Research › Search › Judgment

Jharkhand High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 9 (JHR)

Tapan Kumar, S/o Late Baidya Nath Mitra v. B. C. C. L (Bharat Coking Coal Limited) through its Managing Director

2019-01-02

ANIRUDDHA BOSE, B.B.MANGALMURTI

body2019
ORDER : Aniruddha Bose, J. I.A. No. 5494 of 2018 I.A. No. 5494 of 2018 is an application for condonation of delay of 78 days in filing this appeal. 2. Having gone through this application, we are satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause in preferring this appeal within time. We accordingly condone the said delay. 3. I.A. No. 5494 of 2018 stands allowed. L.P.A. No. 599 of 2017 4. The controversy involved in this appeal relates to proper recordal of age of the appellant dependent on which he ought to superannuate. The appellant was engaged as a general mazdoor with Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. on 08th November, 1996. At that point of time he gave his date of birth as 20th October, 1964, which would have had made him 32 years of age at the time of his entry into the service. This was recorded in the verification roll. In the verification roll, however the columns specified for recording the names of School, College or Institution implying the institution in which the appellant was educated was left blank. The appellant then was sent to Medical Board and the Medical Board had assessed his age as 42 years on 08th November, 1996. Contention of the appellant is that he was made to superannuate on 30th November, 2014, 10 years ahead of his normal age of superannuation. Notice to that effect was issued in the year 2014 itself. 5. Learned counsel for the B.C.C.L, on the other hand submits that in all company records, his year of birth has shown as 1954 and the Medical Board at the time of his entry had also assessed his age on the basis of year of birth to be 1954. 6. Before the learned First Court, the appellant questioned the legality of the superannuation order for having been issued ten years ahead of his normal age of superannuation. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, the learned first Court observed and directed:- “Be that as it may, having heard the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, this court is of the considered view that the case of the petitioner needs consideration. The respondents have assessed the age of the petitioner by sending it to the medical board on 08.11.1996 as 42 years and the date of birth is recorded as 08.11.1954. The respondents have assessed the age of the petitioner by sending it to the medical board on 08.11.1996 as 42 years and the date of birth is recorded as 08.11.1954. No document has been produced on record, neither in the earlier writ petition nor in the present writ petition to show that the petitioner was aware of the said assessment by the Medical Board. Even, the report of Medical Board has not been produced either before the earlier Court or before this Court and counter-affidavit has also not been filed. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is not acceptable to this Court. It is settled principles of law that no correction can be done at the fag end of service of the employee. The same theory will be applicable for the employees as well as for the employers. The respondents should also not to make any correction in the Date-of-birth, if the same was not communicated to the petitioner. However, in present circumstances of the case, the date-of-birth assessed by the Medical Board is 08.11.1954 and on 08.11.1996 the age of the petitioner was assessed as 42 years, whereas, the date-of-birth as claimed by the petitioner, which is mentioned in the verification roll, is 20.10.1964. There is a difference of 10 years, which requires re-assessment by a proper Medical Board i.e. Apex Medical Board. In view of the circumstances, I am remanding the matter back to the BCCL for constitution of an Apex Medical Board and upon such constitution, let the age of the petitioner be reassessed by the Apex Medical Board within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Resultantly, the impugned order dated 26.08.2016 (Annexure 11) is quashed and set aside. If the age of the petitioner is found to be nearer to 20.10.1964, the petitioner is entitled for all the consequential benefits. Needless to say that the petitioner has already retired from services, he will not be reinstated into services but he will be entitled for all the monitory benefits only. If the age of the petitioner is found nearer to 08.11.1954, no interference is required in the age as assessed by the respondents. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition stands disposed of.” 7. We do not find any reason to interfere with the decision of the learned First Court. If the age of the petitioner is found nearer to 08.11.1954, no interference is required in the age as assessed by the respondents. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition stands disposed of.” 7. We do not find any reason to interfere with the decision of the learned First Court. The learned First Court has directed fresh assessment of the appellant’s age by a Medical Board for the purpose of assessment of his age. We accept the reasoning of the learned First Court and direct conclusion of the medical assessment of the appellant’s age within a period of three months from the date of this order. To that extent the judgment of the learned First Court shall stand modified. 8. Accordingly, this Letters Patent Appeal shall stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal disposed of.