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2019 DIGILAW 924 (JHR)

Ram Kumar Tiwari v. Hemant Sahu

2019-04-25

H.C.MISHRA

body2019
ORDER : 1. Heard learned counsel for the defendants petitioners and learned counsel for the plaintiffs opposite parties. 2. The defendants petitioners are aggrieved by the impugned Judgment and Decree dated 22.1.2013, passed by the learned 2nd Additional Munsif, Ranchi, in Eviction Suit No.17 of 2006, whereby the said suit was decreed, holding that there is landlord-tenant relationship between parties, the plaintiffs being the landlord of the suit property, and they required of the suit property for their own use and occupation, reasonably and in good faith, and directing the defendants petitioners to vacate the suit property and hand over the vacant possession thereof to the plaintiffs within 45 days of the date of Decree passed by the Court. Aggrieved by the impugned Judgment and Decree, the defendants have preferred this revision before this Court, in which, by order dated 12.08.2015, an ad-interim order was passed for maintaining the status-quo. 3. I.A. No.4308 of 2015 has been filed by the petitioners for staying the proceedings in the execution case, whereas I.A. No.5754 of 2016 has been filed by the opposite parties for vacating the ad-interim order dated12.08.2015, passed by this Court, and both these I.As are still pending. 4. The impugned Judgment shows that the suit property is quarter No. DT/2879, situated in P.O & P.S. Dhurwa, Ranchi, belonging to M/s Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as 'HEC Ltd.'). The original plaintiff being an employee of HEC Ltd., was allotted that quarter and according to the plaintiffs’ case, the suit property was subsequently leased out in his favour for 30 years on 6.2.1997, by the HEC Ltd. The said property was given to the defendant on rent for the purpose of the marriage of his daughter, but even after the purpose was over, the said property was not vacated by the defendants. Hence the eviction suit was filed by the original plaintiff in the Court below. It appears that as the original plaintiff died during the pendency of the suit, his heirs and legal representatives were substituted at his place. 5. To the contrary, the defendants’ case is that though the original plaintiff inducted the defendant No.1 as a tenant in the suit property on monthly rental, w.e.f., the month June, 1992, but the defendants claim that on the demands made by the plaintiff, the defendant No.1 gave him Rs. 30,400/-on 29.01.1997, again Rs. 1,70,000/-and Rs. 5. To the contrary, the defendants’ case is that though the original plaintiff inducted the defendant No.1 as a tenant in the suit property on monthly rental, w.e.f., the month June, 1992, but the defendants claim that on the demands made by the plaintiff, the defendant No.1 gave him Rs. 30,400/-on 29.01.1997, again Rs. 1,70,000/-and Rs. 30,000/-on 6.1.2005, and the original plaintiff transferred his lease hold right in favour of the defendant No.1, relinquishing his own lease hold right in the suit property. The defendant, claimed that by doing that, the plaintiff thereafter was not the landlord / owner of the suit property, and the defendants are in occupation thereof in their own right. It may be stated at this place that even the plaintiff had not produced and proved the lease deed executed in his favour by HEC Ltd., stating that it was taken away by defendant fraudulently, but the execution of the lease in favour of the plaintiff by HEC Ltd., is an admitted fact and the defendant No.1, who had examined himself as D.W.-3 in the suit, had admitted that he had signed as one of the witness on the said lease deed. 6. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, issues were framed by the Trial Court below, and the two main issues, which only were addressed by the learned counsels for both the sides, are as follows:- Issue No. IV. Whether there is any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties? Issue No. V. Whether the plaintiff requires the suit premises reasonably and in good faith? Discussing the evidence adduced by both the parties, the Trial Court below has decided the issue No. IV in favour of the plaintiffs, holding that there is landlord and tenant relationship between the parties. While deciding the issue No. V, the Trial Court below has discussed the evidence adduced by both the parties, and found that the plaintiff was living in a hutment containing two rooms and a toilet, and having electricity connection, but no water connection. That hutment had also been illegally constructed in the land of HEC Ltd., and the plaintiffs were forced to live in the said illegally constructed hut due to occupation of the suit property by the defendants. As such, the plaintiffs reasonably and in good faith required the suit property for their own use and occupation. 7. That hutment had also been illegally constructed in the land of HEC Ltd., and the plaintiffs were forced to live in the said illegally constructed hut due to occupation of the suit property by the defendants. As such, the plaintiffs reasonably and in good faith required the suit property for their own use and occupation. 7. Faced with these findings by the Trial Court below on the aforesaid two main issues framed by it, learned counsel for the defendants petitioners has argued that the plaintiffs are not the landlord within the meaning of Section 11(1)(c) of Jharkhand Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 2000, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). Learned counsel has drawn the attention of the Court towards Section 11(1)(c), Explanation 1, in the Act, which reads as follows:- “11. Eviction of tenants. -(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), and to those of Section 18, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction there from except in execution of a decree passed by the Court on one or more of the following grounds, *** *** *** (c) Where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord: *** *** *** Explanation 1 – In this clause the word “landlord” shall not include an agent referred to in clause (f) of Section 2." 