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2019 DIGILAW 921 (KAR)

H. Haleshappa Son of Hanumanthappa v. State of Karnataka Represented By Its Principal Secretary

2019-04-22

RAVI MALIMATH, S.G.PANDIT

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JUDGMENT : 1. Aggrieved by the impugned order dated 17.07.2015 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.56832 of 2014, by which the petition was rejected, writ petitioner is in appeal. 2. The petitioner filed writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 11.01.2013 passed by the learned Principal Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) and CJM, Shivamogga in LA Misc. No.10 of 2006 and for a direction to dispose of the petition filed by the petitioner under Section 18(3)(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in Misc. No.10 of 2006 on merits, in accordance with law. 3. It is stated that the land bearing Sy.No.59 of Gopala village, Kasaba Hobli, Shivamogga Taluk, measuring 3 acres 20 guntas was the joint family property of petitioner and his elder brother H.Nagendrappa. His elder brother H.Nagendrappa was looking after the affairs of the joint family. The second respondent acquired the land for formation of Housing scheme under preliminary notification dated 28.08.1992 issued under Section 17(1) of the Karnataka Urban Development Act, 1987 (for short ‘1987 Act’) and final notification under Section 19(1) of the 1987 Act on 30.07.1994. Award was passed by the second respondent on 22.08.1994, notice was issued on 10.10.1994. It is stated that the notice was served on the son of the petitioner’s brother who was a minor. However, the brother of the petitioner accepted the award amount on 07.05.1999. It is asserted that after receipt of the award amount, the brother of the petitioner filed an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ‘1894 Act’) seeking reference to the Competent Civil Court to determine the market value. It is stated that in spite of repeated requests, the authorities failed to make reference. In the meanwhile there was a suit instituted for partition which was settled and decree was passed on 24.09.2005. Thereafter the petitioner filed petition under Section 18(3)(b) of 1894 Act in Misc. No.10 of 2006. The said petition came to be rejected by the learned Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) Shivamogga by order dated 02.01.2013 on the ground that the petition filed under Section 18(3)(b) of 1894 Act is barred by time. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed instant writ petition. No.10 of 2006. The said petition came to be rejected by the learned Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) Shivamogga by order dated 02.01.2013 on the ground that the petition filed under Section 18(3)(b) of 1894 Act is barred by time. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed instant writ petition. The learned Single Judge was of the view that the Civil Court was fully justified in rejecting the petition filed under Section 18(3)(b) of the 1894 Act as the same was filed beyond the prescribed period. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner is in appeal. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and learned Government Advocate. Perused the appeal papers. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the learned Single Judge committed an error in rejecting the writ petition which was required to be allowed. It is contended that before the learned Civil Judge, the ground of limitation was not pleaded and the ground urged was that the miscellaneous petition is filed after receiving the award amount. More over, learned counsel submits that the second respondent who filed I.A.No.1 has not made his submission. The Civil Court failed to appreciate the fact that the award passed is not a consent award. Hence, prays for allowing the appeal. 6. Per contra, learned Government advocate would support the order of the learned Single Judge and submits that the learned Civil Judge rightly dismissed the Miscellaneous petition filed Under Section 18(3)(b) of the 1894 Act as barred by time. It is his submission that the learned Single Judge was right in rejecting the writ petition. Hence prays for dismissal of the appeal. 7. On hearing the learned counsels for the parties and on going through the appeal papers, we are of the view that there is no merit in the appeal. Admittedly, lands of the petitioner were acquired under the preliminary notification dated 28.08.1992 issued under Section 17(1) of the 1987 Act and Final Notification dated 30.07.1994 issued under Section 19(1) of the 1987 Act. Award was passed on 22.08.1994 and notice of award was issued on 10.10.1994. The brother of the petitioner who was the power of attorney holder for the petitioner received the award amount of on 07.05.1999. Thereafter the brother of the petitioner made an application under Section 18 of the 1894 Act seeking reference to the Competent Civil Court to determine the market value. The brother of the petitioner who was the power of attorney holder for the petitioner received the award amount of on 07.05.1999. Thereafter the brother of the petitioner made an application under Section 18 of the 1894 Act seeking reference to the Competent Civil Court to determine the market value. There was no reference made by the authorities. Thereafter in the year 2006, the petitioner filed miscellaneous petition under Section 18(3)(b) of the 1894 Act. The miscellaneous petition under Section 18(3)(b) of 1894 Act will have to be made within 3 years 90 days from the date of application made under Section 18 seeking reference. In the instant case, the petitioner received the award amount on 07.05.1999 and petition averments would disclose that the application under Section 18 for reference was made on 15.09.1999. Petition under Section 18(3)(b) ought to have been made within 3 years 90 days either from 15.09.1999. 