JUDGMENT Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. - This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, whereby and whereunder the order passed by the Labour Court Dhanbad in M.J. Case No. 13 of 2015, on an application filed under Section 33 (C) (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whereby and whereunder the Labour Court has passed an order on 28.09.2018, directing the petitioner-Management to pay monetary compensation to the respondent as provided under Clause 9.5.0 of the National Coal Wage Agreement by adjusting the amount which was already paid i.e. from 12.11.2006, i.e. the date of death of employee to December, 2009 within 60 days from the passing of the order, failing which the Management will be liable to pay the monetary compensation alongwith simple interest @ 12 per cent per annum from the expiry of the period of 60 days till the date of actual payment. 2. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the petitioner-Management has raised the issue that the learned Labour Court while deciding the application filed under Section 33 (C) (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has not taken into consideration the Circular dated 08.04.1995 (Annexure-3), issued by the Coal India Limited, whereby and whereunder it has been decided to pay the monetary compensation on account of death of the deceased-employee from the date of application and therefore, the respondent-workman is entitled to get the monetary compensation from the date of application i.e. from 28.07.2007 and not from the date of the death of the deceased-employee i.e. 12.11.2006. 3. Mr. Niranjan Singh, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent-workman has disputed the aforesaid submission and the grounds urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, as aforesaid by submitting that in the National Coal Wage Agreement, there is no stipulation of any date from which the monetary compensation is to be paid after the death of the deceased employee in harness and therefore, from the date of death only the amount of compensation is to be made and accordingly, the Labour Court after considering this aspect of the matter has passed an order for making payment of the monetary compensation from the date of death, hence, there is no infirmity in the impugned order. He has relied upon the order passed by this Court in the case of Putul Devi-Vs.-M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited & Ors., 2012 1 JCR 436 (Jhr), in the case of Dukhni Devi-Vs.-M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited & Ors. , (2014) 2 JCR 117 (Jhr), unreported order passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 6247 of 2009 in the case of Smt. Ramawati Devi-Vs.-Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors., judgment rendered in the case of Sitwa Devi-Vs.- Bharat Coking Coal Limited through its Managing Director & Ors. , (2018) 4 JLJR 14 , unreported order passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Jirwa Devi-Vs.-M/s. Central Coalfields Limited & Ors. in W.P. (S) No. 5691 of 2015 and one judgment rendered by the Hon''ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Eastern Coalfields Limited-Vs.-Dewanti Kumari & Ors. , (2016) 2 LLJ 671 (Cal). 4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and looking to the factual aspects involved in this case, the issue which has been raised by the petitioner in assailing the impugned order, passed by the Labour Court in an application under Section 33 (C) (2) of the Act, 1947, the core issue is the applicability of the date from which the monetary compensation is to be paid to the member of the family of the deceased-employee whether from the date of death or from making an application. It is not in dispute that the National Coal Wage Agreement is having statutory force, since it is a tripartite agreement entered in view of the provision of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and therefore, the reference of Section 18 of the Act, 1947 needs to be referred, which reads hereunder as :- "18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.-[(1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.-[(1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. (2) [Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), an arbitration award] which has become enforceable shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to arbitration.] [(3)] A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act [or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under sub-section (3-A) of section 10-A] or [an award [of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] which has become enforceable] shall be binding on- (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, [arbitrator,] [Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal], as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause; (c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part." 5. In pursuance to the aforesaid provision, the National Coal Wage Agreement has been entered in between the Management, the workman and the appropriate authority, giving it statutory force which has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, the terms and conditions stipulated in the National Coal Wage Agreement is binding upon all the parties being signatory, since the said Agreement has arrived at in between the parties in course of conciliation i.e. within the meaning of Section 18 (1) of the Act, 1947. 6. 6. It is evident from the provision of the National Coal Wage Agreement, as under Clause 9.5.0, in order to provide immediate relief to the dependent of the bereaved family in case of death of the deceased-employee in harness, two modes have been provided to provide the said relief either by way of providing employment on compassionate ground, if the dependent is found to be eligible and less than 45 years of age or by way of monetary compensation. The factual aspect involved in this case is that the deceased-employee, namely, late Budhan Kalindi died on 12.11.2006 in harness and thereafter, the respondent-workman has applied for compassionate appointment, but it was rejected on the ground that she was more than age of 45 years and thereafter, she has applied for monetary compensation, which was allowed by making payment of monetary compensation, since the month of July, 2010, the Respondent-workman being aggrieved with the date of making compensation, since, according to her, monetary compensation was to be paid from 12.11.2006, therefore, she has raised dispute by filing application under Section 33 (C) (2) of the Act, 1947, wherein, on contest, the Labour Court has passed an order directing the petitioner-Management to make payment of monetary compensation from the date of death of the deceasedemployee. 7. The petitioner-Management being aggrieved with the said order is before this Court by putting reliance upon the decision taken by the Coal India Limited on 08.04.1995 being the head of the Ancillary Coalfields, across the country, wherein, it has been decided that the monetary compensation in case of death of the employee in harness would be paid from the date of the application. 8. The question herein, would be as to whether the Circular, issued by the Coal India Limited, dated 08.04.1995 can override the Agreement, having been arrived in between the parties by a tripartite Agreement entered in course of conciliation under the provision of Section 18 (1) of the Act, 1947. 9. 8. The question herein, would be as to whether the Circular, issued by the Coal India Limited, dated 08.04.1995 can override the Agreement, having been arrived in between the parties by a tripartite Agreement entered in course of conciliation under the provision of Section 18 (1) of the Act, 1947. 