JUDGMENT A.S. Supehia, J. 1. By way of the present writ petition, the petitioner is challenging the order dated 22.07.2009 passed by the Primary Education Tribunal in Application No. 116 of 2000 whereby, the Tribunal while partly allowing her application has denied the salary for the period from June 2000 to 21.09.2002. 2. The petitioner had applied pursuant to an advertisement published in the news paper dated 21.07.1986 and was appointed after following due procedure. The petitioner is possessing the qualification of SSC, PTC. 2.1. The petitioner was paid the salary in the pay scale of Rs. 1200-1800. Thereafter, the 5th Pay Commission was introduced from 01.01.1996, hence, the petitioner made a representation requesting the respondent management to extend such benefits to them but the Management vide letter dated 10.01.2000 informed the petitioner that since the financial position of the management is not sound, it will not be in a position to shoulder the burden of the revised pay scale as per the 5th Pay Commission and that the service of the petitioner shall stand terminated with effect from the end of the session. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that since she was being illegally terminated, such action was challenged by filing an Application No. 116 of 2000 before the Gujarat Primary Education Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the tribunal'). 4. It is also stated that since the management restrained the petitioner from attending the school after 12.06.2000, the tribunal vide interim order dated 24.07.2000 granted interim relief in terms of para 7(3) in the application filed by the petitioner, restraining the respondent management from terminating the services of the petitioner. The aforesaid order was confirmed by the tribunal vide interim order dated 05.09.2000, after hearing the respective parties. 5. Learned advocate Ms. Mamta Vyas appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the management neither allowed the petitioner to join the school nor paid the salary despite the aforesaid order and hence, the petitioner had filed an application under Order 39 Rule 2 of the CPC before the tribunal. She has submitted that in the meantime, the management vide letter dated 07.11.2000 forwarded the proposal to the Director of the Primary Education for closure of the classes on the ground that sufficient number of students were not available. 6. She has submitted that in the meantime, the management vide letter dated 07.11.2000 forwarded the proposal to the Director of the Primary Education for closure of the classes on the ground that sufficient number of students were not available. 6. The State Authority vide order dated 26.12.2000 granted the permission for the closure of the school on the condition that the necessary salaries and compensation as prescribed under the rules shall be paid by the management as well as the necessary procedure for terminating the services of the petitioner shall be followed. 7. Learned advocate Ms. Mamta Vyas has submitted that despite the aforesaid order passed by the Educational department of State, no such procedure was followed by the management. Learned advocate Ms. Vyas has further submitted that though the termination of the petitioner was not founded on the lack of qualification of the petitioner in terms of Schedule-F, the tribunal has examined the aforesaid aspect and held that the petitioner was not qualified since, she was not holding the qualification as per Schedule-F. 8. Learned advocate Ms. Vyas has submitted that before terminating the services of the petitioner, the procedure prescribed under Section 40(B) of the Gujarat Primary Education Act, 1947 was not followed, as no opportunity of hearing was given to her. In support of her submissions, she has placed reliance on the judgment dated 04.10.2004 passed in Special Civil Application No. 7649 of 1995 and has submitted that even if the services of the teacher is terminated on the ground of closure of school or classes, such procedure is required to be followed. She has further submitted that the judgment and order passed by the tribunal is erroneous and is contrary to the aforesaid decision of this Court, since, no such procedure as prescribed under Section 40(B) of the Gujarat Primary Education Act, 1947 was followed. She has submitted that the petitioner after her termination, had joined another school being Sharda Vidhyalaya for 15 days and she was thereafter reappointed as Vidhya Sahayak on 19.09.2002 and hence, the petitioner is entitled for salary from 12.06.2002 to 21.09.2002, or compensation despite there being an interim order passed by the tribunal, the management had not complied with the same. 9. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. 9. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. Vakil appearing for the respondent - Trust has submitted that the petitioner is not entitled to the salary for the aforesaid period since, the petitioner did not qualify for the post as required under Schedule-F and her services were terminated. It is submitted that on the principle of no work no pay, the petitioner is not entitled to the salary for the aforesaid period. Learned advocate Mr. Vakil has asserted that the petitioner in her cross examination has admitted before the tribunal that she was appointed in another school and hence, she did not report to the school. He has submitted that as the petitioner did not appear before the school, hence she is not entitled to any salary for the aforesaid period. 