'Landlord' has been defined in Section 2(f) of the Act, which reads as follows:- “2. Definitions:- (f) “Landlord” includes the person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive, the rent of the building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another, or on account or on behalf of for the benefit of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver, guardian or who would so receive the rent, to be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant." Learned counsel for the defendants petitioners submitted that admittedly the plaintiffs are not the owners of the suit property and they are the lessees of the suit property, on the basis of the lease deed executed in favour of the original plaintiff by HEC Ltd., and as such, the plaintiffs are only 'agent' within the meaning of Explanation-1 to Section 11(1)(c) of the Act, and accordingly, the plaintiffs were not entitled to the decree in their favour. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.M. Quasim Vs. Manohar Lal Sharma & Ors., reported in (1981) 3 SCC 36 , wherein where, the same Act was under consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and the law has been laid down has follows:- "14. -----------------. Therefore, while taking advantage of the enabling provision enacted in Section 11(1)(c), the person claiming possession on the ground of his reasonable requirement of the leased building must show that he is a landlord in the sense that he is owner of the building and has a right to occupy the same in his own right. A mere rent collector, though may be included in the expression “landlord” in its wide amplitude, cannot be treated as a landlord for the purposes of Section 11(1)(c). This becomes manifestly clear from the explanation appended to the clause. By restricting the meaning of expression “landlord” for the purpose of Section 11(1)(c), the legislature manifested its intention namely that landlord alone can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement if he is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building himself and exclude any one holding a title lesser than his own. Such landlord who is an owner and who would have a right to occupy the building in his own right, can seek possession for his own use. -------------. Such landlord who is an owner and who would have a right to occupy the building in his own right, can seek possession for his own use. -------------. The second clause contemplates a situation of trustees and cestique trust but when the case is governed by the first part of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 11, the person claiming possession for personal requirement must be such a landlord who wants possession for his own occupation and this would imply that he must be a person who has a right to remain in occupation against the whole world and not someone who has no subsisting interest in the property and is merely a rent collector such as an agent, executor, administrator or a receiver of the property. For the purposes of Section 11(1)(c) the expression ‘landlord’ could, therefore, mean a person who is the owner of the building and who has a right to remain in occupation and actual possession of the building to the exclusion of everyone else. It is such a person who can seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he requires possession in good faith for his own occupation. A rent collector or an agent is not entitled to occupy the house in his own right. Even if such a person be a lessor and, therefore, a landlord within the expanded inclusive definition of the expression landlord, nonetheless he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants to personally occupy the house. He cannot claim such a right against the real owner and as a necessary corollary he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants possession of the premises for his own occupation. -------------. Therefore, the explanation to clause (c) which cuts down the wide amplitude of the expression “landlord” would unmistakably show that for the purposes of clause (c) such landlord who in the sense in which the word ‘owner’ is understood can claim as of right to the exclusion of everyone, to occupy the house, would be entitled to evict the tenant for his own occupation." (Emphasis supplied). Placing reliance on this decision, learned counsel submitted that since the plaintiff is not the owner of the suit property, and he is a holding of the suit property only as the lessee of the HEC Ltd., he is not entitled to any relief as claimed by him. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiffs opposite parties has opposed the prayer, submitting that 30 years lease by HEC Ltd., executed on 6.2.1997, which is still subsisting in favour of the plaintiffs, as also the induction of the defendants by the original plaintiff in the suit property as tenant, are the admitted facts in this case. Learned counsel further submitted that in the present case, the plaintiffs are the 'landlord' of the suit property within the meaning of Section 11(1)(c) of the Act, as the plaintiffs cannot be said only to be 'agent' of HEC Ltd., in as much as, the suit property was leased in favour of the original plaintiff for residential purpose of the plaintiffs, and the suit property is also required by the plaintiffs for the same purpose. Learned counsel submitted that both these issues have been decided in favour of the plaintiffs holding the plaintiffs to be the landlord and the defendants to be the tenant, and also giving a clear cut finding on issue No.V, that despite having the suit property on lease, they are forced to live in an illegally constructed hut on the land of HEC Ltd., and accordingly, the plaintiffs reasonably and in good faith required the suit property for their own use and occupation. Learned counsel also placed reliance upon the ratio in M.M. Quasim's case (supra), and has submitted that it has been made clear that landlord alone can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement if he is the one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building himself, and exclude any one holding a title lesser than his own. Learned counsel pointed out that the plaintiffs are not