JUDGMENT : S.Manikumar, J. Alleging disobedience of the judgment made in W.P.(C)No.6694 of 2007 dated 15.3.2007, instant Contempt petition (F.No.51940 of 2019) is filed. 2. Material on record discloses that the Registry has raised a doubt as regards limitation. For brevity, note of the Registry is extracted hereunder: “This Contempt of Court Case is filed by a Party in Person. Certain defects have been noted in this file. As per defect No.2, the Party in Person was requested to clarify why R3 and R4, who were not a party in the Writ Petition, are arrayed in the Cause title. As per Defect No.11, it was also requested to clarify as to whether the Contempt Case is time barred in view of the fact that the Writ Petition was disposed on 12.06.2007. All other defects have been cured. To query No.2, the Party in Person has answered that R3 and R4 wilfully not complied with directions in WP(C) 6694/2007. SDM has passed order to Dy.SP, Alathur to strictly comply the orders of Honourable High Court. But the Order passed by SDM on 29.08.2019 has not been complied with by R3 and R4. So, R3 and R4 are made party in this case. To defect No.11, it is answered that the last orders issued by Sub Divisional Magistrate on 29.08.2019 on the strength of Judgment, directed the DYSP to strictly comply with the Orders. R3 and R4 not complied with the above. So, there is no other option than to approach this Hon'ble Court for Contempt of Court Proceedings. It is submitted that as per Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, limitation period for initiation of Contempt proceedings is one year from the date on which the Contempt is alleged to have been committed.” 3. Contending inter alia that there is no delay in filing the Contempt petition, petitioner has re-submitted the Contempt Case (F.No.51940 of 2019). Recording the reasons assigned by the contempt petitioner, Registry has placed the papers before us for appropriate orders. 4. Party in person Sri.G.P.Dinesh Kumar made submissions that the Contempt petition is filed within time and not barred by limitation. 5. We have heard the party in person. 6. W.P.(C)No.6694 of 2007 has been disposed of on 15.3.2007. Recording the reasons assigned by the contempt petitioner, Registry has placed the papers before us for appropriate orders. 4. Party in person Sri.G.P.Dinesh Kumar made submissions that the Contempt petition is filed within time and not barred by limitation. 5. We have heard the party in person. 6. W.P.(C)No.6694 of 2007 has been disposed of on 15.3.2007. As per the provisions of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, limitation period for initiation of Contempt proceedings is one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. On the query raised by the Registry, Contempt petitioner has contended that there is no delay in filing the Contempt petition, as the authorities including Lok Ayukta and Sub Divisional Magistrate have passed orders on 26.4.2019 stating that police protection order of the Honourable High Court is still alive. 7. Material on record further discloses that when the petitioner (party in person) approached the Kerala Lok Ayukta for interim direction directing respondents therein to comply with the order of the High Court of Kerala without any delay, vide order dated 14.2.2017, Kerala Lok Ayukta has closed the I.A.No.674 of 2017 in Complaint No.1130 of 2016. For brevity, order dated 14.2.2017 of the Kerala Lok Ayukta is reproduced: “ORDER The direction sought for by the complainant is a direction to the respondents, particularly the 1st respondent, in this Complaint to comply with the order passed by the Hon'ble High Court. We are of the view that if the complainant has grievance, remedy is available to him. Such remedy lies before the Hon'ble High Court. Giving of that remedy, we close this I.A. without entering any finding regarding merits.” 8. Though by order dated 14.2.2017 in I.A.No.674 of 2017 in Complaint No.1130 of 2016, Kerala Lok Ayukta has observed that such remedy lies before the High Court, we are of the view that the remedy is subject to law of limitation under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 9. Though by order dated 14.2.2017 in I.A.No.674 of 2017 in Complaint No.1130 of 2016, Kerala Lok Ayukta has observed that such remedy lies before the High Court, we are of the view that the remedy is subject to law of limitation under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 9. Material on record further discloses that when W.P.(C)No.15767 of 2017 was filed, for a mandamus directing respondents 2 and 3 to ensure protection to the petitioner as directed by this court in Ext.P1 judgment dated 4.6.2004 in W.P.(C)No.16745 of 2004 and Ext.P3 judgment dated 15.3.2007 in W.P.(C)No.6694 of 2007 and for a writ of certiorari to declare that the directions in Ext.P1 judgment dated 4.6.2004 in W.P.(C)No.16745 of 2004, Ext.P2 interim order dated 28.2.2007 and Ext.P3 judgment dated 15.3.2007 in W.P.(C)No.6694 of 2007 were still in force, a Hon'ble Division Bench of this court, by order dated 6.6.2017, permitted the Contempt petitioner, to withdraw the said writ petition without prejudice to his right to move afresh, if needed. Thus, granting leave, writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. 10. Perusal of the said order, makes it clear that Honourable Division Bench was not inclined to issue any declaration that Ext.P1 judgment dated 4.6.2004, Ext.P2 interim order dated 28.2.2007 and Ext.P3 judgment dated 15.3.2007 in W.P.