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2019 DIGILAW 914 (GUJ)

Natvarlal Shivlal Thakkar v. State of Gujarat

2019-10-15

V.M.PANCHOLI

body2019
JUDGMENT : V.M. PANCHOLI, J. 1. This petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in which, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 02.08.2019 passed by the respondent no. 1 - SSRD in Revision Application No.MVV/HKP/AMD/70/2019. 2. Heard learned advocate, Mr. Dipak R. Dave for the petitioner, learned AGP Mr. K.M. Antani for respondent no. 1 and learned advocate, Mr. Viral Shah for the respondent no. 3. 3. The factual matrix of the present case is as under, 3.1. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner along with co-plaintiffs preferred Regular Civil Suit No. 76/1996 before the learned Civil Judge, Sanand for enforcement of the rights of the plaintiffs against the original owners i.e. the respondent nos. 8 and 9 herein for specific performance and other declaration in respect of the land in question i.e. the land bearing Survey/Block No. 2302 admeasuring Hector 02-03-36 Are-Sq. Mtrs. Situated in Village: Virochannagar, Taluka: Sanand, District: Ahmedabad. 3.2. Along with the plaint, an application, Exh. 5 for injunction was also filed by the plaintiffs, which came to be allowed by the concerned civil court vide order dated 11.06.1997 and thereby granted injunction in favour of the plaintiffs. Against the said order granting injunction, the respondent no. 9 herein preferred Appeal before the District Court, however, the said Appeal came to be dismissed by the concerned District court vide order dated 31.08.2006. 3.3. It is further stated that though the injunction was granted by the concerned civil court in favour of the petitioner and other plaintiffs, the respondent nos. 8 and 9 herein had executed sale deeds in favour of the respondent no. 2 on 18.02.1992 and 21.05.1998. Pursuant to the execution of the said sale deed, Entry Nos. 6861 and 9862 came to be mutated in the revenue record. 3.4. It is also the case of the petitioner that thereafter, the respondent no. 2 executed sale deed in favour of the respondent no. 3 on 12.07.2004 and, therefore, Entry No. 7237 was mutated in the revenue record on 02.04.2005. 3.5. It is stated that when the petitioner came to know about the aforesaid entries mutated in the revenue record, he filed RTS Appeal No. 53-54/2012 before the Deputy Collector. 2 executed sale deed in favour of the respondent no. 3 on 12.07.2004 and, therefore, Entry No. 7237 was mutated in the revenue record on 02.04.2005. 3.5. It is stated that when the petitioner came to know about the aforesaid entries mutated in the revenue record, he filed RTS Appeal No. 53-54/2012 before the Deputy Collector. In the meantime, the petitioner also filed Special Civil Suit No. 307/2009 before the concerned civil court challenging the execution of the sale deed in favour of the respondent nos. 2 and 3. 3.6. The Deputy Collector, vide order dated 21.10.2013, rejected the Appeal filed by the petitioner on the ground of delay. The petitioner, therefore, preferred Revision Application before the Collector. The Collector, by an order dated 19.03.2015, set aside the order passed by the Deputy Collector and remanded the matter back to the Deputy Collector with a direction to take decision in accordance with law and decide as to whether there is any breach of the order of the injunction or not. It is stated that the respondent nos. 2 and 3 filed Revision Application before the respondent-SSRD challenging the order dated 19.03.2015 passed by the Collector. However during the pendency of the said Revision Application, the Deputy Collector passed an order on 02.07.2016 and held that the execution of the sale deed is in breach of the order of the competent court and, therefore, mutation entries cannot be posted in the revenue record. The respondent nos. 2 and 3, therefore, challenged the said order by fling Revision Application No. 826/2016 before the Collector. 3.7. In the meantime, the respondent-SSRD disposed of the Revision Application filed by the respondent nos. 2 and 3 on the ground that the said Revision Application has become infructuous. The respondent nos. 2 and 3, therefore, filed Special Civil Application No. 17084/2017 before this Court. Initially, this Court granted stay in favour of the respondent nos. 2 and 3, however, when the Civil Application was filed for vacating the interim relief, the said petition was withdrawn by the respondent nos. 2 and 3. 3.8. At this stage, it is also stated that the Collector rejected the Revision Application filed by the respondent nos. 2 and 3 and thereby confirmed the order passed by the Deputy Collector. Against which, the respondent nos. 2 and 3 filed Revision Application No. 70/2019 before the respondent no. 1. The respondent no. 2 and 3. 