JUDGMENT : Dipankar Datta, J. 1. Dozens of intra-court writ appeals and writ petitions were finally decided by a Full Bench of this Court by a common judgment and order dated July 16, 2013 (hereafter the said order). The Bench comprised of Arun Mishra, C.J. (as His Lordship then was), and Dipankar Datta and Joymalya Bagchi, JJ. (hereafter the Full Bench). The lead matter was APO 94 of 2009 (District Inspector of Schools, SE, Kolkata and Anr. v. Abhijeet Baidya and Ors.). All the appeals carried by the State Government were dismissed, while the writ petitions succeeded to the extent indicated in the said order. After a special leave petition that the State Government carried to the Supreme Court of India from the said order failed on February 24, 2014, steps were taken to implement the directions contained therein albeit not to the satisfaction of all concerned who succeeded before the Full Bench. 2. We are now tasked to decide G.A. No. 464 of 2018, an application for clarification at the instance of one Md. Abdul Ghani (hereafter the applicant). His writ petition (W.P. No. 1528 of 2002) had succeeded before a learned Judge, whereupon the State Government and its officers preferred an intra-court writ appeal (APO 121 of 2007). By the said order, APO 121 of 2007 too stood dismissed. The present application appears to have been necessitated in the wake of the State Government's understanding of paragraph 77 of the said order and its implementation thereof in a particular manner, which divests the applicant of his right to claim pension with effect from the date following the date of his retirement from service (October 31, 2003) on superannuation, i.e., w.e.f. November 1, 2003. The prayer, therefore, is for a clarification of the said order so as to facilitate payment of pension to the applicant by the State Government from November 1, 2003, instead of from September 10, 2014, i.e., the date on which the applicant refunded the employer's share of Provident Fund with interest and additional interest upon being notified by the State Government the quantum required to be refunded in terms of the said order. THE ORDER UNDER CONSIDERATION 3. It would be profitable if, at this stage, we sketch a brief outline of the said order as a prologue to our decision on the merits of the rival claims. 4. THE ORDER UNDER CONSIDERATION 3. It would be profitable if, at this stage, we sketch a brief outline of the said order as a prologue to our decision on the merits of the rival claims. 4. A conflict of opinion between Division Benches of this Court comprising two Judges had resulted in a reference being laid before the Full Bench. It was noticed at that point of time that several other matters (intra-court writ appeals as well as writ petitions) were pending on the self-same point. The Full Bench, thus, decided not only the reference but also the other pending appeals and writ petitions by the said order. On one side of the litigation were teachers of non-Government educational institutions from all over West Bengal (hereafter the employees) and on the other side, the mighty State itself as well as its officers. 5. The challenge in the writ petitions, out of which the matters dealt with by the Full Bench arose, was directed against substitution of para 13 of Revision of Pay and Allowances, 1998 (hereafter ROPA 1998) with effect from July 13, 1999 and amendment made on May 16, 2007 in para 17 of Revision of Pay and Allowances, 1990 (hereafter ROPA 1990) retrospectively, with effect from March 6, 1990, without extending an opportunity to the employees to switch over to the Pension-cum-Gratuity scheme envisaged in the Death-cum-Retirement Benefit Rules, 1981 (hereafter the DCRB Rules). 6. It would be appropriate at the outset to notice the provisions of para 13 of ROPA 1998 before and after substitution. Originally, rule 13 read as follows: The teaching and non-teaching employees of aided/sponsored educational institutions who will opt for the revised scales of pay shall be allowed to enjoy pensionary benefit including dearness relief at par with the State Government employees. Maximum amount of gratuity shall be raised from Rs. 60,000/- to Rs. 2,50,000/- (Rupees two lakhs fifty thousand only)." and, after substitution, it read as follows: "The teaching and non-teaching employees of Aided/Sponsored Educational Institutions who will come under the revised scale of pay as per memorandum No. 25-SE(B) dated 12.02.1999 will be allowed to enjoy the retirement benefit as per revised pension order of this Department according to the option exercised by them under West Bengal Recognized Non-Govt. Educational Institutions Employees (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Scheme, 1981". 7. Educational Institutions Employees (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Scheme, 1981". 7. Para 17 of ROPA 1990, originally, was in the following terms: "(1) Age of Superannuation and related is-sues-(1) Subject to the provisions of para 5, the age of superannuation of all categories of teaching and non-teaching employees who elect to come over to revised scales of pay shall be fixed at 60 years, as per recommendation of the 3rd Pay Commission. (2) The teaching and non-teaching employees of an aided/sponsored educational institution or organization who will opt for the revised scales of pay shall be allowed to enjoy pensionary benefits including dearness relief at par with State Government employees. Maximum amount to gratuity shall be raised from Rs. 36,000/- to Rs. 60,000/-." After substitution, sub-para (2) thereof read as follows: "(2) The teaching and non-teaching staff of an aided-sponsored educational institution or organization who will opt for the revised scales of pay as per memo No. 33-Edn (B) dated 07.03.1990 shall be allowed to enjoy the retirement benefits as per revised pension order of the Department vide Memo No. 136-Edn (B) dated 15.05.1985 according to the option exercised by them under the West Bengal Recognized Non-Govt. Educational Institution Employees (D.C.R.B.) Scheme, 1981." 8. Paragraph 2 of the said order noted the question involved in all the matters, viz. "whether employees have to be given an opportunity to switch over to the Pension-cum-Gratuity Scheme, in view of change made in para 17(3) of Revision of Pay and Allowances 1990 and in para 13 of Revision of Pay and Allowances 1998". 9. Upon consideration of the rival contentions advanced from the Bar, the Full Bench framed further five questions for determination reading as follows: "i) Whether a person who has opted for revised pay scale under ROPA, 1990 becomes entitled to pension by virtue of operation of para 17 of ROPA, 1990? (ii) Whether an incumbent who has exercised an option under ROPA 1990 can still be conditioned to the rider of option to be exercised under West Bengal Recognized Non-Government Educational Institution Employees DCRB Scheme, 1981, particularly in view of the amendment effected in paragraph 17(2) vide GO. 226-SE(B)/1M-102/98, dated 16th May, 2007 and whether the amendment made in paragraph 17(2) can be said to be valid law; that too with retrospective effect? 226-SE(B)/1M-102/98, dated 16th May, 2007 and whether the amendment made in paragraph 17(2) can be said to be valid law; that too with retrospective effect? (iii) Whether para 13 of Revision of Pay & Allowance Rules, 1998, as amended by Notification dated 13th July, 1999 relating to the employees of West Bengal Recognized Non-Government Aided Institutions can be said to be valid in law? (iv) Whether after amending the para 13 of ROPA 1998 on 13.07.1999 and para 17 of ROPA 1990 in 2007, it was necessary to give fresh opportunity to employees to revise option under West Bengal Recognized Non-Government Educational institution Employees (Death-cum-Retirement benefit) Scheme, 1981? (v) Whether the time time-limit fixed under the DCRB Scheme, 1981 to submit option can be extended in suitable cases?" 10. The Full Bench thereafter dealt with the rival contentions and answered the aforesaid five questions in paragraph 74 of the said order. The same, in its entirety, is reproduced hereinbelow: "74. Thus, we answer the five questions in the following manner: (1) An employee who has opted for revised pay scale under ROPA, 1990 becomes entitled to pension and gratuity by virtue and operation of para 17 of ROPA 1990. It was not necessary for him to exercise fresh option as per Memo dated 16th December, 1991, which was applicable to employees who had not opted for ROPA 1990. Benefit of Pension-cum-Gratuity was conferred due to acceptance of reduced age of superannuation of 60 years under para 17(1) of ROPA 1990 and his right for Pension-cum-Gratuity so accrued could not have been taken away retrospectively by substitution of the provisions of para 17 in 2007 or by substitution of para 13 of ROPA 1998 in 1999. (2) Once option has been exercised under ROPA 1990, a person cannot be subjected to the rider of the option exercised under the DCRB Scheme, 1981 as the invitation of the option under the said scheme was with respect to the employees who elected to continue in service till the age of 65 years and to have the benefit of the old scheme. For such employees opportunity was given to submit fresh options as per Memo dated 16th December, 1991. For such employees opportunity was given to submit fresh options as per Memo dated 16th December, 1991. The amendment made in para 17(2) of ROPA 1990 on May 16, 2007 cannot be said to be valid price of law as such provisions cannot be substituted with retrospective effect to take away the rights already accrued to an employee. So as to validate provisions of para 17(2) of ROPA 1990, as substituted, it was necessary to invite option for switching over to Pension-cum-Gratuity from CPF-cum-Gratuity when the substitution of para 17(2) of ROPA was made on 16th May, 2007 with retrospective effect. (3) Para 13 of the ROPA 1998 as amended on 13th July, 1999 cannot be said to be valid in the eyes of law as it has the effect of taking away benefit conferred by para 17(2) of ROPA 1990, as the ROPA was made applicable to the employees who had opted for ROPA, 1990 and the benefit conferred could not have been taken away by substitution of provisions contained in par 13 of ROPA, 1998. It was clearly arbitrary and an unreasonable exercise of power and to treat it as valid and legal, it was necessary to invite fresh option under the DCRB Scheme, 1981 for switching over to Pension-cum-Gratuity as the provisions had been amended drastically which could not operate to the prejudice of the employees in whose favour right to claim Pension-cum-Gratuity had accrued. The substituted provisions of para 13 of ROPA, 1998 fail to qualify Wednesbury principles of reasonableness. The action was in utter violation of fair play and justice. (4) In our opinion, after substitution of para 13 ROPA, 1998 on 13th July, 1999 and para 17 of ROPA, 1990 on 16th May, 2007, in order to save the provisions from the vice of arbitrariness, it was necessary to give an opportunity to the employees to submit fresh option under DCRB Scheme, 1981. As the option exercised earlier in terms of the DCRB Scheme, 1981 was made applicable, it was necessary to give fresh opportunity to exercise an option for switching over to Pension-cum-Gratuity and the State could not have acted to the detriment of the employees opting for ROPA, 1990 who chose the rider of reduced age of superannuation i.e. 60 years under para 17(1) of ROPA, 1990. (5) In our opinion, as there was drastic change of provisions of para 17(2) of ROPA made by way of substitution in 2007, and ROPA, 1998 also interred with the rights conferred upon the employees under para 17(2) of ROPA, 1990, all the employees who opted for ROPA, 1990 ought to be given fresh opportunity to submit the option to switch over to Pension-cum-Gratuity." 