Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 918 (ALL)

Siya Ram v. State of U. P.

2019-04-11

SUDHIR AGARWAL

body2019
ORDER : Sudhir Agarwal, J. 1. Heard Sri Prateek Chandra, Advocate holding brief of Sri Siddhartha Khare, learned counsel for appellant, learned Standing Counsel for State and perused the material available on record. 2. This writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been filed challenging order dated 25.12.1997 (Annexure-5) passed by Senior Superintendent of Police, Banda, dismissing petitioner from service in exercise of power under the proviso to Rule 8(2)(b) of Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as "Rules, 1991"). 3. It is contended on behalf of petitioner that said Rule cannot be applied in this case. It is not a case where departmental enquiry was found not reasonably practicable and therefore, impugned order passed without holding enquiry is illegal and void ab initio. 3. It is contended on behalf of petitioner that said Rule cannot be applied in this case. It is not a case where departmental enquiry was found not reasonably practicable and therefore, impugned order passed without holding enquiry is illegal and void ab initio. The reasons given by Disciplinary Authority for observing that enquiry is not reasonably practicable read as under:- ^^Jh fl;kjke] vkj{kh 37 ukŒiqŒ ls fnukad 16-12-97 dks M;wVh dSfn;ksa dks dkjkxkj ls U;k;ky; esa is'k djrs gsrq yxkbZ x;h FkhA ,d cUnh tlhe ds ikl 'kjkc gksus dk 'kd gqvk rks bl vad Vh ds eq[; vkj{kh dks ryk'kh ysus gsrq funsZf'kr fd;Ka ftl ij cUnh tyhl ls 'kjkc feyh] ftl ij eq[; vkj{kh us bl vkj{kh dks 'kjkc nkf[ky djus gsrq ns nhA fl;kjke vkj{kh 37 ukŒiaŒ us ;g 'kjkc iqu% canh dks ns nhA ftls ihdj cUnh tyhl us ftyk dkjkxkj ifjlj esa igqap dj mRikr epk;kA bl vkj{kh dks cUnh tyhl ls lkaB xkaB gksus ds dkj.k bls fnukad 17-12-97 dks fuyfEcr fd;k x;kA bl vkj{kh dk vijkf/k;ksa ls lkaB xkaB gksuk rFkk mlds lkFk esytksy j[kus dh iqf"V gqbZ gSA bls jktuSfrd lja{k.k izkIr gksus ds dkj.k ;g jktuSfrd Mkyus dh /kedh nsrk gSA blds vfrfjDr blds dk;Zdykiksa ds LFkkuh; iqfyl ijs'kku gS vkSj turk ds O;fDr;ksa esa f'kdk;r dh gS fd blds dk;Zdykiksa ds dkj.k og Hk;Hkhr gSA ;fn ;g deZpkjh ;gkW ij cuk jgk rks blds }kjk dksbZ Hkh gknlk fd;k tk ldrk gSA bl izdkj vkj{kh dh vijkf/k;ksa ls lkaBxkaB gksus dh lafyIRkrk ikbZ xbZ gSA iqfyl tks fd ,d vuq'kkflr QkslZ gS esa vuq'kklu ,d jhM dh Hkkafr gSA bldh vuq'kklughurk dk dqizHkko vU; deZpkfj;ksa ij iM+ jgk gSA Jh fl;kjke] vkj{kh 37 ukŒiqŒ dks mijksDr xfrfof/k;ksa ls u dsoy iqfyl foHkkx dh Nfo /kwfey gqbZ gS cfYd vke ukxfjdksa esa ns'k ds lafo/kku rFkk dkuwu esa fo'okl ?kVk gSA blds bu d`R;ksa ds dkj.k ;fn bUgs lsok esa dqN vkSj le; vkSj cuk;sa j[kk x;k rks iqfyl foHkkx ds vU; deZpkfj;ksa esa Hkh vuq'kklughurk iSnk gksus dh izcy lEHkkouk gS ftlls foHkkx rFkk lekt ds fy; xEHkhj ifj.kke gks ldrs gSA buds iqfyl lsok esa cus jgus ls ;g vkxs Hkh blh izdkj dh voS/kkfud xfrfof/k;ksa esa lafyIr jg ldrk gSA ftuds fy;s ;g iqfyl dh lsok esa gksus dk ykHk mBkdj vius vijk/kks@d`R;ksa ls cpus dk iz;kl dj ldrs gSA mijksDr fn;s x;s dkj.kks ds vk/kkj ij esjk ;g Hkh lek/kku gks x;k gS fd Jh fl;kjke] vkj{kh 37 ukŒiqŒ dk iqfyl foHkkx dh lsok esa vkxs Hkh cus jguk yksdfgr esa ugh gSA vr% eS bUgs mijksDr fu;kekoyh ds varZxr iznŸk 'kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djrs gq;s ,d ekg dk osru Lohd`r djrs gq, lsok ls inP;qr djrk gwWA^^ "Shri Siya Ram, Constable 37 Civil Police was on 16.12.1997 deputed to produce the prisoners from jail to the court. On a prisoner Jaseem being suspected to have a liquor in his possession, the Head Constable of this posses was directed to do his frisking. Thereupon liquor was recovered from the prisoner Jalees and after that the Head Constable handed it to this Constable for depositing it. Siyaram Constable 37 Civil Police again handed this liquor back to the prisoner, consuming which the prisoner Jalees came into the District Jail premises and created a ruckus. On account of being in collusion with the prisoner Jalees. this constable was placed under suspension on 17.12.1997. The factum of this Constable being in collusion with the criminals and on good terms with them is confirmed. Enjoying political patronage he threatens to exert political pressure. Besides, the local police is troubled with his activities and the general public has complained to be scared of his activities. If this personnel remains here, he may be instrumental for anything untoward to happen. In this way, the constable is found to be in collusion with the criminals. Since, the police is a disciplined force, with discipline being like a spinal cord, his indiscipline is having an adverse impact on other personnel. The aforesaid activities of Shri. Siyaram, Constable 37 Civil Police have not only tarnished the image of the police department but also eroded the faith of the ordinary citizens in the constitution and law of the country. If he, despite these activities, is retained in service any longer, there is immense possibility of indiscipline spreading across other employees of the police department which may have grave consequences for the department and the society. In case of his continuance in the police service, he may even hereinafter indulge in this sort of illegal activities and taking undue advantage of being in the police service he may attempt to escape from the consequences of his offences/acts. On the basis of the reasons given above I am also satisfied that the further continuance of Shri. Siyaram, Constable 37, Civil Police in the police department is not in the public interest. Hence, I, in exercise of the powers conferred under the aforesaid rules, dismiss him from service, sanctioning him one month's salary." (English Translation by Court) 4. A bare perusal of aforesaid order shows that all inferences have been drawn by Disciplinary Authority against petitioner without holding any enquiry or opportunity given to petitioner. Hence, I, in exercise of the powers conferred under the aforesaid rules, dismiss him from service, sanctioning him one month's salary." (English Translation by Court) 4. A bare perusal of aforesaid order shows that all inferences have been drawn by Disciplinary Authority against petitioner without holding any enquiry or opportunity given to petitioner. It is not the case of respondents that enquiry is not reasonably practicable since neither witnesses were examined before authority concerned nor any evidence has been collected and no reason has been given for not conducting enquiry at all. 5. In my view, it was incumbent upon disciplinary authority to hold departmental enquiry in accordance with statutory provision and he could not have declined opportunity to petitioner exercising power prescribed under proviso to Rule 8(2) (b) of Rules, 1991 as a pretext. That would not only be in violation of principles of natural justice but also in the teeth of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 6. This question has been repeatedly considered by this Court and a Division Bench of this Court in Yadunath Singh v. State of U.P. & others, 2009 (9) ADJ 86 : (2010 (1) ALJ (NOC) 59), in a similar matter, has observed in paras 4 to 7 as under: "4. It is common ground that the service of the writ petitioner-appellant is governed by the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules"). Rule 8 of the aforesaid Rules provides for dismissal and removal of police officers of the subordinate rank only after proper inquiry. However, proviso (b) to Rule 8(2) contemplates that where the Government is satisfied, that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold such inquiry, it can be dispensed with. It further provides that where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such an inquiry, it may dispense with the inquiry. Here in the present case, the disciplinary authority had recorded its satisfaction but it is well settled that that satisfaction has to be based on germane grounds and not ipse dixit of the disciplinary authority. Here in the present case, the disciplinary authority had recorded its satisfaction but it is well settled that that satisfaction has to be based on germane grounds and not ipse dixit of the disciplinary authority. Here the only ground to dispense with the inquiry is that if the writ petitioner-appellant is allowed to continue in service, a departmental inquiry shall consume sufficient time and, therefore, such continuance will have bearing on the moral of the other police personnel. We are of the opinion that the ground recorded by the disciplinary authority while dispensing with the inquiry is not germane nor is it on any material that may be relevant, as such, the ground set forth cannot justify dispensing the inquiry at all. 5. The provisions contained under Rule 8(2)(b) have been incorporated keeping in view the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India. The power conferred on the authority to dispense with an inquiry in a given situation where it is reasonably not practicable to hold an inquiry, has been envisaged therein. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India and another v. Tulsi Ram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 : ( AIR 1985 SC 1416 ), had the occasion to consider the scope of the aforesaid provision and the Apex Court laid down the test of reasonableness in the said case to be reflected by the authority while proposing to dispense with an inquiry. Paragraph 130 of the said decision is reproduced below: "130. The condition precedent for the application of clause (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that "it is not reasonably practicable to hold" the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. What is pertinent to note is that the words used are "not reasonably practicable" and not "impracticable". According to the Oxford English Dictionary "practicable" means "Capable of being put into practice, carried out in action, effected, accomplished, or done; feasible". Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word "practicable" inter aha as meaning "possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished : feasible". Further, the words used are not "not practicable" but "not reasonably practicable". Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word "reasonably" as "in a reasonable manner: to a fairly sufficient extent". Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word "practicable" inter aha as meaning "possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished : feasible". Further, the words used are not "not practicable" but "not reasonably practicable". Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word "reasonably" as "in a reasonable manner: to a fairly sufficient extent". Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It is not possible to enumerate the cases in which it would not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry, but some instances by way of illustration may, however, be given. It would not be reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry where the Government servant, particularly through or together with his associates, so terrorizes, threatens or intimidate witnesses who are going to give evidence against him with fear of reprisal as to prevent them from doing so or where the Government servant by himself or together with or through other threatens, intimidates and terrorizes the officer who is the, disciplinary authority or member of his family so that he is afraid to hold the inquiry or direct it to be held. It would also not be reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry where an atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and insubordination prevails, and it is immaterial whether the concerned Government servant is or is not a party to bringing about such an atmosphere. In this connection, we must bear in mind that numbers coerce and terrify while an individual may not. The reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority. Such authority is generally on the spot and knows what is happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is the best judge of this that clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on this question final. The reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority. Such authority is generally on the spot and knows what is happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is the best judge of this that clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on this question final. A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department's case against the Government servant is weak and must fail. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not binding upon the Court so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in such a case the Court will strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty. The case of Arjun Chaubey v. Union of India is an instance in point." 6. The ratio of the decision in Tulsiram Patel's case: AIR 1985 SC 1416 ) (supra) has been further explained in paragraphs 128 to 132, 133, 135, 138 and 141. Applying the aforesaid test, in the present case, the question is as to whether the loss of rifle carried by the petitioner makes out a situation for not holding an enquiry. The reason given in the impugned order that the continuance of the petitioner in service would have an adverse moral effect has absolutely no rational connection with the subject-matter of inquiry. Whether the rifle was lost in transit by the petitioner or not could have been enquired into and it is not the case of the respondent that there was any threat to security or anything otherwise which may obstruct the smooth holding of an inquiry. The reason given in the impugned order, therefore, proceeds on an assumption which cannot be accepted as reasonable. It cannot stand the scrutiny as indicated by the Apex Court in the decision of Tulsi Ram Patel ( AIR 1985 SC 1416 ) (supra) and we are, therefore, unable to approve the same. 7. The reason given in the impugned order, therefore, proceeds on an assumption which cannot be accepted as reasonable. It cannot stand the scrutiny as indicated by the Apex Court in the decision of Tulsi Ram Patel ( AIR 1985 SC 1416 ) (supra) and we are, therefore, unable to approve the same. 7. The question as to whether the petitioner has an alternative remedy or not is not to be gone into the present case when on the facts on record, the reason given in the impugned order does not appear to be germane to the inquiry. The satisfaction recorded by the authority does not proceed on a reasonable ground and, therefore, it is not necessary for us to relegate the petitioner to the alternative remedy of filing an appeal. We are satisfied that the competent authority has not applied its mind in correct perspective and the order being contrary to law, the direction of the learned single Judge to avail the alternative remedy does not commend to us." 7. This aspect has also been considered by this court in catena of decisions where it has been held that disciplinary authorities are completely ignoring and failing to consider the matter in correct perspective and regularly passing orders which are not in conformity with the requirement of law where an action could have been taken against an employee without holding any department enquiry (See: Raja Ram Yadav v. State of U.P. and others,: 2009 (6) ADJ 657 : (2009 (5) ALJ 382); Jahir Singh Yadav v. State of U.P. and others,: 2009 (6) ADJ 605 : (2009 (6) ALJ 75); Subhas Chandra Yadav v. State of U.P.,: 2009 (3) All L.J. 414; Satya Prakash v. State of U.P. and others (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 28875 of 2006), decided on 07.11.2008 (Reported in 2009 (2) ESC 846); Ram Sanehi Misra v. State of U.P. and others (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 61271 of 2006), decided on 05.10.2009; and, Ravi Dutt Tyagi v. State of U.P. and others (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 56979 of 2006), decided on 17.02.2009). 8. The words "reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold enquiry" means that there must be some material for satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that it is not reasonably practicable. Writ Petition No. 56979 of 2006), decided on 17.02.2009). 8. The words "reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold enquiry" means that there must be some material for satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that it is not reasonably practicable. The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. Apex Court in the case of Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1991 SC 385 has observed: "It was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the Court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded by respondent No. 3 in the impugned order. Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the material placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry." "... When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer." 9. Learned Standing Counsel could not dispute that observations made in aforesaid judgments are clearly applicable to the case in hand and impugned order thus cannot be legally sustained. 10. The writ petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 25.12.1997 is hereby quashed. Petitioner shall be entitled for all consequential benefits. However, this order shall not preclude respondents from passing a fresh order after giving opportunity of hearing to parties concerned in accordance with law.