3.8. At this stage, it is also stated that the Collector rejected the Revision Application filed by the respondent nos. 2 and 3 and thereby confirmed the order passed by the Deputy Collector. Against which, the respondent nos. 2 and 3 filed Revision Application No. 70/2019 before the respondent no. 1. The respondent no. 1, by impugned order, allowed the said Revision Application and, therefore, the present petition is filed. 4. Learned advocate, Mr. Dipak R. Dave appearing for the petitioner has assailed the impugned order passed by the respondent no. 1 - SSRD allowing the Revision Application filed by the respondent nos. 2 and 3 on the ground that the petitioner has challenged the mutation entry after a period of nine years. It is submitted that the respondent no. 1 could not have considered the aspect of delay as the order passed by the Collector, by which, the matter was remanded by the Deputy Collector, has attained finality. It is contended that the respondent - SSRD has observed that the petitioner is claiming his right on the basis of the unregistered agreement to sale, which is not permissible and, hence, the finding recorded by the respondent no. 1 is contrary to the finding given by the civil court while deciding the application, Exh. 5, by which, injunction is granted in favour of the present petitioner. 5. Learned advocate, Mr. Dave would further submit that the sale deeds, which have been executed in the year 1998 and 2004 are nullity since they are in teeth of the junction order passed by the competent civil court, therefore, if the mutation entries of such sale deeds are allowed, there would be no rule of law. It is, therefore contended that when the respondent nos. 2 and 3 have committed breach of the order passed by the concerned civil court, the respondent no. 1 ought not to have interfered with the orders passed by the Deputy Collector as well as the Collector. It is, therefore, urged that the impugned order passed by the respondent-SSRD be quashed and set aside. 6. Learned advocate, Mr. Dave has placed reliance upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Delhi Development Authority, New Delhi Vs. Skipper Construction Company Pvt. Ltd., reported in (1996) 4 SCC 622 , more particularly, referred to Paragraph Nos. 17 to 19 of the said decision. 6. Learned advocate, Mr. Dave has placed reliance upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Delhi Development Authority, New Delhi Vs. Skipper Construction Company Pvt. Ltd., reported in (1996) 4 SCC 622 , more particularly, referred to Paragraph Nos. 17 to 19 of the said decision. 7. Learned advocate, Mr. Dave, thereafter, has placed reliance upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in case of Nareshbhai Hathising Shah Vs. Dinaben Jitendrabhai Thakar delivered in Civil Application No. 1094/2013 in First Appeal No. 1996/2008. 8. On the other hand, learned advocate, Mr. Viral Shah appearing for the respondent no. 3 referred to the affidavit in reply filed by the respondent no. 3 and, thereafter, submitted that the respondent nos. 2 and 3 are not the parties defendants before the concerned civil court in the civil suit filed by the present petitioner in the year 1996. It is further submitted that mutation entry nos. 6861 & 6862 came to be mutated in the revenue record in the year 2001 and inspite of that, the petitioner has not challenged the said entry by filing Appeal before the Deputy Collector within reasonable time, thereafter, the respondent no. 3 has purchased the land in question by registered sale deed from the respondent no. 2 in the year 2004, therefore, entry no. 7237 was mutated in the revenue record pursuant to the said registered sale deed. It is, therefore, submitted that the respondent authority was required to mutate the entry of the registered document as per the provision contained in Section 135-C of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code. Learned advocate, Mr. Shah has referred to the said provision. 9. It is, thereafter, contended that the petitioner has filed Special Civil Suit No. 307/2009 against the present respondent nos. 2 and 3, in which, the petitioner has prayed for quashing and setting aside the sale deed executed in favour of the respondent nos. 2 and 3. At this stage, it is pointed out that till date, the concerned civil court has not granted any relief in favour of the petitioner. Thus, when the petitioner has failed to obtain any relief from the concerned civil court, after a period of three years from the date of filing of the said civil suit, Appeal was filed by the petitioner before the Deputy Collector challenging the mutation entries in question. Thus, when the petitioner has failed to obtain any relief from the concerned civil court, after a period of three years from the date of filing of the said civil suit, Appeal was filed by the petitioner before the Deputy Collector challenging the mutation entries in question. It is, therefore, urged that looking to the conduct of the petitioner, this Court may not exercise the discretion in favour of such petitioner. 