the rent collector on behalf of the HEC Ltd., rather the plaintiffs are the rent collector on their own behalf, and are themselves entitled to occupy the suit property in their own right, to the exclusion of everyone else, so long the lease in their favour subsists. Learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Sheela & Ors. Learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Sheela & Ors. Vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, reported in (2002) 3 SCC 375 , in which also, referring to M.M. Quasim's case (supra), the position has been clarified as follows:- "10. -----------. The factor determinative of landlordship is the factum of his receiving or his entitlement to receive the rent of any accommodation. Such receiving or right to receive the rent may be on the own account of the landlord or on account of or for the benefit of any other person. A trustee, a guardian and a receiver are also included in the definition of landlord. -------------. Though of course, we may hasten to add, that the concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by rent control law has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. Ownership is a relative term, the import whereof depends on the context in which it is used. In rent control legislation, the landlord can be said to be the owner if he is entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else, to evict the tenant and then to retain, control, hold and use the premises for himself. What may suffice and hold good as proof of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation probably may or may not be enough to successfully sustain a claim for ownership in a title suit. In M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma it was held that an “owner-landlord” who can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building in his own right and exclude anyone holding a title lesser than his own. -----------." (Emphasis supplied). Placing reliance on these decisions, learned counsel for the plaintiffs opposite parties submitted that the plaintiffs being entitled to receive the rent of the suit property, and also being entitled to use and occupy the same in their own right, are entitled to evict the defendants petitioners from the suit property, and there is no illegality in the impugned Judgment and Decree passed by the Trial Court below. 9. 9. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and upon going through the impugned Judgement, I find that on the basis of the evidence on record, the Trial Court below decided the issues Nos. IV and V in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. These are the findings of facts, and this Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot enter into the findings of the facts given by the Trial Court below, unless such findings are absolutely perverse and not based on any evidence on record. In the present case, no case is made out to interfere with the findings of facts given by the Trial Court below. The question of law, argued by learned counsel for the defendants petitioners that the plaintiffs are the 'agent' of HEC Ltd., being its lessee, and do not come within the meaning of 'landlord' as given under Section 11(1)(c) of the Act, cannot be accepted. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the original plaintiff was an employee of HEC Ltd., and he was allotted the quarter in question for his own use and occupation, and thereafter 30 years lease was executed in his favour by HEC Ltd., on 6.2.1997, for the use and occupation by the plaintiffs in their own right. The said lease is still subsisting in favour of the plaintiffs. As a matter of fact that the plaintiffs require the suit premises for their own use, as is apparent from the finding given by the Trial Court below, that they are forced to live in an illegally constructed hut on the land of HEC Ltd., itself. This is a clear case, in which, the plaintiffs though may not be the owner of the building in strict sense of the term, but the fact remains that admittedly, the original plaintiff had inducted the defendants as the tenants in the suit premises, and it is nobody's case that the rent was being realised from the tenant on behalf of HEC Ltd. The plaintiffs are entitled to receive the rent of the suit property, and also are entitled to use and occupy the same in their own right. As such, the plaintiffs opposite parties fulfill the requirement of law as laid down in M.M. Quasim's case (supra), that the plaintiff are having the right against the whole world to occupy the building. As such, the plaintiffs opposite parties fulfill the requirement of law as laid down in M.M. Quasim's case (supra), that the plaintiff are having the right against the whole world to occupy the building. The plaintiffs opposite parties also fulfill the requirement of law as held in Sheela's case (supra), that "in a rent control legislation, the landlord can be said to be the owner, if he is entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else, to evict the tenant and then to retain, control, hold and use the premises for himself.' As such, the plaintiffs cannot be termed to be only 'agent' as referred to in Section 11(1)(c), Explanation 1, of the Act, rather the plaintiffs opposite parties are 'the landlord' within the meaning of Section 11(1)(c), Explanation 1, of the Act, thus entitled to the decree of eviction of the defendants tenants from the suit premises, for their own use and occupation, which they are requiring reasonably and in good faith. 10. For the foregoing reasons, I find no illegality in the impugned Judgment and Decree dated 22.1.2013, passed by the learned 2nd Additional Munsif, Ranchi, in Eviction Suit No.17 of 2006, decreeing the suit, worth any interference by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction. 11. There is no merit in this revision and the same is accordingly, dismissed, with costs throughout. Consequently, the ad-interim order passed on 12.8.2015, automatically stands vacated. The aforesaid I.A. No.4308 of 2018, filed for staying the execution proceedings, and I.A. No.5754 of 2016, filed for vacating the ad-interim order dated 12.8.2015, also stand disposed of.