ORDER : Annexure-C order passed by Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II (Additional Munsiff), Kasaragod in C.M.P No.647/2018 in C.C No.311/2018 is under challenge in the proceedings on hand. C.M.P No.647/2018 was an application filed by the complainant, in C.C No.311/2018, a prosecution launched by him under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, 'the N.I Act'). The application was filed under Section 143A N.I Act. The prayer in the application was that the complainant is entitled to get 20% of the cheque amount as interim compensation under Section 143A N.I Act. The application was opposed by the accused, the respondent herein, stating that the petitioner is not entitled to get the relief sought by him. It was contended that the cause of action to launch the prosecution was originated and the complaint filed for the purpose was taken cognizance of in the year 2008. Circumstances being so, Section 143A introduced into N.I Act by Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2018 which in view of its prospective operation with effect from 01.09.2018, cannot be invoked to direct deposit of interim compensation. It is further contended that, right to get interim compensation is a substantive right and the new amendment having the effect of creating a substantive right can only have prospective operation and for operating retrospectively, the legislature must have specifically made provision for that. Accordingly, it is submitted that the jurisdiction under Section 143A N.I Act ought not to have been invoked in the case on hand. It is contended that by directing to pay compensation, the court has exceeded it's jurisdiction to grant it. Accordingly, the respondent seeks for dismissal of the application. 2. Having heard the respective counsel on their rival contentions, the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II (Additional Munsiff), Kasaragod has dismissed the application. The reason for dismissal of the application are contained in paragraph 11 of the order, which is extracted herein below: “The above decisions give us the test to determine whether a statute is prospective or retrospective in operation. Provisions which creates a new right or imposes new obligation on the parties are presumed to be prospective unless the legislature provides otherwise expressly or by necessary implication. Section 143 A of N.I Act imposes a new obligation on the drawer of a cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant. Provisions which creates a new right or imposes new obligation on the parties are presumed to be prospective unless the legislature provides otherwise expressly or by necessary implication. Section 143 A of N.I Act imposes a new obligation on the drawer of a cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant. Hence, it creates a new right in favor of the complainant which he can agitate before a court of law having jurisdiction. So, in my view, section 143 A of NI Act cannot have retrospective operation so as to affect the right of parties in the above case. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that Section 143 A is applicable to the above accused since the plea of not guilty of accused was recorded after Section 143 A came into operation, is seems to me as not sustainable. In my view date of recording plea of not guilty is not relevant for the purpose of section 143 A, I think, clause (a) only indicate the stage at which the court can exercise its powers u/s 143 A. Hence I am in agreement with the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent. That apart, after a perusal the documents including the cheque in the above case, I feel that this is not fit case in which 143 A of N.I Act can be invoked. Therefore, the point is answered against the petitioner. In the result, the petition dismissed” 3. Therefore, the reason for dismissal of the application was the finding of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II(Additional Munsiff), Kasaragod that Section 143A N.I Act as it creates a new substantive right in favour of the complainant in a prosecution under Section 142 N.I Act does not have any retrospective operation. Accordingly, the court found that the invocation of Section 143A in a case pending since 2008 is strictly forbidden. This Court finds it apposite to extract Section 143 A N.I Act hereunder: “[143A. Power to direct interim compensation (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (2 of 1974), the court trying an offence under section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant- (a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and (b) in any other case, upon framing of charge. (2) The interim compensation under sub-section (1) shall not exceed twenty per cent of the amount of the cheque. (3) The interim compensation shall be paid within sixty days from the date of the order under sub-section (1), or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the cheque. (4) If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the drawer the amount of interim compensation, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant. (5) The interim compensation payable under this section may be recovered as if it were a fine under section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(2 of 1974). (6) The amount of fine imposed under section 138 or the amount of compensation awarded under section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall be reduced by the amount paid or recovered as interim compensation under this section.] 4. Therefore, as per the newly incorporated Section 143A, the crucial time when application under Section 143A can be entertained in a summary trial or in a summons case is the time when the accused pleads not guilty of the accusation made against him in the complaint and in a case instituted on a police report, on a charge being framed, read over and explained, after recording a plea that he is not guilty of the offence. 5. Though the crucial time for invocation of Section 143A in a prosecution is as stated above, the legislature in its wisdom has restricted its operation with effect from 01.09.2018. For the reason, the provision is meant to be invoked only in respect of complaints launched to prosecute the accused under Section 142 N.I. Act after 01.09.2018. Or in other words, the newly incorporated Section 143A N.I Act cannot have any retrospective operation and cannot be invoked in complaints filed prior to 01.09.2018 and pending on the files of various courts as on date. Or in other words, the newly incorporated Section 143A N.I Act cannot have any retrospective operation and cannot be invoked in complaints filed prior to 01.09.2018 and pending on the files of various courts as on date. The order of the court below under challenge is correct in all respects and is not liable to be interfered with. In the result, Crl.M.C is dismissed.