10. Learned advocate, Mr. Shah further submits that the petitioner is alleging that the original defendants-original land owners have violated the order of injunction passed by the concerned civil court, however, the respondent nos. 2 and 3 are bonafide purchasers and the petitioner has not filed any application under Order 39, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 alleging breach of injunction by the concerned defendants-original land owners nor the petitioner has filed any application under the provision of the Contempt of Courts Act before this Court. It is, therefore, contended that when the petitioner has not filed any proceeding for the alleged breach of the order of injunction, it was not proper on the part of the Deputy Collector as well as the Collector to pass order in favour of the present petitioner. It is, therefore, urged that no error is committed by the respondent no. 1-SSRD while allowing the Revision Application filed by the respondent nos. 2 and 3. He, therefore, urged that this petition be dismissed. 11. Learned advocate, Mr. Shah has placed reliance upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Thomson Press (India) Limited Vs. Nanak Builders and Investors Private Limited & Ors., reported in (2013) 5 SCC 397 . He has also placed reliance upon the decision rendered by this Court in case of Gandabhai Dalpatbhai Patel Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., reported in 2005 (2) GLR 1370 . 12. Learned AGP Mr. Antani submitted that looking to the facts of the present case, when the respondent-SSRD has passed an order in favour of the respondent nos. 2 and 3, this Court may not interfere with the same. 13. Having heard learned advocates appearing for the parties and having gone through the material placed on record, it would emerge that the petitioner and other plaintiffs have filed Regular Civil Suit No. 76/1996 before the concerned Civil Court against the original land owners of the land in question. 2 and 3, this Court may not interfere with the same. 13. Having heard learned advocates appearing for the parties and having gone through the material placed on record, it would emerge that the petitioner and other plaintiffs have filed Regular Civil Suit No. 76/1996 before the concerned Civil Court against the original land owners of the land in question. The concerned civil court has granted injunction in favour of the petitioner and other plaintiffs vide order dated 11.06.1997. It is the case of the petitioner that though the order of injunction is in operation, the original land owner sold the land in question by executing registered sale deeds dated 18.02.1998 and 21.05.1998 in favour of the respondent no. 2, on the basis of which, mutation entry nos. 6861 & 6862 came to be posted in the revenue record. The respondent no. 2, thereafter, sold the land in question by registered sale deed in favour of the respondent no. 2 on 12.07.2004 and, therefore, entry no. 7237 came to be mutated on 02.04.2005. It is required to be noted that the petitioner challenged the aforesaid entries by filing Appeal before the Deputy Collector in the year 2012. It is pertinent to note at this stage that prior to filing of RTS Appeal, the petitioner filed Special Civil Suit No. 307/2009 before the concerned civil court, in which, the petitioner has challenged the sale deeds executed in favour of the present respondent nos. 2 and 3, at that time also, the petitioner had not challenged the mutation entries by filing RTS Appeal before the concerned Deputy Collector. After a period of three years from the date of filing of the civil suit, RTS Appeal was filed by the petitioners. Thus, the conduct of the present petitioner is required to be considered in the present case. 14. Learned advocate for the petitioner has mainly contended that when the respondent nos. 2 and 3 have purchased the land in question by registered sale deed, inspite of the injunction order passed by the concerned civil court, mutation entries posted pursuance to such registered sale deed are required to be cancelled. At this stage, the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Delhi Development Authority, New Delhi (supra) is required to be kept in mind. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said decision has observed in Paragraph Nos. At this stage, the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Delhi Development Authority, New Delhi (supra) is required to be kept in mind. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said decision has observed in Paragraph Nos. 17, 18 and 19 as under, [17] "The contemnor should not be allowed to enjoy or retain the fruits of his contempt": The principle that a contemnor ought not to be permitted to enjoy and/or keep the fruits of his contempt is well-settled. In Mohd. Idris v. R.J. Babuji [ 1985 (1) SCR 598 ], this Court held clearly that undergoing the punishment for contempt does not mean that the Court is not entitled to give appropriate directions for remedying and rectifying the things done in violation of its Orders. The petitioners therein had given an undertaking to the Bombay High Court. They acted in breach of it. A learned Single Judge held them guilty of contempt and imposed a sentence of one month's imprisonment. In addition thereto, the learned Single Judge made appropriate directions to remedy the breach of undertaking. It was contended before this Court that the learned Judge was not justified in giving the aforesaid directions to in addition to punishing the petitioners for contempt of court. The argument was rejected holding that "the Single Judge was quite right in giving appropriate directions to close the breach [of undertaking]". [18] The above principle has been applied even in the case of violation of orders of injunction issued by Civil Courts. In Clarke v. Chadburn [1985 (1) All. E.R. 211], Sir Robert Megarry V-C observed: "I need not cite authority for the proposition that it is of high importance that orders of the court should be obeyed. Willful disobedience to an order of the court is punishable as a contempt of court, and I feel no doubt that such disobedience may properly be described as being illegal. If by such disobedience the persons enjoined claim that they have validly effected some charge in the rights and liabilities of others, I cannot see why it should be said that although they are liable to penalties for contempt of court for doing what they did, nevertheless those acts were validly done. of course, if an act is done, it is not undone merely by pointing out that it was done in breach in law. of course, if an act is done, it is not undone merely by pointing out that it was done in breach in law. If a meeting is held in breach of an injunction, it cannot be said that the meeting has not been held. But the legal consequences of what has been done in breach of the law may plainly be very much affected by the illegality. It seems to me on principle that those who defy a prohibition ought nat to be able to claim that the fruits of their defiance are good, and not tainted by the illegality that produced them." [19] To the same effect are the decisions of the Madras and Calcutta High Courts in Century Flour Mills Limited v. S. Suppiah & Ors. [AIR 1975 Madras 270] and Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun [AIR 1986 Calcutta 220]. In Century Flour Mill Limited, it was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court that where an act is done in violation of an order of stay or injunction, it is the duty of the Court, as a policy, to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrongdoing. The inherent power of the Court, it was held, is not only available in such a case, but it is bound to be exercise it to undo the wrong in the interest of justice. That was a case where a meeting was held contrary to an order of injunction. The Court refused to recognize that the holding of the meeting is a legal one. It put back the parties in the same position as they stood immediately prior to the service of the interim order." 15. This Court cannot dispute the proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. However before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the issue was different. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has exercised the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and while considering the provision contained in Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, certain observations have been made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 16. In the present case, as discussed hereinabove, it is the case of the petitioner that the registered sale deeds were executed in favour of the respondent nos. 16. In the present case, as discussed hereinabove, it is the case of the petitioner that the registered sale deeds were executed in favour of the respondent nos. 2 and 3 in violation of the injunction order passed by the concerned civil court, however, it is pertinent to note that the present respondent nos. 2 and 3 are not the parties in the civil suit filed by the petitioner and other plaintiffs in the year 1996 against the original land owners. Further, the petitioner has not filed any application for the alleged breach/violation of the injunction order passed by the concerned civil court by preferring an application under Order 39, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 nor the petitioner has initiated any proceedings under the provision of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Thus till date, the competent court has not examined as to whether the present respondent nos. 2 and 3 have willfully and intentionally violated any order of injunction passed by the concerned civil court. Thus, the contention taken by learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, is misconceived. Therefore, it was not open for the revenue authority to decide the issue as to whether the present respondent nos. 2 and 3 have committed breach of the order of injunction passed by the concerned civil court. 