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case reported in (2005) 8 SCC 709 in the case of STATE OF KARNATAKA v/s LAXUMAN at paragraphs 8, 11, 12, 13, and 20 has held as under: “8. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "the Act") as amended by Act 68 of 1984 provided that a person interested in land acquired and who has not accepted the award of compensation by the Collector, could apply to the Collector for a reference of his claim within six weeks of the date of the award if he was present at the time of making of the award and within six weeks of the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) of the Act if he was not so present. In a case that may not be covered by either of the above situations, the claimant has to make his application within six months of the date of the award of the Collector. The State Legislature by an amendment brought to Section 18 of the Act substituted the proviso to Section 18(2) by replacing the period of six weeks by a period of 90 days and making the starting point, the date of service of notice from the Deputy Commissioner under Section 12(2) of the Act. The State Legislature by an amendment brought to Section 18 of the Act substituted the proviso to Section 18(2) by replacing the period of six weeks by a period of 90 days and making the starting point, the date of service of notice from the Deputy Commissioner under Section 12(2) of the Act. Subsection (3) was added directing that the Deputy Commissioner should make the reference to the court within a period of 90 days from the date of receipt of the application under subsection (1) of Section 18 of the Act. If he failed to do so within the period of 90 days, the party was given a right under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act to apply to the court to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference and the court was conferred the power to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within such period as may be fixed by the court. For the purpose of convenience it will be better to quote the section as amended in the State of Karnataka: "18. Reference To Court.(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award or amendment thereof, may by written application to the Deputy Commissioner require that the matter be referred by the Deputy Commissioner for determination of the court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. (2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made within ninety days from the date of service of the notice from the Deputy Commissioner under subsection (2) of Section 12. (3)(a) The Deputy Commissioner shall, within ninety days from the date of receipt of an application under subsection (1), make a reference to the court. (b) If the Deputy Commissioner does not make a reference to the court within a period of ninety days from the date of receipt of the application, the applicant may apply to the court to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference, and the court may direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within such time as the court may fix.” The court to which the application was to be made was the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. 11. 11. On a plain understanding of the scheme of Section 18 of the Act as amended in Karnataka, it is apparent that a claimant has to make an application for reference within a period of 90 days of the service of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act. The section casts a duty on the officer concerned to make a reference within 90 days of the receipt of the application for reference. The mere inaction on the part of the officer does not affect or straightaway extinguish, the right of the claimant-applicant. The claimant is conferred the right to approach the court but he has to do so, within three years of his having made an application for reference in view of the general law of limitation. It is in this context that it has been held that the time available to a claimant for approaching the court for getting a reference made, is in all, three years and 90 days from the date of the accrual of the cause of action. That accrual is when he makes an application for reference within the time prescribed by Section 18(2)of the Act. The controversy that is generated in these appeals is whether on the expiry of the said period of three years and 90 days, the right of the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference and that of the claimant to move the court, get extinguished. It is to be remembered that the claimant had made his application for reference within the 90 days prescribed by the statute. Should a construction be adopted which will lead to a position that a claimant who has done his part, loses his right on the failure of the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within 90 days of the receipt of the application for reference? That will depend on the statutory scheme. If we construe the provision as conferring on the litigant a further right to approach the court for getting the matter referred, in case a Deputy Commissioner fails to make a reference within 90 days of the receipt of the application, we have prima facie to say that on his failure to approach the court and get the reference made, he would lose his right to have a reference for enhancement of compensation. Obviously, the mischief that was sought to be averted by the Legislature was the causing of undue delay by Deputy Commissioners in making references and the making of highly belated references, sometimes based on applications clandestinely received long after the award itself had been made. If we keep this object in view, the conclusion possible is that, if a claimant does not get his claim referred to the court within three years of his making the application before the Deputy Commissioner within the period fixed and the accrual of a cause of action, his right to claim enhancement of compensation would get extinguished. In the context of Section 28A of the Act, there will be no irreparable prejudice caused to the claimant since he can always make a claim for more based on any enhancement of award by a court in any other reference arising out of the acquisition under the same notification. The difference may be only in the matter of interest and the like. 12. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended in Karnataka is self contained. The amendments substantially alter the position as obtaining under Section 18 of the Central Act. Under the Central Act, there is only an obligation on the claimant who is not satisfied with the award of compensation and receives it under protest, to make an application to the Collector for making a reference of his claim for enhancement to the Court and to ensure that his application is made within the time provided under sub-Section (2) of that Section. In other words, once an application has been made for making a reference for enhancement, no further right is conferred on him, except, may be that he can approach the High Court in its writ jurisdiction, seeking the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Collector to perform the duty imposed on him by Section 19 of the Act, by making an appropriate reference. Even in such a case, it is open to the High Court to decline to issue a writ as sought for by a claimant, when the approach to the High Court is unduly delayed or the petitioner is guilty of laches. 13. Even in such a case, it is open to the High Court to decline to issue a writ as sought for by a claimant, when the approach to the High Court is unduly delayed or the petitioner is guilty of laches. 13. Under the Karnataka scheme, the period for making an application for reference has been enhanced from six weeks to 90 days and the terminus a quo is the receipt of notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) of the Act. The Section proceeds further and imposes a duty on the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference to the Court within 90 days from the date of receipt of the application under Section 18(1) of the Act. Though it may not be conclusive what one has to notice is that expression used is "shall" and not "may". The scheme does contemplate a situation where the Deputy Commissioner, in spite of the peremptory nature of the duty cast on him, still fails to make the reference within the time stipulated by sub-Section 3(a) of Section 18. The claimant is, therefore, given the right to approach the Court, namely, the Court that is to deal with the claim on the reference being made, to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within a time limit to be fixed by the Court. This right to apply to the Court which is to deal with the reference, is not available under the Central Act. 14………………. 15………………. 16………………. 17………………. 18………………. 19………………. 20. Under the scheme of Section 18 of the Act as in Karnataka, thus the claimant loses his right to move the Court for reference on the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of his making an application to the Deputy Commissioner under Section 18 (1) of the Act within the period fixed by Section 18(2) of the Act. This position is now settled by the decision of this Court in The Addl. Special Land Acquisition Officer, vs. Thakoredas, Major and others (supra). This loss of right to move the court precludes him from seeking a remedy from the court in terms of Section 18 of the Act. This loss of right in the claimant puts an end to the right of the claimant to seek an enhancement of compensation. Special Land Acquisition Officer, vs. Thakoredas, Major and others (supra). This loss of right to move the court precludes him from seeking a remedy from the court in terms of Section 18 of the Act. This loss of right in the claimant puts an end to the right of the claimant to seek an enhancement of compensation. To say that the Deputy Commissioner can make a reference even after the right in that behalf is loss to the claimant, would be incongruous. Once the right of the claimant to enforce his claim itself is lost on the scheme of Section 18 of the Act, there is no question of the Deputy Commissioner who had violated the mandate of sub-Section 3(a) of Section 18 of the Act, reviving the right of the claimant by making a reference at his sweetwill and pleasure, whatever be the inducement or occasion for doing so. On a harmonious understanding of the scheme of the Act in the light of the general principle that even though a right may not be extinguished, the remedy may become barred, it would be appropriate to hold that on the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of an application for reference made within time under Section 18(1) of the Act, the remedy of the claimant to have a reference gets extinguished and the right to have an enhancement becomes unenforceable. The Deputy Commissioner would not be entitled to revive a claim which has thus become unenforceable due to lapse of time or nondiligence on the part of the claimant.” 9. From the principles laid down in the above decision of the Apex Court, it is clear that if the authorities fail to make reference within 90 days from the date of application, one shall file petition under Section 18(3)(b) of 1894 Act within three years from the date of expiry of 90 days. In the case on hand, admittedly, the petitioner has not filed the petition under section 18(3)(b) within the prescribed time. Hence, the learned Single Judge as well as the learned civil Judge are justified in rejecting the petition filed Section 18(3)(b) of 1894 Act. The order of the learned Single Judge is neither perverse nor erroneous so as to call for interference by this Court. No ground is made out to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The order of the learned Single Judge is neither perverse nor erroneous so as to call for interference by this Court. No ground is made out to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed. In view of dismissal of the appeal, I.A.No.1 of 2015 for condonation of delay does not survive and the same stands rejected.