11. These answers were followed by the operative part of the said order contained in paragraphs 75 to 80 thereof, reading as follows: "75. Coming to the relief to be granted, it is clear that some of the employees are in service and some of them have retired and averments are on record that they are ready and willing to repay the amount of employer's share of contribution in the CPF together with interest and additional interest as option had not been called from them to switch over to Pension-cum-Gratuity while substituting para 13 of ROPA, 1998 w.e.f. 13th July, 1999 and retrospective substitution of para 17(2) of ROPA 1990 on 16th May, 2007 w.e.f. 6th March, 1999. 76. We direct the State Government to give opportunity to all the petitioners and other employees similarly situated to submit option to switch over to Pension-cum-Gratuity by issuing public notice in at least four newspapers having wide circulation in this State. Three months' time period be given to them to exercise option and let the amount be specified to each and every employee who elects to switch over to Pension-cum-Gratuity to deposit the amount of employer's share of contribution with interest and additional interest which is required to be refunded to the Government within the period specified. 77. If an employee exercises option, he shall be entitled to Pension-cum-Gratuity in accordance with law with effect from the date refund is made. 78. Let such exercise be completed within a period of six months from today. 79. The appeals filed by the State Government are hereby dismissed. 80. The writ petitions are allowed to the aforesaid extent." 12. The reasons for the aforesaid answers (in paragraph 74) and the relief ultimately granted are delineated in detail in the judgment of the Full Bench. Let such exercise be completed within a period of six months from today. 79. The appeals filed by the State Government are hereby dismissed. 80. The writ petitions are allowed to the aforesaid extent." 12. The reasons for the aforesaid answers (in paragraph 74) and the relief ultimately granted are delineated in detail in the judgment of the Full Bench. Bare perusal thereof would reveal an opinion formed by the Full Bench that drastic changes were sought to be made by substituting ROPA, 1998 with effect from July 13, 1999 as well as amending ROPA, 1990 with effect from March 6, 1990 retrospectively. The Full Bench noted that those who had opted for the revised scales of pay under ROPA, 1990 did so waiving their right to continue in service till 65 years of age and agreed to superannuate on attaining the age of 60 years, on the assurance of receiving a higher pay while in service as compared to those who elected to continue to remain in service till attaining 65 years of age, and also to receive pension at par with Government employees and enhanced amount of gratuity. The contention of the employees was that immediately upon opting for the revised scales of pay made available by ROPA, 1990, a right accrued in their favour to enjoy a better scale of pay as well as pension and enhanced gratuity and such a vested right could not have been taken away by the arbitrary action of the State Government. Once the employees had changed their position and acted to their detriment by accepting the reduced age of superannuation of 60 years with waiver of right to avail extension of service up to 65 years, the Full Bench was clear in its opinion that accrued rights of the employees could not have been abrogated in the manner the Government ventured to do so. 13. It would not be inapt to extract below paragraphs 46 to 49 reading as follows: "46. In our opinion, by way of amendment/substitution of provisions, rights which have accrued cannot be taken away, that to/with retrospective effect. A benefit that has accrued under the existing para 17(2) of ROPA, 1990 cannot be taken away by an amendment with retrospective effect or by provisions as contained in substituted para 13 of ROPA, 1998. 47. In our opinion, by way of amendment/substitution of provisions, rights which have accrued cannot be taken away, that to/with retrospective effect. A benefit that has accrued under the existing para 17(2) of ROPA, 1990 cannot be taken away by an amendment with retrospective effect or by provisions as contained in substituted para 13 of ROPA, 1998. 47. In our considered opinion, though it is open to the Government to change its policy but change in policy must be in conformity with reasonableness and principles of natural justice. With the substitution of para 13 of ROPA, 1998 and para 17(2) of ROPA, 1990 with retrospective effect, the provisions entailed adverse civil consequences and were derogatory to the accrued rights of the employees. The option exercised under the DCRB Scheme, 1981 could not have been made the basis for determination whether the employees were entitled to benefit of either CPF-cum-Gratuity. They were made to accept the reduced age of superannuation at 60 years but were granted the benefit of higher pay scale with an assurance that they would be entitled to pension at the par with State Government employee and enhanced amount of gratuity. Those who opted for the revised pay scale agreed to retire at the age of 60 years with the impression that their winter years of life would be taken care of with pension with par with the Government employees. The employees having been made to change their position, the Government acted in an arbitrary manner by reversion of the employees to the position that was prevailing before they opted for the revised scale in relation to pension. In order to save such provisions from the vice of arbitrariness, it was necessary to give an opportunity to exercise fresh option for switching over from CPF-cum-Gratuity to Pension-cum-Gratuity, which benefit was otherwise available and had accrued in favour of the employees once they exercised option for revised scale of pay as per provisions contained in para 17(2) of ROPA, 1990 and para 13 of ROPA, 1998, as the same existed before substitution. 48. It was submitted by the learned Advocate General that by way of substitution of para 13 of ROPA, 1998, the Government attempted to re-emphasize provisions of the DCRB Scheme, 1981 which were otherwise in vogue even after framing of ROPA, 1990 and it did not take away the vested right. 49. 48. It was submitted by the learned Advocate General that by way of substitution of para 13 of ROPA, 1998, the Government attempted to re-emphasize provisions of the DCRB Scheme, 1981 which were otherwise in vogue even after framing of ROPA, 1990 and it did not take away the vested right. 49. We are unable to accept the submission. Considering the various provisions, we are constrained to hold that the respondents acted arbitrarily in not giving opportunity for submitting fresh option to switch over to Pension-cum-Gratuity while substituting para 13 with effect from 13th July, 1999 and also when substituting para 17(2) of ROPA, 1990 on 16th May, 2007 making the option under the DCRB Scheme, 1981 as relevant. An opportunity was required to be given to the employees to change the option to Pension-cum-Gratuity which benefit was available under 17(2) of ROPA, 1990 and even under the provisions of para 13 of ROPA, 1998 before substitution. When conditions of service depending on option were changed substantially and the benefit of pension at par and enhanced gratuity were to be taken away and made dependant on option exercised in terms of the DCRB Scheme, 1981, it was necessary to invite fresh option as the benefits conferred and accrued were sought to be taken away. It could not have been so done unless the Government had invited all the employees to submit fresh options so as to avoid the provisions from being termed as oppressive and arbitrary." APPLICANT'S CONTENTIONS 14. The applicant was represented by Mr. B.R. Bhattacharya, learned senior advocate. According to him, the State Government by taking the words "with effect from the date refund is made" out of context has deprived the applicant of his dues which would have otherwise flowed to him on a true construction of paragraph 77 of the said order in the light of the judgment rendered by the Full Bench. He contended that there cannot be two dates of retirement for the purpose of payment of pension, one in terms of the DCRB Rules and the other as interpreted by the State Government upon a strained reading of paragraph 77. Referring to the DCRB Rules, it was contended that pension is payable from the date following the date of retirement of a teacher on superannuation and the Full Bench did not direct otherwise. Referring to the DCRB Rules, it was contended that pension is payable from the date following the date of retirement of a teacher on superannuation and the Full Bench did not direct otherwise. The State Government had deliberately, to wriggle out of its duty to pay pension in accordance with law, had misinterpreted paragraph 77 of the said order thereby resulting in unjust deprivation of poor teachers. He further referred to the plight of hundreds of retired teachers who were in utter penury like the applicant and submitted that creating a vacuum between the date of retirement on superannuation and the date of refund was never the intention of the Full Bench. He, accordingly, appealed to this Bench to issue appropriate clarification so that not only the applicant but other similarly placed retired employees are paid pension from the dates following the dates of their respective retirement on superannuation. CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS 15. Mr. Datta, the learned Advocate General for the State of West Bengal, representing the respondents, questioned the maintainability of the application for clarification at the outset. The points in support of the objection to maintainability