JUDGMENT : 1. The four matters were taken up for analogous hearing since they arise from suits between the same parties, being heard together in the court below, and in view of the impugned orders in all the revisional applications being exactly similar. 2. The brief background of the case is that the plaintiff filed four suits against the opposite party, all on the ground of forfeiture as contemplated in Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. In each of the said suits, initially applications were filed by the defendant under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for rejection of the plaints. The trial court rejected such applications under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on which revisional applications were preferred before this court and a co-ordinate bench was pleased to allow the said revisions, thereby rejecting the plaints filed in the said suits. 3. A subsequent attempt to have the said order of the co-ordinate bench reviewed, met with failure, upon which separate special leave petitions were preferred before the Supreme Court, which were disposed of by holding that the question involved in those appeals was whether the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1997 Act") or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1882 Act") applied. It was further held that the said dispute could be resolved by framing an issue by the trial court on the said point and by adjudicating the same as a preliminary issue. Accordingly, the appeals were disposed of by directing the trial court to frame the issue relating to maintainability of the suits and applicability of the enactments as mentioned in the judgment of the Supreme Court and to decide the same in accordance with law as a preliminary issue. 4. Pursuant to the said order of the Supreme Court, the impugned orders were passed upon framing of the following two issues: 1. Is the suit triable under the provisions of the W.B.P.T Act, 1997 or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882? 2. Whether the suit is maintainable as framed or at all? 5. 4. Pursuant to the said order of the Supreme Court, the impugned orders were passed upon framing of the following two issues: 1. Is the suit triable under the provisions of the W.B.P.T Act, 1997 or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882? 2. Whether the suit is maintainable as framed or at all? 5. The trial court, in all the four suits, ultimately answered the said two issues in favour of the plaintiff, holding that the lease deeds were executed on November 20, 1992 for a period of 99 years and the 1997 Act came into force on July 10, 2001, that is, the lease deeds were much earlier than the enforcement of the 1997 Act and that there was no express word in the 1997 Act, with effect from July 10, 2001 that all rights accrued by any party from any prevailing law would be extinguished since the 1997 Act came into force on July 10, 2001. Accordingly, it was held by the trial court that the said four suits were squarely governed by the 1882 Act and not under the 1997 Act and in view of such factual aspect, the suits were perfectly maintainable. 6. The moot question which falls for consideration in the present revisional applications is, whether the premises-in-question is governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 7. Learned counsel for the defendant/petitioner argues that Section 3 of the 1997 Act contains the exemptions from the applicability of the said Act. Section 3(c) provides that any tenancy, where the lease with due consent of the tenant has been registered under the Registration Act, 1908 after the commencement of the 1997 Act, and the fact of such consent has been recorded in the instrument so registered, shall be exempted from the 1997 Act. 8. The said provision was modified by the amendment effected by the 2002 Amendment Act, with retrospective effect from July 10, 2001. In the interregnum, the provision stood as follows: "(c) Any tenancy where the lease has been registered under the Registration Act, 1908 before or after the commencement of this Act, the same would be exempted from the 1997 Act." 9. In the present case, the leases were registered on November 20, 1992 and were given effect from November 1, 1992, being executed for a period of 99 years. 10. In the present case, the leases were registered on November 20, 1992 and were given effect from November 1, 1992, being executed for a period of 99 years. 10. The said leases were terminated by notices dated June 18, 2007 on the ground of forfeiture due to default in payment of rent under Section 111(g) of the 1882 Act. On the basis of such notices, the plaintiff instituted the suits in the year 2007 for eviction of the opposite party. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the relevant point of time to be considered is not the date of execution of the lease deeds but the date of institution of the suits. 