JUDGMENT : Ravindra V. Ghuge, J. The common issue raised in these petitions is as to whether, a minor delay in filing the accounts of election expenses, could be condoned under Section 14B (1)(b) of the Village Panchayat Act, akin to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 2. In both these petitions, the petitioners are aggrieved by the orders passed by the District Collector, Aurangabad, dated 23/02/2016, by which, these petitioners have been disqualified for five years on account of having failed to submit their accounts of election expenses within 30 days from the date of the declaration of the election results. They are also aggrieved by the orders of the Divisional Commissioner rejecting their Appeals. By such common orders, 2006 candidates out of 2996, have been unseated and disqualified for five years, in nine talukas from the Aurangabad district. 3. The learned Advocates for the petitioners jointly submit that these petitioners are working at grass-root levels and are not conversant with the law of submission of accounts of election expenses. Both the petitioners, who are elected as Members of the Gram Panchayat, were unaware as regards the submission of election expenses. The first petitioner was elected in August 2015 and has submitted his accounts on the 33rd day, whereas, the petitioner in the second petition, who was elected unopposed, has submitted her accounts after gathering knowledge from the Talathi, on the 46th day from the date of her election. 4. Both the petitioners received notices from the District Collector, calling upon them to show cause as to why they should not be disqualified on account of failing to tender their accounts. The second petitioner submitted that she was ignorant of any such Rule and was not aware that she is required to file such accounts, though she was elected unopposed. It is further submitted that as both have been elected by the Rule of Majority, they should not be disqualified on account of a lapse, which was due to lack of awareness about any provision mandating submission of the accounts of election expenses. Nevertheless, the 1st petitioner claims that he had submitted his accounts within 30 days to the returning officer Shri Mamidwar, who neither confirms nor denies the same. 5. The learned AGP submits that Section 14B only speaks of submission of such accounts. It does not prescribe the period within which such expenses are to be submitted. Nevertheless, the 1st petitioner claims that he had submitted his accounts within 30 days to the returning officer Shri Mamidwar, who neither confirms nor denies the same. 5. The learned AGP submits that Section 14B only speaks of submission of such accounts. It does not prescribe the period within which such expenses are to be submitted. A Gazette dated 19/11/2010 was introduced, after Section 14B was brought into the effect by the amendment Act - Maharashtra XVI of 2010 on 06/05/2010, prescribing the period of 30 days for submission of accounts of election expenses, from the date of the election results. 6. Section 14B of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act reads as under:- "Disqualification by State Election Commission : (1) If the State Election Commission is satisfied that a person- (a) has failed to lodge an account of election expenses within the time and in the manner required by the State Election Commission, and (b) has no good reason or justification for such failure, the State Election Commission may, by an order published in the Official Gazette, declare him to be disqualified and such person shall be disqualified for being a member of Panchayat or for contesting an election for being a member for a period of five years from the date of this order. (2) The State Election Commission may, for reasons to be recorded, remove any disqualification under sub-section (1) or reduce the period of any such disqualification." 7. It is thus evident that though a candidate may have failed to lodge his accounts, the State Election Commission or any such authority authorized in this behalf by the Commissioner, can assess the reason put forth for explaining such delay. If the said authority or the Commission, as the case may be, is convinced of the reasons assigned, it could remove any such disqualification or reduce the period of such disqualification. 8. The issue as regards a 'no good reason or justification' for such failure, was considered by this Court in Savitribai w/o Kisan Shinde Vs. The Additional Divisional Commissioner, Aurangabad and others [Aurangabad Bench] Writ Petition No. 197/2018, dated 14/02/2018, and this Court has held that an opportunity, for explaining the reasons for delay, needs to be granted by the Collector and such explanation needs to be considered. 9. The Additional Divisional Commissioner, Aurangabad and others [Aurangabad Bench] Writ Petition No. 197/2018, dated 14/02/2018, and this Court has held that an opportunity, for explaining the reasons for delay, needs to be granted by the Collector and such explanation needs to be considered. 9. In Savitribai Shinde (supra), this Court held that the mere failure to submit the accounts would not ipso facto lead to a disqualification, if such a candidate tenders an explanation under Section 14B(1)(b). Such an explanation will have to be considered keeping in view the reasons assigned and the fact that such candidates are elected by the vote of the majority and they cannot be disqualified at the mere askance. 