10. Learned advocate Mr. Vakil has invited the attention of this Court to the deposition of the petitioner at Exh. 29 and submitted that the petitioner has admitted that she was serving elsewhere and hence, she is not entitled for any salary. 11. In response to the aforesaid submission, learned advocate Ms. Vyas has submitted that the respondent authorities did not allow the present petitioner to mark her presence despite there being an interim order passed by the tribunal. She has submitted that on 24.03.2001 the petitioner requested the authorities to allow her to sign the muster roll and to pay the regular monthly salary, however, the respondent trust did not allow her to do so. She has submitted that it is true that the petitioner had worked for only 15 days in Adarsh School from 12.06.2000, however, the petitioner again went to join the school on 07.09.2000, but, she was not allowed to do so. 12. This Court has heard the learned advocates for the respective sides and has perused the documents on record. The facts which are not in dispute are that the petitioner was appointed as a primary teacher on 21.07.1986 and she was possessing the qualification of S.S.C., P.T.C. The petitioner was terminated from her services by an order dated 10.01.2000. A perusal of the order reveals that the services of the petitioner has been terminated on the ground of financial restriction faced by the respondent trust, since, the petitioner had demanded the benefits of 5th Pay Commission. A perusal of the order reveals that the services of the petitioner has been terminated on the ground of financial restriction faced by the respondent trust, since, the petitioner had demanded the benefits of 5th Pay Commission. It is specifically stated in the order of termination that at the end of the session, the petitioner would be considered as terminated from services. Thus, the sole reason for which her service was terminated was the financial crisis experienced by the trust and not for the reason that she was unqualified. 13. The petitioner from 1986 till 2000 i.e. for a period of 14 years had served the respondent school and for all these years, no contention was raised by the respondent school that she was unqualified as a teacher. The Division Bench in the judgment dated 30.08.3017 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1383 of 2017 while examining the case of Primary teacher who did not possess the requisite qualification has held that the service of the concerned teacher was utilized by the respondent Trust for many years, and her service cannot be terminated on the ground that she does not possess the requisite qualification. It is not the case of the respondent that the petitioner was appointed by way of back door entry. By placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Bhartiya Seva Samaj Trust vs. Yogeshbhai Ambalal Patel, 2012 (9) SCC 310 , it is held by the Division Bench that the respondents cannot take benefit of their own wrong. The Supreme Court in the case of Bhartiya Samaj Seva Trust (supra) has observed thus: "21 A person alleging his own infamy cannot be heard at any forum, what to talk of a Writ Court, as explained by the legal maxim 'allegans suam turpitudinem non est audiendus'. If a party has committed a wrong, he cannot be permitted to take the benefit of his own wrong. (Vide: G.S. Lamba & Ors. V/s. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1985 SC 1019 ; Narender Chadha & Ors. V/s. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 638 ; Molly Joseph @ Nish V/s. George Sebastian @ Joy, AIR 1997 SC 109 ; Jose V/s. Alice & Anr., (1996) 6 SCC 342 ; and T. Srinivasan V/s. T. Varalakshmi (Mrs.), AIR 1999 SC 595 ). V/s. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 638 ; Molly Joseph @ Nish V/s. George Sebastian @ Joy, AIR 1997 SC 109 ; Jose V/s. Alice & Anr., (1996) 6 SCC 342 ; and T. Srinivasan V/s. T. Varalakshmi (Mrs.), AIR 1999 SC 595 ). This concept is also explained by the legal maxims 'Commodum ex in-juria sua nemo habere debet'; and 'nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua pro- pria'. (See also: Eureka Forbes Ltd. V/s. Allahabad Bank & Ors., (2010) 6 SCC 193 ; and Inderjit Singh Grewal V/s. State of Punjab & Anr., (2011) 12 SCC 588 )." Thus, the tribunal has enlarged its scope in examining the issue of the qualification of the petitioner. Assuming that it was raised by the respondents, the same was liable to be rejected in light of the law enunciated by the Apex Court and the Division Bench of this Court vide aforenoted judgments. 14. In the present case, the contention raised by the respondent school before the tribunal about her being non qualified appears to be an afterthought and the tribunal has fallen in error by examining the issue of the petitioner being unqualified as per the provision of Schedule-F of the Bombay Primary Education Rules, 1949 and hence, the impugned order suffers from such disqualification as it travels beyond the scope and cause for which the petitioner has been terminated from service. 15. It is also an undisputed fact that before passing the order dated 10.01.2000, the petitioner was not issued any notice and the order is styled as a notice that she would be treated as terminated at the end of the session. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the observations made by this Court in the judgment dated 04.10.2004 in the case of Radhanpur Kelavni Mandal vs. Vasantlal Achharatlal Parekh, 2005 (1) GLH (UJ) (7) passed in Special Civil Application No. 7649 of 1995. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the observations made by this Court in the judgment dated 04.10.2004 in the case of Radhanpur Kelavni Mandal vs. Vasantlal Achharatlal Parekh, 2005 (1) GLH (UJ) (7) passed in Special Civil Application No. 7649 of 1995. The Coordinate Bench of this Court while examining the provisions of Section 40(B) of the Bombay Primary Education Act and Rule 13 of Schedule-F, has held thus:- "....I accordingly find that, before bringing about a valid termination of the services of the teachers concerned, the petitioners were required to follow the procedure as laid down under Section 40B of the Bombay Primary Education Act, in the present case, even when the termination was sought to be brought about on account of decision to reduce the classes for which permission was granted by the State authorities and which would have led to closing down the entire primary section." This Court has held that before termination of the teacher on account of reduction of classes, the procedure prescribed under Section 40(B) of the Act, is required to be followed. 16. In the present case, the respondent school during the pendency of the application of the petitioner before the tribunal by the letter dated 07.11.2000 forwarded the proposal to the Director of the primary education for closure of the classes on the ground that the sufficient number of students were not available. By the order dated 26.12.2000, the Education Department granted the permission of closure of school from June-2000. It was also observed that the entire responsibility of granting the protection of surplus to such teachers who are affected due to closure of classes from 1 to 7 std. as well as the grant of compensation was fastened on the Management. Thus, the Education Department granted the permission of closure of primary section of standard 1 to 7 of the respondent school vide order dated 26.12.2000 on the aforesaid condition. 17. After the aforesaid permission was granted, the school authorities were required to follow the prescribed procedure under Section 40(B) of the Gujarat Primary Education Act, 1947. No such procedure was followed and the petitioner was terminated from the service without any compensation as provided under Section 13(2) of the Bombay Primary Education Rules, 1949 under Schedule-F. The provisions of Section 40(B) of the Bombay Primary Education Act, 1947 incorporated as under:- "40B. No such procedure was followed and the petitioner was terminated from the service without any compensation as provided under Section 13(2) of the Bombay Primary Education Rules, 1949 under Schedule-F. The provisions of Section 40(B) of the Bombay Primary Education Act, 1947 incorporated as under:- "40B. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of teachers. - (1) (a) No teacher of a recognize private primary school shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated until- (i) he has been given by the manager an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him; and (ii) the action proposed to be taken in regard to him has been approved in writing by the administrative officer of the school board in the jurisdiction of which the private primary school is situate; Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to a teacher who is appointed temporarily for a period less than a year or a teacher appointed temporarily on a leave vacancy for a period less than a year." 18. Since, the learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner may be paid salary/compensation as per provisions of relevant rules of 1949, this Court is continuing the issue to the entitlement of such compensation. The provisions of Rule 13(2) of the Bombay Primary Education Rules, 1949 under Schedule-F, which provides for compensation reads as under:- "13. Termination of Services of a Teacher.- (1) The management of a private school shall not terminate otherwise than as a measure of penalty the services of any permanent trained teachers without the previous permission of an Administrative Officer. (2) A permanent trained teacher whose services are terminated with the permission of the Administrative Officer after three years of his service shall be entitled to a compensation. (2) A permanent trained teacher whose services are terminated with the permission of the Administrative Officer after three years of his service shall be entitled to a compensation. (3) Equal to 6 months salary including allowances if the teachers have in service in the school for a period not exceeding five years, and (b) equal to six month's salary including allowances for the first five years and a month's salary for every year of the period exceeding five years, if the teacher has put in service in the school for a period exceeding five years: Provided that total compensation payable under clause (a) or (b) shall not exceed twelve months, salary including allowances: Provided further that in the case of a teacher an Inquiry Committee shall be constituted consisting of the following persons, namely:- (i) One representative of the management; (ii) the Head Master of the School; and (iii) a representative of the concerned teacher; and accordingly the formal inquiry against the teacher shall be held by the said committee instead of the management or an enquiry officer as if where the context so requires for the words "the management" or "inquiry officer" the word "Enquiry Committee" has been substituted." 