17. Similarly, in case of Nareshbhai Hathising Shah (supra), the Division Bench of this Court was considering the issue of tendering an unconditional and unqualified apology given by the contemnor and while considering such issue, the Division Bench has observed in Paragraph Nos. 14.1 to 14.4 as under, "[14.1] By tendering unconditional and unqualified apology, the contemnor is trying to rule out the possible action for contempt of Court after violating the interim order passed by this Court and after enjoying the fruits for the illegality committed by him. It is trite law that apology is neither the weapon of defence to purge the guilt of their offence; nor is it intended to operate as universal panacea, it is intended to be evidence of real contriteness [Vide M. Y. Shareef v. Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Nagpur (1955)1 SCR 757 ; M.B. Sanghi v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana (1991)3 SCC 600 ]. Contemnor has now tendered unconditional apology and volunteered to set right the illegality committed by them, but the purpose for flouting the order has been achieved. Therefore, to maintain the sanctity of the order of this Court and to give a message that parties cannot get away by merely tendering unconditional and unqualified apology after enjoying the fruits of the illegality, we are inclined to punish opponent No. 11 and impose the fine. [14.2] The opponent No. 11 is guilty of contemptuous conduct and as such is beneficiary of clandestine transaction which is in violation of the restraint order passed by this Court. [14.3] The conduct of opponent No. 11 as evidenced from the aforesaid material establishes beyond doubt that all throughout, the opponent No. 11 was trying to play with the Court and at every stage and/or from time to time he has changed story only with a view to mislead the Court. We are not inclined to accept the unconditional apology tendered by opponent No. 11 having regard to the conduct of opponent No. 11 which we have adverted to hereinbefore. [14.4] As stated hereinabove sufficient opportunities have been given to opponent No. 11 and opponent Nos. 1 to 6 to purge the contempt and to restore the transaction/sale deed which is in breach of injunction/interim order granted by this Court, rather than by availing the same, they have adopted various dilatory tactics to delay the present proceedings. Noncompliance of the orders passed by the Court shakes the very foundation of our judicial system and undermine the Rule of law, which are bound to honour and protect. This is essential to maintain faith and confidence of people of this country in the judiciary. Nobody can be permitted to play mischief with the Court/Court's proceedings and any attempt which undermines the Rule of law is required to be dealt with iron handedly." 18. In the facts of the present case, as discussed hereinabove, the aforesaid decision would not render any assistance to the petitioner. 19. Even in a decision in case of Thomson Press (India) Limited (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed in Paragraph No. 53 as under, "53. In the facts of the present case, as discussed hereinabove, the aforesaid decision would not render any assistance to the petitioner. 19. Even in a decision in case of Thomson Press (India) Limited (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed in Paragraph No. 53 as under, "53. There is, therefore, little room for any doubt that the transfer of the suit property pendente lite is not void ab initio and that the purchaser of any such property takes the bargain subject to the rights of the plaintiff in the pending suit. Although the above decisions do not deal with a fact situation where the sale deed is executed in breach of an injunction issued by a competent Court, we do not see any reason why the breach of any such injunction should render the transfer whether by way of an absolute sale or otherwise ineffective. The party committing the breach may doubtless incur the liability to be punished for the breach committed by it but the sale by itself may remain valid as between the parties to the transaction subject only to any directions which the competent Court may issue in the suit against the vendor." 20. At this stage, the provision contained in Section 135-C of the Bombay Land Revenue Code is required to be referred to, "Acquisition of rights to be reported. 135C. At this stage, the provision contained in Section 135-C of the Bombay Land Revenue Code is required to be referred to, "Acquisition of rights to be reported. 