10. This Court has dealt with a similar case in the matter of Sahebrao Dashrathrao Patole Vs. State of Maharasthtra and others, (2010) 5 MhLJ 462 . In the said case, the petitioner had taken a stand that they had submitted their statement on plain papers within one month, to the returning officer. They had no knowledge and were not aware about tendering affidavits or the specific format which was prescribed. The State had taken a stand that an affidavit is necessary along with the said accounts. This Court concluded that a democratically elected counseller should not be disqualified casually and the explanation needs to be gone into by proper application of mind. The matters were remitted to the Additional Collector for reconsideration. A similar direction of remanding the matters for a re-hearing was issued in Vimalbai Sahebrao Gawai and others Vs. Divisional Commissioner Amravati and others, (2015) 5 MhLJ 723 . 11. The learned AGP submits that Section 14B has to be strictly applied. The accounts of election expenses along with all bills of expenditure and an affidavit, is now mandatory. He however concedes that in the instant cases, issue is of the delay of two days and sixteen days, respectively and the impugned orders have been passed purely on the ground of delay. 12. After perusing Section 14B, I called upon the Respondents to cite the provision which prescribes a particular period for submitting the accounts. All the respondents fumbled and were all at sea. They started searching for the relevant provision and finally the AGP could locate a Gazette dated 19/11/2010, which published a circular regarding the 30 days period. Nobody could cite the exact circular. 13. All the respondents fumbled and were all at sea. They started searching for the relevant provision and finally the AGP could locate a Gazette dated 19/11/2010, which published a circular regarding the 30 days period. Nobody could cite the exact circular. 13. Before signing this order, I noticed from the Judges' library that the State Election Commission issued an order on 07/02/1995 which was published in the State Gazette dated 10/02/1995, prescribing the 30 days period for submission of accounts of election expenses. The relevant portion of the said order reads as under :- "CONSTITUTION OF INDIA No. SEC. 13. Before signing this order, I noticed from the Judges' library that the State Election Commission issued an order on 07/02/1995 which was published in the State Gazette dated 10/02/1995, prescribing the 30 days period for submission of accounts of election expenses. The relevant portion of the said order reads as under :- "CONSTITUTION OF INDIA No. SEC. 1095/101/Desk-3.--Whereas the Superintendence, direction and control of all elections to the Panchayats and the Municipalities in the State are vested in the State Election Commission, Maharashtra in accordance with the provisions of Articles 243-K, and 243-ZA of the Constitution of India; And whereas as envisaged in the provisions made by the Constitution (Seventy-third) amendment Act, 1992 and the Constitution (Seventy-fourth) amendment Act, 1992 it is intended inter alia to ensure regular, timely and also free, fair and in efficient manner, all elections to the Panchayats and the Municipalities under the superintendence, direction and control of the State Election Commission ; And whereas the increasing role of money power in elections has a pernicious influence on society, resulting into malady which tends to reduce the process of election into a mere farce thereby placing some privileged candidates with financial resources in a distinctly advantageous position over the other candidates with meagre resources ; And whereas the provisions with regard to the elections to the Panchayats and the Municipalities made in the relevant State Acts under which the Panchayats and the Municipalities are constituted do not provide for any limit of expenditure to be incurred by a candidate at an election to a Panchayat or a Municipality ; And whereas it is necessary and expedient in the interest of purity of elections to a Panchayat or a Municipality and in the interest of conduct of such election in a free, fare and efficient manner, to provide for limit of expenditure to be incurred by a candidate at an election and for incidental provisions with regard to rendering of accounts of such expenditure at elections ; Now therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Articles 243-K and 243-ZA of the Constitution of India, read with sub-section (4) of section 18A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act (Bom.III of 1888), sub-section (4) of section 9B of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 (C.P. and Berar II of 1950), sub-section (4) of section 14 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (Bom.LIX of 1949), sub-section (4) of section 10A of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965, sub-section (4) of section 10A of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1958 (Bom.III of 1959),the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 (Mah. V of 1962) and of all other powers enabling me in this behalf, and in relation to holding of elections under these provisions by the State Election Commission, I.,D.N. Chaudhari, State Election Commissioner, Maharashtra hereby direct as follows :- 1. The limit of expenditure that may be incurred by a contesting candidate (either by himself or by his authorised election agent or any particular Party/Aghadi/Front or any other association, body or individual) in connection with the election to any of the Panchayats or the Municipalities shall-- (a) in the case of an election as a Councillor to a Municipal Corporation, be Rs. 40,000/-; (b) in the case of an election as a Councillor to a Municipal council, be Rs. 30,000/-; (c) in the case of an election as a Councillor to a Zilla Parishad, be Rs. 30,000/- ; (d) in the case of election as a member of a Panchayat Samiti, be Rs. 20,000/- ; and (e) in the case of election as a member of a Village Panchayat, be Rs. 5,000/- ; 2. ....... 