12. In the present case, since the suits were instituted in the year 2007, that is, after coming into force of the 1997 Act, Section 3(c), as amended, squarely applies and only tenancies created by registered deeds of lease with due consent of the tenant, being recorded in the instrument, were exempted from the operation of the 1997 Act. By conscious deletion of lease deeds registered prior to the commencement of the 1997 Act, as in the present case, from the exemption clause, such pre-Act registered leases were thus brought within the fold of the 1997 Act. 13. It is obvious from a plain reading of Section 3(c) of the 1997 Act, it is argued, that the present lease deeds, which were registered in 1992, that is, prior to the 1997 Act coming into force, the same was not exempted from operation of the 1997 Act and would be governed by the said Act and not by the 1882 Act. 14. On the other hand, learned counsel for the plaintiff/opposite party argues that although there was an option for renewal for a further period of 99 years in the registered lease deeds dated November 20, 1992, there were no sooner determination clauses and as such, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1956 Act") did not apply. It is further argued that since the suit property did not come within the purview of the 1956 Act, the same also could not be governed by the 1997 Act, the latter being the successor Act of the 1956 Act. It is further argued that since the suit property did not come within the purview of the 1956 Act, the same also could not be governed by the 1997 Act, the latter being the successor Act of the 1956 Act. The protection under the 1956 Act was given to two categories: (i) Leases less than 20 years, whether or not terminable at the option of the landlord or tenant; and (ii) Leases after August 24, 1965, terminable at the option of the lessor or lessee. 15. As such, it is argued, that the amendment to Section 3(c), whereby the mischief as regards post-1997 Act registered lease deeds was rectified, and the earlier protection brought back to pre-1997 Act leases, created a new and absurd situation. The question is now posed whether the 1997 Act creates protection for a new class of tenants who did not enjoy protection under the earlier Act. 16. Learned counsel for the opposite party submits that the literal interpretation applied by the petitioner to Section 3(c) of the 1997 Act is incorrect. 17. First, the objects and reasons of both the 1997 Act and the amending Act do not disclose any intention of the legislature to create a new class of tenants for protection. Secondly, when the ordinary meaning leads to manifest contradiction of apparent purpose - the literal construction cannot be followed. 18. Principles of mischief rule are to be applied in seeing what the law was before and what mischief was sought to be remedied, so as to advance the cause and suppress the mischief. 19. In this context, the opposite party relies on the judgments reported at AIR 1955 SC 830 (paragraph no.7) [Tirath Singh vs. Bachittar Singh and others] as well as the judgment reported at AIR 1955 SC 661 (paragraph no. 22) [Bengal Immunity Company Limited vs. State of Bihar and others] and Odger on Interpretation of deeds and statues. 20. Learned counsel for the opposite party next cites a division bench judgment of this court of Prakashwati Chopra vs. Shibaji Mitra, reported at 2007(1) CLJ(Cal) 47, for the proposition that the literal rule of interpretation was not applied in the said judgment to Section 3(c) of the 1997 Act and the provisions of the 1882 Act [Section 111(a) and Section 108(q)] were relied on to harmoniously construe Section 3(c), noticing the prior law and the objects thereof. 21. 21. Learned counsel for the opposite party next relies on a co-ordinate bench judgment of this court in Bengal Steel Industries Ltd. vs. Bank of India & Ors. reported at (2008) 4 Cal LT 113, which followed the ratio of Prakashwati Chopra (supra). By placing particular reliance on paragraph no. 27 of the single bench judgment, learned counsel submits that, on the ratio of Prakashwati Chopra (supra), it was held that if the lease is found to be for a period in excess of 20 years such that it did not make the lessee a monthly tenant entitled to protection under the 1956 Act, upon the 1956 Act being replaced by the 1997 Act, the lessee would not come within the purview of the definition of "tenant" under the 1997 Act. 22. As such, it is argued that in the present case, since the registered leases were of November 20, 1992 for a period of 99 years from November 1, 1992 and without any sooner determination clause, let alone such clauses being exercised, the provisions of the 1882 Act were applicable and neither the 1956 Act nor the 1997 Act afforded any protection to the lessee, being the defendant herein. 23. In reply, learned counsel for the petitioner argues that there were sooner determination clauses in the lease deeds-in-question, which contemplated what would be done in the case if the leases were determined prior to the 99 years stipulated therein. Clause (f) of the lease deeds are particularly relied on in this context. There are several clauses in the lease deeds, according to the petitioner, which provide for sooner determination of the deeds, contrary to the submissions made by the opposite party. 24. Although it is open to the parties to contract with a clause akin to a sooner determination clause whereby the parties agree that the option of sooner determination will be available, but the modality of sooner determination of the lease is left to be adopted through Section 111(h) of the 1882 Act. 25. Had the parties in the present leases no intention of having a sooner determination clause or did not want to curtail the period of lease apart from that of forfeiture, which is already specifically mentioned in the leases, there was no occasion for the parties to use the clause and determine the leases sooner. 