(C)No.6694 of 2007 were still in force. 11. Though Sri.G.P. Dinesh Kumar, party in person, submitted that the Honourable Division Bench has observed that the directions issued in W.P. (C)No.6694 of 2007 dated 15.3.2007 were in force and therefore, there was no need to file a fresh writ petition (W.P.(C)No.15767 of 2017), we are not inclined to accept the said contentions for the reason that enforcement of an order of the High Court can only be made by filing a Contempt petition and not by repetitive writ petitions. That position is well settled in a decision of this court in Balakrishna Pisharady v. K.S.E.B. reported in 1987 (2) KLT 937 , wherein it is held thus: “1. We are Surprised that when an order of this Court was not obeyed, the petitioner felt that he must invoke the jurisdiction of this Court once again under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was explained by Sri Nayanar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that it was so done because in the first order no time limit was fixed for compliance. It was explained by Sri Nayanar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that it was so done because in the first order no time limit was fixed for compliance. It is not the law that when no time limit is fixed, the order is not required to be complied with. If the time limit is not fixed, the order has to be complied within a reasonable time. What in a given case is the reasonable time depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. When an order is made by this Court in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution, it has all the efficacy and vitality and has to be obeyed. If it is not obeyed the party cannot once again approach this Court for securing what he thinks a stronger order by securing fixation of time limit for compliance. That is precisely what the petitioner has done by approaching this Court once again and on the second occasion the petitioner secured a direction to comply with the earlier judgment within the specified time. This is clearly impermissible. If the writ issued by this Court is not obeyed the remedy is not to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for the enforcement of the earlier writ issued by this Court. The remedy available to the aggrieved party is to enforce the first order in appropriate proceedings. This can be done by invoking the powers of this Court under the Contempt of Courts Act. The petitioner not having done so now seeks relief under the Contempt of Courts Act when the second order was also disobeyed. Having regard to the conduct of the petitioner we could have declined jurisdiction. As if was explained by Sri Nayanar that the mistake committed by him is bona fide we shall not decline jurisdiction. Notice. Personal presence is dispensed with. Call after ten days.” 12. Instant Contempt petition has been filed, after 12 years, for enforcement of an order in W.P.(C)No.6694 of 2007 dated 15.3.2007. On the aspect as to whether Contempt petition filed after one year is barred by limitation, the following decisions require consideration: In Devi Kishan v. Madan Lal Verma reported in 2000 KHC 2638, High Court of Rajasthan held as under: "7. On the aspect as to whether Contempt petition filed after one year is barred by limitation, the following decisions require consideration: In Devi Kishan v. Madan Lal Verma reported in 2000 KHC 2638, High Court of Rajasthan held as under: "7. Since S.20 of the Act provides for a condition precedent for exercising the jurisdiction of a Court, thus, it becomes mandatory that before the Court exercises its jurisdiction, the said condition precedent should be fulfilled and if the Court is satisfied that the condition precedent has been fulfilled, only then it can initiate the contempt proceedings, otherwise not. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation as it would otherwise defeat the provisions of law. (Vide State of Kerala v. P. K. Ramchandranan, JT 1997 (8) SC 189 (sic)). The natural corollary of this would be that after the period, as prescribed by S.20 of the Act, lapses, the jurisdiction of the Court automatically evaporates and Court loses jurisdiction under the said Act. 12. Therefore, it is an outcome of the conscious application of mind by the Court to the facts and material before it and the limitation provided by S. 20 of the Act is different as the limitation is understood under the provisions of the Limitation Act. Even S. 5 of the Limitation Act has no application in the case and the Court loses its jurisdiction after expiry of the limitation, rather jurisdiction evaporates automatically after expiry of period provided under S. 20 of the Act. In T. Deendayal v. High Court of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1997 SC 3451 : 1997 CriLJ 4080, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that proceedings may be initiated within one year and it is not necessary that it should be concluded within that stipulated period. 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D. K. Mittal, 2000 (3) SCC 171 : 2000 CriLJ 1700, has elaborately dealt with this issue and placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Baradakanta Mishra v. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, AIR 1974 SC 2255 : 1975 CriLJ 1, wherein the Apex Court had held that it is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates proceedings for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of proceedings for contempt. Exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of proceedings for contempt. That is why, the terminus a qua for a period of limitation provided under S.20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court. 