135C. Any person acquiring the right on any land by succession, survivorship, inheritance, partition, purchase, mortgage, gift, 8[lease or Certificate of No Dues made under sub-section (2) and (3) of section 125L and section 133(2), or otherwise] any right as holder, occupant, owner, mortgagee, assignee of the rent thereof, shall make a report of such acquisition of such right, either manually or electronically, to the designated officer within the period of three months from the date of such acquisition, and the said designated officer shall at once, give a written acknowledgment of the receipt of such report to the person making it: Provided that where the person acquiring the right is a minor, or otherwise disqualified, his guardian or other person, having charge of his property, shall make the report to the designated officer: Provided further that any person acquiring a right by virtue of a registered document shall be exempted from the obligation to report to the designated officer: Explanation I.--The rights mentioned above include a mortgage without possession, but do not include an easement or a charge not amounting to a mortgage of the kind specified in section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Explanation II.-A person in whose favour a mortgage is discharged or extinguished, or lease determines, acquires a right within the meaning of this section.]" 21. From the aforesaid provision, it is clear that when the registered document is produced before the revenue authority, by which, the right is acquired by the concerned person, entry is required to be mutated in the revenue record. In the present case, the original land owner has sold the land in question to the respondent no. 2 in the year 1998 and, therefore on the basis of the said registered sale deed, entry was mutated in the revenue record in the year 2001. After a period of three years, the respondent no. 2 sold the land in question by registered sale deed in favour of the respondent no. 3. Therefore on the basis of said registered sale deed executed in the year 2004, mutation entry nos. After a period of three years, the respondent no. 2 sold the land in question by registered sale deed in favour of the respondent no. 3. Therefore on the basis of said registered sale deed executed in the year 2004, mutation entry nos. 7237 was posted in the revenue record on 02.04.2005 and the entries mutated on the basis of the registered document has been challenged by the petitioner in the year 2012 by filing RTS Appeal before the Deputy Collector. 22. At this stage, the decision rendered by this Court in case of Gandabhai Dalpatbhai Patel (supra) is required to be kept in view. This Court has held in Paragraph Nos. 8 and 9 as under, "8. Heard the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the parties. So far as the contention on behalf of the petitioner and the proposition of law laid down in the judgment reported in 1992 Bombay Page 149 is concerned, there is no dispute with regard to said proposition of law. The only question is whether such an enquiry is required to be conducted by Mamlatdar in an RTS proceeding or not. The questions in relation to genuineness of power of attorney and/or authority, and whether the power of attorney holder can execute the sale deed or not, are the questions which are required to be considered by a Civil Court and not in an RTS proceeding while mutating necessary entry in the record of rights which is only made for fiscal purpose and which does not confer any right, title or interest in favour of a person in whose favour entry is made. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Swarni (SMT) Vs. Indrakumar (SMT) and others, reported in 1996(6) SCC 433 and in the case of Sankalchand Jayantilal Patel (Supra), record of rights and mutation entries are only one of the modes of proof of enjoyment of the property and such entries do not create any right, title or interest in property. It is required to be noted that the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sankalchand Patel (supra) was also relating to the provisions of Bombay Land Revenue Code and the Apex Court was dealing with Section 135 of the Code. It is required to be noted that the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sankalchand Patel (supra) was also relating to the provisions of Bombay Land Revenue Code and the Apex Court was dealing with Section 135 of the Code. Even it is the consistent practice and view of this Court as held in catena of judgments that the entries in the record of rights do not confer any right, title or interest in the property and that they are only for the fiscal purposes for collection and payment of revenue. 9. It is the consistent view taken by this Court in catena of judgments that the revenue authorities while dealing with RTS proceedings had no jurisdiction and/or authority to decide the question of title and if there is any dispute with regard to title the parties are to be relegated to the Civil Court. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat VS. Patel Raghav Natha- AIR 1969 SC Page 1297 and judgment of this Court in the case of Ratilal Chunilal Solanki & Ors. Vs. Shantilal Chunilal Solanki- 1996(2) GLR 525 and Siddharth B. Shah vs. State of Gujarat, reported in 1999(3) GLR Page 2527, the revenue authorities cannot decide the disputed question of title to the property and they have to merely go by the documents produced before them. Even this Court has held in the case of Nathabhai Meraman Darji (Supra) that when a document of registered sale deed is produced before the authority, the revenue authorities are bound to give effect to the same and are not required to decide the question of title." 