25. Had the parties in the present leases no intention of having a sooner determination clause or did not want to curtail the period of lease apart from that of forfeiture, which is already specifically mentioned in the leases, there was no occasion for the parties to use the clause and determine the leases sooner. This sooner determination, it is argued, cannot be equated with determination through forfeiture as has been sought to be done by the plaintiff. 26. It is further argued that Prakashwati Chopra (supra) was a case where the suit was instituted after the expiry of lease and the lease was allowed to run its full course. As such, it is argued that the said decision did not adjudicate whether Section 3(c) of the 1997 Act excludes pre-1997 Act registered deeds from the purview of the Act of 1997. The main issue in Prakashwati Chopra (supra) was recorded in paragraph no. 22 of the said decision which was, whether the defendant was a tenant within the meaning of the provision of Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act. 27. In both the cited judgments, it is argued, the case was of determination of lease by efflux of time and as such, the ratio laid down therein does not apply to the instant cases. 28. It is further argued that nothing is explained in Prakashwati Chopra (supra) as to when the criteria was shifted from mere terminability to actual termination and how it has got anything to do with the amended Section 3(c) of the 1997 Act. The judgment, in paragraph no. 25, holds that the situation has been sought to be remedied by the new Act; however, there is no change in the definition of tenant on this aspect between the 1956 and the 1997 Acts. 29. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that in Bengal Steel Industries Ltd. (supra), in particular paragraph no. 38, it has been clearly held that the purport of any clause, whether for a renewal or extension, has to be asserted primarily from the clause itself and if there is any shade of ambiguity from the other covenants of the lease, oral evidence adduced by the parties may also provide an answer. 30. 38, it has been clearly held that the purport of any clause, whether for a renewal or extension, has to be asserted primarily from the clause itself and if there is any shade of ambiguity from the other covenants of the lease, oral evidence adduced by the parties may also provide an answer. 30. The preliminary issue, in this regard, appears to be a mixed question of law and fact, according to the petitioner, since the interpretation of the respective clauses in the lease deeds-in-question as regards sooner determination have to be interpreted upon taking evidence on the intention of the parties. As such, the said issues could not be decided as preliminary issues at all. 31. The ratio, as appearing at paragraph no. 27 of Bengal Steel Industries Ltd. (supra), is not applicable because it does not lay down any restriction for applicability of the 1997 Act to leases registered prior to the commencement of the 1997 Act, although paragraph no. 29 of Prakashwati Chopra (supra), which is relied on by the single bench in the preceding paragraph, makes it amply clear that paragraph no. 29 of Prakashwati Chopra (supra), clearly, only applies to cases where the lease expired by efflux of time and the lessee is continuing in possession, and not to other lessees. As such, it is argued that the appreciation of the decision of Prakashwati Chopra (supra) at paragraph no. 27 of Bengal Steel Industries Ltd. (supra) was erroneous and cannot be relied on. 32. The ratio of Prakashwati Chopra (supra), is not applicable to the instant case. Considerable doubt in that regard is cast in paragraph nos. 44, 45 and 46 of Bengal Steel Industries Ltd. (supra). The applicability of Section 3(c) of the 1997 Act was never considered in the said single bench decision. 33. Even assuming that there was no sooner determination clause in the instant leases, the question of terminability vis-à-vis actual termination becomes academic in this case, as Prakashwati Chopra (supra) did not even consider leases which had no sooner determination clauses and thus no mischief was needed to be remedied. Further, it is argued by the petitioner, there is no discussion in Prakashwati Chopra (supra) as to what would be the effect on pre-1997 Act registered leases where there were no sooner determination clauses, in view of amended Section 3(c) of the 1997 Act. Further, it is argued by the petitioner, there is no discussion in Prakashwati Chopra (supra) as to what would be the effect on pre-1997 Act registered leases where there were no sooner determination clauses, in view of amended Section 3(c) of the 1997 Act. Hence, in the present case, literal interpretation of Section 3(c) is the only interpretation possible. 34. That apart, it is argued, that if the contention of the opposite party is to be accepted, Section 3(c) of the 1997 Act is to be effaced from the statute book, since even in the case of pre-1997 Act registered leases without sooner determination clauses, the Transfer of Property Act would apply. 35. Moreover, it is argued that the 1956 Act and all its provisions and inchoate rights have been repealed by Section 45 of the 1997 Act. In any event, there is no vested right in case of procedure that the plaintiff can seek to be entitled to under the 1997 Act. 36. Learned counsel for the petitioner cites two judgments, reported respectively at (2002) 3 SCC 496 [Haryana Financial Corporation and another vs. Jagdamba Oil Mills and another] and at (2008) 1 SCC 494 [Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV), Mumbai vs. State of Maharashtra and others] for the proposition that courts should not place reliance on a decision without discussing how the factual situation fits in with the fact-situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of the courts are not to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark upon lengthy discussions but such discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, not judgments. They interpret words of statutes, their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. 