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2019 DIGILAW 891 (GAU)

Real Time Technology v. Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal

2019-08-09

A.K.GOSWAMI, MANISH CHOUDHURY

body2019
JUDGMENT : A.K. Goswami, J. 1. Heard Ms. M.L. Gope, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. B. Sarma, learned standing counsel, Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax, appearing for the respondents. 2. This is an appeal under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 praying for setting aside the order dated 29.05.2018 passed by the learned Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Eastern Bench, Kolkata, as well as the order dated 05.01.2018 (communicated on 30.01.2018) passed by the Commissioner (Appeals), Guwahati, in an appeal preferred by the appellant under Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 against the Order-in-Original dated 14.07.2010 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Central Excise and Service Tax, Guwahati. 3. By the Order-in-Original dated 14.07.2010, the following directions were issued:- “…………….. ORDER 1. I confirm the demand of Service Tax amounting to Rs.16,75,100/- [Rupees Sixteen Lakhs Seventy Five Thousand & One Hundred] only, Education Cess of Rs.33,420/- [Rupees Thirty Three Thousand Four Hundred & Twenty] only and Secondary & Higher Education Cess of Rs.7,385/- [Rupees Seven Thousand Three Hundred & Eighty Five] only totaling to Rs.17,15,905/- [Rupees Seventeen Lakhs Fifteen Thousand Nine Hundred & Five] only and order for recovery of the same from M/s Real Time Technology, C/O Late S.M. Purkayastha, Gopinath Nagar, Kalapahar (Near Vivekananda Bidyamandir High School), Guwahati-781016 along with interest, as applicable, in terms of Section 75 of the Finance Act, 1994. 2. Besides, I impose penalty @Rs.200/- per day or @2% per month on the amount of Rs.17,15,905/- [Rupees Seventeen Lakhs Fifteen Thousand Nine Hundred & Five] only, whichever is higher, till the date up to which the Notice’s failure to pay the outstanding dues amounting to Rs.17,15,905/- continue in terms of Section 76 of the Finance Act, 1994. 3. I further impose a penalty of Rs.17,15,905/- [Rupees Seventeen Lakhs Fifteen Thousand Nine Hundred & Five] only on the Notice in terms of Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994. 3. I further impose a penalty of Rs.17,15,905/- [Rupees Seventeen Lakhs Fifteen Thousand Nine Hundred & Five] only on the Notice in terms of Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994. However, the Notice may avail the facility of reduced penalty to the extent of 25% of their total tax liability in terms of the 2nd proviso to Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 by way of making payment of their total tax liability as determined vide this Order within 1(one) month from the date of communication of this Order along with interest, as applicable thereon, and the amount of penalty equivalent to the extent of 25% of their total tax liability of Rs.17,15,905/-. 4. Moreover, I impose a penalty of Rs.1,000/- [Rupees One Thousand] only on the Notice in terms of Section 77 of the Finance Act, 1994 on account of their failure to obtain Service Tax Registration and due to non-submission of ST-3 Return during the material period. 5. Moreover, I order for appropriation of the amount of Rs.20,000/- [Rupees Twenty Thousand] only already deposited by the Notice towards clearance of their outstanding liability arising out of the instant Show Cause Notice.” 4. The stand of the department is that the said Order-in-Original was served personally on the appellant on 16.07.2010 and the same was duly acknowledged by him. In the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), plea was taken by the appellant that he was not provided with a copy of the Order-in-Original by the adjudicating authority and he came to know about the same after receipt of the letter dated 10.04.2017 from the department asking him to pay the confirmed demand. The appellant received the copy of the Order-in-Original on 01.09.2017 and thereafter the appeal was filed on 10.10.2017. The Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the plea taken by the appellant holding that he was of the firm belief that the impugned order was received by the proprietor of the firm on 16.07.2010. While forming that opinion, the Commissioner (Appeals) observed that it is not believable that the appellant would keep quiet for 7 years even if he had not received the Order-in-Original and that the appellant changes his signature regularly. Accordingly, the appeal having been preferred beyond the period of 60 days, same was dismissed as time-barred without going into the merits of the case. 5. Accordingly, the appeal having been preferred beyond the period of 60 days, same was dismissed as time-barred without going into the merits of the case. 5. The appellant preferred an appeal before the CESTAT under Section 35B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 on 23.04.2018. The said appeal was rejected by the CESTAT upholding the order of the Commissioner (Appeals). 6. Ms. Gope has submitted that the Order-in-Original of the adjudicating authority is not tenable in law and there is no reason as to why the appellant would not prefer appeal within the period of limitation if the Order-in-Original was received, more so, when there is no provision for condonation of delay. It is submitted by her that the appellant was under the bona-fide impression that after hearing the appellant, the authority might have been satisfied and, therefore, the show-cause notice issued earlier was dropped. She reiterates that the appellant did not receive the Order-in-Original though stand is taken by the department that the same is delivered to the appellant by a special messenger. If the date of receipt of the certified copy is taken to be the date on which the appellant has knowledge about the Order-in-Original, then the appeal preferred to the Commissioner (Appeals) would be within time. She contends that when in the Order-in-Original it was indicated that the said order should be communicated by registered post with A/D, it is not understood why or on what basis or under what authority the Superintendent (Adjudication) had resorted to deliver the order by a special messenger. It is submitted by her that if the appeal is not considered on merit, grave prejudice will be caused to the appellant for no fault of his. Neither the Commissioner (Appeals) nor the CESTAT considered the aspect as to whether the department was justified in sending the Order-in-Original by a special messenger when direction was issued for delivery of the same by registered A/D, she contends. 7. Mr. B. Sarma, learned standing counsel, appearing for the respondents, submits that when a notice dated 10.05.2010 fixing the date of hearing on 19.05.2010 was sent by registered post with A/D, the same was returned un-served and, therefore, when personal hearing was fixed on 08.07.2010, the notice was delivered personally to the appellant. 7. Mr. B. Sarma, learned standing counsel, appearing for the respondents, submits that when a notice dated 10.05.2010 fixing the date of hearing on 19.05.2010 was sent by registered post with A/D, the same was returned un-served and, therefore, when personal hearing was fixed on 08.07.2010, the notice was delivered personally to the appellant. It is submitted that as on one occasion, notice sent by registered post was returned back un-served, the department had taken recourse to serve the Order-in-Original by a special messenger and no fault can be attributed for taking the course as had been taken in the instant case. He has submitted that as the appellant had received the Order-in-Original, there is demonstrable laches and negligence on the part of the appellant and as the statute debars entertainment of any appeal after a period of 60 days along with grace period of 30 days subject to showing sufficient cause, when, admittedly, the appellant had filed the appeal after more than 7 years, the learned Commissioner (Appeals) and the CESTAT were justified in rejecting the appeal as time-barred. He, however, candidly admits that the Order-in-Original was not despatched by registered post with A/D. 8. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials on record. 9. A perusal of the Order-in-Original dated 14.07.2010 would go to show that on the last page of the order, which is page-47 of the appeal papers, the following appears:- “REGISTERED WITH A/D C.No.V(15)21/ADJ/HQR/GHY/09/3564 Dated:- 15.7.10 (3564 and 15.7.10 are hand-written) To, M/s Real Time Technology, C/o Late S.M. Purkayastha, Gopinath Nagar, Kalapahar (Near Vivekananda Bidyamandir High School), Guwahati-781016. Sd/-14/7/2010 (V.N. Thete) Additional Commissioner C.No.V(15)21/ADJ/HQR/GHY/09/3565-67 Dated:- 15.7.10 (3565-67 and 15.7.10 are hand-written) Copy to – 1. The Commissioner, Central Excise & Service Tax, Guwahati. 2. The Superintendent (Review), Central Excise & Service Tax, Guwahati. 3. The Deputy Commissioner, Service Tax Division, Guwahati. Sd/- 15/7/10 (P.K. Bhattacharjee) Superintendent (Adjudication)” 10. It appears the Superintendent (Adjudication) had sent a letter C.No.V(15)21/ADJ/HQRS/GHY/09/3564 dated 15.07.2010 to the Superintendent (Anti-Evasion), Gp.-1, Central Excise & Service Tax, Hqrs. Office, Guwahati, requesting him to cause personal delivery of the aforementioned Order-in-Original dated 14.07.2010 with acknowledgement and to send the receipt of acknowledgement to the office. Sd/- 15/7/10 (P.K. Bhattacharjee) Superintendent (Adjudication)” 10. It appears the Superintendent (Adjudication) had sent a letter C.No.V(15)21/ADJ/HQRS/GHY/09/3564 dated 15.07.2010 to the Superintendent (Anti-Evasion), Gp.-1, Central Excise & Service Tax, Hqrs. Office, Guwahati, requesting him to cause personal delivery of the aforementioned Order-in-Original dated 14.07.2010 with acknowledgement and to send the receipt of acknowledgement to the office. The said document is available at page-53 of the appeal papers and there is an endorsement to the following effect:- “Received REGISTER WITH A/D C.No.V(15)21/ADJ/HQR/GHY/09/3564 RECEIVE ………… 16.7.10” ……is a signature. 11. Mr. Sarma has submitted that the signature appearing thereon is that of the appellant and it manifestly demonstrates that the appellant had received the said Order-in-Original. 12. It is to be noticed that the letter number appearing at page-47 with the signature of the Additional Commissioner is the same letter dated 15.07.2010 issued by the Superintendent (Adjudication). Having regard to the endorsement of Additional Commissioner, the author of the Order-in-Original, that the order is being sent by registered post with A/D, it is not understood under what authority the Superintendent (Adjudication) altered the mode of service and sought to effect service of the order through a special messenger. If the order is sent by a special messenger as asserted by the department, it is baffling why there should be an endorsement “Register with A/D” at page-53, on which much reliance is placed by Mr. Sarma. 13. When a particular mode for service is prescribed by the author of the Order-in-Original, we are of the considered opinion that such mode has to be complied with and no other mode is permissible, though a number of modes, otherwise, is provided in Section 37-C of the Central Excise Act, 1944. 14. In the above backdrop, we do not consider it necessary to go into the disputed question as to whether the signature appearing at page-53 letter dated 15.07.2010 is that of the appellant or not. 15. In the facts obtaining before us, the computation of period of limitation will begin from 01.09.2017, the date on which, the appellant undisputedly was furnished with a certified copy of the Order-in-Original. So computed, the appeal filed before the Commissioner (Appeals) on 10.10.2017 is within the prescribed period of limitation. 15. In the facts obtaining before us, the computation of period of limitation will begin from 01.09.2017, the date on which, the appellant undisputedly was furnished with a certified copy of the Order-in-Original. So computed, the appeal filed before the Commissioner (Appeals) on 10.10.2017 is within the prescribed period of limitation. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the CESTAT did not consider or advert to this aspect of the matter, which according to us, goes to the moot question with regard to date of knowledge of the appellant. 16. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the orders passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) and CESTAT cannot be sustained in law and accordingly, the orders dated 05.01.2018 (communicated on 30.01.2018) and 29.05.2018 are set aside. The Commissioner (Appeals) will now hear the appeal on merits and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. Parties to the proceeding will appear before the Commissioner (Appeals) on 16.09.2019. 17. With the above directions, the appeal is allowed. No cost.