JUDGMENT : JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA, J. 1. In this petition the petitioner has sought for a writ or appropriate order or direction quashing the FIR No.90/2012 registered in P.S. Economic Offences Wing, Crime Branch, New Delhi (Annexure-N). 2. The brief facts of the case are that the second and third respondent lodged a report before the P.S. Economic Offences Wing at New Delhi alleging commission of offences, punishable under Section 406, 420 and 120(B) of Indian Penal Code. 3. According to the complainant, the petitioner herein practiced deception on the second and third respondent and with malafide intention and with ulterior motives to cheat the second and third respondent, offered to sell the properties bearing Survey No.32, measuring 4 acres 24 guntas and Survey No.33, measuring 2 acres 11 guntas, situated at Sonnappanahalli Village, Jala Hobli, Bengaluru and by making false representation induced the second and third respondent to part with Rs.4,25,00,000/-. It is alleged that the accused concealed the fact the said properties were subject to encumbrances and were not amenable for conversion and that the accused had no alienable right to any portion of the properties, as they were the subject matter of a prior agreement of sale dated 16.06.2007. 4. Based on this complaint, crime No.90/2012 was registered on 27.07.2012 for the offences punishable under Section 406, 420 read with Section 120(B) of Indian Penal Code, 1860. At that stage, the petitioner has approached this court and by order dated 06.08.2013, further investigation has been stayed. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that having regard to the nature of the allegations made against the petitioner, the cause of action for the registration of the case as well as for the investigation thereon has arisen within the territorial limits of Bengaluru City for the reason that the property in question is situated in Bengaluru; agreement was entered into in Bengaluru; the cheques were issued and received by the complainant in Bengaluru, and the alleged deception is also alleged to have been taken place within the territorial limits of Bengaluru City, and hence the Economic Offences Wing, Crime Branch at New Delhi has no jurisdiction to investigate into the alleged offences. 6. 6. Secondly, he contends that, though the allegations made in the FIR do not attract the offence punishable under Section 405 and 406 of Indian Penal Code, yet having regard to the fact that the FIR is registered invoking Section 405 of Indian Penal Code, by virtue of Section 181(4) of Criminal Procedure Code "Any offence of criminal misrepresentation or of criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which is the subject matter of the offence was received or retained, or was required to be returned or accounted for, by the accused person". The submission of the learned senior counsel is that in view of the above provisions, the Economic Offences Police attached to the Economic Offences Wing at New Delhi have no jurisdiction whatsoever either to register the alleged complaint or to investigate into the matter. The very fact that the complainant has invoked the jurisdiction of the Delhi police itself amounts to an abuse of the process of the court. 7. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision in Navinchandra N. Majithia Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in, (2000) AIR SC 2966 with reference to paragraph Nos.13 and 43. 8. In addition to the above contentions, the learned senior counsel has referred to the criminal proceedings initiated by the respondents themselves for the alleged dishonour of cheques under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and would submit that the complainant themselves having invoked the territorial jurisdiction of the Bengaluru courts by presenting the complaint at Bengaluru under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, the offence alleged against the petitioner in the instant case also arises out of the same transaction and therefore the police at Delhi do not derive any jurisdiction to investigate the alleged offences. 9. Further, it is argued that the dispute raised in the FIR is civil in nature and the liabilities of the parties being contractual in nature, invocation of criminal process by the petitioners giving it a colour of economic offences is nothing but an abuse of the process of the courts. Hence, on these grounds, the petitioner has sought to quash the proceedings initiated against him. 10. Hence, on these grounds, the petitioner has sought to quash the proceedings initiated against him. 10. Refuting the above contentions, the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent has placed reliance on the decision in Satvinder Kaur Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Another reported in, (1999) 8 SCC 728 and with reference to paragraph No.8 thereof has emphasized that the limited question that falls for consideration of this court is; Whether the respondent police have powers and jurisdiction to register the FIR and to investigate into the alleged complaint? The learned counsel would submit that the averments made in the complaint clearly disclose that part of the cause of action has arisen within the limits of Delhi police station. Dealing with the applicability of Section 177 to 184 of Criminal Procedure Code, the learned counsel would submit that the said provisions relate to "inquiries" and "trial" and not for investigation. Section 177 of the Code deals with the place of trial and, the law on the point is expounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above decision as well as in the constitution Bench decision in Lalita Kumari Vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others reported in, (2014) 2 SCC 1 , wherein it is held that the police have a statutory right to receive the complaint and to investigate the allegations made therein. If for any reason the police arrive at the conclusion that the alleged offences have taken place beyond its territorial limits the police are bound to transfer the investigation to the concerned jurisdictional police. Since the petitioners have approached this court at the stage of registration of FIR seeking for quashing of the registration of the FIR petitioners are not entitled to invoke the said provisions. 