37. It is lastly submitted, on the basis of the said decisions, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since generality of expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. A case is only an authority for what it actually decides and cannot be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all. 38. Upon hearing both sides and a perusal of the materials on record, a plain and meaningful reading of the plaints clearly establishes that the suits were filed for eviction on forfeiture of the respective leases under Section 111 of the 1882 Act. 39. In this context, two provisions, as discussed in Prakashwati Chopra (supra) of the 1997 Act, become relevant. They are as follows: "West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997: 2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, -... ... ... ... 39. In this context, two provisions, as discussed in Prakashwati Chopra (supra) of the 1997 Act, become relevant. They are as follows: "West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997: 2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, -... ... ... ... (g) "tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is or, but for a special contract, would be payable, and includes any person continuing in possession after termination of his tenancy and, in the event of death of any tenant, also includes, for a period not exceeding five years from the date of death of such tenant or from the date of coming into force of this Act, whichever is later, his spouse, son, daughter, parent and the widow of his predeceased son, who were ordinarily living with the tenant up to the date of death of the tenant as the members of his family and were dependent on him and who do not own or occupy any residential premises, and in respect of premises let out for non-residential purpose his spouse, son, daughter and parent who were ordinarily living with the tenant up to the date of his death as members of his family and were dependant on him or a person authorised by the tenant who is in possession of such premises, but shall not include any person against whom any decree or order for eviction has been made by a court of competent jurisdiction: Provided that the time limit of five years shall not apply to the spouse of the tenant who was ordinarily living with the tenant up to his death as a member of his family and was dependent on him and who does not own or occupy any residential premises: Provided further that the son, daughter, parent or the widow of the predeceased son of the tenant who was ordinarily residing with the tenant in the said premises up to the date of death of the tenant as a member of his family and was dependent on him and who does not own or occupy any residential premises, shall have a right of preference for tenancy in a fresh agreement in respect of such premises on condition of payment of fair rent. This proviso shall apply mutatis mutandis to premises let out for non-residential purpose. 3. Exemption. This proviso shall apply mutatis mutandis to premises let out for non-residential purpose. 3. Exemption. - Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to - ... ... ... ... (c) any tenancy where the lease with due consent of the tenant has been registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), after the commencement of this Act, and the fact of such consent has been recorded in the instrument so registered. ... ... ... ..." 40. Section 111(g) of the 1882 Act is also relevant in this context and is quoted below: "Transfer of Property Act, 1882: 111. Determination of lease. - A lease of immovable property determines - ... ... .... ... (g) by forfeiture; that is to say, (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that, on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event; and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease. ... ... ... ..." 41. A bare perusal of the amended Section 3(c) of the 1997 Act shows that only those tenancies are exempted from the 1997 Act, where the lease was, with due consent of the tenant, registered under the Registration Act, 1908 and records such consent. 42. However, a plain and literal interpretation of the said provision might lead to multiple results. 43. The first possible literal interpretation can be that leases which were registered prior to the commencement of the 1997 Act universally fall within the purview of the 1997 Act, since not exempted by Section 3(c) of the said Act. 44. Secondly, it may also mean that clause (c) of Section 3 restricts only the exemption to post-1997 Act registered deeds with the consent of the tenant recorded, but is silent on other categories of registered lease deeds. For example, there can be registered lease deeds executed after the commencement of the 1997 Act which, though registered, were not with due consent of the tenant or even if executed with such consent, do not record such consent in the instrument itself. For example, there can be registered lease deeds executed after the commencement of the 1997 Act which, though registered, were not with due consent of the tenant or even if executed with such consent, do not record such consent in the instrument itself. Similarly, pre-1997 Act registered lease deeds of all shades are also not dealt with by the exemption under Section 3(c) of the 1997 Act. Hence, it can also be argued that those registered lease deeds, which are not specified in Section 3(c), can either fall within the purview of the 1997 Act or not, since the exemption provided in Section 3(c) is silent on that. Even if it is seen that a classification is made among equals (in the present case, being registered lease deeds), on the touchstone of the date of execution of such deeds, an exemption provided to one of the categories does not automatically imply inclusion of the other category within the ambit of the statute-in-question. 