3. ....... 4. ..... 5. ....... 6. the failure to submit day-to-day account, as required under paragraph 3 above, by the candidate shall be viewed seriously and treated as a major default on the part of such candidate. Further as a consequence of that default, the result of election of such candidates shall not be declared till such times as details of day-to-day expenditure upto the date of poll is submitted to the returning officer concerned and the expenditure is found to be within the limit of expenditure permissible in the case of such a candidate at such election. 7. The statement of accounts maintained in Annexure-I by the contesting candidate shall be submitted by him within thirty days of the declaration of the result, in the case of a contesting candidate as councillor of Municipal Corporation, to the Municipal Commissioner concerned and the Municipal Commissioner or an officer not below the rank of Deputy Municipal Commissioner authorised by the Municipal Commissioner in this behalf, shall give an acknowledgment for receipt of the statement. In any other case, such statement of accounts shall be submitted by the contesting candidate, within the period aforesaid, to the Collector of a District concerned and the Collector or an officer not below the rank of Deputy Collector authorised by the Collector in this behalf shall give acknowledgement for receipt of the statement. 8. The contesting candidate shall, while submitting the accounts, furnish together with the account, the following details of expenditure, if any incurred in respect thereof - (a) size of the advertisement released in the Newspaper and the amount paid for each such advertisement and the name and date of such newspaper. (b) Details of hoardings put up by them and of the writing on the walls, etc. and expenditure incurred on such items. (c) Number of vehicles used by them and details of such vehicles and the expenditure incurred in respect thereof including expenditure incurred on petrol, etc. 9. A voucher shall be obtained for every item of expenditure, unless from the nature of the case, such as postage, travel by rail and the like, it is not practicable to obtain a voucher. 10. The statement of account of expenditure in Annexure -I, submitted by the contesting candidate shall be accompanied by an affidavit on oath sworn in by him in the format in Annexure-III. The affidavit shall inter alia recite specifically that the expenditure against each item has been completely and unexceptionally included in the statement of accounts in Annexure-I and that no expenditure whatsoever has remained to be disclosed. 11. Any violation by the contesting candidate or his authorised agent or particular Party/Aghadi/Front or any association, body or individual to incur expenditure in excess of the limit mentioned above or failure to submit the accounts as indicated hereinabove will be viewed seriously by the State Election Commission and stringent action as may be available under the relevant law including action to institute criminal prosecution shall be taken against the defaulter." 14. By an order dated 21/04/1995, the State Election Commission modified its earlier directions as under :- "In partial modification to the directions contained in clause 7 of the Order No. SEC.1095/101/D-3, dated 7th February, 1995, the State Election Commission, Maharashtra hereby directs that in the case of general elections or by-elections to village Panchayats, the statement of account of expenditure incurred by contesting candidate shall be submitted, by him within 30 days from the date of declaration of results, to the officer not below the rank of Tahsildar as the collector may authorise in this behalf and such authorised officer shall give acknowledgement for receipt of the statement". 15. The State Election Commission then issued an order on 10/08/2015, prescribing that the contesting candidates should submit an undertaking to file their accounts of election expenses within 30 days. The relevant portion reads thus :- xxx 16. The learned Advocates for the petitioners submit that it is practically three and half years from the date of their elections and almost three years from the date of their disqualification, that they are before this Court. There tenures would conclude in August 2020 which is just about sixteen months from today. They, therefore, pray that these matters may not be remanded to the District Collector as it would commence a second round of tardy litigation and by the time justice is done, their tenures would have concluded, which would live up to the phrase "operation successful, but patient died". 17. In my view, such disqualification on account of failing to submit accounts within thirty days, cannot be compared with grounds of disqualification like having more than two children, not having a toilet, encroachment on government land, developing interest in the works of the Village Panchayat or acts disgraceful on the part of an elected representative. Though the message needs to go out loud and clear that accounts of election expenses have to be tendered in proper format, the explanation put forth needs to be considered since the disqualification would lead to the ousting of a democratically elected person and placing additional financial burden on the government for conducting fresh elections to the posts that have fallen vacant due to orders of disqualification under Section 14B. 18. 