JUDGMENT D.N. Patel, J. -This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original respondents in the writ petition being W.P. (S) No.348 of 2014. The writ petition was preferred by the respondents and it was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 30th July, 2014 and hence the original respondents have preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Having heard learned counsel for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that public advertisement was issued being No.95 of 2012 for holding Teachers'' Eligibility Test. Only those candidates, who are clearing these tests, are eligible to be appointed as a Teacher in the Primary and Middle Schools. 3. The respondents applied to appear in the Teachers'' Eligibility Test conducted by the appellants. 4. As, they were appearing in B.Ed. Examination, they were permitted to appear in Teachers'' Eligibility Test, but, they had to produce either their marks-sheet or B.Ed. certificate on or before 13th May, 2013. 5. It appears from the facts of this case that the respondents (original petitioners) have produced, neither the original marks-sheets, nor the original certificate of B.Ed examination, before the appellants. 6. The respondents have produced Web copy of marks-sheet of Semester-I which is a part of Annexures C Series to this writ petition. Looking to the said annexures, it appears that the documents which were produced by the respondents (original petitioners), cannot be said to be the final marks-sheet or final B.Ed. certificate. It is of Semester-I only. Meaning thereby to, the respondents are half B.Ed. The respondents are not sure whether they have cleared final Semester examination of B.Ed. or not. Even if the respondents are alleging that they have cleared the final examination of final Semester of B.Ed., neither the final Semester marks-sheets nor the B.Ed. certificates were ever produced by them before the cut-off date i.e. 13th May, 2013. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondents being W.P. (S) No.348 of 2014 vide judgment and order dated 30th July, 2014 and hence the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. 7. Much has been argued out by the counsel for the respondents (original petitioners) that the marks sheet of B.Ed. is annexed as Annexure-8 to the writ petition. 7. Much has been argued out by the counsel for the respondents (original petitioners) that the marks sheet of B.Ed. is annexed as Annexure-8 to the writ petition. Be as it may, the High Court while exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot extend the cut-off date. To prescribe the cut-off date is a matter of policy floated by the State of Jharkhand. 8. It has been held by Hon''ble The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works, (1975) 1 SCC 305 at paragraph 10 as under:- "10. The concessional rate of duty can be availed of only by those who satisfy the conditions which have been laid down under the notification. The respondent was not a manufacturer before September 4, 1967 as it had applied for licence only on September 5, 1967 and it could not have made a declaration before September 4, 1967 that its total clearance for the financial year 1967-68 is not estimated to exceed 75 million matches. In the matter of granting concession or exemption from tax, the Government has a wide latitude of discretion. It need not give exemption or concession to everyone in order that it may grant the same to some. As we said, the object of granting the concessional rate of duty was to protect the smaller units in the industry from the competition by the larger ones and that object would have been frustrated, if, by adopting the device of fragmentation, the larger units could become the ultimate beneficiaries of the bounty. That a classification can be founded on a particular date and yet be reasonable, has been held by this Court in several decisions (see Hatisingh Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India ,Dr Mohammad SahebMahboob Medico v. Deputy Custodian-General , BhikuseYamasa Kshatriya ( P ) Ltd. v. Union of India and Daruka& Co. v. Union of India. The choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. v. Union of India. The choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide off the reasonable mark See Louisville Gas Co. v. Alabama Power Co. per Justice Holmes." (Emphasis supplied) 9. It has also been held by Hon''ble The Supreme Court in the case of A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra, (1990) 2 SCC 669 , at paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 as under:- "6. There is no dispute that the eligibility of a candidate as to age for appointment as Deputy Superintendent of Police should be determined according to Rule 5 of the A.P. Police Services Rules. It is, therefore, necessary to look first at that Rule. Rule 5 so far as is relevant provides: "5. Qualifications.