45. It is in this context that Prakashwati Chopra (supra) becomes very relevant. 46. The particular portions of Prakashwati Chopra (supra) which are relevant in the present context are contained primarily in paragraph nos. 25, 26 and 29 of the said judgment. 47. Paragraph no. 25 provides as follows: "It would thus appear that great emphasis was given by the earlier Act on the terminability of the lease. If a long lease for more than 20 years was terminable before expiration of its term it would be covered under the Act and all the provisions thereof would apply as indicated hereinabove irrespective of whether such a lease was in fact terminated before expiry of its term. We are of the considered opinion that this situation was sought to be remedied by the new Act when it provided that a person continuing in possession after termination of his tenancy shall be within the definition of a tenant. Mere terminability of the lease is no longer the criteria. We are of the considered opinion that this situation was sought to be remedied by the new Act when it provided that a person continuing in possession after termination of his tenancy shall be within the definition of a tenant. Mere terminability of the lease is no longer the criteria. In order to bring a pre Act registered lease within the fold of the tenancy Act of 1997 one has to show that the lease has in fact been terminated prematurely only then it would come within the mischief of the Act but it would not come within the mischief of the Act after the lease has been allowed to have a run of its normal life, in other words a lease will not come within the purview of the Act of 1997, if it expires by efflux of time. It is also worth noticing that under Section 3 of the Act a registered lease executed after the Act came into operation is specifically excluded from the purview of the Act of 1997. Therefore the legislature has rationalised the old Act in that mere terminability is no longer material. It is actual termination before expiry of lease is what is material. And in the case of new registered leases parties have been given absolute freedom." 48. Paragraph no. 26 provides inter alia as follows: "The legislature intended to create environment which stimulates future construction and with this end in view the applicability of the act to post legislation registered leases was abolished altogether. And in order to strike a balance between interests of landlords and tenants the factor of bringing a pre-Act registered lease within the purview of rent legislation the criteria was shifted from mere terminability to actual termination." 49. On the other hand, paragraph no. 29 of the said judgment states as follows: "We, therefore, are of the opinion that in those cases where the lease expired by efflux of time but the lessee is continuing in possession he/she would not come within the purview of the definition of a "tenant" under Section 2(g) of the Act of 1997." 50. Although the said judgment pertained to a case where the lease had expired by efflux of time, it cannot be gainsaid that the division bench considered the general question, as formulated in paragraph no. Although the said judgment pertained to a case where the lease had expired by efflux of time, it cannot be gainsaid that the division bench considered the general question, as formulated in paragraph no. 22 thereof, as to whether the defendant therein was a tenant within the meaning of the provisions of Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act. 51. Upon a comparative study of the 1882 Act and the Acts of 1956 and 1997, the division bench came to certain findings, as reflected in the statements quoted above. It is seen from the ratio laid down in Prakashwati Chopra (supra) that a line of distinction was drawn by the division bench between the pre-1997 Act lease deeds which were actually terminated and which either contained no sooner determination clause or contained such clauses but those were not exercised and the lease was permitted to run its full course. 52. The division bench took into consideration that post-1997 Act registered lease deeds, which complied with the criteria as stipulated in Section 3(c), were exempted from the 1997 Act in any event. 