9. It is not in dispute, as would be evident from the provision of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 that in case of any Agreement having been entered either in course of conciliation or settlement arrived in course of pendency of a reference, the same would be binding upon the parties, having its statutory force within the meaning of Section 18 of the Act, 1947 and therefore, if the petitioner-Management wants to make any addition to the said tripartite Agreement, it is by way of the same mode i.e. by way of taking consent of the signatories of the National Coal Wage Agreement, but, that admittedly is not case of the petitioner-Management, since the communication dated 08.04.1995 have been issued by the Coal India Limited and from the face of this communication, it would be evident that it is not within the meaning of Section 18 of the Act, 1947 and therefore, the said communication cannot be treated to be part and parcel of the agreement. 10. Mr. Amit Kumar Das has tried to impress upon this Court by referring to the judgment of the Hon''ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Mohan Mahto-Vs.-Central Coal Field Ltd. and Ors. , (2007) 8 SCC 549 by putting reliance upon it, he has submitted that in the case of appointment, the Coal India Limited has issued Circular time to time, fixing the date of submission of application for getting appointment on compassionate ground and that the said Circular has been declined to be interfered with by the Hon''ble Apex Court in the said judgment. 11. The question of National Coal Wage Agreement was before the Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Mahto (Supra), wherein, it has been held that it has got statutory force. The argument, as has been advanced by Mr. 11. The question of National Coal Wage Agreement was before the Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Mahto (Supra), wherein, it has been held that it has got statutory force. The argument, as has been advanced by Mr. Das that the Circular, providing therein, the period of limitation to make application by dependent of the deceased-family, even has been approved by the Hon''ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Mohan Mahto (Supra), but it is settled position of law that every judgment is to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. So far as the applicability of the period of limitation pertaining to question of providing appointment on compassionate ground, the same is altogether different, keeping the intent and spirit of appointment to be provided on compassionate ground, which is to provide immediate relief to the dependent of the bereaved family and that is the reason, the Circular of period of limitation has been issued by the Coal India Limited, prescribing therein, the time period, which has been declined to be interfered with in the aforesaid judgment, but, here the case is altogether different, since the matter pertains to extend the benefit of monetary compensation. The contention has been raised that since the workman has filed an application for getting appointment and therefore, the amount of compensation cannot be paid on from the date of death, admittedly, the workman while making the application for getting appointment, was more than the age of 45 years and therefore, she was not eligible to be appointed on compassionate ground, on account of age, but that does not mean that she will be precluded from seeking her right for getting compensation from the date of death, otherwise, the very purpose for coming out with the said Agreement which has been meant by way of welfare measure by providing relief to the bereaved family after it would be frustrated. This aspect of the matter has been taken care of by this Court in the judgments rendered in the case of in the case of Putul Devi-Vs.-M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited & Ors., 2012 1 JCR 436 (Jhr), in the case of Dukhni Devi-Vs.-M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited & Ors. This aspect of the matter has been taken care of by this Court in the judgments rendered in the case of in the case of Putul Devi-Vs.-M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited & Ors., 2012 1 JCR 436 (Jhr), in the case of Dukhni Devi-Vs.-M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited & Ors. , (2014) 2 JCR 117 (Jhr), unreported order passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 6247 of 2009 in the case of Smt. Ramawati Devi-Vs.-Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors., judgment rendered in the case of Sitwa Devi-Vs.-Bharat Coking Coal Limited through its Managing Director & Ors. , (2018) 4 JLJR 14 , unreported order passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Jirwa Devi-Vs.-M/s. Central Coalfields Limited & Ors. in W.P. (S) No. 5691 of 2015 and one judgment rendered by the Hon''ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Eastern Coalfields Limited-Vs.- Dewanti Kumari & Ors. , (2016) 2 LLJ 671 (Cal), keeping into consideration the object and intent of the provision of Section 18 of the Act, 1947 and also considering the fact that the Circular dated 08.04.1995 cannot supplement having no statutory force, as discussed above. Hence, according to the considered view of this Court, the order passed by the Labour Court, as impugned in this writ petition, require no interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. If a finding of fact is based on no evidence or the authority has acceded his jurisdiction, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. Radhakrishnan , (1964) AIR SC 477 . It needs to refer herein that the scope of interference of the High Court to issue writ of certiorari sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited, as has been discussed by Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. Radhakrishnan , (1964) AIR SC 477 . It needs to refer herein that the scope of interference of the High Court to issue writ of certiorari sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited, as has been discussed by Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. Radhakrishnan , (1964) AIR SC 477 Supreme Court wherein at paragraph no.7 their Lordships have held as follows:- "The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque , (1955) 1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division , (1958) SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh , (1960) AIR SC 1168 . In another judgment of Hon''ble Apex Court in the Case of Sawarn Singh Vrs. State of Punjab , (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: "12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob''s case (supra). 13. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob''s case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice." In another judgment rendered by Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey , (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference with the finding of the tribunal has been please to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao `. Ashalata S. Guram , (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para 17 has held as under:- "17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: ...... The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: ...... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority." 12. According to the considered view of this Court, the order impugned requires no interference by issuing writ of Certiorari, as has been settled for exercising the power of issuing writ of Certiorari. 13. Accordingly, writ petition fails and is dismissed.