified period in the notice to participate would amount to collecting the material behind the back of the addressees of the notice and conducting the enquiry otherwise than fairly. But for the above reasons, in our view, the proceedings of the Commission during that period cannot be held to be vitiated and cannot be declared as null and void for notice under Section 8B can be given at any stage of the proceedings and it would have been open to the Commission to give notices under Section 8B even at the closure of the enquiry.” (emphasis supplied) 99. In the case of Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry and another reported as (1989) 1 SCC 494 , Inquiry Committee had been set up under the Act to enquire into allegations of the police officers handcuffing and lathi charging lawyers at Tees Hazari complex in Delhi. Notice had been issued to the petitioner and other police officers to appear before the Committee. Notice had been issued to the petitioner and other police officers to appear before the Committee. They did not appear before the Committee on the ground that if they appear at the initial stage of the inquiry, their defence would be exposed which would cause grave prejudice to them. The Committee recommended action against them under Section 178 of the IPC. It was held by the Supreme Court that the reluctance of the petitioner and other police officers to appear and depose before the Committee at the initial stage, was justified as it would have prejudiced them as allegations had been leveled against them. The action of the Committee in holding that the petitioners were not covered by Section 8-B of the Act and compelling them to enter the witness box at the initial stage of the inquiry was held to be discriminatory. It was also held that requirements of Section 8-B are not confined to a particular stage and can arise at any stage where a Commission of Inquiry considers it necessary to enquire into the conduct of a person or is of opinion that his reputation may be prejudicially affected. It was further held that Section 8-B of the Act is a safeguard to the right to reputation which is a facet of right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. Relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “21. The reason for the importance attached with regard to the matter of safeguarding the reputation of a person being prejudicially affected in Clause (b) of Section 8-B of the Act is not far to seek. 22. The following words of caution uttered by the Lord to Arjun in Bhagwad Gita with regard to dishonour or loss of reputation may usefully be quoted: “Akirtinchapi Bhutani Kathaishyanti te-a-vyayam, Sambhavitasya Chakirtir maranadatirichyate.” (2.34) (Men will recount thy perpetual dishonour, and to one highly esteemed, dishonour exceedeth death.) 23. In Blackstone's commentary of the laws of England, Volume I, 4th edn., it has been stated at page 101 that the right of personal security consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health and his reputation. 24. In Blackstone's commentary of the laws of England, Volume I, 4th edn., it has been stated at page 101 that the right of personal security consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health and his reputation. 24. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 77 at page 268 is to be found the statement of law in the following terms: “It is stated in the definition Person, 70 C.J.S. p. 688 note 66 that legally the term “person” includes not only the physical body and members, but also every bodily sense and personal attribute, among which is the reputation a man has acquired. Blackstone in his Commentaries classifies and distinguishes those rights which are annexed to the person, jura personarum, and acquired rights in external objects, jura rerum; and in the former he includes personal security, which consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. And he makes the corresponding classification of remedies. The idea expressed is that a man's reputation is a part of himself, as his body and limbs are, and reputation is a sort of right to enjoy the good opinion of others, and it is capable of growth and real existence, as an arm or leg. Reputation is, therefore, a personal right, and the right to reputation is put among those absolute personal rights equal in dignity and importance to security from violence. According to Chancellor Kent, “as a part of the rights of personal security, the preservation of every person's good name from the vile arts of detraction is justly included. The laws of the ancients, no less than those of modern nations, made private reputation one of the objects of their protection. The right to the enjoyment of a good reputation is a valuable privilege, of ancient origin, and necessary to human society, as stated in Libel and Slander Section 4, and this right is within the constitutional guaranty of personal security as stated in Constitutional Law Section 205, and a person may not be deprived of this right through falsehood and violence without liability for the injury as stated in Libel and Slander Section 4. Detraction from a man's reputation is an injury to his personality, and thus an injury to reputation is a personal injury, that is, an injury to an absolute personal right.” (emphasis supplied) 100. Reference may also be made to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Lal Krishna Advani and others v. State of Bihar AIR 1997 PAT 15 , wherein Commission had been set up to enquire into the