16. As the petition has been presented after expiry of the statutory limitation, the Court cannot entertain the same. 18. Undoubtedly, a party cannot be rendered remediless (vide Rameshwar Lal v. Municipal Council, Tonk, 1996 (6) SCC 100 but the Court must be satisfied that party has a right to enforce and he has endeavoured to enforce it and in order to do that he has persued the case deligently and bona fide. The rights claimed by the petitioner are doubtful and it is further fortified from the fact that the petitioner himself has approached this Court after a lapse of six years and it appears that he had not been perusing the remedy deligently and effectively and there is no justification for resorting to the provisions under Art.215 of the Constitution at such a belated stage." In Prakash Kakubhai Rangwala v. Nyayalay Karamachari Anne N. H. S. and Another reported in (2011) 14 SCC 762, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under: "5. S.20 provides that no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. The appellant states that the letter was written by him containing alleged insinuation against the judge of the Bombay High Court in a letter dated 15.10.2007 and, therefore, the notice which was also issued by the High Court initiating action for commission of offence of contempt on 3.12.2009 is barred by limitation. Counsel appearing for the State, however, has drawn our attention to the letter which was sent by the Nyayalaya Karmachari Anne Nayayadish Hitkari Sangh, Swar Gate, Pune, to the High Court on 17.8.2009. According to him the said letter was the basis of drawing up the contempt proceedings by the High Court taking suo moto action on the basis of that. 7. Even otherwise, we may appropriately refer to the decision of this Court in Pallav Seth Vs. According to him the said letter was the basis of drawing up the contempt proceedings by the High Court taking suo moto action on the basis of that. 7. Even otherwise, we may appropriately refer to the decision of this Court in Pallav Seth Vs. Custodian and others reported in 2001 (7) SCC 549 wherein this Court, after referring to a decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal case reported in 2000 (3) SCC 171 held that if the interpretation of S.20 put in Om Prakash Jaiswal case is correct, it would mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed the High Court would become powerless to take any action. On the other hand, if the filing of an application before the subordinate court or the High Court, making a reference by a subordinate court on its own motion or the filing of an application before an Advocate -General for permission to initiate contempt proceedings is regarded as initiation by the court for the purposes of S.20, then such an interpretation would not impinge on or stultify the power of the High Court to punish for contempt which power, dehors the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and enshrined in Art.215 of the Constitution of India. It was also held that such an interpretation of S.20 would harmonise that section with the powers of the courts to punish for contempt which is recognised by the Constitution. 8. According to us, the aforesaid ratio of the decision of this Court squarely applies to the facts of the present case and, therefore, we reject the contention of the appellant, who appears in person, that the initiation of the contempt proceeding is barred by limitation. So far the merits of his arguments are concerned, we are of the opinion that the letter which was written by him brings direct insinuation against the sitting Judges of the Bombay High Court. The appellant has not been able to show us any truth of the allegation made. No material is shown to us to substantiate the allegation of taking money by a Judge of the High Court. The appellant has not been able to show us any truth of the allegation made. No material is shown to us to substantiate the allegation of taking money by a Judge of the High Court. There has been a number of such baseless insinuation against other Judges also in the present affidavit, which is filed before this Court." In Ravi A. v. G.R. Kanagaraj reported in 2018 KHC 4359, the High Court of Madras held thus: "9. The general principle of law in this regard is that whenever there is a Special Act enacted in respect of limitation, the powers conferred under the Constitution as well as the Special Act to be read cogently and harmoniously. Harmonious reading of these provisions, no doubt, the High Courts are empowered to exercise the power of contempt as the High Court is the Court of record. However, such power can be exercised only with reference to Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. This will not mean that, the High Courts cannot exercise the powers of contempt beyond the limitation period of one year. The powers of contempt beyond the limitation period can be exercised only on exceptional circumstances, and sparingly. The powers conferred under the Constitution in normal circumstances are to be exercised only with reference to the Special Act viz., the Contempt of Courts Act. Only in extraordinary circumstances; the High Courts can go beyond the period of one year and exercise the powers of Contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. The practice prevailing now is that, irrespective of the period limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, the contempt applications are filed in a routine manner by stating that no limitation is applicable in respect of the contempt applications filed before the High Courts. Such a concept is not in accordance with the legal principles settled in this regard. 