- (A) No person shall be eligible for appointment as a Deputy Superintendent of Police, Category 2 by direct recruitment unless he- (i) has completed the age of 21 years and had not completed the age of 26 years on the first day of July of the year in which the selection is made. * * * 7. The rule prescribes the minimum as well as the maximum age for appointment as Deputy Superintendent of Police. Minimum age is 21 years. The candidate must have completed 21 years on the first day of July of the year in which the selection is made. He should not have also completed 26 years as on that day. The Tribunal while construing this rule has observed: "According to the procedure the process of selection begins with the issue of the advertisement and culminates in forwarding the list to the appointing authority. The essence of the process lies in the preparation of the list. A selection can be said to have been done only when the list is prepared. The Tribunal while construing this rule has observed: "According to the procedure the process of selection begins with the issue of the advertisement and culminates in forwarding the list to the appointing authority. The essence of the process lies in the preparation of the list. A selection can be said to have been done only when the list is prepared. In this view the eligibility of the candidates as to age has to be determined at this stage." If the word ''selection'' is understood in a sense meaning thereby only the final act of selecting candidates with preparation of the list for appointment, then the conclusion of the Tribunal may not be unjustified. But round phrases cannot give square answers. Before accepting that meaning, we must see the consequences, anomalies and uncertainties that it may lead to. The Tribunal in fact does not dispute that the process of selection begins with the issuance of advertisement and ends with the preparation of select list for appointment. Indeed, it consists of various steps like inviting applications, scrutiny of applications, rejection of defective applications or elimination of ineligible candidates, conducting examinations, calling for interview or viva voce and preparation of list of successful candidates for appointment. Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Public Service Commission is also indicative of all these steps. When such are the different steps in the process of selection, the minimum or maximum age for suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific, and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for recruiting agency to scrutinise applications. It would be, therefore, unreasonable to construe the word selection only as the factum of preparation of the select list. Nothing so bad would have been intended by the rule making authority. 8.The appeal therefore, is allowed setting aside the order of the Tribunal." (Emphasis supplied) 10. It has further been held by Hon''ble The Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Nothing so bad would have been intended by the rule making authority. 8.The appeal therefore, is allowed setting aside the order of the Tribunal." (Emphasis supplied) 10. It has further been held by Hon''ble The Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ami Lal Bhat (Dr) v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 614 , at paragraphs 5, 7, 11 and 17 as under:- "5. This contention, in our view, is not sustainable. In the first place the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age prescribed for a post is not, per se, arbitrary. Basically, the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age required for a post, is in the discretion of the rule-making authority or the employer as the case may be. One must accept that such a cut-off date cannot be fixed with any mathematical precision and in such a manner as would avoid hardship in all conceivable cases. As soon as a cut-off date is fixed there will be some persons who fall on the right side of the cut-off date and some persons who will fall on the wrong side of the cut-off date. That cannot make the cut-off date, per se, arbitrary unless the cut-off date is so wide off the mark as to make it wholly unreasonable. This view was expressed by this Court in Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works and has been reiterated in subsequent cases. In the case of A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. SaratChandra the relevant service rule stipulated that the candidate should not have completed the age of 26 years on the 1st day of July of the year in which the selection is made. Such a cut-off date was challenged. This Court considered the various steps required in the process of selection and said, "when such are the different steps in the process of selection the minimum or maximum age of suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for the recruiting agency to scrutinise the applications". This Court, therefore, held that in order to avoid uncertainty in respect of minimum or maximum age of a candidate, which may arise if such an age is linked to the process of selection which may take an uncertain time, it is desirable that such a cut-off date should be with reference to a fixed date. Therefore, fixing an independent cut-off date, far from being arbitrary, makes for certainty in determining the maximum age. 7. In the present case, the cut-off date has been fixed by the State of Rajasthan under its Rules relating to various services with reference to the 1st of January following the year in which the applications are invited. All Service Rules are uniform on this point. Looking to the various dates on which different departments and different heads of administration may issue their advertisements for recruitment, a uniform cut-off date has been fixed in respect of all such advertisements as 1st January of the year following. This is to make for certainty. Such a uniform date prescribed under all Service Rules and Regulations makes it easier for the prospective candidates to understand their eligibility for applying for the post in question. Such a date is not so wide off the mark as to be construed as grossly unreasonable or arbitrary. The time-gap between the advertisement and the cut-off date is less than a year. It takes into account the fact that after the advertisement, time has to be allowed for receipt