Bhagalpur riots. It was held by the High Court after perusing the report of the Commission that as observations had been made in the report against the petitioner which would adversely affect his reputation, it was essential to comply with Section 8-B of the Act and provide him opportunity of being heard and to produce evidence in his defence with regard to the allegations or findings, which, in case, remain un-rebutted, would certainly prejudicially affect his reputation. The High Court partly allowed the writ petition and ordered that such parts of the report which had commented upon the conduct and adversely affected his reputation shall be inoperative and no action can be taken on the basis thereof. It was also held that the fact that the report does not have binding value or is of no consequence and does not render the petitioner remediless, especially in a case, where release of report would adversely affect his reputation without giving him an opportunity to explain his conduct. The judgment was challenged by the State of Bihar and was upheld by the Supreme Court reported as State of Bihar v. Lal Krishna Advani and others (2003) 8 SCC 361 wherein the importance of the right to reputation as emphasized in the case of Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry and another (supra) was reiterated. The relevant extract of the judgment of the Supreme Court is reproduced hereunder:- “5. The High Court, in our view, has been rightly cautious in observing that it was not concerned about the merit on the question of appointment or the recommendations of the Commission but it confined its inquiry to the parts of the Report which, according to Respondent 1, were objectionable and it was necessary that he was allowed an opportunity before making any comment on his alleged conduct. The High Court, after elaborate discussion on the point involved, partly allowed the writ petition, ordering that such parts of the Report shall be inoperative and no action can be taken on the basis thereof.” “6. The High Court, while referring to a decision reported in State of J & K v. Bakshi Gulam Mohammad observed that when an authority takes a decision, which may have civil consequences and affects the right of a person, the principles of natural justice would at once come into play. Reputation of an individual is an important part of one's life. The High Court then quoted a passage from a decision of this Court reported in Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry which passage (SCC p.515, para 25) contains the observations from an American decision in D.F. Marion v. Minnie Davis and reads as follows : “The right to enjoyment of a private reputation, unassailed by malicious slander is of ancient origin, and is necessary to human society. A good reputation is an element of personal security, and is protected by the Constitution equally with the right to the enjoyment of life, liberty and property.” Some decisions, to which our attention has been drawn by Shri Harish N. Salve, learned senior counsel appearing for Respondent 1, may be referred: Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni wherein it was observed that right to reputation is a facet of right to life of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution. He has also referred to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1965 (ICCPR), recognizing the right to have opinions and the right of freedom of expression subject to the right of reputation of others. The Covenant provides : “1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. 3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) for respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) for the protection of national security or of public order (order public), or of public health or morals.” It is thus amply clear that one is entitled to have and preserve, one's reputation and one also has a right to protect it. In case any authority, in discharge of its duties fastened upon it under the law, traverses into the realm of personal reputation adversely affecting him, it must provide a chance to him to have his say in the matter. In such circumstances right of an individual to have the safeguard of principles of natural justice before being adversely commented upon by a Commission of Inquiry is statutorily recognised and violation of the same will have to bear the scrutiny of judicial review. A reference may be made to Peter Thomas Mahon v. Air New Zealand Ltd. 7. The provision as contained under Section 8-B of the Act quoted above, was brought into the statute-book by amending Act 79 of 1971. 8. It may be noticed that the amendment was brought about, about 20 years after passing of the main Act itself. The experience during the past two decades must have made the legislature realize that it would but be necessary to notice a person whose conduct the Commission considers necessary to inquire into during the course of the inquiry or whose reputation is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry. It is further provided that such a person would have a reasonable opportunity of being heard and to adduce evidence in his defence. Thus the principles of natural justice were got inducted in the shape of a statutory provision. It is thus incumbent upon the Commission to give an opportunity to a person, before any comment is made or opinion is expressed which is likely to prejudicially affect that person. Needless to emphasise that failure to comply with the principles of natural justice renders the action non est as well as the consequences thereof. 9. It is thus incumbent upon the Commission to give an opportunity to a person, before any comment is made or opinion is expressed which is likely to prejudicially affect that person. Needless to emphasise that failure to comply with the principles of natural justice renders the action non est as well as the consequences thereof. 9. Shri Dinesh Dwivedi, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that since no action has been taken against Respondent 1 so far, in pursuance of the report of the Inquiry Commission there was no occasion for him to move the Court in the matter. It was not the appropriate stage to raise any grievance by filing a petition challenging certain observations made by the Commission of Inquiry. The petition was thus premature. We feel that it may not be necessary for a person to wait till certain action is initiated by the Government considering the report of the Inquiry Commission where the observations made by the Commission are such which militate against the reputation of a person and particularly, without giving any chance to such a person to explain his conduct. It would be open for him to move the Court for deletion of such remarks made against him violating the provisions of Section 8-B of the Act.” xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 11. We have already observed that had it been only a question of any adverse action being taken against the person against whom some adverse finding has been recorded, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant may perhaps would have been entertainable. The government actually takes action or it does not or the fact that the report is yet to be considered from that angle, cannot be a reason to submit that it won't be the appropriate stage to approach the Court. There may be occasions where after consideration of the report the Government may decide not to take any action against the person concerned yet the observation and remarks may be such which may play upon the reputation of the person concerned and this aspect of the matter has been fully taken care of under clause (b) of Section 8-B of the Act. It is not, therefore, necessary that one must wait till a decision is taken by the Government to take action against the person after consideration of the report. It is not, therefore, necessary that one must wait till a decision is taken by the Government to take action against the person after consideration of the report. We have already dealt with the point about the right to have and protect one's reputation. We, therefore, find no force in the submission that respondent 1 had approached the Court at a premature stage. No other point has been urged on behalf of the appellant. In our view, the judgment of the High Court calls for no interference.” (emphasis supplied) 101. The case of Sanjay Gupta and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2015)5 SCC 283 had arisen out of appointment of Commission of Inquiry to enquire into a fire incident at a park in Meerut and the organizers of the event has been issued a notice to appear before the Commission. It was held that the report without compliance of Section 8-B and 8-C could not be sustained and with the consent of the parties, another Commission under a retired Judge of the Supreme Court was appointed to proceed after following the provisions of the Act. The notice was construed to be a notice under Section 4(a) of the Act for summoning a witness and not one issued under Section 8-B of the Act. The notice issued to one of the organizers of the event is reproduced hereunder:- “Sh. Lakhan Tomar (in Jail), Organizer, Consumer Show, Victoria Park, Meerut, Via Superintendent, District Jail, Meerut, Meerut On 10th of April, a sad incident of massive fire occurred in the 3 pandals of the Brand Consumer Show at Victoria Park, Civil Lines area of police station, District Meerut. In order to ascertain the reasons, circumstances and fixing of responsibilities, the Government of Uttar Pradesh issued notification bearing No. 2155p/Chh.p-3-2006- 12(51)p/2006 dated 2-6-2006 appointing a one member Enquiry Commission under the Commission of Inquiry Act 1952 (Government Order no. 60 of 1952) and the said Commission is in progress. The Commission is enquiring into the following issues: 1. To find out the circumstances and causes on account of which the aforesaid accident occurred. 2. To recommend ways and means to keep up such incidents in check in future. 3. In respect of the aforesaid occurrence, determination of liability and fixing the same. 4. Measures to be adopted to prevent such occurrences in future. To find out the circumstances and causes on account of which the aforesaid accident occurred. 2. To recommend ways and means to keep up such incidents in check in future. 3. In respect of the aforesaid occurrence, determination of liability and fixing the same. 4. Measures to be adopted to prevent such occurrences in future. Your presence is mandatorily required for the said enquiry. You are hereby directed to appear before the Commission on 27-9-2006 at 10:30 AM and ensure the recording of your statement. You are also required to present before the Commission all the documents, correspondence, Acts, Rules, government orders, departmental orders, if any, related to the circumstances of the incident. You are also informed that the above notice is issued under the provisions of Commission of Enquiry Act 1952 (Government Order No. 60 of 1952) and the compliance with which is necessary, mandatory and binding.” (emphasis supplied) The Supreme Court held that : “9. Similar notices were sent to the other organizers. On a perusal of the said notice, it is limpid that the said notice is in the nature of notice requiring him to appear. It has to be construed as a notice under Section 4(a) of the Act. That apart, on a scrutiny of the list of witnesses who were examined by the Commission, we find that respondents 10 to 12 were summoned almost after examination of 45 witnesses and the respondent-organisers were not afforded opportunity of cross-examination. The Commission, on the basis of the evidence and taking recourse to certain violation of statutory provisions, has submitted the report. 10. In State of Bihar v. Lal Krishna Advani while interpreting Section 8-B of the Act which has been brought into the statute by amending Act 79 of 1971, the Court has opined thus: (SCC p. 367, para 8) “8. It may be noticed that the amendment was brought about, about 20 years after passing of the main Act itself. The experience during the past two decades must have made the legislature realize that it would but be necessary to notice a person whose conduct the Commission considers necessary to inquire into during the course of the inquiry or whose reputation is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry. It is further provided that such a person would have a reasonable opportunity of being heard and to adduce evidence in his defence. It is further provided that such a person would have a reasonable opportunity of being heard and to adduce evidence in his defence. Thus the principles of natural justice were got inducted in the shape of a statutory provision. It is thus incumbent upon the Commission to give an opportunity to a person, before any comment is made or opinion is expressed which is likely to prejudicially affect that person. Needless to emphasise that failure to comply with the principles of natural justice renders the action non est as well as the consequences thereof.” (emphasis supplied) 102. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to order passed by Single Bench of this Court in the case of Virender Kumar v. State of Haryana, CWP No.24807 of 2018 wherein, it was alleged by the petitioner therein that the notice issued under Section 8-B of the Act by the Justice S.N. Jha Commission inquiring into incidence of violence in Haryana was not in conformity with Section 8-B of the Act as the material against the petitioner had not been disclosed. By order dated 27.9.2018, the Commission was directed to defer the hearing beyond the date given by the Court. The Advocate General for the State of Haryana made a statement before the Court on 9.10.2018 that the earlier proceedings initiated upon issuance of notice under Section 8-B of the Act be treated as redundant and the petitioner would be given fresh notice in terms of Section 8-B of the Act. The Justice S.N. Jha Commission was functioning and had not ceased to exist at that time. The order dated 9.10.2018 is as follows: “I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Keeping in view the fact that the notice issued under Section 8(B) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (for short 'the Act') is defective, the learned Advocate General, Haryana has submitted that the earlier proceedings, initiated upon the issuance of notice under Section 8(B) of the Act, be treated as redundant and that the petitioner would be given a fresh notice in terms of Section 8(B) of the Act on his appearance, on a date fixed by this Court, before the Commission. He has also submitted that the Commission would follow the statutory procedure, in terms of the provisions of the Act. He has also submitted that the Commission would follow the statutory procedure, in terms of the provisions of the Act. In view of the above, the present petition is disposed of and the petitioner is directed to appear before the Commission on 16.10.2018.” 103. Therefore, it does not leave any manner of doubt that there has been violation of Section 8-B of the Act as notice in conformity therewith was not issued to the petitioner in the case at hand. 104. To treat the notice dated 11.3.2016 as complying with the requirement of Section 8-B would render Section 8-B nugatory and otiose. Legal or statutory provision cannot be diluted in any manner. 105. The contention of the learned Senior counsel for the respondent that there is delay in challenging order dated 25.03.2016 which would disentitle the petitioner to any relief in the instant case would be difficult to accept. 106. It is the case of the petitioner that it was indicated in the order dated 25.3.2016 that had there been any complaint against him it would have been put to him and therefore he was under the impression that whenever any material against him surfaces in the course of inquiry, the same would be sent to him. The report was submitted to the Government and has not been tabled in the Legislature. There is merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that he had learnt that there is something adverse against him in the report after statements were issued by functionaries of the Government including respondent No.2 as reported in the media and thereafter he approached this Court. He has referred to various reports which have been annexed as Annexure P-11 (Colly.). Had the petitioner approached the Court earlier before the submission of report perhaps the petition would have been premature. 