18. It is undisputed that hundreds of disqualification orders have been passed by the competent authorities on this count in this part of the State and this Court is flooded with such litigation. The learned AGP fairly states that in most of the cases, the authorities have simply checked whether, thirty days are over and have issued orders of disqualification as like in these cases, even if the delay is of a day or two days or a little more. 19. I find from the impugned order of the District Collector dated 23/02/2016 that it is a common order in 2996 cases of such village panchayat candidates from the nine talukas' of Aurangabad. Explanation of 900 candidates have been accepted and 2096, elected or defeated candidates, have been disqualified from contesting elections for a period of five years. 20. In Shakti Balkrishna Mhatre Vs. Returning Officer, Panchayat Vindhane and others, 2015 (5) AllMR 275, this Court considered the reason of the death of a close relative and concluded that the delay was not of such a magnitude to overturn the will of the majority and unseat an elected candidate. 21. In my view, Section 14B(1)(b) vests discretion in the authority of the District Collector or the Divisional Commissioner, akin to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, to consider as to whether the delay is of such magnitude that it cannot be condoned. While considering such period of delay, the underlying principle is of there being a sufficient cause or ground so as to accept the explanation for the delay. As such, in some cases the delay could be extremely minor as like in these two cases wherein the delay is of two days and sixteen days. In such cases, the Court cannot expect the litigant to explain each day's delay in view of the law laid down in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v/s. Katiji, (1987) AIR SC 1353 and Esha Bhatacharjee v/s Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 . In cases where a trivial reason is assigned and the delay is long, that the competent authority can rule that the reason is not satisfactory to condone the long delay. 22. In cases where a trivial reason is assigned and the delay is long, that the competent authority can rule that the reason is not satisfactory to condone the long delay. 22. In Collector, Land Acquisition (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court has held in paragraph 3 as under :- "The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice--that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides." 23. In the first petition before this Court, the delay is actually of two days. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides." 23. In the first petition before this Court, the delay is actually of two days. The explanation offered by the first petitioner, to the District Collector on 08/10/2015, in response to the show cause notice, was that the accounts of expenses were submitted to the returning officer, Gram Panchayat Nagapur Shri Mamidwar, within 30 days. However, the learned AGP submits that the result was declared on 06/08/2015 and the election expenses along with an affidavit dated 07/09/2015, were received by the concerned authority on 07/09/2015. Considering that the month of August has thirty one days, the delay caused is of two days in the disputed background of this petitioner contending that accounts were submitted to Mr. Mamidwar within 30 days. Even if it is presumed that Mr. Mamidwar has not given any acknowledgment to this petitioner, the fact remains that the delay is of only two days. 24. In my view, the said delay is not inordinate so as to conclude that the explanation given by the petitioner that he has submitted his expenses and had then submitted an affidavit in support thereof, belatedly by two days, would be sufficient to disqualify him. 25. In the second petition, the petitioner has put forth an explanation on 23/09/2015 which is on the 46th Day from the date of her election. The said explanation is addressed to the District Collector. It is plainly admitted by the said petitioner that she had no knowledge about the submission of accounts, especially by a candidate who has been declared elected unopposed and who did not spend on the campaigning of her candidature and canvassing for her election. 26. The learned Counsel for the second petitioner relies upon an observation made in the matter of Smt. Vaijayata Deepak Warke and others Vs. State Election Commission and others, (2016) 1 AllMR 829 , wherein this Court had noted that the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir has concluded in Kacho Mohd. Ali Khan Vs. Shri Kushok Bakula, Vol. XXXIV E.L.R. 323, that an unopposed candidate is not required to lodge any account of election expenses. State Election Commission and others, (2016) 1 AllMR 829 , wherein this Court had noted that the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir has concluded in Kacho Mohd. Ali Khan Vs. Shri Kushok Bakula, Vol. XXXIV E.L.R. 323, that an unopposed candidate is not required to lodge any account of election expenses. This court therefore granted interim protection to the said petitioners in the group of petitions and stayed their disqualification until final orders. By the said reported judgment dated 11/12/2015, this Court continued the interim relief and relegated the petitioners to the statutory remedy of approaching the Divisional Commissioner for challenging the orders of disqualification issued by the District Collector. 