of applications, for their scrutiny, for calling candidates for interview, for preparing a panel of selected candidates and for actual appointment. The cut-off date, therefore, cannot be considered as unreasonable. It was, however, strenuously urged before us that the only acceptable cut-off date is the last date for receipt of applications under a given advertisement. Undoubtedly, this can be a possible cut-off date. But there is no basis for urging that this is the only reasonable cut-off date. The cut-off date, therefore, cannot be considered as unreasonable. It was, however, strenuously urged before us that the only acceptable cut-off date is the last date for receipt of applications under a given advertisement. Undoubtedly, this can be a possible cut-off date. But there is no basis for urging that this is the only reasonable cut-off date. Even such a date is liable to question in given circumstances. In the first place, making a cut-off date dependent on the last date for receiving applications, makes it more subject to vagaries of the department concerned, making it dependent on the date when each department issues an advertisement, and the date which each department concerned fixes as the last date for receiving applications. A person who may fall on the wrong side of such a cut-off date may well contend that the cut-off date is unfair, since the advertisement could have been issued earlier; or in the alternative that the cut-off date could have been fixed later at the point of selection or appointment. Such an argument is always open, irrespective of the cut-off date fixed and the manner in which it is fixed. That is why this Court has said in the case of Parameswaran Match Works and later cases that the cut-off date is valid unless it is so capricious or whimsical as to be wholly unreasonable. To say that the only cut-off date can be the last date for receiving applications, appears to be without any basis. In our view the cut-off date which is fixed in the present case with reference to the beginning of the calendar year following the date of application, cannot be considered as capricious or unreasonable. On the contrary, it is less prone to vagaries and is less uncertain. 11. In our view this kind of an interpretation cannot be given to a rule for relaxation of age. The power of relaxation is required to be exercised in public interest in a given case; as for example, if other suitable candidates are not available for the post, and the only candidate who is suitable has crossed the maximum age-limit; or to mitigate hardship in a given case. Such a relaxation in special circumstances of a given case is to be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. Such a relaxation in special circumstances of a given case is to be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. There cannot be any wholesale relaxation because the advertisement is delayed or because the vacancy occurred earlier especially when there is no allegation of any mala fides in connection with any delay in issuing an advertisement. This kind of power of wholesale relaxation would make for total uncertainty in determining the maximum age of a candidate. It might be unfair to a large number of candidates who might be similarly situated, but who may not apply, thinking that they are age-barred. We fail to see how the power of relaxation can be exercised in the manner contended. 17.In the premises the appeals of the candidates who have challenged the cutoff date under the relevant rules are dismissed while the appeals filed by the State of Rajasthan are allowed. The validity of the Rules concerned relating to the cut-off date being fixed with reference to 1st of January of the year following the application is upheld. There will be no order as to costs." (Emphasis supplied) 11. It has been held by Hon''ble The Supreme Court in the case of Shankar K. Mandal v. State of Bihar, (2003) 9 SCC 519 , at paragraph 5 as under:- "5. Pursuant to the directions contained in the earlier judgment of the High Court as affirmed by this Court, a fresh exercise was undertaken. Since the present appellants were not selected, writ petitions were filed before the High Court. Pursuant to the directions contained in the earlier judgment of the High Court as affirmed by this Court, a fresh exercise was undertaken. Since the present appellants were not selected, writ petitions were filed before the High Court. In the writ petition which was filed by fifty-five persons and disposed of by the Division Bench the conclusions were essentially as follows: (1) Some of the writ petitioners (Writ Petitioners 5, 18, 23, 28, 41 and 53) were overage at the time of their initial appointment and their cases were, therefore, wholly covered by the directions given by the High Court, and they were not entitled to relaxation of age; (2) So far as Writ Petitioners 6, 26, 30 and 55 are concerned, the stand was that they had not crossed the age-limit at the time of making the applications for appointment and, therefore, were within the age-limit at the time of initial appointment and were, therefore, entitled to relaxation of age in terms of the judgment passed by the High Court earlier and affirmed by this Court. This plea was turned down on the ground that what was relevant for consideration related to the age at the time of initial appointment and not making of the application; (3) As regards Writ Petitioner 24, he was underage at the time of appointment. He was permitted to file a representation before the Director of Primary Education and the High Court ordered that his case would be considered afresh; (4) In