53. What was considered in Prakashwati Chopra (supra) was what would be the fate of the silent zone, left outside the purview of Section 3(c), and how far the 1997 Act would apply to those lease deeds which were registered prior to enactment of the 1997 Act. 54. The crux of the proposition laid down in the said division bench judgment is that in cases where the tenants were not enjoying the benefit of the 1956 Act and the 1882 Act operated, the benefits of the 1997 Act (which was the successor statute of the 1956 Act) could not be extended to such tenants. Taking such ratio to its logical conclusion, the division bench held that where a lease expired by efflux of time, or, despite there being a sooner determination clause, such clause merely remained on paper and was not exercised by an actual sooner determination of the lease, the lease ran its full course and as such, fell within the exemptions as contemplated in the 1956 Act and were governed by the 1882 Act. 55. 55. However, a necessary corollary of such proposition is that where the lease is of 20 years or more and is a registered lease deed entered into prior to the 1997 Act, although the 1882 Act would govern such lease in case the same was permitted to run its full course, in case of sooner determination, the 1997 Act would apply, (as, for that matter, would the 1956 Act). 56. A line of distinction between the 1956 Act and the 1997 Act was drawn in Prakashwati Chopra (supra) inasmuch as the 1956 Act laid stress on mere terminability of the lease, that is, the mere existence of a sooner determination clause, which was sufficient to extend the protection of the 1956 Act. However, as per the division bench, the 1997 Act restricted such protection only to cases where the lease was actually determined sooner than its normal date of expiry. 57. The moot question on which the present case hinges is, whether the expression "sooner determination" can be confined merely to the existence of an actual clause contemplating sooner determination in the lease deed and exercise of such clause at the option of either of the parties, or even a "sooner determination" by virtue of forfeiture as contemplated under Section 111(g) of the 1882 Act. 58. An attempt was made on behalf of the opposite party to restrict the meaning of "sooner determination clause" to the third clause of Section 110 of the 1882 Act, read with Section 111(h) of the said Act. A bare reading of Section 110 and its heading shows that the same pertains to exclusion of the day on which the term of the lease commences. The entire ambit of the said section revolves around the duration of a lease. In such context, the last clause, which has the caption "option to determine lease", stipulates that where the time so limited (meaning, as per the first clause, the time limited by a lease of immovable property) is expressed to be terminable before its expiration, and the lease omits to mention at whose option it is so terminable, the lessee, and not the lessor, shall have such option. 59. 59. Clause (h) of Section 111, on the other hand, contemplates the determination of a lease of immovable property on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other. 60. Although both the said clauses could apply to a case where the lease deed contained a specific provision as to determination of the lease earlier than its normal life, it cannot be said that the expression "sooner determination", as contemplated in Prakashwati Chopra (supra), has to be restricted to such provisions. The provision in Section 110 of the 1882 Act has to be seen in its perspective, being specification of the duration of a lease. Section 111(h), on the other hand, does not envisage by itself any such sooner determination clause but provides a mode of determination of a lease in the event either of the parties give a notice to quit, taking into its ambit not merely the lessee invoking the sooner determination clause but also a lessor giving a notice to quit, be it under Section 111(g) or even Section 106 of the 1882 Act. 61. The stress laid by learned counsel for the opposite party on the scope of Section 108(q) of the 1882 Act, which provides that one of the liabilities of the lessee was that on the determination of the lease, the lessee is bound to put the lessor into possession of the property, does not have any relevance to the context at all and was only a prop used by the division bench while rendering the judgment in Prakashwati Chopra (supra) to interpret the intention of the legislature in extending protection to a particular class of lessees/tenants. 62. As far as the judgment of Bengal Steel Industries Ltd. (supra) is concerned, the same also pertained to a case of expiry of a lease by efflux of time. In fact, although Prakashwati Chopra (supra) was referred to therein, it was stated in paragraph no. 46 of the said judgment that the plaintiff's assertion that the matter was covered by the dictum found in the first sentence of paragraph no. In fact, although Prakashwati Chopra (supra) was referred to therein, it was stated in paragraph no. 46 of the said judgment that the plaintiff's assertion that the matter was covered by the dictum found in the first sentence of paragraph no. 29 of Prakashwati Chopra (supra) still begged the question as to whether the third defendant could be reckoned as a monthly tenant under the 1956 Act by reason of the expressed term as to tenure in the indenture of lease. It was held that if she was, indeed, a monthly tenant protected by the 1956 Act then by reason of the nominal rent the third defendant can also be a tenant protected under the 1997 Act. In such a situation, it was held, there did not appear to be any exemption plainly visible under Section 3 of the 1997 Act to take the third defendant beyond the ambit of the definition of a tenant thereunder. 