27. The learned AGP strongly contends that such an explanation that a candidate was not aware that the unopposed elected member has to tender accounts of expenses, would be an excuse available to all such elected persons. Though I find that the learned AGP is justified in making such submissions, such an explanation will have to be tested against the length of the delay. As held in Shakti Mhatre (supra), it will have to be assessed as to whether the delay was of such a magnitude so as to unseat an elected candidate. It also cannot be over-looked that even the Respondents herein were unable to cite the circular prescribing 30 days period, which is a pointer towards the fact that this provision has not been given enough publicity at the village and taluka levels. 28. The second petitioner has plainly and truthfully confessed before the Additional Collector that she was an illiterate person and had no knowledge about any government decision introducing the limitation of thirty days under Section 14B. She plainly admitted that she had no knowledge of the said provision and it was the Talathi, who made her aware that even an unopposed candidate has to submit accounts of expenses, that she promptly filed her accounts with such explanation to the concerned authority. 29. As noted above, the ground for disqualification on account of failure to submit such accounts cannot be compared with more serious grounds as noted above, which would warrant and justify the disqualification of a candidate in those cases of misappropriation and disgraceful conduct. However, in cases as like of the second petitioner, such an explanation has to be tested with reference to the length of the delay. 30. However, in cases as like of the second petitioner, such an explanation has to be tested with reference to the length of the delay. 30. As has been crystallized by the judgment delivered by the Honourable Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra), the issue in such matters is as to condone or not to condone the delay caused and whether or not to apply the same standard in applying the "sufficient cause" test to all the litigants regardless of their personality in the said contest. It is concluded by the Honourable Supreme Court that ordinarily no litigant would benefit by causing any delay in his matter. 31. As in this case, these Petitioners would not benefit in any way by delaying the filing of their accounts of election expenses. Refusing to condone minor delay, would result in not only ousting these Petitioners from their elected positions, but would result in disqualification them for a period of five years thereby, precluding them from contesting such elections. It, therefore, needs to be assessed as to whether, the length of the delay is such that such a petitioner could be made to suffer such a harsh consequence. As held by the Honourable Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra), the doctrine of explaining the delay must be applied in a "rational common sense pragmatic manner". When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice must be subserved. The judiciary is respected not on account of it's power to legalize injustice on technical ground, but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, the test of "sufficient cause" should be applied pragmatically taking into account all attending circumstances. 32. These words of wisdom sounded by the Honourable Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) have been reiterated in the subsequent judgment delivered in Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, (2013) 12 SCC 649 . It was held that substantial justice being paramount and pivotal, the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the concept of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. It was held that substantial justice being paramount and pivotal, the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the concept of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. There is always a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of a short duration or few days, for, to the former, the doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas, to the latter, it may not be attracted. Therefore, the case of inordinate delay would warrant a strict scrutiny and if the delay is very short or minor, would call for a liberal delineation. I find that these conclusions of the Honourable Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee (supra), would be squarely applicable to this case. 33. Both the petitioners submit that they have lost almost three years of their tenure in this litigation. Though new elections have been stayed, these persons have been kept away from their membership, have not participated in any meetings and are practically in suspended animation. They submit that they would not claim any allowances or benefits, if any, for the period for which they have been disqualified by the impugned orders, which would be a commensurate penalty to these candidates. Unseating and disqualifying them, for five years, alongwith 2094 candidates, en-masse, would be too harsh. 34. Taking an overall view of all these factors and after considering the explanation of both the petitioners, in the face of a minor delay of two and sixteen days, both the petitions are allowed. The impugned orders are quashed and set aside. 35. Both these petitioners shall stand reinstated as members of the village panchayat for the remainder term and would not be entitled for any benefits or allowances as members of the village panchayat from the date of their disqualification by the District Collector, till the date of this order.