respect of Writ Petitioners 9 and 17, it was noted that they were refused absorption on the ground that they had not made any application in response to advertisement issued pursuant to the order passed by this Court. Since no material was placed to substantiate this stand and no reasons had been communicated for non-absorption, direction was given to consider representations if made by them within one month from the date of judgment. The said judgment is under challenge in CA No. 916 of 1999. The appellants have taken the stand that in terms of this Court''s judgment, a person who was not overage on the date of initial appointment was to be considered. Though it was conceded before the High Court that they were overage at the time of initial appointment, much would turn as to what is the date of initial appointment. The appellants have taken the stand that in terms of this Court''s judgment, a person who was not overage on the date of initial appointment was to be considered. Though it was conceded before the High Court that they were overage at the time of initial appointment, much would turn as to what is the date of initial appointment. The High Court had not considered as to what was the applicable rule so far as the eligibility regarding age is concerned. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent State however submitted that having made a concession before the High Court that they were overage on the date of appointment, it is not open to the appellants to take a different stand. The crucial question is whether appellants were overage on the date of their initial appointment. It is true that there was concession before the High Court that they were overage on the date of initial appointment. But there was no concession that they were overage at the time of making the application. There was no definite material before the High Court as to what was the eligibility criteria so far as age is concerned. No definite material was placed before the High Court and also before this Court to give a definite finding on that aspect. What happens when a cut-off date is fixed for fulfilling the prescribed qualification relating to age by a candidate for appointment and the effect of any non-prescription has been considered by this Court in several cases. The principles culled out from the decisions of this Court (1) The cut-off date by reference to which the eligibility requirement must be satisfied by the candidate seeking a public employment is the date appointed by the relevant service rules. (2) If there is no cut-off date appointed by the rules then such date shall be as appointed for the purpose in the advertisement calling for applications. (3) If there is no such date appointed then the eligibility criteria shall be applied by reference to the last date appointed by which the applications were to be received by the competent authority." (Emphasis supplied) 12. (3) If there is no such date appointed then the eligibility criteria shall be applied by reference to the last date appointed by which the applications were to be received by the competent authority." (Emphasis supplied) 12. In view of the aforesaid decisions, the cut-off date prescribed by the appellants, which is dated 13th May, 2013, cannot be altered by this Court and, hence, even if any marks-sheet is annexed as Annexure-8 to the writ petition preferred by the writ petitioners, cannot be taken on record by the appellants because, no document can be accepted after the cut-off date by the appellants. Whenever any cut-off date is prescribed, there are bound to be a few candidates who will fall on the wrong side of the cut-off date. There cannot be any cut-off date whereby no candidate is aggrieved. If such type of cut-off date is being altered by this Court, perhaps, no result can be finalized. Every time, a late comer will file a writ petition and he will pray for extension of cut-off date. 13. In view of the aforesaid decisions, cut-off date, which is prescribed in this case i.e. 13th May, 2013, for production of B.Ed. marks-sheets or B.Ed. Certificates, cannot be altered by this Court and the respondents have failed to produce final marks-sheet of B.Ed. or final certificate of B.Ed. before the cut-off date before these appellants and hence, no relief prayed in the writ petition, could have been granted by the learned Single Judge. The Court cannot be more charitable than the law. Charity beyond law is cruelty to others. The highest charitable person is the law itself. Sympathy beyond the law, is not permissible. Sympathy beyond law is nothing, but, an illegality, which cannot be permitted. 14. Even otherwise also, if any candidate has cleared Teachers'' Eligibility Test, he can be appointed for a Teacher only within five years, from the date of the result. If the candidate is not appointed as a Teacher within five years, from the date on which the Teachers'' Eligibility Test is cleared, such candidate has to re-appear in the Teachers'' Eligibility Test and has to again sharpen his wisdom and knowledge and again he has to clear the Teachers'' Eligibility Test, if at all he wants to be appointed as a Teacher. In the facts of the present case, the result of the earlier examination was declared in May, 2013 and hence, period of five years is already over. Hence also, there is no sustenance in the case of the respondents (original petitioners). 15. The aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge, hence, the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No.348 of 2014 dated 30th July, 2014 is hereby quashed and set aside. This Letters Patent Appeal is allowed and disposed of.