Research › Search › Judgment

Orissa High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 93 (ORI)

Jambu Bisoiani @ Jambhubati Bisoi v. General Traders

2019-02-06

A.K.RATH

body2019
JUDGMENT : A.K. Rath, J. The legal heirs of the defendant are the appellants against the reversing judgment. 2. Plaintiff-Respondent no.1 instituted the suit for realisation of 4841.08 ps. with pendente lite and future interest. Case of the plaintiff is that it is a registered firm. The firm deals in mohua flower, jaggery and other commodities. On 30.1.1963, the defendant opened one mutual and current account with the plaintiff-firm and used to take goods on credit and deposit money according to his convenience. The account was maintained by the plaintiff in due course of business. On 3.2.1968, defendant purchased mohua flower amounting to Rs. 432.28 ps. He deposited an amount of Rs. 474/- on 13.3.1968. Thereafter, he stopped payment. An amount of Rs. 4131.03 ps. was outstanding against the defendant as on 30.3.1968. When all the persuasions made by the plaintiff to clear up the outstanding dues ended in a fiasco, he filed the suit. 3. Defendant filed a written statement pleading, inter alia, that the plaintiff-firm is not registered under the Indian Partnership Act. The suit is barred under Sec.69 of the Partnership Act. There was no outstanding due against him. 4. Stemming on the pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck six issues. Parties led evidence, oral and documentary. On an anatomy of pleadings and evidence on record, learned trial court dismissed the suit holding, inter alia, that the firm was an unregistered one. Sec. 69 of the Partnership Act is a bar for institution of suit by an unregistered firm. The suit is not maintainable. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the learned trial court, the plaintiff filed an appeal before the learned District Judge, Berhampur, which was subsequently transferred to the court of the learned Addl. District Judge, Berhampur and re-numbered as M.A No.7/88 (M.A No.20/78 GDC). During pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff filed a petition under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC to implead Harihar Patra, managing partner of the firm as the plaintiff. The defendant objected to the petition. Learned appellate court rejected the petition for impleadment on 10.3.1981. Against the said order, plaintiff filed Civil Revision No.273 of 1981 before this Court. The petition was allowed on 26.06.1989, whereafter Harihar Patra was impleaded as plaintiff no.2 in his individual capacity on 26.06.1989. The defendant objected to the petition. Learned appellate court rejected the petition for impleadment on 10.3.1981. Against the said order, plaintiff filed Civil Revision No.273 of 1981 before this Court. The petition was allowed on 26.06.1989, whereafter Harihar Patra was impleaded as plaintiff no.2 in his individual capacity on 26.06.1989. Learned appellate court came to hold that Harihar Patra, managing partner of plaintiff no.1-firm, was impleaded as plaintiff no.2 and as such, he is entitled to the relief. The finding with regard to genuineness of the claim of the plaintiff has not been assailed by the defendant by filing cross-objection. The order allowing impleadment has attained finality and as such, binding on the defendant. The suit is not barred by limitation. Held so, it allowed the appeal. It is apt to state here that during pendency of the first appeal, the original defendant died; whereafter his legal heirs and successors have been substituted. 5. The second appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law. “Whether inclusion of plaintiff no.2 in the year 1989 would make the claim barred by limitation.” 6. Heard Mr. Buddhiram Das on behalf of Mr. N.C. Pati, learned counsel for the appellants. None appeared for the respondents. 7. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that initially plaintiff-respondent no.1-firm instituted the suit for realisation of money. It was an unregistered firm. Sec.69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act is a bar to institute a suit by an unregistered firm. The application to implead Harihar Patra was allowed by this Court on 26.06.1989 in Civil Revision No.273 of 1981. The suit is barred by limitation. To buttress the submission, he placed reliance on the decision of the apex Court in the case of Ramalingam Chettiar v. P.K. Pattabiraman and another, (2001) AIR SC 1185. 8. Before adverting to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants, it is apt to refer to Sec.69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act. “69.(1) xxx xxx xxx (2) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.” 9. “69.(1) xxx xxx xxx (2) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.” 9. On a bare reading of sub-sec.(2) of Sec.69 of the Indian Partnership Act, it is manifest that unless a firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm, no suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party. 