JUDGMENT : V. Ramasubramanian, J. Challenging an order passed by Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as 'the Appellate Tribunal') directing them to make a pre- deposit of 50% of the debt recoverable from them, the borrowers as well as guarantors have come up with the above writ petition. 2. Heard Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners. 3. Assailing the measures taken by the Authorized Officer of the respondent-Bank under Section 13 (4) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as 'SARFAESI Act'), the petitioners herein filed an Appeal in SA No. 316 of 2016 on the file of the Debts Recovery Tribunal-I, Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal'). The appeal was dismissed by the Tribunal by an order dated 20th April, 2019. 4. Challenging the said order of the Tribunal, the petitioners filed a statutory Appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. The Appeal was accompanied by an Application in IA No. 457 of 2019 for waiver of the pre-deposit condition. In the said Application, it was contended by the petitioners that the Bank had already realized a sum of Rs.6.75 crores by the auction sale of the mortgaged property and that since the total dues to the Bank were estimated only at Rs. 7,48,46,284/-, the requirement of pre-deposit condition stood satisfied. Reliance was placed by the petitioners in this regard on a judgment of the Delhi High Court in Srishti Arogyadham Pvt. Ltd. versus Punjab National Bank {W.P. (C) No. 12299 of 2018}. 5. However, by an order dated 31st May, 2019, the Appellate Tribunal rejected the prayer for waiver of pre-deposit condition and directed the petitioners to make payment of 50% of the amount due. It is against the said order that the petitioners have come up with the above writ petition. 6. The one and only issue that arises for our consideration in this writ petition is as to whether the sale proceeds of an auction sale conducted by the Authorized Officer of the Bank are liable to be adjusted as against the requirement of pre-deposit stipulated statutorily in the second proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act or not. 7. Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act reads as follows: 18. 7. Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act reads as follows: 18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal.-(1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal: Provided that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less: Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent of debt referred to in the second proviso. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made there under. 8. The second proviso mandates that an Appellate Tribunal shall not entertain an appeal, unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal 50% of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less. A discretion is conferred upon the Appellate Tribunal by the third proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, to reduce the amount of pre-deposit to not less than 25%. 9. The language of the second proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act is unambiguous and it is mandatory. The second proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act does not provide room for any controversy with regard to the quantum of amount to be deposited. The amount to be deposited is 50% and this 50% should be of either the amount of debt as claimed by the secured creditors or of the amount of debt as determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. 10. The amount to be deposited is 50% and this 50% should be of either the amount of debt as claimed by the secured creditors or of the amount of debt as determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. 10. In Srishti Arogyadham's case, the Delhi High Court interpreted the second proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act to the effect that once the Bank had realized some portion of the debt through the auction sale of a secured asset, the first eventuality contemplated by the second proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act that there must be a debt due, will not stand satisfied. Therefore, the Delhi High Court came to be conclusion that an appellant before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal cannot be called upon to make a pre-deposit of 50% of the amount that was due before the auction sale. Paragraphs 16 to 18 of the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Srishti Arogyadham's case read as follows: 16. On a perusal of the second proviso to Section 18, it is clear that the same pre-supposes two eventualities; (i) that debt is due from the petitioner as claimed by the respondent No. 1 Bank or; (ii) debt has been determined by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, and the same is liable to be paid/recovered on the date when the appeal is entertained by the DRAT. In either of the eventualities 50% of the amount of debt need to be made as pre-deposit. We may state here that the Supreme Court in Narayan Chandra Ghosh v. UCO Bank and Others, (2011) 4 SCC 548 , has inter alia held that the requirement of pre-deposit is a mandatory provision and need to be complied with. There cannot be any dispute on the said proposition and the same is binding upon this Court. In the said case, the argument of the petitioner therein was, that the debt has not been determined by the DRT. The Supreme Court rejected the plea by holding, if the debt has not been determined by the DRT, the borrower is liable to pay 50% of the debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors. In the said case, the argument of the petitioner therein was, that the debt has not been determined by the DRT. The Supreme Court rejected the plea by holding, if the debt has not been determined by the DRT, the borrower is liable to pay 50% of the debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors. The facts being at variance, as there is no amount due from the borrower i.e. petitioner herein when more than due amount has already been realized by the Bank the judgment has no applicability. 17. It is a conceded case of the respondents that none of the eventualities exist as the amount due to the Bank has been recovered. The application has been opposed by the respondents and decided by the DRAT primarily on an apprehension that since, the petitioner has challenged the auction, the same may be set aside. In other words, the sale remains in a nebulous stage and the sale will achieve finality/confirmed only when the legal proceedings come to an end. 18. Surely such an apprehension as noted above, cannot govern the interpretation of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The Section is clear and contemplates a situation stated in the earlier paragraph and the same has to be interpreted in the manner it exist, by giving a plain meaning. 11. But with great respect to the Delhi High Court, we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the line of reasoning given by them. The reasons are manifold. 