ORDER : A.S. SUPEHIA, J. 1. The present writ petition has been filed seeking the following prayers;- (A) To issue writ of mandamus and/or any other writ, order or direction in nature of mandamus certiorari or the lie by directing the respondent authorities to continue the petitioners in their services and not to restrain them from working on the post of District Coordinator which have held by them for Vadodara, Panchmahals District respectively. And/or (B) Your Lordships be pleased to give suitable interim relief during the pendency of this petition by restraining them not to terminate and/or end the services of the petitioners till the final disposal of this petition. And/or (C) … …. …. …. 2. The present petitioners were appointed on contractual basis on the post of District Coordinators in the fixed honorarium of Rs. 10,000/- for 11 months. 3. Learned advocate Mr. Vasavada appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the action of the respondent authorities in continuing in service is illegal and the respondent cannot employed the other persons by way of outsourcing ignoring the present petitioners. 4. The respondent No. 2 has filed an affidavit-in-reply, wherein it is specifically stated that the petitioners were employed on contractual basis to perform their duties as District Coordinators till further instructions. 5. It is further stated that the petitioner No. 2 was appointed purely on contractual basis on the post of District Coordinator for a period of three months, which was then extended for eight months. It is further submitted that the petitioners cannot seek to absorb them to the aforesaid post. 6. In the present case, the petitioners were appointed on contractual basis on the post of District Coordinators in the fixed honorarium of Rs. 10,000/- for 11 months and without following the regular recruitment process. The condition specifically states that the appointments were made on contractual on the basis of advertisement, which was issued by the respondent authorities. The advertisement refers to the appointment would be on contractual basis in the fixed honorarium of Rs. 10,000/-. Thus, nature of the appointment was purely on contractual and ad hoc basis. 7. At this stage it would be apposite to refer to the observations made by the Constitution Bench in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others Versus Umadevi (3) and others, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 . 10,000/-. Thus, nature of the appointment was purely on contractual and ad hoc basis. 7. At this stage it would be apposite to refer to the observations made by the Constitution Bench in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others Versus Umadevi (3) and others, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 . Wherein the Supreme Court has observed thus: 43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, which we have described as 'litigious employment' in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates. 45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularized or made permanent, courts are swayed by the fact that the concerned person has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain-not at arms length-since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succor to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 47. 47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post. 48. It was then contended that the rights of the employees thus appointed, under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, are violated. It is stated that the State has treated the employees unfairly by employing them on less than minimum wages and extracting work from them for a pretty long period in comparison with those directly recruited who are getting more wages or salaries for doing similar work. The employees before us were engaged on daily wages in the concerned department on a wage that was made known to them. There is no case that the wage agreed upon was not being paid. Those who are working on daily wages formed a class by themselves, they cannot claim that they are discriminated as against those who have been regularly recruited on the basis of the relevant rules. No right can be founded on an employment on daily wages to claim that such employee should be treated on a par with a regularly recruited candidate, and made permanent in employment, even assuming that the principle could be invoked for claiming equal wages for equal work. There is no fundamental right in those who have been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have a right to be absorbed in service. There is no fundamental right in those who have been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have a right to be absorbed in service. As has been held by this Court, they cannot be said to be holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be made only by making appointments consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The right to be treated equally with the other employees employed on daily wages, cannot be extended to a claim for equal treatment with those who were regularly employed. That would be treating unequals as equals. It cannot also be relied on to claim a right to be absorbed in service even though they have never been selected in terms of the relevant recruitment rules. The arguments based on Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are therefore overruled. 8. The Supreme Court has further observed that the contractual appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract and if it was an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. It is held that a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment and merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed. 9. In the present case, the petitioners are asserting their right to be continued in their service, though they are appointed on contractual basis upon honorarium pay. The respondent authorities have their right to regulate the appointment of such employees. 10. The petitioners have accepted the terms and conditions stipulated in the advertisement pursuant to which the advertisement was made. The Supreme Court in the case of Vidyavardhaka Sangha and Another Versus Y.D. Deshpande and Others, reported in (2006) 12 SCC 482 has held thus:- 4. It is now well-settled principle of law that the appointment made on probation/ad hoc basis for a specific period of time comes to an end by efflux of time and the person holding such post can have no right to continue on the post. It is now well-settled principle of law that the appointment made on probation/ad hoc basis for a specific period of time comes to an end by efflux of time and the person holding such post can have no right to continue on the post. In the instant case as noticed above, the respective respondents have accepted the appointment including the terms and conditions stipulated in the appointment orders and joined the posts in question and continued on the said post for some years. The respondents having accepted the terms and conditions stipulated in the appointment order and allowed the period for which they were appointed to have been elapsed by efflux of time, they are not now permitted to turn their back and say that their appointments could not be terminated on the basis of their appointment letters nor they could be treated as temporary employee or on contract basis. The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents to the said effect has no merit and is, therefore, liable to be rejected. It is also well-settled law by several other decisions of this Court that appointment on ad hoc basis/temporary basis comes to an end by efflux of time and persons holding such post have no right to continue on the post and ask for regularisation etc. 11. The Supreme Court has held that it is well-settled that the appointment on ad hoc basis or temporary basis comes to an end by efflux of time and persons holding such post have no right to continue on the post and ask for regularisation. 12. In this view of the matter and the law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Umadevi (supra), the petitioners do not have any right on the post. The petition is premature and is filed on apprehension that their services will be terminated. 13. The present writ petition fails. Rule discharged. However, it is clarified that it will be open for the petitioners to approach the respondent authorities for continuing them in service, if they are not terminated.