of the application are: (i) The judgment and order of the Full Bench dated July 6, 2013 attained finality, once the special leave petition preferred from the same by the State Government stood dismissed. There being no ambiguity in paragraph 77 of the said order, the State Government obeyed the direction therein by paying pension to the employees with effect from the date refund was made by them of the quantum that they were required to refund. Question of any clarification, therefore, does not arise. (ii) An application for review has to be made in accordance with Chapter 10 of the Appellate Side Rules, which ordains that a memorandum of review has to be presented. In the absence of a memorandum, the present application cannot be construed to be one for review of the said order either. (iii) The present application not being one for review of the said order, a review cannot be had in the disguise of an application for clarification. The remedy now pursued by the applicant is not the appropriate remedy; his remedy was to approach the Supreme Court, if any part of the said order left him aggrieved and dissatisfied. (iii) The present application not being one for review of the said order, a review cannot be had in the disguise of an application for clarification. The remedy now pursued by the applicant is not the appropriate remedy; his remedy was to approach the Supreme Court, if any part of the said order left him aggrieved and dissatisfied. Support was sought to be drawn by relying upon the decisions reported in (2013) 2 SCC 698 : ( AIR 2013 SC 3669 ) (Cine Exhibition (P) Ltd. v. Collector) and (2018) 3 SCC 336 : (AIR Online 2018 SC 420) (State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Balu). (iv) The applicant did not question the said order prior to commencement of payment of pension to him, and by his conduct he has accepted the said order. Having acquiesced in the developments post issuance of notification dated June 13, 2014 in terms of paragraph 76 of the said order, there cannot be any clarification by this Bench after the said order has been acted upon. The decisions reported in (2003) 8 SCC 671 (State of Nagaland v. Toulvi Kibami) and (2003) 12 SCC 347 (Asha Prasad v. Chandrakant Gopalka) were relied upon to draw support. (v) An application for clarification could lie if there were unintentional slips or omissions in an order giving rise to ambiguity. The said order neither lacks clarity nor is anything unclear to be clarified by the Court. Since there has been no mistake or omission on the part of the Full Bench, power conferred by section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter the CPC) cannot be invoked and the misconceived application is liable to rejection. The decisions reported in (2004) 5 SCC 353 : ( AIR 2004 SC 3467 ) (Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat) and (2004) 12 SCC 713 : ( AIR 2004 SC 4096 ) (Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi) have been relied on to fortify the submission made. (vi) If clarification is made, as has been sought for by the applicant, the same would fundamentally alter or change the very conditions on which the said order of the Full Bench is based and that is impermissible. (vi) If clarification is made, as has been sought for by the applicant, the same would fundamentally alter or change the very conditions on which the said order of the Full Bench is based and that is impermissible. (vii) In terms of the Rules framed by this Court, both on the Original Side as well as the Appellate Side, a Full Bench is required to give its opinion on a substantial question of law which might have been referred to it or if a conflict of opinion of two Benches of co-equal strength requires resolution; and based on such opinion, the lis is required to be decided by a Division Bench or a single Bench, as the case may be. The judgment and order of the Full Bench was rendered to resolve a conflict of opinion of Benches of co-equal strength; hence, an application for review or clarification of the opinion rendered by the Full Bench does not lie. (viii) The present application is vexatious and keeping in mind the law laid down in the decision reported in (2015) 3 SCC 552 : (AIR Online 2014 SC 73) (Chaman Lal Saraf v. State of Haryana), it ought to be dismissed. 16. Insofar as the conduct of the applicant is concerned, Mr. Datta invited our attention to the fact that the applicant has presented a fresh writ petition before this Court (W.P. No. 20315 (W) of 2015) wherein prayers have been made for payment of arrears of pension with effect from the date of retirement without, however, challenging the validity of the notification dated June 13, 2014. Despite pendency of such writ petition, the present application has been filed; therefore, it is clear that the applicant has been pursuing parallel remedies, which is impermissible in law. 17. On merits, Mr. Datta by referring to a judgment and order dated December 7, 2015 has highlighted that a single Judge of this Court dismissed W.P. No. 20604 (W) of 2015 (Amal Kanti Chakraborty and 197 Ors. v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.) holding that the claim of the petitioners before His Lordship was a misadventure. In His Lordship's view, the Full Bench having made it clear that pension would be payable with effect from the date refund is made and the petitioners before His Lordship had accepted the notification, it was held that there was no merit in the writ petition. In His Lordship's view, the Full Bench having made it clear that pension would be payable with effect from the date refund is made and the petitioners before His Lordship had accepted the notification, it was held that there was no merit in the writ petition. Our attention was also drawn to the judgment and order dated February 14, 2017 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in MAT 1877 of 2015, which was carried from the said judgment and order dated December 7, 2015. It was, inter alia, held in paragraph 17 as follows:- "The writ petitioners having submitted to the directions as contained in the order of the Full Bench, by exercising their option in terms of notification pursuant thereto and are actually receiving their pension on and from the date of their respective refund of Government share of CPF, are not entitled to question the same subsequently." 18. The order dated November 3, 2017 passed by the Supreme Court dismissing the Special Leave Petition, which was carried from such order dated February 14, 2017, was also brought to our notice and it was contended that even the Supreme Court found no reason to fault the Division Bench's understanding of paragraph 77 of the said order. 19. It has thus been argued by Mr. Datta that several Benches having interpreted the said order in the way the State Government has interpreted and implemented it, any clarification of the nature sought for by the applicant would unsettle the settled position. 20. While referring to the order of the Division Bench dated February 14, 2017 dismissing MAT 1877 of 2015, our attention was further drawn to the fact that by the self-same order MAT 1459 of 2016 (Reported in 2017 (4) Cal HN 235) (The State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Sri. Ranajit Bar & Ors.) was also allowed by setting aside the order under appeal dated May 13, 2016 passed by one of us (Dipankar Datta, J.), whereby W.P. No. 28844 (W) of 2014 (Ranajit Bar & Ors. v. Sri. Ranajit Bar & Ors.) was also allowed by setting aside the order under appeal dated May 13, 2016 passed by one of us (Dipankar Datta, J.), whereby W.P. No. 28844 (W) of 2014 (Ranajit Bar & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors.) [challenging clause 3(x) of the notification dated June 13, 2014], was referred to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting an appropriate Bench or a larger Bench for the purpose of deciding the issue framed therein, viz.: "Whether in terms of the judgment and order of the Full Bench dated July 16, 2013 passed by a Full Bench of the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta in the case of District Inspector of Schools (SE), Kolkata & Anr. v. Abhijit Baidya & Ors., reported in 2013 (3) Cal LJ 178, a willing employee, who exercises option and is otherwise entitled to pension, would be entitled to pension payable from the date of his retirement or pension payable from the date he makes refund of the amount received by him on account of employer's share of provident fund with interest and additional interest?" 21. According to Mr. Datta, the reference made by the order dated May 13, 2016 having been set at naught by the Division Bench, this Bench should dissuade from making any clarification as prayed for. 22. Finally, our attention has also been drawn to a series of orders passed by one of us (Joymalya Bagchi, J.) on writ petitions filed by several employees seeking payment of pension from the date of retirement in contrast to payment made from the date of refund. The decisions rendered by His Lordship are more or less identical. A paragraph from the decision rendered in W.P. 11767 (W) of 2009 (Aruna Pradhan v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.) was relied on in this behalf, which is quoted below:- "This issue is no longer res integra having been decided by a Special Bench of this Court by judgment and order dated 16.07.2013 in APO 94 of 2009, GA 665 of 2013 with W.P. 694 of 2008 with all other 201 connected matters (District Inspector of Schools (SE), Kolkata v. Abhijit Baidya). In view of the ratio as laid down in the said decision, if the petitioner exercises option in terms of para 76 of the said judgment in favour of the Pension-cum-Gratuity Scheme pursuant to the public notice issued by the State Government, as provided in the said paragraph, seeking such option, and, in the event she has already received upon superannuation benefits under the CPF scheme, the State Government shall within a month from her exercising such option, specify to the petitioner the amount of employees' (sic, employer's) share of contribution with interest and additional interest and call upon the latter to refund the same within a specified time and upon such refund being so made, the petitioner shall be entitled to the benefit of Pension-cum-Gratuity scheme from the date of such refund." 