19. The respondent school has also clearly violated the aforesaid provisions of statute. The tribunal has totally ignored the aforesaid aspects and has fell in error by examining the case of the petitioner solely on the ground of her being not qualified as per the provisions of Schedule-F though the termination of the petitioner is not premised on such ground. 20. It is true that the petitioner had admitted that she was employed in the Sharda High School for 15 days, but the same will not dis-entitle her for compensation as per Section 40(B) of the provisions of Gujarat Primary Education Act and Rule 13(2) of the Gujarat Primary Education Rules under Schedule-F. 21. On the application filed by the petitioner being No. 116 of 2000 before the tribunal, the tribunal vide order dated 24.07.2000 granted the interim order in terms of para 7(3) of the application whereby, the respondent trust was directed not to restrain her from carrying her duties as a teacher and also to allow her to sign the muster roll and pay her regular salary every month. 22. 22. The respondent school, thereafter, filed an application of vacating the aforesaid interim order and after hearing the respective sides, the tribunal vide order dated 05.09.2000 directed the respondent school not to restrain her from entering the school and also to pay her regular salary. It was further ordered that the unpaid salary shall be paid within a period of 15 days. 23. Since, the school authorities did not comply with the aforesaid order, the petitioner was constrained to file Exh. 16 application on 16.04.2001 under the provisions of Order 39 Rule 2 of the CPC praying for the implementation of the aforesaid order. The aforesaid application was kept pending by the tribunal and no order was passed and the same was ordered to be heard along with the main application. Since, the issue which was raised by the petitioner in her application pertained to the non-compliance of the interim order, as she was neither allowed to report for duty nor paid the salary, the Tribunal should have decided such application, instead of ordering it to be heard with the main matter. Thus, the aforesaid interim orders remained un-complied since the same was heard along with the main application. 24. Be that as it may, by the letter dated 24/27.03.2001, the petitioner requested the respondent school to pay her regular salary and to allow her to sign the muster roll, however, it appears that the same was not allowed and in the interregnum, the petitioner worked for 15 days in Adarsh High School. 25. In support of her submissions, the petitioner has also pointed out the judgment in the case of Radhanpur Kelavni Mandal (supra) to the Tribunal, but it appears that the tribunal has discarded judgment by observing that the same is not applicable in the facts of the present case. 26. In the considered opinion of this Court, the aforenoted approach of the tribunal needs to be deprecated. Thus, the judgment and order passed by the tribunal is required to be quashed and set aside since, it travels beyond the scope of the termination order. 26. In the considered opinion of this Court, the aforenoted approach of the tribunal needs to be deprecated. Thus, the judgment and order passed by the tribunal is required to be quashed and set aside since, it travels beyond the scope of the termination order. The initial termination of the petitioner was on the ground of financial restriction experienced by the respondent school as observed in the order dated 10.01.1990 since, they were not in a position to pay the benefit of 5th Pay Commission and her services would be treated as terminated at the end of the session. Thereafter, no further termination order has been passed and the State Authorities had granted the permission to close down the primary section on the condition of fulfilling the responsibilities by the respondent school of granting the benefit of surplus as well as compensation. The entire procedure of the Management is de hors the provision of the Section 40(B) of the Act, 1947. The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. Dayanand Chakravarty, 2013 (7) SCC 595 , has held that the principle of "no work no pay" is not applicable if an employee is prevented by the employer from performing the duties. Similar view has been reiterated in the decision rendered in the case of Ramesh kumar vs. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 2904 , in which the Apex Court has held that the aforesaid principle will not apply if the employer is at fault. Thus, the petitioner cannot be denied the benefit of compensation for the intervening period. 27. In this view of the matter, the present writ petition succeeds in part. The respondents are hereby directed to grant compensation to the petitioner in terms of Rule 13(2) of the Bombay Primary Education Rules, 1949 under Schedule-F. The necessary orders in this regards shall be passed within a period of two months from the date of receipt of writ of the present order. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent.