JUDGMENT : Dated this the 7th day of November, 2019 S.Manikumar, C.J. Being aggrieved by the decision in W.P.(C) No.2706 of 2012 dated 5.3.2015 by which, the Deputy General Manager (HRD), Human Resource Development, Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML), Bangalore, respondent No.1 before writ court, was directed to consider and pass favourable orders on Exhibit-P14 representation in the next arising vacancy, instant writ appeal has been filed. 2. Short facts leading to the writ appeal are that respondent/father expired on 5.7.1981, when he was working with the appellants at Rail Coach Division, Bangalore, leaving his family in indigent circumstances. At the time of death of his father, respondent was aged about 10 years. According to the appellants, even though there was no claim for appointment, under dying-in-harness scheme, they extended an offer of appointment to mother of the respondent. She did not join duty. After twelve years, respondent submitted a representation claiming employment assistance on compassionate grounds. 3. From the material on record, it could be deduced that when respondent preferred W.P.(C) No.2706 of 2012, with a prayer to call for Exhibit-P1 death certificate of his mother, Exhibit-P2 death certificate of his brother, Exhibit-P3 degree certificate in science and Exhibit-P4 letter issued by 1st respondent therein to his mother, to issue a mandamus directing appellants to appoint the respondent in any of the existing vacancies based on the qualification of the respondent under the dying in harness scheme, a counter affidavit has been filed by the Senior Manager (Legal) BEM Limited, Bangalore, opposing the prayers sought for, on the grounds, inter alia, that writ petition is not maintainable, either in law or on facts. For brevity, the relevant portions are extracted hereunder: “At this juncture, it is humbly submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of J&K V. Sajad Ahmed Mir (2006) 5 SCC 766 held that normally, an employment in the Government or other public sectors should be open to all eligible candidates, who can come forward to apply and compete with each other. It is in consonance with Article 14 of the Constitution. On the basis of the competitive merits, an appointment should be made to public office. This general rule should not be departed from except where compelling circumstances demand, such as, death of the sole breadwinner and likelihood of the family suffering because of the set back. It is in consonance with Article 14 of the Constitution. On the basis of the competitive merits, an appointment should be made to public office. This general rule should not be departed from except where compelling circumstances demand, such as, death of the sole breadwinner and likelihood of the family suffering because of the set back. Once it is proved that in spite of the death of the breadwinner, the family survived and substantial period is over, there is no necessity to say good bye to the normal rule of appointment and to show favour to one at the cost of the interests of several others ignoring the mandate of Article 14 of the constitution. It would be relevant to submit that the dependants of employees, who die in harness, do not have any special claim or right to employment, except by way of the concession that may be extended by the employer under the rules or by a separate scheme, to enable the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. The claim for compassionate appointment is therefore traceable only to the scheme framed by the employer for such employment and there is no right whatsoever outside such scheme. An appointment under the scheme can be made only if the scheme is in force and not after it is abolished/withdrawn. [ 2010 (11) SCC 661 ; State Bank of India V Rajkumar]. The Respondent Company doesn't have a scheme for compassionate employment under dying in harness scheme. It is submitted that the averment in para 3 of the Writ Petition is misleading. The Respondent Company had sent a letter vide Ref. No.RK/EMP/12-5(P)/1422 dated 18/01/1982 (Exhibit-P4), to Smt.KM Saraswathy, widow of late Vasudevan, offering the job on casual basis on daily wages of Rs.12/-per day and accordingly, she was advised to report immediately with all original certificates and testimonials. Whereas, she has neither reported for duty nor sent any communication informing her inability to report for duty within stipulated date ie. 27/01/1982. As such, the contention of the petitioner that his mother's case was not considered for employment till her death is not correct and the same is hereby denied. It is humbly submitted that the allegations in Para-4 of the Writ Petition are misleading. 27/01/1982. As such, the contention of the petitioner that his mother's case was not considered for employment till her death is not correct and the same is hereby denied. It is humbly submitted that the allegations in Para-4 of the Writ Petition are misleading. It is admitted that the petitioner has requested for employment and based on that his name was registered on the data bank of the Respondent company and informed him vide Exhibit-P5 that whenever vacancy arises suiting to his qualification, his case would be considered for employment. This itself does not constitute an offer of employment as alleged by the Petitioner. With regard to the Paragraphs-7 and 8 of the Writ Petition, It is admitted that the petitioner was informed by the Respondent Company to come for a meeting to examine his case for a suitable job on compassionate grounds. As such, it cannot be construed as an offer for appointment. However, on examining his case he was not found suitable to the job. With regard to Para-9, the contention of the petitioner that several appointment had been effected and the petitioner was discriminated without any basis and his case was not considered on the principle of compassionate appointment is baseless. In this connection, it is submitted that the Respondent Company has offered the job for his mother on casual basis, which was not accepted by the petitioner's mother. Subsequently, the petitioner's details were sought and examined on two occasions, since he was not meeting the requirements of the Respondent Company, his case was not considered. As such, the contention of the petitioner is hereby denied. Further, the Respondent Company is not having a Scheme for appointment on compassionate grounds and the cases will be considered on case-to-case basis depending upon the requirements of the Respondent Company and suitability of the candidate.” 4. Considering the rival submissions, writ court ordered thus: “The stand taken by the respondent in the counter affidavit is that there was no vacancy suited to the qualification of the petitioner for being appointed. Going by Ext.P13, it can be seen that it is on the basis of Ext.P13 advertisement dated 7.12.2011, the petitioner is making a claim for being appointed as security guard. Admittedly Ext.P14 representation is pending. The learned standing counsel for the first respondent, on instructions, submits that at present, there are no vacancies. Going by Ext.P13, it can be seen that it is on the basis of Ext.P13 advertisement dated 7.12.2011, the petitioner is making a claim for being appointed as security guard. Admittedly Ext.P14 representation is pending. The learned standing counsel for the first respondent, on instructions, submits that at present, there are no vacancies. However, taking into account the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the writ petition is disposed of directing the first respondent to consider and pass favourable orders on Ext.P14 in the next arising vacancy.” 5. Being aggrieved, instant appeal is filed on the grounds, inter alia, that: “C. The learned single Judge failed to appreciate that the qualification of the respondent is Graduation in Science and degree in Library Science which does not have any scope of employment in the appellant company which is a Central Public Sector Mini Ratna Company under the Ministry of Defence inter-alia engaged in the manufacturing of equipment required for defence mining and construction Rails, Metro Aero space, Dredging etc. D. The learned single Judge ought to have considered the fact that the basis of claim under compassionate appointment is to meet the immediate requirement of the destitute family and the respondent had approached for compassionate appointment after lapse of almost 12 years, which is evident that the family has survived the sudden financial crisis on account of the death of his father. E. The learned single Judge failed to appreciate Exhibit-P8 letter issued by the then Minister of State for Defence Production and Supplies in reply to a Query by the then Member of Parliament Lok-Sabha Sri.V.S.Vijayaraghavan that it would not be possible for the appellants to accommodate the respondent as there was no suitable vacancy as per his qualifications. Further it was informed that on account of the financial resentment the appellants were trying to reduce its manpower and even introduced Voluntary Retirement Scheme in that regard. F. It is well settled in law that appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of recruitment. On the other hand it is an exception to the general rule that recruitment to public services should be on the basis of merit, by an open invitation providing equal opportunity to all eligible persons to participate in the selection process. F. It is well settled in law that appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of recruitment. On the other hand it is an exception to the general rule that recruitment to public services should be on the basis of merit, by an open invitation providing equal opportunity to all eligible persons to participate in the selection process. The dependants of employees, who die in harness, do not have any special claim or right to employment, except by way of the concession that may be extended by the employer under the rules or by a separate scheme, to enable the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. The claim for compassionate appointment is therefore traceable only to the scheme framed by the employer for such employment and there is no right whatsoever outside such scheme. An appointment under the scheme can be made only if the scheme is in force and not after it is abolished/withdrawn. [ 2010 (11) SCC 661 ; State Bank Of India v. Rajkumar] G. The learned single Judge failed to appreciate that Smt. K.M Saraswathy widow of late Vasudevan was offered casual employment and accordingly, she was advised to report immediately with all original certificates and testimonials. But she has neither reported for duty nor sent any communication informing her inability to report for duty. H. The learned single Judge failed to consider the dictum laid down in State of J&K and others Vs. Sajad Ahamed Mir in 2006 (5) SCC 766 that once it is proved that in spite of the death of bread winner, the family survived and substantial period is over, there is no necessity to say goodbye to the General rule of appointment'. In the instant case the employee died in the year 1981 at a time when the respondent was only 10 years old. All along till this time the family have survived on their own. Moreover the widow did not choose the offered employment. This itself will show that the respondent is not in dire need for appointment under the dying-in-harness scheme. I. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal Vs. State of Haryana and others ( 1994 (4) SCC 138 ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Public Service appointments should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of application and merit. This itself will show that the respondent is not in dire need for appointment under the dying-in-harness scheme. I. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal Vs. State of Haryana and others ( 1994 (4) SCC 138 ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Public Service appointments should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of application and merit. The appointment on compassionate ground is not another source of recruitment but merely an exception to the aforesaid requirement taking in to consideration of the fact of the death of the employee, while in service, leaving his family without any means of livelihood. In such cases the object is to enable the family to get over sudden financial crisis which it faces at the time of the death of the soul bread winner, the compassionate appointment cannot be claimed and offered what ever the lapse of time and crisis is over. J. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Chandra Narain Verma (1994) 2 SCC 752 ) and Union of India Vs. Shashank Goswami and another (AIR 2012 SC 229), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right and so also it is choice of the employer as per guidelines and rules and availability of the vacancies. It is pertinent to submit that the learned single Judge failed to appreciate the fact that there was no rules/guidelines for compassionate appointment available with the appellants at the relevant period. K. In State Bank of India Vs. Rajkumar (2010(11)SCC 661), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that appointment under compassionate ground can be made, only if scheme for the same is in force. L. In MGB Gramin Bank Vs. Chakrawarti Singh ( AIR 2013 SC 3365 ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that appointment on compassionate ground may not be claimed as a matter of right nor an applicant becomes entitled automatically for appointment rather it depends on various other circumstances i.e. eligibility, Financial condition of the family etc. and the application has to be considered in accordance with the scheme. In case the Scheme does not create any legal right, a candidate cannot claim that his case is to be considered as per the Scheme existing on the date the cause of action had arisen i.e. death of the incumbent on the post. and the application has to be considered in accordance with the scheme. In case the Scheme does not create any legal right, a candidate cannot claim that his case is to be considered as per the Scheme existing on the date the cause of action had arisen i.e. death of the incumbent on the post. M. The learned single Judge erred in directing to consider ExhibitP14 by discarding the fact that the Respondent had already beyond the age for seeking employment to the post he is eligible to be appointed in respect of his educational qualification.” 6. On the above grounds, Mr. Sunil Nair Palakkat, learned counsel for the appellants, made submissions and sought for reversal of the judgment made by writ court. 7. Per contra, inviting the attention of this Court to the letter dated 15.1.1994, sent to Mr.V.S.Vijayaraghavan, Member of Parliament (Lok Sabha), New Delhi, with a copy marked to the respondent (Exhibit-P5), the letter dated 27.4.2007 (Exhibit-P9) addressed to the respondent to submit all the certificates and testimonials pertaining to age, qualification, experience etc., Exhibit-P10 letter dated 20.05.2011 issued by Senior Manager, Bharat Earth Movers Limited, Bangalore, to the respondent requesting him to fill up the Annexure (enclosed format) and come in person to the Human Resource Department at Bangalore Complex or at Palakkad Complex, Smt.Sherly Thomas, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that a promise has been made by the appellants to provide employment on compassionate grounds and, therefore, appellants are estopped from going back on the promise. 8. When confronted with the decision of a Hon'ble Division Bench of the Madras High Court in A.Anitha Vigi v. The Secretary, School Education Department, Chennai, and others (W.A. No.3080 of 2019 dated 5.9.2019), wherein it was held that compassionate appointment is not a matter of right and depends upon the scheme, learned counsel for the respondent made an attempt to distinguish the said judgment stating that in the case on hand, appellants were consistently promising to provide employment assistance by requesting the respondent to submit necessary documents stated supra and that, there was no rejection unlike in the case of A.Anitha Vigi (supra). Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that no sooner the respondent came to know that his case is not being considered, immediately he approached this Court in the year 2012 itself. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that no sooner the respondent came to know that his case is not being considered, immediately he approached this Court in the year 2012 itself. Thus, according to the learned counsel, there is no delay in approaching, either the appellants or the court for that matter. She, therefore, prayed to sustain the judgment of writ court. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 10. Admittedly, father of the respondent died on 5.7.1981 in harness. At that time, respondent was aged about ten years. When mother of the respondent made an application for employment assistance on compassionate grounds, appellants vide letter dated 18.1.1982 (Exhibit-P4) informed her that her case is under consideration for casual employment on daily wages of Rs.12/-per day. She was requested to report to office of the appellants not later than 27.1.1982 with all original certificates and testimonials. Contention of the appellants that she has not reported for duty, and she has not sent any communication informing her inability to report for appointment within the stipulated date i.e., 27.1.1982, has not been refuted. Indisputably, after completion of graduation in the year 1992 i.e. after eleven years from the date of death of his father, respondent has made an application for employment assistance. 11. Law on compassionate appointments has been dealt with in various decisions and a few require consideration. “(i) In Steel Authority of India Limited v. Madhusudan Das, (2008) 15 SCC 560 , wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clarified the law relating to compassionate appointments and held that it is only a concession and not a right: "15. This Court in a large number of decisions has held that the appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It must be provided for in the rules. The criteria laid down therefore viz. that the death of the sole bread earner of the family, must be established. It is meant to provide for a minimum relief. When such contentions are raised, the constitutional philosophy of equality behind making such a scheme be taken into consideration. Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India mandate that all eligible candidates should be considered for appointment in the posts which have fallen vacant. It is meant to provide for a minimum relief. When such contentions are raised, the constitutional philosophy of equality behind making such a scheme be taken into consideration. Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India mandate that all eligible candidates should be considered for appointment in the posts which have fallen vacant. Appointment on compassionate ground offered to a dependant of a deceased employee is an exception to the said rule. It is a concession, not a right. (See SBI v. Anju Jain, (2008) 8 SCC 475 para 33.)" (ii) In State of Gujarat v. Arvindkumar T. Tiwari, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 545 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court while examining the scheme, in the matters of compassionate appointment, has made the following observations: "11. The courts and tribunals do not have the power to issue direction to make appointment by way of granting relaxation of eligibility or in contravention thereof. In State of M.P. v. Dharam Bir (1998) 6 SCC 165 , this Court while dealing with a similar issue rejected the plea of humanitarian grounds and held as under: (SCC p. 175, para 31) "31. ... The courts as also the tribunals have no power to override the mandatory provisions of the Rules on sympathetic consideration that a person, though not possessing the essential educational qualifications, should be allowed to continue on the post merely on the basis of his experience. Such an order would amount to altering or amending the statutory provisions made by the Government under Article 309 of the Constitution. 12. Fixing eligibility for a particular post or even for admission to a course falls within the exclusive domain of the legislature/executive and cannot be the subject-matter of judicial review, unless found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or has been fixed without keeping in mind the nature of service, for which appointments are to be made, or has no rational nexus with the object(s) sought to be achieved by the statute. Such eligibility can be changed even for the purpose of promotion, unilaterally and the person seeking such promotion cannot raise the grievance that he should be governed only by the rules existing, when he joined service. In the matter of appointments, the authority concerned has unfettered powers so far as the procedural aspects are concerned, but it must meet the requirement of eligibility, etc. In the matter of appointments, the authority concerned has unfettered powers so far as the procedural aspects are concerned, but it must meet the requirement of eligibility, etc. The court should therefore, refrain from interfering, unless the appointments so made, or the rejection of a candidature is found to have been done at the cost of "fair play", "good conscience" and "equity". (Vide State of J&K v. Shiv Ram Sharma (1999)3 SCC 653 and Praveen Singh v. State of Punjab (2000) 8 SCC 633 .)” Issue to be considered is when the scheme provides for a limitation or a specific period within which, an application for employment assistance has to be made, and how the said period of three years from the date of death of the Government Servant has to be computed, whether a person, who is otherwise not eligible to apply within the said period, on account of age or not satisfying the required qualifications for any post in the service, in which the employee died, can make an application, on attaining majority and whether such application has to be considered irrespective of the period of limitation? On this aspect, this Court deems fit to consider few decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court. (i) In Union of India (UOI) and Others v. Bhagwan Singh, reported in 1995(6) SCC 476 , a Senior Clerk in Railways died on September 12, 1972, leaving behind his wife, two major sons and the respondent (before the Hon'ble Supreme Court), who was a minor, aged about 12 years. He passed Higher Secondary Examination in 1983. Stating that he had attained majority only in 1980/1981, he sought appointment on compassionate grounds. The same was rejected. The authorities took the view that the application was beyond the period of limitation (five years) and that the case of the respondent was not covered by the relevant rules, at the time of the demise of Ram Singh. Besides, there were two other major sons of the deceased, who did not seek for employment and that the family was not in financial distress. The Central Administrative Tribunal, held that the order of rejection as unjustified and directed Union of India to reconsider the case of the respondent therein, if he was otherwise qualified. Besides, there were two other major sons of the deceased, who did not seek for employment and that the family was not in financial distress. The Central Administrative Tribunal, held that the order of rejection as unjustified and directed Union of India to reconsider the case of the respondent therein, if he was otherwise qualified. Testing the correctness of the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal and taking note of the object behind the grant of special concession of employment assistance on compassionate grounds to provide immediate financial assistance to the family of a Government Servant who dies in harness, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph No.8, held as follows: "8. It is evident, that the facts in this case point out, that the plea for compassionate employment is not to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis or distress which resulted as early as September 1972. At the time Ram Singh died on September 12, 1972 there were two major sons and the mother of the children who were apparently capable of meeting the needs in the family and so they did not apply for any job on compassionate grounds. For nearly 20 years, the family has pulled on, apparently without any difficulty. In this background, we are of the view that the Central Administrative Tribunal acted illegally and wholly without jurisdiction in directing the Authorities to consider the case of the respondent for appointment on compassionate grounds and to provide him with an appointment, if he is found suitable. We set aside the order of the Tribunal dated February 22, 1993. The appeal is allowed." (ii) In Haryana State Electricity Board and another v. Hakim Singh, reported in 1997 (8) SCC 85 , Haryana Electricity Board challenged an order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana contending inter-alia that the respondent therein was not entitled to be considered for appointment in the Board on compassionate grounds. In the reported case, father of the respondent therein was a Lineman in employment of the Board. He died on 24.8.1974 in harness, leaving behind him, his widow and minor children, including the respondent. About 14 years, after the death of the said Lineman, widow applied for appointment to her son in the Board, on compassionate grounds, based on two circulars. He died on 24.8.1974 in harness, leaving behind him, his widow and minor children, including the respondent. About 14 years, after the death of the said Lineman, widow applied for appointment to her son in the Board, on compassionate grounds, based on two circulars. As per the said circulars, one member of the family of the deceased employee could be considered for employment in the service of the Board, as a goodwill gesture, provided the request for such employment is made within one year of the death of the employee. The respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court contending inter-alia that when his father died, he was only four years old and therefore, his mother could make an application in the prescribed form and when he attained majority, he made a request. The Board did not give any favourble response to the repeated representations made in the matter. The Board took a stand that as the application was not made within the period specified in the circulars, the Board was unable to entertain the request for appointment on compassionate grounds. The High Court ordered the Board to consider the case of the respondent therein for compassionate appointment on the ground that, even if the dependents happened to be a minor child, at the time of death of the employee, the policy mandates his case to be considered by an extended period i.e., the time till the defendant attained majority. The Board's appeal was negatived by the Hon'ble Division Bench, with a direction to comply with the orders of the Single Judge, within a time frame. When the correctness of the above said orders was tested, at paragraph No.8 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "8. The rule of appointment to public service is that they should be on merits and through open invitation. It is the normal route through which one can get into a public employment. However, as every rule can have exceptions there are a few exceptions to the said rule also which have been evolved to meet certain contingencies. As per one such exception relief is provided to the bereaved family of a deceased employee by accommodating one of his dependents in a vacancy. The object is to give succour to the family which has been suddenly plunged into penury due to the untimely death of its sole bread-winner. As per one such exception relief is provided to the bereaved family of a deceased employee by accommodating one of his dependents in a vacancy. The object is to give succour to the family which has been suddenly plunged into penury due to the untimely death of its sole bread-winner. This Court has observed time and again that the object of providing such ameliorating relief should not be taken as opening an alternative mode of recruitment to public employment." As regards the extended period, on attaining majority, the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph Nos.14 and 15, held as follows: "14. In that case widow of a deceased employee made an application almost twelve years after the death of her husband requesting for accommodating her son in the employment of the Board, but it was rejected by the Board. When she moved the High Court the Board was directed to appoint him on compassionate ground. This Court upset the said directions of the High Court following two earlier decisions rendered by this Court one in Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana and Ors. [ 1994 (3) SCR 893 ], the other in Jadgish Prasad v. State of Bihar and Anr. 1996 (1) SCC 301 . In the former, a Bench of two Judges has pointed out that "the whole object of granting compassionate employment is to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give a member of such family a post much less a post for the post held by the deceased". In the latter decision which also was rendered by a Bench of two judges, it was observed that "the very object of appointment of dependent of the deceased employees who die in harness is to relieve unexpected immediate hardship and distress caused to the family by sudden demise of earning member of the family". The learned Judges pointed out that if the claim of the dependent which was preferred long after the death of the deceased employee is to be countenanced it would amount to another mode of recruitment of the dependent of the deceased government servant "which cannot be encouraged, dehors the recruitment rules." 15. The learned Judges pointed out that if the claim of the dependent which was preferred long after the death of the deceased employee is to be countenanced it would amount to another mode of recruitment of the dependent of the deceased government servant "which cannot be encouraged, dehors the recruitment rules." 15. It is clear that the High Court has gone wrong in giving a direction to the Board to consider the claim of the respondent as the request was made far beyond the period indicated in the circular of the Board dated 1.10.1986. Respondent, if he is interested in getting employment in the Board has to pass through the normal route now." Ultimately, the Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders of the High Court. (iii) In Sanjay Kumar v. The State of Bihar and Others, reported in 2000 (7) SCC 192 , the petitioner was 10 years old, and his mother working as a Excise Constable, died. He made an application on 02.06.1988, soon after the death of his mother, seeking appointment on compassionate grounds. The said application was rejected on 10.12.1996. Fresh application subsequently made was also rejected on 21.04.1997. Being aggrieved by the same, he preferred a writ petition before the High Court. A learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition and that the same was also confirmed by the Hon'ble Division Bench. On appeal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph No.3, held as follows: "3. We are unable to agree with the submissions of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. This Court has held in a number of cases that compassionate appointment is intended to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over sudden crisis resulting due to death of the bread earner who had left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood: In fact such a view has been expressed in the very decision cited by the petitioner in Director of Education and Anr. v. Pushpendra Kumar and Ors. (Supra). It is also significant to notice that on the date when the first application was made by the petitioner on 2.6.1988, the petitioner was a minor and was not eligible for appointment. This is conceded by the petitioner. There cannot be reservation of a vacancy till such time as the petitioner becomes a major after a number of years, unless there is some specific provisions. This is conceded by the petitioner. There cannot be reservation of a vacancy till such time as the petitioner becomes a major after a number of years, unless there is some specific provisions. The very basis of compassionate appointment is to see that the family gets immediate relief." (iv) In Sushma Gosain v. Union of India reported in 1989 (4) SCC 468 , it was observed that in all the claims of appointment on compassionate grounds, there should not be any delay in appointment. The purpose of providing appointment on compassionate ground is to mitigate the hardship due to death of the breadwinner in the family. Such appointments should, therefore, be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. The fact that the ward was a minor at the time of death of his father is no ground, unless the Scheme itself envisages specifically otherwise, to state that as and when such minor becomes a major he can be appointed without any time consciousness or limit. The above view was reiterated in Phoolwati v. Union of India [1991 Supp (2) SCC 689] and Union of India v. Bhagwan Singh [ 1995 (6) SCC 476 ]. (v) In Director of Education (Secondary) v. Pushpendra Kumar reported in 1998 (5) SCC 192 , it was observed that in the matter of compassionate appointment, there cannot be insistence for a particular post. Out of purely humanitarian consideration, and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided the family would not be able to make both ends meet, provisions are made for giving appointment to one of the dependents of the deceased who may be eligible for appointment. Care has, however, to be taken that provision for grant of compassionate employment which is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions does not unduly interfere with the right of those other persons who are eligible for appointment to seek appointment against the post which would have been available, but for the provision enabling appointment being made on compassionate grounds of the dependent of the deceased employee. As it is in the nature of exception to the general provisions it cannot substitute the provision to which it is an exception and thereby nullify the main provision by taking away completely the right conferred by the main provision. As it is in the nature of exception to the general provisions it cannot substitute the provision to which it is an exception and thereby nullify the main provision by taking away completely the right conferred by the main provision. (vi) In Director, Defence Metal Research Laboratory v. G. Murali, reported in 2003(9) SCC 247 , the applicant was aged about two years, at the time of death of his father and that his application for compassionate ground appointment made, on attainment of majority was rejected, on the ground of non-availability of posts. The Central Administrative Tribunal, rejected the challenge. However, the High Court directed appointment on compassionate grounds, with a direction to the respondent's therein to create a post to accommodate him. The Civil appeal filed by the Director (Defense) and another, was allowed and at paragraph No.4, the Hon'ble Supreme Court opined as follows: "4. We do not find any flimsy ground or technicalities in the Tribunal’s order. In fact, we find the High Court’s order to be unsustainable. There has been a failure to appreciate what the Tribunal had rightly taken into account, namely, that the writ petitioner and his family had coped without the compassionate appointment for about eighteen years. There was no warrant in such circumstances for directing the writ petitioner’s appointment on compassionate grounds and that too with the direction to the respondents to the writ petition to create a post to accommodate him." (vii) In National Hydroelectric Power Corporation and Anr. v. Nanak Chand and Anr., reported in 2004 (12) SCC 487 , father of the respondent was working under Hydro Electric Project of Government of India and died on 10.12.1976. The project was handed over to the appellant Corporation in 1978. The respondent, after attaining majority in 1986 applied for compassionate appointment which was rejected on the ground that the application was made after 10 years and that Corporation had surplus staff. Placing reliance on the instructions issued by the Government, contained in Swamy's Complete Manual and Establishment and Administration, the High Court granted the relief in favour of the respondent/dependent. Setting aside the said order, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after referring to a catena of decisions held that the impugned judgment therein, as unsustainable. Placing reliance on the instructions issued by the Government, contained in Swamy's Complete Manual and Establishment and Administration, the High Court granted the relief in favour of the respondent/dependent. Setting aside the said order, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after referring to a catena of decisions held that the impugned judgment therein, as unsustainable. The Apex Court further held that the fact that the ward was a minor at the time of death of his father, was no ground to grant compassionate ground appointment, unless the Scheme itself envisages. (viii) In State Bank of India v. Somvir Singh, reported in 2007 (4) SCC 778 , at Paragraphs 7 and 10, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows: "7. Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India guarantees to al its citizens equality of opportunity in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Article 16(2) Protects citizens against discrimination in respect of any employment or office under the State on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex and descent. It is so well settled and needs no restatement at our end that 28 appointment on compassionate grounds is an exception carved out to the general rule that recruitment to public services is to be made in a transparent and accountable manner providing opportunity to all eligible persons to compete and participate in the selection process. Such appointments are required to be made on the basis of open invitation of applications and merit. Dependents of employees died in harness do not have any special or additional claim to public services other than the one conferred, if any, by the employer. 10. There is no dispute whatsoever that the appellant bank is required to consider the request for compassionate appointment only in accordance with the scheme framed by it and no discretion as such is left with any of the authorities to make compassionate appointment dehors the scheme. In our considered opinion the claim for compassionate appointment and the right, if any, is traceable only to the scheme, executive instructions, rules, etc. framed by the employer in the matter of providing employment on compassionate grounds. In our considered opinion the claim for compassionate appointment and the right, if any, is traceable only to the scheme, executive instructions, rules, etc. framed by the employer in the matter of providing employment on compassionate grounds. There is no right of whatsoever nature to claim compassionate appointment on any ground other than the one, if any, conferred by the employer by way of scheme or instructions as the case may be." The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that it is well settled that the hardship of the dependent does not entitle one, to compassionate appointment, dehors the scheme or the statutory provisions, as the case may be. (ix) In S.Venkateswaran v. The Additional Director, Land Survey and Records Department [W.P.(MD)No.9086 of 2011, dated 14.09.2011], it is held as follows: “The principles enunciated in the above said judgments would makes it clear that compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time, in future. Compassionate employment cannot be claimed after a lapse of time, after the crisis is over. On the facts and circumstances of the above case, the Apex Court proceeded to observe that the employee died in harness in the year 1981 and after a long squabble by the dependents of the deceased, they have arrived at a settlement that the son-in-law (husband of the second daughter) who was unemployed may request for appointment on compassionate grounds. The request so made was accepted by the Personal Manager of the Company subject to the approval of the Director of the Company. The Director (P), who is the competent authority for post facto approval, keeping in view the object and purpose of providing compassionate appointment has cancelled the provisional appointment on the ground that nearly after 12 years from the date of death of the employee such an appointment could not have been offered to the so called dependent of the deceased employee. The Supreme Court held that the decision of the employer was in consonance with Umesh Kumar Nagpal's case and the same should not have been interfered with by the High Court.” (x) In Local Administration Department v. M.Selvanayagam reported in 2011 AIR SCW 2198, an application was made by the son of the deceased, 30 after 7½ years, from the date of death of his father, who died as a Watchman in Karaikal Municipality on 22.11.1988, leaving behind, his wife and two sons, including the respondent therein. At the time of his death, the respondent therein was aged 11 years. After about 5½ years from the date of his father's death, the respondent therein passed S.S.L.C. examination in April, 1993. Thereafter, for the first time on July, 29, 1993, the respondent's mother therein made an application for his appointment on compassionate grounds. No action was taken on the application, since the respondent therein was still a minor. A learned Single Judge directed the authorities to consider his claim for appointment on compassionate grounds, afresh and to pass an order on his application, within four months, from the date of passing of the order. As the same was not complied with, a contempt proceeding was initiated. The Municipality rejected the respondent's claim therein, for compassionate appointment. Once again, a writ petition was filed and this time, a learned Single Judge rejected the same. The Hon'ble Division Bench, which considered the correctness of the said order, allowed the writ appeal and that the same was challenged before the Hon'ble Apex Court. After considering the scheme of employment assistance on compassionate grounds, at Paragraphs 7 to 9, the Hon'ble Apex Court, held as follows: "7. We think that the explanation given for the wife of the deceased not asking for employment is an afterthought and completely unacceptable. A person suffering from anemia and low blood pressure will always greatly prefer the security and certainty of a regular job in the municipality which would be far more lucrative and far less taxing than doing menial work from house to house in an unorganized way. But, apart from this, there is a far more basic flaw in the view taken by the Division Bench in that it is completely divorced from the object and purpose of the scheme of compassionate appointments. But, apart from this, there is a far more basic flaw in the view taken by the Division Bench in that it is completely divorced from the object and purpose of the scheme of compassionate appointments. It has been said a number of times earlier but it needs to be recalled here that under the scheme of compassionate appointment, in case of an employee dying in harness one of his eligible dependents is given a job with the sole objective to provide immediate succor to the family which may suddenly find itself in dire straits as a result of the death of the bread winner. An appointment made many years after the death of the employee or without due consideration of the financial resources available to his/her dependents and the financial deprivation caused to the dependents as a result of his death, simply because the claimant happened to be one of the dependants of the deceased employee would be directly in conflict with Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution and hence, quite bad and illegal. In dealing with cases of compassionate appointment, it is imperative to keep this vital aspect in mind. 8. Ideally, the appointment on compassionate basis should be made without any loss of time but having regard to the delays in the administrative process and several other relevant factors such as the number of already pending claims under the scheme and availability of vacancies etc. normally the appointment may come after several months or even after two to three years. It is not our intent, nor it is possible to lay down a rigid time limit within which appointment on compassionate grounds must be made but what needs to be emphasized is that such an appointment must have some bearing on the object of the scheme. 9. In this case the Respondent was only 11 years old at the time of the death of his father. The first application for his appointment was made on July 2, 1993, even while he was a minor. Another application was made on his behalf on attaining majority after 7 years and 6 months of his father's death. In such a case, the appointment cannot be said to sub-serve the basic object and purpose of the scheme. The first application for his appointment was made on July 2, 1993, even while he was a minor. Another application was made on his behalf on attaining majority after 7 years and 6 months of his father's death. In such a case, the appointment cannot be said to sub-serve the basic object and purpose of the scheme. It would rather appear that on attaining majority he staked his claim on the basis that his father was an employee of the Municipality and he had died while in service. In the facts of the case, the municipal authorities were clearly right in holding that with whatever difficulty, the family of Meenakshisundaram had been able to tide over the first impact of his death. That being the position, the case of the Respondent did not come under the scheme of compassionate appointments." (xi) In National Institute of Technology v. Niraj Kumar Singh reported in 2007 (2) SCC 481 , an employee died, leaving behind his wife. She made an application to the respondent therein, for appointment of her grandson on compassionate grounds. Thereafter, he was appointed on daily wages and his services were extended from time to time. After a gap of about 15 years, he made an application for his appointment on compassionate grounds on regular basis. Thereafter, wife of the deceased employee, sought for appointment for her son and while claiming so, she also requested cancellation of the respondent's appointment. As her request was rejected, she filed a writ petition, which was dismissed. One of the reasons assigned for dismissal of the writ petition filed by the wife was that at the time of death of the deceased employee, her son was aged one and half years old and that the application was submitted only after attaining majority i.e. after 18 years and therefore, no appointment can be given to the employee's son on compassionate ground. Letters patent appeal was also dismissed by the Hon'ble Division Bench. There were other issues of making a false claim by the grandson. Suo-motu contempt notice was issued. On the above facts and considering the policy of the Government, at Paragraphs 21 and 22, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held as follows: “21. The appointment on compassionate ground, thus, could have been offered only to a person who was the widow of the deceased or a dependent child. Suo-motu contempt notice was issued. On the above facts and considering the policy of the Government, at Paragraphs 21 and 22, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held as follows: “21. The appointment on compassionate ground, thus, could have been offered only to a person who was the widow of the deceased or a dependent child. Admittedly, the son of the deceased Ashutosh Kumar was only one year old at the time of his father's death. He could not, thus, have been given any appointment on compassionate ground. It may be true that Smt. Vidhya Devi filed an application for grant of appointment on compassionate ground in favour of the respondent. But, it now stands admitted that he was not the natural grandson of late Shri B.P. Sinha but was a grandson of his cousin brother. Therefore, he was not entitled for appointment in terms of the scheme of the Institute. The Institute, therefore, committed an illegality in granting him such an appointment. Moreover the purported the appointment on compassionate ground had been given in 2001, i.e., after more than 15 years from the date of death of the said Shri B.P. Sinha. 22. If the appointment of the respondent was wholly illegal and without jurisdiction and such an appointment had been obtained by practising fraud upon the appellant, the same was a nullity. We are, however, not oblivious of the fact that the same attained finality in view of the fact that the writ petition of the said Vidhya Devi was dismissed. Despite the same, the principles of res judicata shall not apply in a case of this nature. It is well known that where an order is passed by an authority which lacks inherent jurisdiction, the principles of res judicata would not apply, the same being nullity. [See Chief Justice of A.P., v. L.V.A.Dixitulu, 1979 (2) SCC 34 and Union of India v. Pramod Gupta (D) by LRs. and Ors., (2005) 12 SCC 1]” 12. Upon perusal of the documents relied on by learned counsel for the respondent, it could be seen that Exhibit-P5 dated 15.01.1994 addressed to the respondent, Bharat Earth Movers Ltd., only state that they would try to consider his candidature. and Ors., (2005) 12 SCC 1]” 12. Upon perusal of the documents relied on by learned counsel for the respondent, it could be seen that Exhibit-P5 dated 15.01.1994 addressed to the respondent, Bharat Earth Movers Ltd., only state that they would try to consider his candidature. Exhibit-P6 letter dated 18.7.1995 is stated to have been sent by V.S.Vijayaraghavan, Member of Parliament (Lok Sabha), New Delhi to the then Hon'ble Minister for Industry, Government of India, New Delhi for which, a reply dated 31.7.1995 (Exhibit-P7) has been given. Exhibit.P7 is extracted hereunder: “31st July, 1995. Dear Shri Vijayaraghavan, I am in receipt of your D.O. Letter dated the 18th July, 1995 regarding the request of Shri K.M. Pradeep Varma for a suitable job in M/s. Bharat Earth Movers Limited, Bangalore on compassionate grounds. I am having the matter examined. With regards, Yours sincerely, Sd/- (K.Karunakaran) Shri V.S.Vijayaraghavan, Member of Parliament, B-101, M.s.Flats, Baba Kharak Singh Marg, New Delhi -110 001.” 13. Reading of the said letter does not indicate that there was any offer made by the appellants. Exhibit-P8 letter dated 8.3.1996 issued by the Hon'ble Minister of State for Defence Production & Supplies India to Mr. V.S.Vijayaraghavan, Member of Parliament (Lok Sabha), New Delhi, forwarded to the respondent is extracted hereunder: 8th March, 1996 Dear Shri Vijay Raghvanji, Please refer to your letter dated 18.7.95 addressed to Shri K. Karunakaran, Minister of Industry forwarding an application of Shri K.M. Pradeep Varma for a suitable job in Bharati Earth Movers Limited (BEML) on compassionate ground. I have had the matter looked into and found BEML have introduced Voluntary Retirement that Scheme since 1992 to reduce its excess man power. Hence, it would not be possible for the company to accommodate him, as there is no suitable vacancy as per his qualifications. However, as a policy, as and when, a vacancy does arise, the same is notified to the employment exchange and merit being equal, preference is given to compassionate employment. The candidate may apply against such vacancies. You may like to advise Shri Varma accordingly. With regards, Yours sincerely, Sd/- (SURESH PACHOURI) Shri V.S. Vijay Raghavan, Member of Parliament (LS), B-101, B.K.S. Marg, NEW DELHI.” 14. The candidate may apply against such vacancies. You may like to advise Shri Varma accordingly. With regards, Yours sincerely, Sd/- (SURESH PACHOURI) Shri V.S. Vijay Raghavan, Member of Parliament (LS), B-101, B.K.S. Marg, NEW DELHI.” 14. Reading of the above, shows that BEML Limited has introduced Voluntary Retirement Scheme, since 1992, to reduce its excess man power and, therefore, it would not be possible for the Company to accommodate the respondent as there is no suitable vacancy as per his qualifications. The letter further shows that as per the policy, whenever a vacancy arises, the same would be notified to the employment exchange and merit being equal, preference be given to compassionate appointment. Letter also discloses that the Hon'ble Minister of State for Defence Production and Supplies, India, has stated that candidate may apply against such vacancies. Here again, it is clear that there was no scheme for providing employment assistance on compassionate grounds to the candidate and he/she has to apply against the vacancies and preference is given to a candidate, who seeks appointment on compassionate grounds. 15. Exhibit-P9 letter dated 27.4.2007 sent by Bharat Earth Movers Limited, Bangalore to the respondent is stated to be on the basis of an application for a suitable job. 16. Responding to the above, appellants have requested the respondent to attend for an interview/meeting on 4th May, 2007, to examine his case for a suitable job on compassionate appointment. Similarly, in 2011, BEML, Bangalore, has sent a letter to the respondent to produce certain documents for verification. Though Smt.Sherly Thomas, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that there was an offer for employment and that is why he was asked to produce the documents in original, in the absence of any material document produced before this Court as to the existence of any scheme for providing employment assistance on compassionate grounds, the said contention cannot be accepted, treating the same as an offer and thus, the appellants were estopped. 