25. In the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Maheshwar Peri v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad thro. Such a concept is not in accordance with the legal principles settled in this regard. 25. In the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Maheshwar Peri v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad thro. Registrar General, reported in 2016 (6) scale 425 : AIR 2016 SC 3267 , dealt with the Contempt of Courts Act 1971, His Lordship Justice Kurian Joseph J., while speaking for the Bench held as follows: "8.The main contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the High Court, having initiated action only after four years of the alleged contempt, the whole proceedings are barred by Section 20 of the contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') which has prescribed the period of limitation of one year for initiating any proceedings of contempt be it suo motu or otherwise. Section 20 of the Act reads as follows: "20. Limitation for actions for contempt.-No court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed." 9. Learned counsel appearing for the High Court, however contends that being an action initiated by the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India and since the genesis of the initiation of the contempt is the application dated 18.11.2008 field by Mr.Manoj Kumar Srivastava and Mr.Veer Singh, Advocates, and since the High Court had considered the application within one year and had taken action by issuing notice, though after six years, it is within time. 10. Our attention is invited to a three Judge Bench decision of this Court in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and others, AIR 2001 SC 2763 and particular to paragraphs-39 and 40. Paragraphs 39 and 40 reads as follows: "39. In the case of criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate -General or the Law Officer of the Central Government in the case of a Union Territory. This reference or motion can conceivably commence on an application being field by a person whereupon the subordinate court or the Advocate-General if it is so satisfied may refer the matter to the High Court. This reference or motion can conceivably commence on an application being field by a person whereupon the subordinate court or the Advocate-General if it is so satisfied may refer the matter to the High Court. Proceedings for civil contempt normally commence with a person aggrieved bringing to the notice of the Court the wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, order etc. which could amount to the commission of the offence. The attention of the Court is drawn to such a contempt being committed only by a person filing an application in that behalf. In other words, unless a Court was to take a suo motu action, the proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would normally commence with the filing of an application drawing the attention of the Court to the contempt having been committed. When the judicial procedure requires an application being filed either before the court or consent being sought by a person from the Advocate -General or a law Officer, it must logically follow that proceeding for contempt are initiated when the applications are made. 40. In other words the beginning of the action prescribed for taking cognizance of criminal contempt under Section 15 would be initiating the proceedings for contempt and the subsequent action taken thereon of refusal or issuance of a notice or punishment thereafter are only steps following or succeeding such initiation. Similarly, in the case of a civil contempt, filing of an application drawing the attention of the court is necessary for further steps to be taken under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971." 11. We are afraid, the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellants cannot be appreciated. Be it an action initiated for contempt under Article 129 of the Constitution of India by the Supreme Court or under Article 215 of the Constitution of India by the High Court, it is now settled law that the prosecution procedure should be in consonance with the Act, as held by this Court is Pallav Sheth case, AIR 2001 SC 2763 (supra) 12. And thus, the dispute boils down to the question of limitation only. 13. Under the Act, the action for contempt is taken by only two courts, either the Supreme Court or the High Court. The procedure is prescribed under Section 15 of the Act, which reads as follows: "15. And thus, the dispute boils down to the question of limitation only. 13. Under the Act, the action for contempt is taken by only two courts, either the Supreme Court or the High Court. The procedure is prescribed under Section 15 of the Act, which reads as follows: "15. Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases.-(1) In the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by- (a) the Advocate-General, or (b) any other person, with the consent in writing to (sic of ) the Advocate -General, or (c) in relation to the High Court for the Union territory of Delhi, such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, or any other person, with the consent in writing of such Law Officer. (2). In the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate Court, the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by subordinate Court or on a mote made by the Advocate-General or, in relation to a Union territory, by such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf. (3). Every motion or reference made under this section shall specify the contempt of which the person charged is alleged to be guilty. Explanation - In this section, the expression "Advocate -General" means (a) in relation to the Supreme Court, the Attorney-General or the Solicitor General; (b) in relation to the High Court, the Advocate -General of the State or any of the States for which the High Court has been established; (c) in relation to the Court of a Judicial Commissioner, such law officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf." 14. Criminal Contempt of Court subordinate to High Court can be initiated either suo motu or on a motion made by the Advocate-General. The suo motu action is set in motion on a Reference made to it by the subordinate court, in Pallav Sheth case (supra), it has been held that the reference is the starting point of the process of initiation of the action for contempt. The suo motu action is set in motion on a Reference made to it by the subordinate court, in Pallav Sheth case (supra), it has been held that the reference is the starting point of the process of initiation of the action for contempt. That is why in paragraph-39, which we have extracted above, it has been clearly held that... "unless a Court was to take suo motu action, the proceeding under The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would normally commence with the filing of an application drawing the attention of the court to the contempt having been committed. "The application is the motion provided under Section 15 of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Such a motion, by any person other than Advocate-General, can be made only with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General. In other words, any other application made by a person without the consent of the Advocate-General, is not an application in the eyes of law' 15. This aspect has been succinctly discussed and subtly distinguished in paragraph-44 of the Pallav Sheth case (supra ).To quote paragraph 44: "44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice, in the other cases initiation can only be by a partly filing an application, In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year form the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed." 28. The High Courts cannot invoke the powers under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, in all the cases by entertaining the contempt application beyond the period of one year, so as to dilute or eradicate the law prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. All contempt applications ought to be filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. All contempt applications ought to be filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The High Court on exceptional circumstances, on arriving a conclusion that a gross injustice to the society or the case is of public importance, then the inherent powers provided under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, can be exercised without reference to Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. A litigant may come out with an interpretation that an injustice is caused to all the orders or judgments passed by the High Courts. Such a general proposition, as advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner deserves no merit consideration. No doubt, the litigants approach the Court to get justice, that does not mean that all the contempt applications have to be entertained after a period of one year prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Generalisation in this regard can never be encouraged. What exactly the circumstances warranting interference under Article 215 of the Constitution of India has to be decided judiciously and applying the peculiar facts and circumstances prevailing in each and every case. General application in this regard is certainly impermissible and Courts have to interpret these provisions in a pragmatic way than in a general manner. In other words, the principles of constructive interpretation is to be adopted while interpreting the period of limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act as well as Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Thus, this Court is not inclined to consider the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner by citing the above judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court." 13. On the aspect as to whether exercise of power under Article 215 of the Constitution of India can be made at any time, we deem it fit to consider the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and Others reported in (2001) 7 SCC 549 , wherein at paragraph 44, the Honourable Supreme Court held thus: “44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the Court and that instituted otherwise than on the Court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice. In other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.” In the light of the above discussions and decisions, we sustain the objection of the Registry that Contempt Case (F.No.51940 of 2019) is barred by limitation. Therefore, this unnumbered Contempt Case (F.No.51940 of 2019) is rejected.