10. Admittedly plaintiff-respondent no.1 is an unregistered firm. Thus the suit is not maintainable. The application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC for impleadment of Harihar Patra in the partnership firm was filed before the learned appellate court on 18.7.1980. The same having been rejected on 10.3.1981, he filed Civil Revision No.273 of 1981 before this Court. The civil revision was allowed on 26.06.1989; whereafter Harihar Patra was impleaded as plaintiff no.2. 11. The question does arise as to whether impleadment of Harihar Patra would relate back to the date of institution of the suit or date of order dated 26.06.1989 passed by this Court in Civil Revision No.273 of 1981. 12. In Ramalingam Cheettiar, the State of Tamil Nadu was not impleaded as defendant in the suit. Thereafter, an application for impleadment of the State of Tamil Nadu was filed. Learned trial court allowed the same on 11.10.1979. The apex Court held that Section 21 of the Limitation Act provides that where after the institution of a suit, if a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party. In view of Section 21 of the Limitation Act, so far as the State of Tamil Nadu was concerned, suit filed by respondent has to be treated as instituted when the application for impleadment of State of Tamil Nadu was allowed, i.e. on 11.10.1979 and by that time the suit stood barred by time. In view of Section 21 of the Limitation Act, so far as the State of Tamil Nadu was concerned, suit filed by respondent has to be treated as instituted when the application for impleadment of State of Tamil Nadu was allowed, i.e. on 11.10.1979 and by that time the suit stood barred by time. A contention was raised that even if the application for impleadment of State of Tamil Nadu was allowed on 11.6.1979, the said order has to be understood as if impleadment of State of Tamil Nadu was with effect from the date of filing the suit. The contention was repelled. The apex Court held that Sec.21 of the Limitation Act contemplates two situations - one under the substantive provision which provides that where after filing of a suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been brought on the day when he was added or substituted as a party in the suit. The second situation contemplated under the proviso to the substantive provision is where the court is satisfied that a new plaintiff or defendant was omitted to be added or substituted due to a mistake in good faith, the court may direct that the suit, as regards the newly added or substituted party, shall be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date. Thus, under the proviso, if the court is satisfied, it can direct that the suit as regards newly added or substituted plaintiff or defendant shall be deemed to have been instituted on an earlier date. In such a case, the court after substituting or adding a party in the suit is required to pass a separate/further order that the suit as regards the newly added defendant or plaintiff shall be deemed to have been instituted with effect from the date the suit was laid. Merely adding or substituting a plaintiff or defendant by the court is not enough. In the absence of any order that the impleadment of newly added or substituted party shall take effect from the date of institution of a suit, the period of limitation so far as the newly added or substituted shall run from the date of their impleadment in the suit. In the absence of any order that the impleadment of newly added or substituted party shall take effect from the date of institution of a suit, the period of limitation so far as the newly added or substituted shall run from the date of their impleadment in the suit. The Court looked into the records but do not find any order having passed under the proviso to Sec.21 of the Limitation Act that the impleadment of the State of Tamil Nadu would take effect from the date of institution of the suit. It was held that in the absence of such an order by the trial court, the suit filed by the respondent was barred by limitation as contemplated under Sec. 59 of the Act. 13. In the instant case, pursuant to the order dated 26.06.1989 passed in Civil Revision No.273 of 1981, Harihar Patra was impleaded as plaintiff no.2. The order does not reveal that newly impleaded plaintiff shall effect from the date of institution of the suit. Thus the limitation begins to run from the date of impleadment of plaintiff no.2 in the suit. Under Article 14 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation is three years for the price of goods sold and delivered, where no fixed period of credit is agree upon and the date of the delivery of the goods. Thus the suit filed by the plaintiff has to be treated as instituted when the application for impleadment of Harihar Patra was allowed on 26.06.1989. By that time the suit stood barred by time. The substantial question of law is answered in affirmative. 14. Resultantly, the judgment of the learned appellate court is set aside. The suit is dismissed. 15. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.