23. Thus from the aforesaid decision, it can be said that the revenue authority cannot decide the question in relation to the genuineness of the power of attorney and/or whether power of attorney holder cane execute the sale deed or not. However, such questions are required to be decided by the competent civil court. The revenue authority while dealing with the RTS proceedings had no jurisdiction and/or authority to decide the issue of title and if there is any dispute with regard to the title, the parties can file civil proceedings before the civil court. 24. However, such questions are required to be decided by the competent civil court. The revenue authority while dealing with the RTS proceedings had no jurisdiction and/or authority to decide the issue of title and if there is any dispute with regard to the title, the parties can file civil proceedings before the civil court. 24. In the present case, as discussed hereinabove, the case of the petitioner is on the basis of the unregistered agreement to sale executed by the original land owner in his favour. Whereas entries in question have been mutated by the revenue authority on the basis of the registered sale deed executed by the concerned land owner initially in favour of the respondent no. 2. The respondent no. 2 has executed the sale deed in favour of the respondent no. 3. Further, civil suit is already filed by the petitioner against the original land owners in the year 1996 and the petitioner has also challenged the sale deed executed in favour of the respondent nos. 2 and 3 by filing Special Civil Suit No. 307/2009 before the concerned civil court, however till date, no relief is granted in favour of the petitioner in the civil suit filed in the year 2009. Thus, when the respondent-SSRD has considered the aforesaid relevant aspects and passed the impugned order, by which, the orders passed by the Deputy Collector as well as the Collector are set aside, this Court is of the view that no error is committed by the respondent no. 1 25. Another contention of learned advocate, Mr. Dave appearing for the petitioner that when the Collector has remanded the matter back to the Deputy Collector for considering certain aspects and when the Deputy Collector in remand proceedings, considered the said aspects only and passed an order in favour of the petitioner, the respondent-SSRD could not have gone beyond the order of remand passed by the Collector, is misconceived. As discussed hereinabove, the conduct of the petitioner is also required to be considered while granting relief in favour of the present petitioner. The disputed entry mutated in the revenue record in the year 2001 was challenged in the year 2012 and prior to that, in the year 2009, the petitioner filed civil suit challenging the sale deed executed in favour of the respondent nos. 2 and 3. The disputed entry mutated in the revenue record in the year 2001 was challenged in the year 2012 and prior to that, in the year 2009, the petitioner filed civil suit challenging the sale deed executed in favour of the respondent nos. 2 and 3. At that stage also, he had not challenged the mutation entry by filing RTS Appeal and, therefore, this conduct of the petitioner is required to be considered. Further for the alleged breach of the order of injunction passed by the concerned civil court, till date, the petitioner has not filed an application under order 39, Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 nor any proceeding under the provision of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are initiated against the original land owner or the present respondent nos. 2 and 3. Further the respondent nos. 2 and 3 are not the party defendants in the suit filed by the petitioner in the year 1996 and even in the year 2009, when the petitioner has filed civil suit against the respondent nos. 2 and 3, till date, no relief is granted by the civil court in favour of the petitioner. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that the revenue entries are only for the fiscal purposes and the rights of the parties can be determined by the civil court. Thus in the facts of the present case, as discussed hereinabove, the contention taken by the petitioner cannot be accepted. 26. In view of the aforesaid discussion, no interference is required in the impugned order passed by the respondent-SSRD. Therefore, the present petition is dismissed. FURTHER ORDER After the dictation of the judgment, learned advocate for the petitioner requests that this order be stayed for a period of four weeks so that the petitioner can challenge the same by filing Appeal before the Division Bench. However in view of the discussion made in the aforesaid judgment and reasons recorded in the aforesaid judgment, the request is rejected.