12. If we peep into the history of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, it could be seen that immediately after Act 54 of 2002 was notified in the Gazette, challenges were made to the constitutional validity of the same before various Courts. Finally, the Supreme Court upheld almost all provisions of the Act by its decision in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. and others versus Union of India and others, (2004) 4 SCC 311 . The Supreme Court struck down sub-Section (2) of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act as ultra vires, as it mandated the deposit of 75% of the amount claimed by the Bank, before the Debt Recovery Tribunal entertained an appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The Supreme Court struck down sub-Section (2) of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act as ultra vires, as it mandated the deposit of 75% of the amount claimed by the Bank, before the Debt Recovery Tribunal entertained an appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. Though Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act used the expression Appeal , the Supreme Court held that it is in the nature of an original proceeding and that therefore, a condition for making a pre-deposit will be ultra vires. 13. After the decision of the Supreme Court in Mardia Chemicals' case, a series of amendments were made to the SARFAESI Act by Amendment Act 30 of 2004. It is through the said Amendment Act 30 of 2004 that the second and third provisos to sub-Section (1) of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act were inserted. These two provisos came into effect on 11th November, 2004. 14. The Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Amendment Act 30 of 2004 would show that the Parliament in its wisdom not only stipulated the payment of 50% of the amount of debt as claimed by the secured creditor or as determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal as a pre-deposit, but also conferred power upon the Tribunal through the third proviso to grant waiver of the pre-deposit up to a particular limit. 15. The very reason why the Appellate Tribunal is conferred the power by the third proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act to reduce the amount, is to take note of certain contingencies, such as, the payment of money during the period when the matter was pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal or after the disposal of the application by the Debts Recovery Tribunal but before an appeal was filed. 16. Primarily, the second proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act imposes an obligation upon a person filing an appeal to make a pre-deposit. A person filing an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal cannot take advantage of the amount paid by other parties, except under certain circumstances. Say, for instance, the Bank was proceeding against the properties of a guarantor, after exhausting its remedies against the borrower and after recovering a portion of the debt due from the borrower. A person filing an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal cannot take advantage of the amount paid by other parties, except under certain circumstances. Say, for instance, the Bank was proceeding against the properties of a guarantor, after exhausting its remedies against the borrower and after recovering a portion of the debt due from the borrower. In cases of that nature, the very attempt of the Bank would only be to recover from the guarantor, the balance of the money due after appropriating the sale proceeds of the properties of the borrower. But in cases where the borrowers themselves are the appellants, they cannot claim the benefit of the money recovered through an auction, which itself had become the subject matter of challenge. A borrower who assails an auction conducted under the Act, as null and void, cannot take advantage of the amount recovered by the Bank through such an auction. If in the opinion of the borrower, an auction is invalid, it would not confer any benefit upon any of the parties, including the secured creditors and the auction purchaser. As a corollary, such an auction cannot confer a benefit upon the borrower. To put it differently, an auction, which, according to the borrower, cannot confer any benefit upon the auction purchaser or the secured creditor, on account of being a nullity, cannot confer a benefit upon the borrower either. To show the sale proceeds of the very auction that is assailed in an appeal, as a money recovered by the Bank, would tantamount to the proverbial act of eating the cake even while retaining it. 17. The issue can be looked at from another angle also. An illegality cannot confer any benefit upon anyone. If an auction, according to the borrower is illegal, he cannot be heard to contend that the proceeds of such auction sale represent the amount of debt already recovered by the secured creditor. 18. Interestingly, Delhi High Court accepted the argument, as seen from paragraph 19 of its judgment that the condition of pre-deposit is intended to discourage frivolous litigation. Once the foundation for the condition contained in the second proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act is accepted as valid and justified, there is no room for maneuvering or manipulating within the letter of the law. 19. Once the foundation for the condition contained in the second proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act is accepted as valid and justified, there is no room for maneuvering or manipulating within the letter of the law. 19. As seen from paragraph 22 of the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Srishti Arogyadham's case, the Supreme Court already clinched the issue in Indian Bank versus Blue Jaggers Estates Limited and others, (2010) 8 SCC 129 . But the Delhi High Court distinguished the said judgment on the ground that in the case before the Supreme Court, the sale had not been confirmed and that therefore, it was in a nebulous stage. 20. But with great respect, we do not think that such a distinction is plausible. No borrower accepts before the Appellate Tribunal that his right of redemption is already lost due to the confirmation of sale or the issue of a sale certificate and its registration. So long as it is contended by the borrower/guarantor that his right of redemption is not lost and he is entitled to have the sale certificate set aside by the Appellate Tribunal, the money recovered by the Bank through the auction, is not a money fully and finally recovered. 21. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the Appellate Tribunal was right in demanding from the petitioner, the payment of 50% of the amount as per the second proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. As a result, we see no merits in the writ petition. Hence, it is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any.