17. Promise made should be unequivocal. Reading of the letters stated supra, does not indicate that there was any specific promise made by the appellants to provide job assistance. 18. In the instant case, it is the contention of learned counsel for the respondent that application submitted by the respondent was not rejected and, therefore, the judgment in A.Anitha Viji (supra) is not applicable. Reading of the letters stated supra, does not indicate that there was any specific promise made by the appellants to provide job assistance. 18. In the instant case, it is the contention of learned counsel for the respondent that application submitted by the respondent was not rejected and, therefore, the judgment in A.Anitha Viji (supra) is not applicable. We are not inclined to accept that submission for the reason that the scheme of employment assistance on compassionate grounds is to tide over the financial constraints of a family in indigent circumstances owing to sudden demise of earning member in the family. Here, though the respondent is stated to have been continuously corresponding with the appellants, for which replies were given, respondent has approached this Court after 31 years from the date of death of his father. Even taking it for granted that there is scheme for compassionate appointment, on the aspect as to whether a belated claim of compassionate appointment can be entertained by courts, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in State of Himachal Pradesh and Another v. Shashi Kumar reported in [ (2019) 3 SCC 653 ] held thus: “5. The Writ Petition before the High Court was instituted on 11 May 2015, well over seven years thereafter. The respondent has averred that he had made representations, but to no avail, as a result of which he was eventually compelled to initiate proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court. The High Court consolidated a batch of cases, both Letters Patent Appeals and Writ Petitions for hearing. They emanated from a Policy dated 18 January 1990 framed by the State Government for providing employment assistance on compassionate grounds to dependants of government servants who have died in harness, leaving a family in need of assistance. The High Court, during the course of the judgment, framed as many as nine issues which were in the following terms: "(i) Whether the amount of family pension and other retiral benefits, received by the family of the deceased -employee, can be included in the family income for denying the compassionate appointment? The High Court, during the course of the judgment, framed as many as nine issues which were in the following terms: "(i) Whether the amount of family pension and other retiral benefits, received by the family of the deceased -employee, can be included in the family income for denying the compassionate appointment? (ii) Which date would be relevant for applicability of the Policy whether the date of death of the employee or the date when the application was presented, for the first time, for seeking employment on compassionate ground or the date on which the application came up for consideration before the Authorities, and whether a claim for compassionate appointment can be decided on the basis of subsequent amendment, when the application was presented prior to such amendment? (iii) If an applicant was in lis and his case was directed to be reconsidered, whether the claim of such applicant is to be determined as per the policy which was existing at the time of passing the order or as per the policy which was in place at the time of staking claim for the first time or as per the policy existing at the time of consideration? (iv) Whether the applicant can claim appointment on compassionate ground against a higher cadre, once he had been appointed in the lower cadre? (v) In case a person is appointed on contract basis, whether he is within his rights to seek appointment on regular basis? (vi) In a given set of cases, in one case the appointment on compassionate ground has been offered against a Class -III post and in other case, the appointment has been offered to a Class -IV post, whether it amounts to discrimination? (vii) Whether a person can claim compassionate appointment after a considerable delay? (viii) Whether requisite qualification or age can be relaxed? (ix) In case one or more dependants of a deceased -employee is / are in service, though living separately, whether that can be made a ground to deny compassionate appointment to the other dependant of the deceased -employee?" 16. Another aspect of the Policy which requires mention is the fixation of income slabs. On 1 November 2008, as noticed by the High Court, the Secretary, Public Works Department, addressed a communication to the Engineer -in Chief adverting to a letter dated 29 September 2008 of the Finance Department, bearing No. PBW A -B(2) -34/2006. Another aspect of the Policy which requires mention is the fixation of income slabs. On 1 November 2008, as noticed by the High Court, the Secretary, Public Works Department, addressed a communication to the Engineer -in Chief adverting to a letter dated 29 September 2008 of the Finance Department, bearing No. PBW A -B(2) -34/2006. The income criteria which was prescribed by the Finance Department was in the following terms: "The Income Criteria fixed by the Finance Department takes into consideration maximum family income ceiling fixed by the finance Deptt. for a family for 4 members as Rs. 1.00 lac and for smaller families, the internal criteria is Rs. 25,000/-per person, per annum. Thus, if there is only one dependent, the overall income limit to be considered is Rs. 25,000/-per annum. In case, there are two dependents of the deceased, the income of the applicant should not exceed Rs. 50,000/-per annum. In case of three dependents, the overall income should not exceed Rs. 75,000/-per annum. The overall income limit is Rs. 1.00 lac per annum, even if family size is more than four. Gratuity, leave encashment, commutation amount are excluded for purpose of calculating family income but monthly pension / family pension, Dearness Relief, Interim Relief is included for calculation of yearly family income." 18. The High Court while dealing with the first issue which it framed for decision, held that the State is not entitled to take into account family pension and other terminal benefits in determining whether compassionate appointment should be granted to the dependant of a deceased employee. 20. Assailing the view which has been taken by the High Court, Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel urged that the terms of the Policy dated 18 January 1990 envisage the grant of employment assistance to dependants of government servants, where an employee of the State has died while in service, leaving the family in indigent circumstances. The submission is that the genesis of compassionate appointment is that assistance should be rendered to the family of an employee who dies in harness in a case where the family is in immediate need of subsistence and is otherwise left in indigent circumstances. The submission is that the genesis of compassionate appointment is that assistance should be rendered to the family of an employee who dies in harness in a case where the family is in immediate need of subsistence and is otherwise left in indigent circumstances. Learned senior counsel submitted that a consistent line of authority of this Court establishes the principle that there is no right to compassionate appointment, but only an entitlement to be considered in accordance with the prevailing scheme or the rules framed by the employer, where such a scheme exists. In the present case, it was urged that the Policy, as subsequently amended, categorically requires that whether the family is in indigent circumstances has to be determined by taking into account the assets left behind by the deceased, the income from various sources including pension and the nature of the liabilities including the number of dependants. Hence, when terms of the Policy require that pensionary benefits should be accounted for, it was urged that the High Court was not justified in issuing a direction to ignore the Policy. At the same time, it has been submitted that the State does not take into account gratuity, leave encashment and commutation. However, monthly pension, family pension, dearness relief and interim relief are taken into consideration. The rationale for excluding one time payments is that, in the considered view of the State, these do not enure to the benefit of the family over a period of time. Be that as it may, it has also been urged that the decision of the Finance Department to prescribe an income ceiling or slab cannot be faulted. Learned senior counsel submitted that the prescription of an income slab subserves a fair assessment of individual applications. It reduces the element of discretion and obviates a case by case analysis of what should or should not be an income criterion for deciding the indigent circumstances of a family. Finally, it was urged, on the facts of the present case, that the application which was submitted by the respondent in 2007 was dealt with by requiring the inclusion of the pension which the family was receiving in the statement of income. Finally, it was urged, on the facts of the present case, that the application which was submitted by the respondent in 2007 was dealt with by requiring the inclusion of the pension which the family was receiving in the statement of income. Upon the letter dated 15 January 2008 of the Additional Secretary, the Writ Petition was filed on 11 May 2015, well over seven years thereafter and nearly ten years after the death of the deceased employee. Hence, it was submitted that the ultimate direction issued by the High Court for consideration of the application is manifestly misconceived. The purpose of compassionate appointment is to enable the family of a deceased employee to tide over an immediate crisis caused by the death of the employee. Hence, delay of this nature, in any event, should result in the rejection of the application as well as the Writ Petition. 