107. It is also noteworthy that the report has not been published or laid before the Legislative Assembly in view of the undertaking given by the learned Advocate General to this Court on 23.11.2016. 108. Learned counsel for the petitioner had contended that the report be opened and perused by this Court to know whether there is any observation therein which would affect the reputation of the petitioner. 108. Learned counsel for the petitioner had contended that the report be opened and perused by this Court to know whether there is any observation therein which would affect the reputation of the petitioner. He has referred to the judgment of the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of Jai Prakash Associates Ltd., Lucknow v. State of U.P (supra), wherein the report was opened and perused by the Court. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent has however contended that as the report has to be placed before the Legislature it should not be opened by this Court. 109. However, we deem it necessary to peruse the report to ascertain whether it contains observations against the petitioner which would prejudicially affect his reputation in the light of Section 8-B of the Act. Without perusal of the report it would be difficult to opine on the compliance of Section 8-B. If there is nothing adverse to the petitioner in the report, the question of applicability of Section 8-B of the Act thereto may not arise. The report has not been published in terms of the interim orders of this Court and is not in public domain. 110. We have perused the report of the Commission. 111. It is apparent from the contents of the report that the conduct of the petitioner as Minister in charge of Town and Country Planning in issuing licenses for colonisation, change of land use, etc. was in question. There are adverse observations and findings against the petitioner which would certainly affect his reputation. 112. Ordinarily, in the event of non-compliance of provision of law or principles of natural justice, the Courts do remand the case back and give an opportunity to comply with the provision and take action thereafter in accordance with law. In the case of Sanjay Gupta and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (supra), the Supreme Court with the consent of the parties had appointed another Commission to proceed from the stage of evidence led before the previous Commission as it was alleged that Section 8-B and 8-C of the Act were not complied and the term of the previous Commission had come to an end. It was held thus: “11. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, it is difficult to sustain the report. It was held thus: “11. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, it is difficult to sustain the report. We are obliged to state here that in course of hearing, we had asked the learned counsel for the parties that in case the report of the Commission would be set aside, the Commission has to proceed after following the provisions of the Act. The said position was acceded to. On a further suggestion being made, learned counsel for the parties had fairly agreed for appointment of another retired Judge as Commission. The learned counsel for the parties had suggested certain names in sealed covers but there was no commonality. Regard being had to the gravity of the situation and the magnitude of the tragedy, on due deliberation we appoint Justice S.B. Sinha, formerly a Judge of this Court, as the one man Commission. It is agreed by the learned counsel for the parties that the witnesses, who were examined by the previous Commission and not cross-examined by Respondents 10 to 12, their depositions shall be treated as examination-in-chief and they shall be made available for cross-examination by the respondent. It has also been conceded that the documents which have been marked as exhibits, unless there is a cavil over the same, they shall be treated as exhibited documents.” (emphasis supplied) 113. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Jai Prakash Associates Ltd., Lucknow v. State of U.P. (supra) while quashing the report of the Inquiry Commission on the ground of reasonable opportunity in terms of Section 8-B of the Act not being afforded had clarified that the quashing of the report of the Commission does not fetter the powers of the State Government for appointing a Commission of Inquiry under Section 3 of the Act. The relevant paras are reproduced hereunder:- “26. In view of foregoing discussions the Inquiry Commission report submitted on 21-11-2003 cannot be sustained and is hereby quashed. 27. Now there remains the prayer of the petitioner for quashing the letter dated 25-1-2004 issued by the Secretary, Handloom & Environment, Government of Uttar Pradesh to Sri Vijay Shanker Mathur informing him about the appointment to enquire certain matters referred to therein. The said letter shows that the State Government on administrative side has taken a decision to enquire certain matters. The said letter shows that the State Government on administrative side has taken a decision to enquire certain matters. There cannot be any fetter in the power and jurisdiction of the State Government to direct any fact-finding enquiry in any matter of public importance. The State Government is fully free to enquire any matter. The submission of Sri Sudhir Chandra that there is no error in the action of the State Government appointing Sri Vijay Shanker Mathur to conduct fact-finding enquiry with regard to subject-matter as indicated in the letter has substance. The prayer of the petitioner as made in the writ petition for quashing the said letter is refused. In fact Sri Dwivedi has not stressed on the said prayer in the writ petition but stated that if any such enquiry is held petitioner be given opportunity. 