11. The learned senior counsel has also placed reliance on the decision in Harjeet Singh Ahluwalia Vs State of Punjab and Another reported in, (1987) 2 ILR(P&H) 1 (paragraph Nos.5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 14). Further, placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel Vs. 11. The learned senior counsel has also placed reliance on the decision in Harjeet Singh Ahluwalia Vs State of Punjab and Another reported in, (1987) 2 ILR(P&H) 1 (paragraph Nos.5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 14). Further, placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel Vs. State of Gujarat and Another reported in, (2012) 7 SCC 621 with reference to paragraph No.37, would submit that mere presentation of the complaint for dishonour of the cheque does not oust the jurisdiction of the Delhi police to investigate into the complaint which clearly makes out the ingredients of the offence alleged against the petitioner. With reference to paragraph No.37, the learned counsel has emphasized that though the petitioner is tried for the offences punishable under the provisions of Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, in the instant case the allegations made against the petitioner attract the offence punishable under Section 420 of Indian Penal Code. The prosecution under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and the mens rea i.e. required to make out offence under Section 420 of Indian Penal Code are entirely different. Hence, on this count also the petitioner cannot seek to quash the proceedings. 12. In the light of the contentions urged by the parties the only question that arises for consideration is whether the Economic Offences Wing, Delhi Police has territorial jurisdiction to investigate into the alleged offences punishable under Section 120(B), 420 and 406 of Indian Penal Code? 13. Undisputedly, the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, at the stage of registration of FIR against the petitioner. The law is now well settled by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Lalita Kumari case, that the registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code, if the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation. If the information received does not discloses cognizable offence but indicates the necessity of an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not. If the information received does not discloses cognizable offence but indicates the necessity of an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not. In the instant case, though a contention is urged by the petitioner that the allegations made in the complaint, do not disclose any cognizable offence but on reading of the complaint it is seen that necessary allegations are found in the complaint attracting the offence punishable under Section 120 (B) of the Indian Penal Code as well as under Section 406 of Indian Penal Code. 14. This court in exercise of power either under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code or under Section 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India cannot quash the FIR on that ground as sought for by the petitioner. In this context the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satvinder Kaur Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Another reported in, (1999) 8 SCC 728 in paragraph No.8 has held as under:- "8. In our view, the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant requires to be accepted. The limited question is whether the High Court was justified in quashing the FIR on the ground that Delhi Police Station did not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the offence. From the discussion made by the learned Judge, it appears that learned Judge has considered the provisions applicable for criminal trial. The High Court arrived at the conclusion by appreciating the allegations made by the parties that the SHO, Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi was not having territorial jurisdiction to entertain and investigate the FIR lodged by the appellant because the alleged dowry items were entrusted to the respondent at Patiala and that the alleged cause of action for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC arose at Patiala. In our view, the findings given by the High Court are, on the face of it, illegal and erroneous because: (1) The SHO has statutory authority under Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code to investigate any cognizable case for which an FIR is lodged. (2) At the stage of investigation, there is no question of interference under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the ground that the investigating officer has no territorial jurisdiction. (2) At the stage of investigation, there is no question of interference under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the ground that the investigating officer has no territorial jurisdiction. (3) After investigation is over, if the investigating officer arrives at the conclusion that the cause of action for lodging the FIR has not arisen within his territorial jurisdiction, then he is required to submit a report accordingly under Section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Code and to forward the case to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence." 15. In the light of this legal position, the contention urged by the petitioner that the FIR registered before the Delhi Police is an abuse of the process of the court and is liable to be quashed cannot be accepted. In so far as the contention urged by the petitioner touching the applicability of Section 181(4) of Criminal Procedure Code is concerned, in my view, the said provision is applicable only at the stage of inquiries and trial and not at the stage of investigation as laid down in the decision referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner supra. 16. For the aforesaid reasons, no interference of this court is called for at this stage. However, as observed above, after investigation, if the Delhi Police arrive at a conclusion that the cause of action for lodging the FIR has not arisen within its territorial jurisdiction, they shall submit a report under Section 178 of Criminal Procedure Code and forward the same to Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. The petition is dismissed.