23. The contention of Mr. Datta, therefore, has been that learned Judges of this Court have uniformly held, upon duly reading the said order, that the retired employees are entitled to pension from the date of refund and there being no valid reason for taking a different view, there is no need for clarification of the said order; accordingly, G.A. No. 464 of 2018 merits outright dismissal. REPLY OF THE APPLICANT 24. Mr. Bhattacharya contended that the learned Advocate General merely raised technical points without having anything to argue on the merits. According to him, the technical objections cannot override the Court's duty to render justice. In any event, he urged that the applicant had done what law permitted him to do and hence, no exception ought to be taken. Insofar as the conduct of the applicant is concerned, it was contended that even if the conduct were reprehensible the nature and character of the judgment rendered by the Full Bench would not be changed thereby. The only forum that was available had been approached for exercise of its inherent power to remove the injustice caused by the brazen acts of highhandedness perpetrated by the respondents. He brought to the notice of this Bench the plight of the applicant. Having returned Rs. 4,89,342.00, which included interest and additional interest as directed by the Full Bench in the said order, payment of pension in favour of the applicant commenced from September 10, 2014 at a time when he is aged 75 +. He brought to the notice of this Bench the plight of the applicant. Having returned Rs. 4,89,342.00, which included interest and additional interest as directed by the Full Bench in the said order, payment of pension in favour of the applicant commenced from September 10, 2014 at a time when he is aged 75 +. He did move a writ petition but during its pendency found other Benches of this Court taking a view contrary to what the Full Bench had directed and hence, had no other option but to apply for a clarification in the changed circumstances. He, thus, prayed that appropriate clarification be issued to set things right. THE DECISION 25. Legislation is the task of the legislature, while it is given only to the judiciary to interpret what the legislature said or intended to say. Whenever the legislature uses words in a statute which are ambivalent and the court perceives that the legislature has failed to express itself unequivocally or without ambiguity, the legislators cannot be called upon to explain what they intended to say by the words they used. Therefore, the essential function of interpretation rests with the judiciary. However, if difficulty arises in interpreting a judgment/order passed by a court because of unintentional slips or omissions on its part and should the author of the judgment/order be available, the parties to the litigation could approach him for a clarification. If a Bench comprises more than one Judge and the author is not available but the companion Judge is available, normally it is a Bench comprising, inter alia, such Judge who is available that deals with the matter. It is only for unavoidable reasons that a Bench, not comprising a Judge who was part of the original Bench, could consider the prayer for clarification. More often than not, sections 151 and 152 of the CPC are pressed into service for achieving the desired result. However, it is always desirable that the clarification, if at all required, is provided by a Judge/Judges who was/were a member/members of the parent Bench. 26. More often than not, sections 151 and 152 of the CPC are pressed into service for achieving the desired result. However, it is always desirable that the clarification, if at all required, is provided by a Judge/Judges who was/were a member/members of the parent Bench. 26. G.A. No. 464 of 2018 being such an application, seeking clarification of the said order having regard to the dichotomy in understanding of paragraph 77 thereof, it is only just and proper that the clarification, if at all, ought to be issued by the same Bench that delivered it or those Judges of the Full Bench who are still available. It is noteworthy that for hearing and disposing of the application for clarification of the said order, this Bench happens to be the third in the series constituted in succession with the Hon'ble the Chief Justice as the presiding Judge and the other Judges being' the common member Judges. Be that as it may. 27. Keeping in mind what we have referred to and extracted supra, paragraph 77 of the said order calls for proper interpretation as to what the Full Bench intended in terms of relief to be granted to the retired employees. 28. Since Mr. Datta has urged that the application is not maintainable, a fortiori, this Bench has no jurisdiction to entertain the same, this Bench considers it appropriate to first remind itself of its own jurisdiction and whether in appropriate cases, not being shackled by technicalities, the inherent power ought to be exercised to remedy injustice wherever it is found. In the process, it would also exercise the consideration of this Bench how far the decisions cited by Mr. Datta are relevant for not entertaining the application and deciding it. 29. In its decision reported in 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433 : (AIR 1933 SC 1014) (M.V. Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment and Trading (P) Ltd.), the Supreme Court while overruling ancient decisions of the Bombay High Court and this Court in respect of admiralty jurisdiction, held that the High Courts continue to enjoy the same jurisdiction as it had immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, as stated in Article 225, and subject to its own Rules, exercise of its manifold jurisdiction, unless barred, is unlimited (Emphasis supplied). 30. 30. Not too long thereafter, the Supreme Court in its decision reported in (2000) 1 SCC 666 : ( AIR 2000 SC 540 ) (M.M. Thomas v. State of Kerala) noticed the aforesaid decision and after dwelling on the powers that a High Court as a court of record under Article 215 of the Constitution must have, ruled in the following words: "14. The High Court as a court of record, as envisaged in Article 215 of the Constitution, must have inherent powers to correct the records. A court of record envelops all such powers whose acts and proceedings are to be enrolled in a perpetual memorial and testimony. A court of record is undoubtedly a superior court which is itself competent to determine the scope of its jurisdiction. The High Court, as a court of record, has a duty to itself to keep all its records correctly and in accordance with law. Hence, if any apparent error is noticed by the High Court in respect of any orders passed by it the High Court has not only power, but a duty to correct it. The High Court's power in that regard is plenary. In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1 , a nine-Judge Bench of this Court has recognised the aforesaid superior status of the High Court as a court of plenary jurisdiction being a court of record. (Emphasis supplied) 31. More or less ten years later, this is what the Supreme Court in its decision reported in (2010) 12 SCC 585 : ( AIR 2009 SC 2136 , para 15) (Tilak Raj v. Baikunthi Devi) said: "25. Since the court exists to dispense justice, any mistake which is found to be clerical in nature should be allowed to be rectified by exercising inherent power vested in the court for subserving the cause of justice. The principle behind the provision is that no party should suffer due to bona fide mistake. Whatever is intended by the court while passing the order or decree must be properly reflected therein otherwise it would only be destructive of the principle of advancing the cause of justice. In such matters, the court should not bind itself by the shackles of technicalities." (Emphasis supplied) 32. Even in Ram Chandra Singh ( AIR 2004 SC 4096 ) (supra) relied on by Mr. In such matters, the court should not bind itself by the shackles of technicalities." (Emphasis supplied) 32. Even in Ram Chandra Singh ( AIR 2004 SC 4096 ) (supra) relied on by Mr. Datta, the law is laid down, upon consideration of the decision reported in AIR 1967 SC 1 440 (Samarendra Nath Sinha v. Krishna Kumar Nag), in the following terms: "19. It is no doubt true that in appropriate cases this Court may pass an order ex debito justitiae by correcting mistakes in the judgment but inherent power of this Court can be exercised only when there does not exist any other provision in that behalf. Clerical or arithmetical mistake or an error arising from an accidental slip or omission and to vary its judgment so as to give effect to its meaning and intention is permissible as has been held in Samarendra Nath Sinha." (Emphasis supplied) 33. Ram Chandra Singh ( AIR 2004 SC 4096 ) (supra) also considered the decision reported in (2001) 4 SCC 181 : ( AIR 2001 SC 1084 ) (Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho) which, in turn, relied on the decision reported in (1999) 3 SCC 500 : ( AIR 1999 SC 1031 ) (Dwarka Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh). Paragraphs 21 to 23 (paras 19, 20 & 21 of AIR) are instructive and hence, quoted below: "21. In Jayalakshmi Coelho ( AIR 2001 SC 1084 ) whereupon Mr. Mishra relied upon, this Court observed: 13. So far as the legal position is concerned, there would hardly be any doubt about the proposition that in terms of Section 152, CPC, any error occurred in the decree on account of arithmetical or clerical error or accidental slip may be rectified by the court. The principle behind the provision is that no party should suffer due to mistake of the court and whatever is intended by the court while passing the order or decree must be properly reflected therein, otherwise it would only be destructive to the principle of advancing the cause of justice.' 22. This Court upon analysing some earlier decisions of this Court opined: "13. ... To illustrate the point, it has been indicated as an example that in a case where the order may contain something which is not mentioned in the decree would be a case of unintentional omission or mistake. This Court upon analysing some earlier decisions of this Court opined: "13. ... To illustrate the point, it has been indicated as an example that in a case where the order may contain something which is not mentioned in the decree would be a case of unintentional omission or mistake. Such omissions are attributable to the court which may say something or omit to say something which it did not intend to say or omit. No new arguments or re-arguments on merits are required for such rectification of mistake. In a case reported in Dwaraka Das v. State of M.P. ( AIR 1999 SC 1031 ) this Court has held that the correction in the order or decree should be of the mistake or omission which is accidental and not intentional without going into the merits of the case. It is further observed that the provisions cannot be invoked to modify, alter or add to the terms of the original decree so as to in effect pass an effective judicial order after the judgment in the case." (Emphasis supplied in original) 23. This decision itself, thus, lays down that in the garb of correction of mistakes arising out of accidental slips or typographical errors, the judgment cannot be altered or modified by this Court in exercise of its inherent power." JUDGMENT : Dipankar Datta, J. 1. Dozens of intra-court writ appeals and writ petitions were finally decided by a Full Bench of this Court by a common judgment and order dated July 16, 2013 (hereafter the said order). The Bench comprised of Arun Mishra, C.J. (as His Lordship then was), and Dipankar Datta and Joymalya Bagchi, JJ. (hereafter the Full Bench). The lead matter was APO 94 of 2009 (District Inspector of Schools, SE, Kolkata and Anr. v. Abhijeet Baidya and Ors.). All the appeals carried by the State Government were dismissed, while the writ petitions succeeded to the extent indicated in the said order. After a special leave petition that the State Government carried to the Supreme Court of India from the said order failed on February 24, 2014, steps were taken to implement the directions contained therein albeit not to the satisfaction of all concerned who succeeded before the Full Bench. 2. We are now tasked to decide G.A. No. 464 of 2018, an application for clarification at the instance of one Md. Abdul Ghani (hereafter the applicant). 2. We are now tasked to decide G.A. No. 464 of 2018, an application for clarification at the instance of one Md. Abdul Ghani (hereafter the applicant). His writ petition (W.P. No. 1528 of 2002) had succeeded before a learned Judge, whereupon the State Government and its officers preferred an intra-court writ appeal (APO 121 of 2007). By the said order, APO 121 of 2007 too stood dismissed. The present application appears to have been necessitated in the wake of the State Government's understanding of paragraph 77 of the said order and its implementation thereof in a particular manner, which divests the applicant of his right to claim pension with effect from the date following the date of his retirement from service (October 31, 2003) on superannuation, i.e., w.e.f. November 1, 2003. The prayer, therefore, is for a clarification of the said order so as to facilitate payment of pension to the applicant by the State Government from November 1, 2003, instead of from September 10, 2014, i.e., the date on which the applicant refunded the employer's share of Provident Fund with interest and additional interest upon being notified by the State Government the quantum required to be refunded in terms of the said order. THE ORDER UNDER CONSIDERATION 3. It would be profitable if, at this stage, we sketch a brief outline of the said order as a prologue to our decision on the merits of the rival claims. 4. A conflict of opinion between Division Benches of this Court comprising two Judges had resulted in a reference being laid before the Full Bench. It was noticed at that point of time that several other matters (intra-court writ appeals as well as writ petitions) were pending on the self-same point. The Full Bench, thus, decided not only the reference but also the other pending appeals and writ petitions by the said order. On one side of the litigation were teachers of non-Government educational institutions from all over West Bengal (hereafter the employees) and on the other side, the mighty State itself as well as its officers. 5. The Full Bench, thus, decided not only the reference but also the other pending appeals and writ petitions by the said order. On one side of the litigation were teachers of non-Government educational institutions from all over West Bengal (hereafter the employees) and on the other side, the mighty State itself as well as its officers. 5. The challenge in the writ petitions, out of which the matters dealt with by the Full Bench arose, was directed against substitution of para 13 of Revision of Pay and Allowances, 1998 (hereafter ROPA 1998) with effect from July 13, 1999 and amendment made on May 16, 2007 in para 17 of Revision of Pay and Allowances, 1990 (hereafter ROPA 1990) retrospectively, with effect from March 6, 1990, without extending an opportunity to the employees to switch over to the Pension-cum-Gratuity scheme envisaged in the Death-cum-Retirement Benefit Rules, 1981 (hereafter the DCRB Rules). 6. It would be appropriate at the outset to notice the provisions of para 13 of ROPA 1998 before and after substitution. Originally, rule 13 read as follows: The teaching and non-teaching employees of aided/sponsored educational institutions who will opt for the revised scales of pay shall be allowed to enjoy pensionary benefit including dearness relief at par with the State Government employees. Maximum amount of gratuity shall be raised from Rs. 60,000/- to Rs. 2,50,000/- (Rupees two lakhs fifty thousand only)." and, after substitution, it read as follows: "The teaching and non-teaching employees of Aided/Sponsored Educational Institutions who will come under the revised scale of pay as per memorandum No. 25-SE(B) dated 12.02.1999 will be allowed to enjoy the retirement benefit as per revised pension order of this Department according to the option exercised by them under West Bengal Recognized Non-Govt. Educational Institutions Employees (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Scheme, 1981". 7. Para 17 of ROPA 1990, originally, was in the following terms: "(1) Age of Superannuation and related is-sues-(1) Subject to the provisions of para 5, the age of superannuation of all categories of teaching and non-teaching employees who elect to come over to revised scales of pay shall be fixed at 60 years, as per recommendation of the 3rd Pay Commission. (2) The teaching and non-teaching employees of an aided/sponsored educational institution or organization who will opt for the revised scales of pay shall be allowed to enjoy pensionary benefits including dearness relief at par with State Government employees. (2) The teaching and non-teaching employees of an aided/sponsored educational institution or organization who will opt for the revised scales of pay shall be allowed to enjoy pensionary benefits including dearness relief at par with State Government employees. Maximum amount to gratuity shall be raised from Rs. 36,000/- to Rs. 60,000/-." After substitution, sub-para (2) thereof read as follows: "(2) The teaching and non-teaching staff of an aided-sponsored educational institution or organization who will opt for the revised scales of pay as per memo No. 33-Edn (B) dated 07.03.1990 shall be allowed to enjoy the retirement benefits as per revised pension order of the Department vide Memo No. 136-Edn (B) dated 15.05.1985 according to the option exercised by them under the West Bengal Recognized Non-Govt. Educational Institution Employees (D.C.R.B.) Scheme, 1981." 8. Paragraph 2 of the said order noted the question involved in all the matters, viz. "whether employees have to be given an opportunity to switch over to the Pension-cum-Gratuity Scheme, in view of change made in para 17(3) of Revision of Pay and Allowances 1990 and in para 13 of Revision of Pay and Allowances 1998". 9. Upon consideration of the rival contentions advanced from the Bar, the Full Bench framed further five questions for determination reading as follows: "i) Whether a person who has opted for revised pay scale under ROPA, 1990 becomes entitled to pension by virtue of operation of para 17 of ROPA, 1990? (ii) Whether an incumbent who has exercised an option under ROPA 1990 can still be conditioned to the rider of option to be exercised under West Bengal Recognized Non-Government Educational Institution Employees DCRB Scheme, 1981, particularly in view of the amendment effected in paragraph 17(2) vide GO. 226-SE(B)/1M-102/98, dated 16th May, 2007 and whether the amendment made in paragraph 17(2) can be said to be valid law; that too with retrospective effect? (iii) Whether para 13 of Revision of Pay & Allowance Rules, 1998, as amended by Notification dated 13th July, 1999 relating to the employees of West Bengal Recognized Non-Government Aided Institutions can be said to be valid in law? (iv) Whether after amending the para 13 of ROPA 1998 on 13.07.1999 and para 17 of ROPA 1990 in 2007, it was necessary to give fresh opportunity to employees to revise option under West Bengal Recognized Non-Government Educational institution Employees (Death-cum-Retirement benefit) Scheme, 1981? (iv) Whether after amending the para 13 of ROPA 1998 on 13.07.1999 and para 17 of ROPA 1990 in 2007, it was necessary to give fresh opportunity to employees to revise option under West Bengal Recognized Non-Government Educational institution Employees (Death-cum-Retirement benefit) Scheme, 1981? (v) Whether the time time-limit fixed under the DCRB Scheme, 1981 to submit option can be extended in suitable cases?" 10. The Full Bench thereafter dealt with the rival contentions and answered the aforesaid five questions in paragraph 74 of the said order. The same, in its entirety, is reproduced hereinbelow: "74. Thus, we answer the five questions in the following manner: (1) An employee who has opted for revised pay scale under ROPA, 1990 becomes entitled to pension and gratuity by virtue and operation of para 17 of ROPA 1990. It was not necessary for him to exercise fresh option as per Memo dated 16th December, 1991, which was applicable to employees who had not opted for ROPA 1990. Benefit of Pension-cum-Gratuity was conferred due to acceptance of reduced age of superannuation of 60 years under para 17(1) of ROPA 1990 and his right for Pension-cum-Gratuity so accrued could not have been taken away retrospectively by substitution of the provisions of para 17 in 2007 or by substitution of para 13 of ROPA 1998 in 1999. (2) Once option has been exercised under ROPA 1990, a person cannot be subjected to the rider of the option exercised under the DCRB Scheme, 1981 as the invitation of the option under the said scheme was with respect to the employees who elected to continue in service till the age of 65 years and to have the benefit of the old scheme. For such employees opportunity was given to submit fresh options as per Memo dated 16th December, 1991. The amendment made in para 17(2) of ROPA 1990 on May 16, 2007 cannot be said to be valid price of law as such provisions cannot be substituted with retrospective effect to take away the rights already accrued to an employee. So as to validate provisions of para 17(2) of ROPA 1990, as substituted, it was necessary to invite option for switching over to Pension-cum-Gratuity from CPF-cum-Gratuity when the substitution of para 17(2) of ROPA was made on 16th May, 2007 with retrospective effect. So as to validate provisions of para 17(2) of ROPA 1990, as substituted, it was necessary to invite option for switching over to Pension-cum-Gratuity from CPF-cum-Gratuity when the substitution of para 17(2) of ROPA was made on 16th May, 2007 with retrospective effect. (3) Para 13 of the ROPA 1998 as amended on 13th July, 1999 cannot be said to be valid in the eyes of law as it has the effect of taking away benefit conferred by para 17(2) of ROPA 1990, as the ROPA was made applicable to the employees who had opted for ROPA, 1990 and the benefit conferred could not have been taken away by substitution of provisions contained in par 13 of ROPA, 1998. It was clearly arbitrary and an unreasonable exercise of power and to treat it as valid and legal, it was necessary to invite fresh option under the DCRB Scheme, 1981 for switching over to Pension-cum-Gratuity as the provisions had been amended drastically which could not operate to the prejudice of the employees in whose favour right to claim Pension-cum-Gratuity had accrued. The substituted provisions of para 13 of ROPA, 1998 fail to qualify Wednesbury principles of reasonableness. The action was in utter violation of fair play and justice. (4) In our opinion, after substitution of para 13 ROPA, 1998 on 13th July, 1999 and para 17 of ROPA, 1990 on 16th May, 2007, in order to save the provisions from the vice of arbitrariness, it was necessary to give an opportunity to the employees to submit fresh option under DCRB Scheme, 1981. As the option exercised earlier in terms of the DCRB Scheme, 1981 was made applicable, it was necessary to give fresh opportunity to exercise an option for switching over to Pension-cum-Gratuity and the State could not have acted to the detriment of the employees opting for ROPA, 1990 who chose the rider of reduced age of superannuation i.e. 60 years under para 17(1) of ROPA, 1990. (5) In our opinion, as there was drastic change of provisions of para 17(2) of ROPA made by way of substitution in 2007, and ROPA, 1998 also interred with the rights conferred upon the employees under para 17(2) of ROPA, 1990, all the employees who opted for ROPA, 1990 ought to be given fresh opportunity to submit the option to switch over to Pension-cum-Gratuity." 11. These answers were followed by the operative part of the said order contained in paragraphs 75 to 80 thereof, reading as follows: "75. Coming to the relief to be granted, it is clear that some of the employees are in service and some of them have retired and averments are on record that they are ready and willing to repay the amount of employer's share of contribution in the CPF together with interest and additional interest as option had not been called from them to switch over to Pension-cum-Gratuity while substituting para 13 of ROPA, 1998 w.e.f. 13th July, 1999 and retrospective substitution of para 17(2) of ROPA 1990 on 16th May, 2007 w.e.f. 6th March, 1999. 76. We direct the State Government to give opportunity to all the petitioners and other employees similarly situated to submit option to switch over to Pension-cum-Gratuity by issuing public notice in at least four newspapers having wide circulation in this State. Three months' time period be given to them to exercise option and let the amount be specified to each and every employee who elects to switch over to Pension-cum-Gratuity to deposit the amount of employer's share of contribution with interest and additional interest which is required to be refunded to the Government within the period specified. 77. If an employee exercises option, he shall be entitled to Pension-cum-Gratuity in accordance with law with effect from the date refund is made. 78. Let such exercise be completed within a period of six months from today. 79. The appeals filed by the State Government are hereby dismissed. 80. The writ petitions are allowed to the aforesaid extent." 12. The reasons for the aforesaid answers (in paragraph 74) and the relief ultimately granted are delineated in detail in the judgment of the Full Bench. Bare perusal thereof would reveal an opinion formed by the Full Bench that drastic changes were sought to be made by substituting ROPA, 1998 with effect from July 13, 1999 as well as amending ROPA, 1990 with effect from March 6, 1990 retrospectively. Bare perusal thereof would reveal an opinion formed by the Full Bench that drastic changes were sought to be made by substituting ROPA, 1998 with effect from July 13, 1999 as well as amending ROPA, 1990 with effect from March 6, 1990 retrospectively. The Full Bench noted that those who had opted for the revised scales of pay under ROPA, 1990 did so waiving their right to continue in service till 65 years of age and agreed to superannuate on attaining the age of 60 years, on the assurance of receiving a higher pay while in service as compared to those who elected to continue to remain in service till attaining 65 years of age, and also to receive pension at par with Government employees and enhanced amount of gratuity. The contention of the employees was that immediately upon opting for the revised scales of pay made available by ROPA, 1990, a right accrued in their favour to enjoy a better scale of pay as well as pension and enhanced gratuity and such a vested right could not have been taken away by the arbitrary action of the State Government. Once the employees had changed their position and acted to their detriment by accepting the reduced age of superannuation of 60 years with waiver of right to avail extension of service up to 65 years, the Full Bench was clear in its opinion that accrued rights of the employees could not have been abrogated in the manner the Government ventured to do so. 13. It would not be inapt to extract below paragraphs 46 to 49 reading as follows: "46. In our opinion, by way of amendment/substitution of provisions, rights which have accrued cannot be taken away, that to/with retrospective effect. A benefit that has accrued under the existing para 17(2) of ROPA, 1990 cannot be taken away by an amendment with retrospective effect or by provisions as contained in substituted para 13 of ROPA, 1998. 47. In our considered opinion, though it is open to the Government to change its policy but change in policy must be in conformity with reasonableness and principles of natural justice. With the substitution of para 13 of ROPA, 1998 and para 17(2) of ROPA, 1990 with retrospective effect, the provisions entailed adverse civil consequences and were derogatory to the accrued rights of the employees. With the substitution of para 13 of ROPA, 1998 and para 17(2) of ROPA, 1990 with retrospective effect, the provisions entailed adverse civil consequences and were derogatory to the accrued rights of the employees. The option exercised under the DCRB Scheme, 1981 could not have been made the basis for determination whether the employees were entitled to benefit of either CPF-cum-Gratuity. They were made to accept the reduced age of superannuation at 60 years but were granted the benefit of higher pay scale with an assurance that they would be entitled to pension at the par with State Government employee and enhanced amount of gratuity. Those who opted for the revised pay scale agreed to retire at the age of 60 years with the impression that their winter years of life would be taken care of with pension with par with the Government employees. The employees having been made to change their position, the Government acted in an arbitrary manner by reversion of the employees to the position that was prevailing before they opted for the revised scale in relation to pension. In order to save such provisions from the vice of arbitrariness, it was necessary to give an opportunity to exercise fresh option for switching over from CPF-cum-Gratuity to Pension-cum-Gratuity, which benefit was otherwise available and had accrued in favour of the employees once they exercised option for revised scale of pay as per provisions contained in para 17(2) of ROPA, 1990 and para 13 of ROPA, 1998, as the same existed before substitution. 48. It was submitted by the learned Advocate General that by way of substitution of para 13 of ROPA, 1998, the Government attempted to re-emphasize provisions of the DCRB Scheme, 1981 which were otherwise in vogue even after framing of ROPA, 1990 and it did not take away the vested right. 49. We are unable to accept the submission. Considering the various provisions, we are constrained to hold that the respondents acted arbitrarily in not giving opportunity for submitting fresh option to switch over to Pension-cum-Gratuity while substituting para 13 with effect from 13th July, 1999 and also when substituting para 17(2) of ROPA, 1990 on 16th May, 2007 making the option under the DCRB Scheme, 1981 as relevant. Considering the various provisions, we are constrained to hold that the respondents acted arbitrarily in not giving opportunity for submitting fresh option to switch over to Pension-cum-Gratuity while substituting para 13 with effect from 13th July, 1999 and also when substituting para 17(2) of ROPA, 1990 on 16th May, 2007 making the option under the DCRB Scheme, 1981 as relevant. An opportunity was required to be given to the employees to change the option to Pension-cum-Gratuity which benefit was available under 17(2) of ROPA, 1990 and even under the provisions of para 13 of ROPA, 1998 before substitution. When conditions of service depending on option were changed substantially and the benefit of pension at par and enhanced gratuity were to be taken away and made dependant on option exercised in terms of the DCRB Scheme, 1981, it was necessary to invite fresh option as the benefits conferred and accrued were sought to be taken away. It could not have been so done unless the Government had invited all the employees to submit fresh options so as to avoid the provisions from being termed as oppressive and arbitrary." APPLICANT'S CONTENTIONS 14. The applicant was represented by Mr. B.R. Bhattacharya, learned senior advocate. According to him, the State Government by taking the words "with effect from the date refund is made" out of context has deprived the applicant of his dues which would have otherwise flowed to him on a true construction of paragraph 77 of the said order in the light of the judgment rendered by the Full Bench. He contended that there cannot be two dates of retirement for the purpose of payment of pension, one in terms of the DCRB Rules and the other as interpreted by the State Government upon a strained reading of paragraph 77. Referring to the DCRB Rules, it was contended that pension is payable from the date following the date of retirement of a teacher on superannuation and the Full Bench did not direct otherwise. The State Government had deliberately, to wriggle out of its duty to pay pension in accordance with law, had misinterpreted paragraph 77 of the said order thereby resulting in unjust deprivation of poor teachers. The State Government had deliberately, to wriggle out of its duty to pay pension in accordance with law, had misinterpreted paragraph 77 of the said order thereby resulting in unjust deprivation of poor teachers. He further referred to the plight of hundreds of retired teachers who were in utter penury like the applicant and submitted that creating a vacuum between the date of retirement on superannuation and the date of refund was never the intention of the Full Bench. He, accordingly, appealed to this Bench to issue appropriate clarification so that not only the applicant but other similarly placed retired employees are paid pension from the dates following the dates of their respective retirement on superannuation. CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS 15. Mr. Datta, the learned Advocate General for the State of West Bengal, representing the respondents, questioned the maintainability of the application for clarification at the outset. The points in support of the objection to maintainability of the application are: (i) The judgment and order of the Full Bench dated July 6, 2013 attained finality, once the special leave petition preferred from the same by the State Government stood dismissed. There being no ambiguity in paragraph 77 of the said order, the State Government obeyed the direction therein by paying pension to the employees with effect from the date refund was made by them of the quantum that they were required to refund. Question of any clarification, therefore, does not arise. (ii) An application for review has to be made in accordance with Chapter 10 of the Appellate Side Rules, which ordains that a memorandum of review has to be presented. In the absence of a memorandum, the present application cannot be construed to be one for review of the said order either. (iii) The present application not being one for review of the said order, a review cannot be had in the disguise of an application for clarification. The remedy now pursued by the applicant is not the appropriate remedy; his remedy was to approach the Supreme Court, if any part of the said order left him aggrieved and dissatisfied. Support was sought to be drawn by relying upon the decisions reported in (2013) 2 SCC 698 : ( AIR 2013 SC 3669 ) (Cine Exhibition (P) Ltd. v. Collector) and (2018) 3 SCC 336 : (AIR Online 2018 SC 420) (State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Balu). Support was sought to be drawn by relying upon the decisions reported in (2013) 2 SCC 698 : ( AIR 2013 SC 3669 ) (Cine Exhibition (P) Ltd. v. Collector) and (2018) 3 SCC 336 : (AIR Online 2018 SC 420) (State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Balu). (iv) The applicant did not question the said order prior to commencement of payment of pension to him, and by his conduct he has accepted the said order. Having acquiesced in the developments post issuance of notification dated June 13, 2014 in terms of paragraph 76 of the said order, there cannot be any clarification by this Bench after the said order has been acted upon. The decisions reported in (2003) 8 SCC 671 (State of Nagaland v. Toulvi Kibami) and (2003) 12 SCC 347 (Asha Prasad v. Chandrakant Gopalka) were relied upon to draw support. (v) An application for clarification could lie if there were unintentional slips or omissions in an order giving rise to ambiguity. The said order neither lacks clarity nor is anything unclear to be clarified by the Court. Since there has been no mistake or omission on the part of the Full Bench, power conferred by section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter the CPC) cannot be invoked and the misconceived application is liable to rejection. The decisions reported in (2004) 5 SCC 353 : ( AIR 2004 SC 3467 ) (Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat) and (2004) 12 SCC 713 : ( AIR 2004 SC 4096 ) (Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi) have been relied on to fortify the submission made. (vi) If clarification is made, as has been sought for by the applicant, the same would fundamentally alter or change the very conditions on which the said order of the Full Bench is based and that is impermissible. (vii) In terms of the Rules framed by this Court, both on the Original Side as well as the Appellate Side, a Full Bench is required to give its opinion on a substantial question of law which might have been referred to it or if a conflict of opinion of two Benches of co-equal strength requires resolution; and based on such opinion, the lis is required to be decided by a Division Bench or a single Bench, as the case may be. The judgment and order of the Full Bench was rendered to resolve a conflict of opinion of Benches of co-equal strength; hence, an application for review or clarification of the opinion rendered by the Full Bench does not lie. (viii) The present application is vexatious and keeping in mind the law laid down in the decision reported in (2015) 3 SCC 552 : (AIR Online 2014 SC 73) (Chaman Lal Saraf v. State of Haryana), it ought to be dismissed. 16. Insofar as the conduct of the applicant is concerned, Mr. Datta invited our attention to the fact that the applicant has presented a fresh writ petition before this Court (W.P. No. 20315 (W) of 2015) wherein prayers have been made for payment of arrears of pension with effect from the date of retirement without, however, challenging the validity of the notification dated June 13, 2014. Despite pendency of such writ petition, the present application has been filed; therefore, it is clear that the applicant has been pursuing parallel remedies, which is impermissible in law. 17. On merits, Mr. Datta by referring to a judgment and order dated December 7, 2015 has highlighted that a single Judge of this Court dismissed W.P. No. 20604 (W) of 2015 (Amal Kanti Chakraborty and 197 Ors. v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.) holding that the claim of the petitioners before His Lordship was a misadventure. In His Lordship's view, the Full Bench having made it clear that pension would be payable with effect from the date refund is made and the petitioners before His Lordship had accepted the notification, it was held that there was no merit in the writ petition. Our attention was also drawn to the judgment and order dated February 14, 2017 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in MAT 1877 of 2015, which was carried from the said judgment and order dated December 7, 2015. It was, inter alia, held in paragraph 17 as follows:- "The writ petitioners having submitted to the directions as contained in the order of the Full Bench, by exercising their option in terms of notification pursuant thereto and are actually receiving their pension on and from the date of their respective refund of Government share of CPF, are not entitled to question the same subsequently." 18. The order dated November 3, 2017 passed by the Supreme Court dismissing the Special Leave Petition, which was carried from such order dated February 14, 2017, was also brought to our notice and it was contended that even the Supreme Court found no reason to fault the Division Bench's understanding of paragraph 77 of the said order. 19. It has thus been argued by Mr. Datta that several Benches having interpreted the said order in the way the State Government has interpreted and implemented it, any clarification of the nature sought for by the applicant would unsettle the settled position. 20. While referring to the order of the Division Bench dated February 14, 2017 dismissing MAT 1877 of 2015, our attention was further drawn to the fact that by the self-same order MAT 1459 of 2016 (Reported in 2017 (4) Cal HN 235) (The State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Sri. Ranajit Bar & Ors.) was also allowed by setting aside the order under appeal dated May 13, 2016 passed by one of us (Dipankar Datta, J.), whereby W.P. No. 28844 (W) of 2014 (Ranajit Bar & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors.) [challenging clause 3(x) of the notification dated June 13, 2014], was referred to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting an appropriate Bench or a larger Bench for the purpose of deciding the issue framed therein, viz.: "Whether in terms of the judgment and order of the Full Bench dated July 16, 2013 passed by a Full Bench of the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta in the case of District Inspector of Schools (SE), Kolkata & Anr. v. Abhijit Baidya & Ors., reported in 2013 (3) Cal LJ 178, a willing employee, who exercises option and is otherwise entitled to pension, would be entitled to pension payable from the date of his retirement or pension payable from the date he makes refund of the amount received by him on account of employer's share of provident fund with interest and additional interest?" 21. According to Mr. Datta, the reference made by the order dated May 13, 2016 having been set at naught by the Division Bench, this Bench should dissuade from making any clarification as prayed for. 22. According to Mr. Datta, the reference made by the order dated May 13, 2016 having been set at naught by the Division Bench, this Bench should dissuade from making any clarification as prayed for. 22. Finally, our attention has also been drawn to a series of orders passed by one of us (Joymalya Bagchi, J.) on writ petitions filed by several employees seeking payment of pension from the date of retirement in contrast to payment made from the date of refund. The decisions rendered by His Lordship are more or less identical. A paragraph from the decision rendered in W.P. 11767 (W) of 2009 (Aruna Pradhan v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.) was relied on in this behalf, which is quoted below:- "This issue is no longer res integra having been decided by a Special Bench of this Court by judgment and order dated 16.07.2013 in APO 94 of 2009, GA 665 of 2013 with W.P. 694 of 2008 with all other 201 connected matters (District Inspector of Schools (SE), Kolkata v. Abhijit Baidya). In view of the ratio as laid down in the said decision, if the petitioner exercises option in terms of para 76 of the said judgment in favour of the Pension-cum-Gratuity Scheme pursuant to the public notice issued by the State Government, as provided in the said paragraph, seeking such option, and, in the event she has already received upon superannuation benefits under the CPF scheme, the State Government shall within a month from her exercising such option, specify to the petitioner the amount of employees' (sic, employer's) share of contribution with interest and additional interest and call upon the latter to refund the same within a specified time and upon such refund being so made, the petitioner shall be entitled to the benefit of Pension-cum-Gratuity scheme from the date of such refund." 23. The contention of Mr. Datta, therefore, has been that learned Judges of this Court have uniformly held, upon duly reading the said order, that the retired employees are entitled to pension from the date of refund and there being no valid reason for taking a different view, there is no need for clarification of the said order; accordingly, G.A. No. 464 of 2018 merits outright dismissal. REPLY OF THE APPLICANT 24. Mr. REPLY OF THE APPLICANT 24. Mr. Bhattacharya contended that the learned Advocate General merely raised technical points without having anything to argue on the merits. According to him, the technical objections cannot override the Court's duty to render justice. In any event, he urged that the applicant had done what law permitted him to do and hence, no exception ought to be taken. Insofar as the conduct of the applicant is concerned, it was contended that even if the conduct were reprehensible the nature and character of the judgment rendered by the Full Bench would not be changed thereby. The only forum that was available had been approached for exercise of its inherent power to remove the injustice caused by the brazen acts of highhandedness perpetrated by the respondents. He brought to the notice of this Bench the plight of the applicant. Having returned Rs. 4,89,342.00, which included interest and additional interest as directed by the Full Bench in the said order, payment of pension in favour of the applicant commenced from September 10, 2014 at a time when he is aged 75 +. He did move a writ petition but during its pendency found other Benches of this Court taking a view contrary to what the Full Bench had directed and hence, had no other option but to apply for a clarification in the changed circumstances. He, thus, prayed that appropriate clarification be issued to set things right. THE DECISION 25. Legislation is the task of the legislature, while it is given only to the judiciary to interpret what the legislature said or intended to say. Whenever the legislature uses words in a statute which are ambivalent and the court perceives that the legislature has failed to express itself unequivocally or without ambiguity, the legislators cannot be called upon to explain what they intended to say by the words they used. Therefore, the essential function of interpretation rests with the judiciary. However, if difficulty arises in interpreting a judgment/order passed by a court because of unintentional slips or omissions on its part and should the author of the judgment/order be available, the parties to the litigation could approach him for a clarification. Therefore, the essential function of interpretation rests with the judiciary. However, if difficulty arises in interpreting a judgment/order passed by a court because of unintentional slips or omissions on its part and should the author of the judgment/order be available, the parties to the litigation could approach him for a clarification. If a Bench comprises more than one Judge and the author is not available but the companion Judge is available, normally it is a Bench comprising, inter alia, such Judge who is available that deals with the matter. It is only for unavoidable reasons that a Bench, not comprising a Judge who was part of the original Bench, could consider the prayer for clarification. More often than not, sections 151 and 152 of the CPC are pressed into service for achieving the desired result. However, it is always desirable that the clarification, if at all required, is provided by a Judge/Judges who was/were a member/members of the parent Bench. 26. G.A. No. 464 of 2018 being such an application, seeking clarification of the said order having regard to the dichotomy in understanding of paragraph 77 thereof, it is only just and proper that the clarification, if at all, ought to be issued by the same Bench that delivered it or those Judges of the Full Bench who are still available. It is noteworthy that for hearing and disposing of the application for clarification of the said order, this Bench happens to be the third in the series constituted in succession with the Hon'ble the Chief Justice as the presiding Judge and the other Judges being' the common member Judges. Be that as it may. 27. Keeping in mind what we have referred to and extracted supra, paragraph 77 of the said order calls for proper interpretation as to what the Full Bench intended in terms of relief to be granted to the retired employees. 28. Since Mr. Datta has urged that the application is not maintainable, a fortiori, this Bench has no jurisdiction to entertain the same, this Bench considers it appropriate to first remind itself of its own jurisdiction and whether in appropriate cases, not being shackled by technicalities, the inherent power ought to be exercised to remedy injustice wherever it is found. In the process, it would also exercise the consideration of this Bench how far the decisions cited by Mr. In the process, it would also exercise the consideration of this Bench how far the decisions cited by Mr. Datta are relevant for not entertaining the application and deciding it. 29. In its decision reported in 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433 : (AIR 1933 SC 1014) (M.V. Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment and Trading (P) Ltd.), the Supreme Court while overruling ancient decisions of the Bombay High Court and this Court in respect of admiralty jurisdiction, held that the High Courts continue to enjoy the same jurisdiction as it had immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, as stated in Article 225, and subject to its own Rules, exercise of its manifold jurisdiction, unless barred, is unlimited (Emphasis supplied). 30. Not too long thereafter, the Supreme Court in its decision reported in (2000) 1 SCC 666 : ( AIR 2000 SC 540 ) (M.M. Thomas v. State of Kerala) noticed the aforesaid decision and after dwelling on the powers that a High Court as a court of record under Article 215 of the Constitution must have, ruled in the following words: "14. The High Court as a court of record, as envisaged in Article 215 of the Constitution, must have inherent powers to correct the records. A court of record envelops all such powers whose acts and proceedings are to be enrolled in a perpetual memorial and testimony. A court of record is undoubtedly a superior court which is itself competent to determine the scope of its jurisdiction. The High Court, as a court of record, has a duty to itself to keep all its records correctly and in accordance with law. Hence, if any apparent error is noticed by the High Court in respect of any orders passed by it the High Court has not only power, but a duty to correct it. The High Court's power in that regard is plenary. In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1 , a nine-Judge Bench of this Court has recognised the aforesaid superior status of the High Court as a court of plenary jurisdiction being a court of record. (Emphasis supplied) 31. More or less ten years later, this is what the Supreme Court in its decision reported in (2010) 12 SCC 585 : ( AIR 2009 SC 2136 , para 15) (Tilak Raj v. Baikunthi Devi) said: "25. (Emphasis supplied) 31. More or less ten years later, this is what the Supreme Court in its decision reported in (2010) 12 SCC 585 : ( AIR 2009 SC 2136 , para 15) (Tilak Raj v. Baikunthi Devi) said: "25. Since the court exists to dispense justice, any mistake which is found to be clerical in nature should be allowed to be rectified by exercising inherent power vested in the court for subserving the cause of justice. The principle behind the provision is that no party should suffer due to bona fide mistake. Whatever is intended by the court while passing the order or decree must be properly reflected therein otherwise it would only be destructive of the principle of advancing the cause of justice. In such matters, the court should not bind itself by the shackles of technicalities." (Emphasis supplied) 32. Even in Ram Chandra Singh ( AIR 2004 SC 4096 ) (supra) relied on by Mr. Datta, the law is laid down, upon consideration of the decision reported in AIR 1967 SC 1 440 (Samarendra Nath Sinha v. Krishna Kumar Nag), in the following terms: "19. It is no doubt true that in appropriate cases this Court may pass an order ex debito justitiae by correcting mistakes in the judgment but inherent power of this Court can be exercised only when there does not exist any other provision in that behalf. Clerical or arithmetical mistake or an error arising from an accidental slip or omission and to vary its judgment so as to give effect to its meaning and intention is permissible as has been held in Samarendra Nath Sinha." (Emphasis supplied) 33. Ram Chandra Singh ( AIR 2004 SC 4096 ) (supra) also considered the decision reported in (2001) 4 SCC 181 : ( AIR 2001 SC 1084 ) (Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho) which, in turn, relied on the decision reported in (1999) 3 SCC 500 : ( AIR 1999 SC 1031 ) (Dwarka Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh). Paragraphs 21 to 23 (paras 19, 20 & 21 of AIR) are instructive and hence, quoted below: "21. In Jayalakshmi Coelho ( AIR 2001 SC 1084 ) whereupon Mr. Mishra relied upon, this Court observed: 13. Paragraphs 21 to 23 (paras 19, 20 & 21 of AIR) are instructive and hence, quoted below: "21. In Jayalakshmi Coelho ( AIR 2001 SC 1084 ) whereupon Mr. Mishra relied upon, this Court observed: 13. So far as the legal position is concerned, there would hardly be any doubt about the proposition that in terms of Section 152, CPC, any error occurred in the decree on account of arithmetical or clerical error or accidental slip may be rectified by the court. The principle behind the provision is that no party should suffer due to mistake of the court and whatever is intended by the court while passing the order or decree must be properly reflected therein, otherwise it would only be destructive to the principle of advancing the cause of justice.' 22. This Court upon analysing some earlier decisions of this Court opined: "13. ... To illustrate the point, it has been indicated as an example that in a case where the order may contain something which is not mentioned in the decree would be a case of unintentional omission or mistake. Such omissions are attributable to the court which may say something or omit to say something which it did not intend to say or omit. No new arguments or re-arguments on merits are required for such rectification of mistake. In a case reported in Dwaraka Das v. State of M.P. ( AIR 1999 SC 1031 ) this Court has held that the correction in the order or decree should be of the mistake or omission which is accidental and not intentional without going into the merits of the case. It is further observed that the provisions cannot be invoked to modify, alter or add to the terms of the original decree so as to in effect pass an effective judicial order after the judgment in the case." (Emphasis supplied in original) 23. This decision itself, thus, lays down that in the garb of correction of mistakes arising out of accidental slips or typographical errors, the judgment cannot be altered or modified by this Court in exercise of its inherent power."