21. On the other hand, it has been submitted on behalf of the respondent that the issue of delay ought not to come in the way of the application for compassionate appointment being considered, having regard to the fact that Paragraph 8 of the Policy contemplates that where none of the children of the deceased employee had attained the age of majority, the time limit for the submission of an application is extended till the attainment of the age of twenty one years by the eldest child. Though the respondent was not a minor on the date of the death of the deceased employee, it was urged, by analogy of reasoning, that delay, by itself, ought not to result in the rejection of the application, particularly since the upper age of recruitment in the State has been extended to forty five years. On the aspect of the inclusion of family pension, reliance was placed on the decision of the High Court, which in turn is based on certain judgments of this Court. Finally, on the income slab, it has been submitted that apart from the considerations which have weighed with the High Court, it was not open to the Finance Department to amend the Policy. Moreover, there is no basis for the income limit of Rs.1,00,000/-, which was prescribed by the Finance Department on 29 September 2008 as enhanced to Rs.1,50,000/-. Finally, on the income slab, it has been submitted that apart from the considerations which have weighed with the High Court, it was not open to the Finance Department to amend the Policy. Moreover, there is no basis for the income limit of Rs.1,00,000/-, which was prescribed by the Finance Department on 29 September 2008 as enhanced to Rs.1,50,000/-. It was urged that as a result of the prescription of an unduly low income limit, the benefit of compassionate appointment will be denied to families which are indigent and are in need of employment. 22. While considering the rival submissions, it is necessary to bear in mind that compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule that appointment to any public post in the service of the State has to be made on the basis of principles which accord with Art.14 and Art.16 of the Constitution. Dependants of a deceased employee of the State are made eligible by virtue of the Policy on compassionate appointment. The basis of the policy is that it recognizes that a family of a deceased employee may be placed in a position of financial hardship upon the untimely death of the employee while in service. It is the immediacy of the need which furnishes the basis for the State to allow the benefit of compassionate appointment. Where the authority finds that the financial and other circumstances of the family are such that in the absence of immediate assistance, it would be reduced to being indigent, an application from a dependant member of the family could be considered. The terms on which such applications would be considered are subject to the policy which is framed by the State and must fulfill the terms of the Policy. In that sense, it is a well settled principle of law that there is no right to compassionate appointment. But, where there is a policy, a dependant member of the family of a deceased employee is entitled to apply for compassionate appointment and to seek consideration of the application in accordance with the terms and conditions which are prescribed by the State. 40. But, where there is a policy, a dependant member of the family of a deceased employee is entitled to apply for compassionate appointment and to seek consideration of the application in accordance with the terms and conditions which are prescribed by the State. 40. For these reasons, we have come to the conclusion that the High Court was not justified, based on the decision in Govind Prakash Verma (supra) in issuing a direction to the State to act in a manner contrary to the express terms of the Scheme which require that the family pension received by the dependants of the deceased employee be taken into account. 41. That leads the Court to the next aspect of the matter relating to the fixation of an income slab. In our view, the fixation of an income slab is, in fact, a measure which dilutes the element of arbitrariness. While, undoubtedly, the facts of each individual case have to be borne in mind in taking a decision, the fixation of an income slab subserves the purpose of bringing objectivity and uniformity in the process of decision making. The High Court was of the view that it was not open to the Finance Department to amend the Scheme. The circulars which are issued by the Finance Department cannot be construed to be an amendment of the policy. They are really clarificatory of the intent and purpose of the Scheme. The circulars are explanatory, since they are intended to guide the decision maker on the concept of indigency which is incorporated in the Scheme. In fact, as we have noted earlier, in the decision of this court in Shashank Goswami (supra), the Court was specifically dealing with a circular of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India which had imposed income limits respectively for Group 'B', 'C' and 'D' posts for the purpose of guiding the decision in the case of compassionate appointment. The fixation of income limits was not construed to be and is not an arbitrary exercise of power. However, what we find from the record of this case is that the income limit was fixed (as the High Court observed) on 29 September 2008 by the letter of the Finance Department. The income limit of Rs.1,00,000/-for a family of four persons has since been revised to Rs.1,50,000/-on 20 April 2011. Mr. However, what we find from the record of this case is that the income limit was fixed (as the High Court observed) on 29 September 2008 by the letter of the Finance Department. The income limit of Rs.1,00,000/-for a family of four persons has since been revised to Rs.1,50,000/-on 20 April 2011. Mr. P.S. Patwalia has, on instructions, stated before this Court that this ceiling has been reiterated on 27 July 2017. What should be the appropriate income criterion is undoubtedly a matter of policy for the State Government to determine. However, we would impress upon the State Government the need to periodically revise the income limits preferably at intervals of three years. Inflation and the increase in the cost of living have an important bearing on financial exigencies faced by families of serving as well as deceased employees. In fixing the income criteria for considering cases of compassionate appointment, it would be appropriate if the State revisits the income limit at periodic intervals, as we have indicated above. We clarify that it would be open to the State to revise the income limits at a frequency of less than three years, if the State is so advised.” 19. In an unreported judgment in Government of India and Another v. P.Venkatesh (Civil Appeal No.2425 of 2019 dated 1.3.2019), the Hon'ble Supreme Court declined to entertain the writ petition. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under: “The primary difficulty in accepting the line of submissions, which weighed with the High Court, and were reiterated on behalf of the respondent in these proceedings, is simply this: Compassionate appointment, it is well-settled, is intended to enable the family of a deceased employee to tide over the crisis which is caused as a result of the death of an employee, while in harness. The essence of the claim lies in the immediacy of the need. If the facts of the present case are seen, it is evident that even the first recourse to the Central Administrative Tribunal was in 2007, nearly eleven years after the death of the employee. In the meantime, the first set of representations had been rejected on 3 January 1997. The Tribunal, unfortunately, passed a succession of orders calling upon the appellants to consider and then re-consider the representations for compassionate appointment. In the meantime, the first set of representations had been rejected on 3 January 1997. The Tribunal, unfortunately, passed a succession of orders calling upon the appellants to consider and then re-consider the representations for compassionate appointment. After the Union Ministry of Information and Broadcasting rejected the representation on 13 November 2007, it was only in 2010 that the Tribunal was moved again, with the same result. These successive orders of Tribunal for re-consideration of the representation cannot obliterate the effect of the initial delay in moving the Tribunal for compassionate appointment over a decade after the death of the deceased employee. This ‘dispose of the representation’ mantra is increasingly permeating the judicial process in the High Courts and the Tribunals. Such orders may make for a quick or easy disposal of cases in overburdened adjudicatory institutions. But, they do no service to the cause of justice. The litigant is back again before the Court, as this case shows, having incurred attendant costs and suffered delays of the legal process. This would have been obviated by calling for a counter in the first instance, thereby resulting in finality to the dispute. By the time, the High Court issued its direction on 9 August 2016, nearly twenty one years had elapsed since the date of the death of the employee.” 20. Even assuming that the appellants were sending letters directing the submission of documents, that would not clothe any indefeasible right to the respondent to seek for appointment on compassionate grounds. Mere sending of repeated representations would not condone the delay in approaching the court. 21. Apart from the specific cases on the delay in the matter of compassionate appointments, let us consider a few decisions on reasonable time, laches and delay. “(i) In Veerayeeammal v. Seeniammal reported in 2002 (1) SCC 134 , at Paragraph 13, is as follows: "13. The word “reasonable” has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the person concerned is called upon to act reasonably knows or ought to know as to what was reasonable. It may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. The reason varies in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thinks. It may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. The reason varies in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thinks. The dictionary meaning of the “reasonable time” is to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. In other words it means, as soon as circumstances permit. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s The Law Lexicon it is defined to mean: “A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than ‘directly’; such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea.” (ii) In State of M.P., v.Bhailal Bhai reported in AIR 1964 SC 1006 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that unreasonable delay denies to the petitioner, the discretionary extraordinary remedy of mandamus, certiorari or other relief. (iii) In State of M.P., v. Nandlal Jaismal reported in 1986 (4) SCC 566 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraph 24, held as follows: “24. Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. We do not think it necessary to burden this judgment with reference to various decisions of this Court where it has been emphasised time and again that where there is inordinate and unexplained delay and third party rights are created in the intervening period, the High Court would decline to interfere, even if the State action complained of is unconstitutional or illegal. .........Of course, this rule of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a strait jacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and creation of third party rights the High Court may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the petitioner. But, such cases where the demand of justice is so compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay or creation of third party rights would by their very nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would be a matter within the discretion of the court; ex hypothesi every discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it." (iv) In State of Maharastra v. Digambar reported in AIR 1995 SC 1991 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, considered a case, where compensation for the acquired land was claimed belatedly and at Paragraphs 12, 18 and 21, held as follows: "12. How a person who alleges against the State of deprivation of his legal right, can get relief of compensation from the State invoking writ jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution even though, he is guilty of laches or undue delay is difficult to comprehend, when it is well settled by decision of this Court that no person, be he a citizen or otherwise, is entitled to obtain the equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution if his conduct is blame-worthy because of laches, undue delay, acquiescence, waiver and the like. Moreover, how a citizen claiming discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution against a State, could be relieved of his obligation to establish his unblameworthy conduct for getting such relief, where the State against which relief is sought is a welfare State, is also difficult to comprehend. Where the relief sought under Article 226 of the Constitution by a person against the welfare State is founded on its alleged illegal or wrongful executive action, the need to explain laches or undue delay on his part to obtain such relief, should, if anything, be more stringent than in other cases, for the reason that the State due to laches or undue delay on the part of the person seeking relief, may not be able to show that the executive action complained of was legal or correct for want of records pertaining to the action or for the officers who were responsible for such action not being available later on. Further, where granting of relief is claimed against the State on alleged unwarranted executive action, is bound to result in loss to the public exchequer of the State or in damage to other public interest, the High Court before granting such relief is required to satisfy itself that the delay or laches on the part of a citizen or any other person in approaching for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution on the alleged violation of his legal right, was wholly justified in the facts and circumstances, instead of ignoring the same or leniently considering it. Thus, in our view, persons seeking relief against the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, be they citizens or otherwise, cannot get discretionary relief obtainable thereunder unless they fully satisfy the High Court that the facts and circumstances of the case clearly justified the laches or undue delay on their part in approaching the Court for grant of such discretionary relief. Therefore, where a High Court grants relief to a citizen or any other person under Article 226 of the Constitution against any person including the State without considering his blame-worthy conduct, such as laches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver, the relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the relief was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by the State. 18. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person in approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, long ago, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong (1874) 5 PC 221) thus: "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy." 21. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy." 21. Therefore, where a High Court in exercise of its power vested under Article 226 of the Constitution issues a direction, order or writ for granting relief to a person including a citizen without considering his disentitlement of such relief due to his blameworthy conduct of undue delay or laches in claiming the same, such a direction, order or writ becomes unsustainable as that not made judiciously and reasonably in exercise of its sound judicial discretion, but as that made arbitrarily." (v) In State of Rajasthan v. D.R.Laxmi reported in 1996 (6) SCC 445 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that though the order may be void, if the party does not approach the Court within a reasonable time, which is always a question of fact and have the order invalidated or acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. (vi) In Chairman, U.P.Jal Nigam and another v. Jaswant Singh reported in AIR 2007 SC 924 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after considering a catena of decisions, on the aspect of delay, at Paragraph 13, held as follows: “13........Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or while away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the Court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted." (vii) In S.S.Balu v. State of Kerala reported in 2009 (2) SCC 479 , at Paragraph 17, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "17. It is also well-settled principle of law that “delay defeats equity”. The Government Order was issued on 15-1-2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal thereagainst, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is also well-settled principle of law that “delay defeats equity”. The Government Order was issued on 15-1-2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal thereagainst, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage. In N DM C v . P a n Si n g h this Court held: (SCC p. 283, para 16) “16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction.” (viii) In K.V.Rajalakshmiah Setty and others v. State of Mysore and others reported in A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 993, the Hon'ble Apex Court, on the facts and circumstances of the said case, held that, "There is also a good deal of force behind the 'contention that the appellants are guilty of laches. After the passing of the order of May 17, 1950, they should have made an application within a reasonable time thereafter. After the passing of the order of May 17, 1950, they should have made an application within a reasonable time thereafter. Merely because the Chief Engineer had espoused their cause and was writing letters from time to time to the State Government to do something for them did not mean; that they could rest upon their oars if they were really being discriminated against. As we cannot hold that the appellants were entitled to any particular indulgence or concession, the only way, of meting out equality to all surveyors who had been promoted to the cadre of Assistant Engineers 13 would be to say that promotions, should in all cases be effective from the date of the notification." (ix) In Gian Singh v. the State of Punjab and Haryana, reported in AIR 1980 SC 1894 , the Hon'ble Apex Court, held as follows:- "The writ petition was filed in this Court in 1978, about eleven years after the dates from which the promotions are claimed. There is no valid explanation for the delay. That the petitioner was making successive representations during this period can hardly justify our overlooking the inordinate delay." (x) In Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd vs. K.Thangappan and Another reported in 2006 (4) SCC 322, the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph Nos.6 to 10 held thus:- "6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports ( AIR 1970 SC 769 ). Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd etc. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd etc. (1874 (5) P.C. 221 at page 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd., v. Industrial Courts ( AIR 1967 SC 1450 ) and Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service ( AIR 1969 SC 329 ). Sir Barnes had stated: "Now, the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy." 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation with Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that Article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in R.N.Bose v. Union of India ( AIR 1970 SC 470 ) that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that Article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in R.N.Bose v. Union of India ( AIR 1970 SC 470 ) that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal ( AIR 1987 SC 251 ), that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. 10. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K.V. Raja Lakshmiah v. State of Mysore ( AIR 1967 SC 973 ). This was re-iterated in R.N. Bose's case (supra) by stating that there is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government had turned down one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. This was re-iterated in R.N. Bose's case (supra) by stating that there is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government had turned down one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. (xi) In State of Orissa v. P.Samantraj (AIR 1976 SC 1617) making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay alone. (See State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar ( AIR 1976 SC 1639 also)." 15. In State Of Orissa and Another vs Mamata Mohanty, reported in 2011 3 SCC 436 at paragraph No.53, the Hon'ble Apex Court held thus:- "53. Needless to say that Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply in writ jurisdiction. However, the doctrine of limitation being based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ petitions are dismissed at initial stage on the ground of delay and laches. In a case like at hand, getting a particular pay scale may give rise to a recurring cause of action. In such an eventuality, the petition may be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and the court may refuse to grant relief for the initial period in case of an unexplained and inordinate delay." In the light of the above discussion and decisions, judgment made in W.P.(C) No.2706 of 2012 requires interference. Accordingly, the judgment is set aside. Writ appeal is allowed.