28. We, however, make it clear that quashing of report of Single Member Commission submitted on 21-11-2003 does not fetter the power of the State Government for appointing a Commission of Inquiry under Section 3 of the Act or to direct for any other kind of enquiry regarding the subject in issue. In the result we partly allow the writ petition. The Single Member Commission report submitted on 21-11-2003 is quashed, rest of prayers made in the writ petition are refused. The parties shall bear their own costs.” (emphasis supplied) 114. In the case at hand, the Commission of Inquiry was appointed on 14.5.2015 and its term was for a period of 6 months. The term was extended by period of 6 months vide notification dated 7.12.2015 and further extended till 31.8.2016 by notification dated 1.7.2016. The Commission submitted its report on 31.8.2016. The Commission is no longer in existence and thus, it would not be possible for it to issue a fresh notice under Section 8-B of the Act. 115. It is in those cases where the Commission is functioning that a direction could be issued for it to proceed afresh from the stage of issuing notice under Section 8-B. As the tenure of the Commission has come to an end, it has submitted the report and ceased to exist only a fresh Commission can be appointed under the Act. In such circumstances, it would be in the interest of justice if the respondent is granted liberty to appoint a Commission of Inquiry on the same subject matter. 116. In such circumstances, it would be in the interest of justice if the respondent is granted liberty to appoint a Commission of Inquiry on the same subject matter. 116. Resultantly, I would partly allow the petition. The report of the Commission is not sustainable and is hereby quashed. It shall not be published as it cannot be read against the petitioner and no action on the basis thereof be taken against the petitioner. The respondent No.1 would, however, be at liberty to appoint a Commission of Inquiry on the same subject matter. In: CWP No.24139 of 2016 Bhupinder Singh Hooda v. State of Haryana and others 117. Anupinder Singh Grewal, J. has authored separate judgment, wherein the conclusion in respect of broad issues dealt in the judgment written by Ajay Kumar Mittal, J. has been concurred. However, there is difference in the operative portion of the respective judgments. Ajay Kumar Mittal, J. has concluded as under:- “69. Having perused the report, we find that it touches and opines on the conduct of the petitioner and affects the reputation thereof. In such circumstances, it was essential to have issued the notice under Section 8B of the Act which has not been done as the notice which was issued did not fulfil the conditions essentially required thereunder. Accordingly, the report submitted by the Commission is held to be non est and the same shall not be published. However, it shall be open for the Commission to proceed further from the stage when notice under Section 8B of the Act was required to be issued and submit fresh report in accordance with law. The writ petition is disposed of in the manner indicated hereinbefore.” 118. According to Anupinder Singh Grewal, J., the following conclusion has been arrived:- “In the case at hand, the Commission of Inquiry was appointed on 14.5.2015 and its term was for a period of 6 months. The term was extended by period of 6 months vide notification dated 7.12.2015 and further extended till 31.8.2016 by notification dated 1.7.2016. The Commission submitted its report on 31.8.2016. The Commission is no longer in existence and thus, it would not be possible for it to issue a fresh notice under Section 8-B of the Act. The term was extended by period of 6 months vide notification dated 7.12.2015 and further extended till 31.8.2016 by notification dated 1.7.2016. The Commission submitted its report on 31.8.2016. The Commission is no longer in existence and thus, it would not be possible for it to issue a fresh notice under Section 8-B of the Act. It is in those cases where the Commission is functioning that a direction could be issued for it to proceed afresh from the stage of issuing notice under Section 8-B. As the tenure of the Commission has come to an end, it has submitted the report and ceased to exist only a fresh Commission can be appointed under the Act. In such circumstances, it would be in the interest of justice if the respondent is granted liberty to appoint a Commission of Inquiry on the same subject matter. Resultantly, I would partly allow the petition. The report of the Commission is not sustainable and is hereby quashed. It shall not be published as it cannot be read against the petitioner and no action on the basis thereof be taken against the petitioner. The respondent No.1 would, however, be at liberty to appoint a Commission of Inquiry on the same subject matter.” 119. In view of the difference in the operative portion of the judgments of Ajay Kumar Mittal, J. and Anupinder Singh Grewal, J., the matter be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders. 120. In the meantime, the original record and the report of the Commission in sealed cover be returned to the Advocate General, Haryana, with the direction to produce the same as and when required by the Court.