63. As such, the said judgment is not relevant at all in the present context. In this regard, the judgments reported at (2002) 3 SCC 496 [Haryana Financial Corporation and another vs. Jagdamba Oil Mills and another] and (2008) 1 SCC 494 [Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV), Mumbai vs. State of Maharashtra and others] are to be taken into consideration and a judgment rendered previously has to be treated as a precedent only for what was actually held in the factual context of the case and not as a statute, by discussing as to what would be the logical interpretation of what was held therein. 64. Thus, it is absolutely clear, in the light of the judgment pronounced in Prakashwati Chopra (supra), that the said judgment shed light on the grey area left open by the silence of the exemption clause in Section 3(c) of the 1997 Act as to post-1997 Act lease deeds not containing any provision as to due consent of the tenant in that regard and in respect of pre-1997 Act lease deeds in general. The ratio, clearly laid down in Prakashwati Chopra (supra), was that only in cases where the lease was permitted to run its full life, the same would be governed by the 1882 Act. Otherwise, if an option was exercised for sooner determination of the lease than its normal tenure, the protection of the 1997 Act would be attracted. 65. The ratio, clearly laid down in Prakashwati Chopra (supra), was that only in cases where the lease was permitted to run its full life, the same would be governed by the 1882 Act. Otherwise, if an option was exercised for sooner determination of the lease than its normal tenure, the protection of the 1997 Act would be attracted. 65. The said conclusion was drawn in the light of Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act, which brings within the definition of tenants, persons whose tenancies have been terminated but are continuing in possession of the suit property. 66. In the present case, although the registered lease deed was entered in the year 1992 for a period of 99 years, it was not allowed to run its full course but was terminated sooner by issuance of a notice on the ground of forfeiture under Section 111 (g) of the 1882 Act, although not by invoking any "sooner determination clause". Since the expression "sooner determination" need not be confined, nor was confined in any of the cited judgments, to invocation of a specific clause in the lease deed to that effect, but also contemplates any mode of determination sooner than its full tenure, including forfeiture as envisaged in Section 111 (g) of the 1882 Act, even applying the principle of Prakashwati Chopra (supra), the instant case can be said to be governed not by the 1882 Act but under the 1997 Act. 67. Unlike the 1956 Act or the 1997 Act, which contemplate determination of a tenant only upon passing of a decree under Section 13 and Section 6 respectively of the said Acts, under the 1882 Act, the determination of lease occurs by dint of the notice issued under Section 111(g) of the said Act itself, thereby occasioning a sooner determination in the present case. 68. As discussed earlier, the "sooner determination" contemplated in Prakashwati Chopra (supra) does not restrict itself to the existence of such a clause and exercise thereof by either of the parties but can come in any mode and form, including a sooner determination by the landlord by a notice under Section 111(g) of the 1882 Act. Thus, in the present case, the 1882 Act ceased to operate by dint of issuance of the notice under Section 111(g) of the 1882 Act, even as per the ratio laid down in Prakashwati Chopra (supra). 69. Thus, in the present case, the 1882 Act ceased to operate by dint of issuance of the notice under Section 111(g) of the 1882 Act, even as per the ratio laid down in Prakashwati Chopra (supra). 69. As such, the suits, filed under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, are not maintainable in view of all the respective tenancies being governed under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, pursuant to the sooner determination effected by virtue of issuance of the notices under Section 111(g) of the 1882 Act, by the landlord. 70. Under such circumstances, the trial court acted without jurisdiction in all the four matters by holding both the preliminary issues in favour of the plaintiff. 71. In view of the discussions above, it is held that the suits are triable under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 and not the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 72. In view of such decision, on the first issue formulated by the trial court, the second issue also has to be decided against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant, in holding that the suits are not maintainable, being framed under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 73. Accordingly, all the four suits, from which the four revisional applications arise, are hereby dismissed by holding the preliminary issues against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant. 74. C.O. No.1582 of 2019, C.O. No.1583 of 2019, C.O. No.1584 of 2019 and C.O. No.1585 of 2019 are allowed, thereby setting aside the impugned orders and holding that the corresponding suits in each of the revisional applications are dismissed as not maintainable under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 75. There will be no order as to costs. 76. This court expresses its appreciation to the learned counsel for both sides for having assisted the court ably both by advancing extensive arguments and by filing succinct notes on arguments. 77. Urgent certified website copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.