JUDGMENT : A.S. CHANDURKAR, J. 1. The petitioners who are the original complainants are aggrieved by the judgment of the Industrial Court thereby allowing the revision application preferred by the respondent nos.1 and 2 herein and setting aside the order passed by the Labour Court directing their reinstatement on the post held by them alongwith continuity in service. 2. The facts in brief are that it is the case of the petitioners that the respondent no.1-Society is running a technical workshop for physically handicapped persons. The petitioners came to be appointed on 18.04.1995 in the said workshop. The petitioner no.1 came to be appointed on the post of Accountant while the petitioner no.2 was appointed as an Instructor. The appointment of the petitioners was on probation for a period of one year. The period of probation was extended for a period of one year. Thereafter on 25.03.1996 their services were approved on permanent basis from 01.07.1996. On 23.09.1996 revised orders came to be issued by the District Social Welfare Officer in which it was stated that if the services of the petitioners were not found to be satisfactory they could be terminated after giving notice of one month. It was also stated that the services would be governed by the Special Code for Schools for handicapped persons (for short, ‘the Special Code’). On 21.03.1997, the respondent no.1-Society terminated the services of the petitioners with effect from 30.04.1997. It was stated that since the petitioners did not render satisfactory services during the period of probation, their services were being terminated. Being aggrieved, the petitioners filed a complaint under Section 28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short, ‘the said Act’). According to the petitioners, the orders of termination were illegal and hence they were entitled for reinstatement. The provisions of Item 1 of Schedule IV to the said Act were invoked. In the written statement as filed, the entitlement of the petitioners was denied. It was also pleaded that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and that the remedy available to the petitioners was under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (for short, ‘the Act of 1977’). In the written statement as filed, the entitlement of the petitioners was denied. It was also pleaded that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and that the remedy available to the petitioners was under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (for short, ‘the Act of 1977’). The Labour Court after considering the entire material on record held that the petitioners were entitled for necessary reliefs in view of the fact that the orders of termination were in violation of the provisions of Sections 25F and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, ‘the Act of 1947’). After holding that the Labour Court had jurisdiction, the complaint was allowed and the relief of reinstatement with continuity of service came to be granted. The respondent nos.1 and 2 preferred revision application and the Industrial Court held that the petitioners had remedy under provisions of the Act of 1977 and therefore it was not permissible for the Labour Court to have exercised jurisdiction. The revision application was thus allowed and the complaint was dismissed. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition. 3. Ms Kalpana K. Pathak, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Industrial Court erred in coming to the conclusion that the services of the petitioners were governed by the provisions of the Act of 1977. She submitted that both the petitioners were members of the non-teaching staff and even if their services were governed by the Special Code, the Institution in question was not a private school under provisions of Section 2(20) of the Act of 1977. Referring to various provisions of the Act of 1977, it was submitted that the Director of Social Welfare was not the supervisory Authority and therefore the school in question could not be treated as a private school. The Special Code under which the services of the petitioners were sought to be governed was not a statute and reference to Rule 72(1)(e) of the Special Code in the appointment order would not confer jurisdiction on the School Tribunal. The Special Code under which the services of the petitioners were sought to be governed was not a statute and reference to Rule 72(1)(e) of the Special Code in the appointment order would not confer jurisdiction on the School Tribunal. Referring to the judgment of the Full Bench in Suryakant Sheshrao Panchal Versus Vasantrao Naik Vimukta Jati, Bhatakya Jamati Aadarsh Prasarak Mandal & Others, (2002) 3 CurLR 351 it was submitted that unless the school in question is a private school within the meaning of Section 2(20) of the Act of 1977, the question of invoking jurisdiction of the School Tribunal would not arise. She further submitted that in Writ Petition No.999 of 2014 [Rashtra Sant Tukdoji Maharaj Technical Education Sanstha Versus Prashant Manikrao Kubitkar] decided on 06.08.2015, the respondent nos.1 and 2 had sought to raise a similar challenge that the workman therein was not governed by the provisions of the Act of 1947. Said contention was turned down and the adjudication under the Act of 1947 was upheld. Said jurisdictional aspect was not interfered with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court wherein the said judgment was challenged. It was then submitted that as held in Miss A.Sudarambal Versus Government of Goa, Daman and Diu & Others, (1988) SCC(L&S) 892, an educational institution has to be treated as an ‘Industry’ and as the petitioners were members of the non-teaching staff they had rightly invoked the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It was their grievance that the procedure laid under the provisions of Sections 25F and 25G of the Act of 1947 had not been complied with and termination of services in violation thereof amounted to an unfair labour practice. The learned counsel relied upon the decision in Krishan Prasad Gupta Versus Controller, Printing & Stationery, (1996) 1 SCC 69 and Pramodini Patkar Versus Hon.Secretary, M/s Indian Cancer Society & Another, (1992) 65 FLR 394 in support of her contentions. While the Labour Court had appropriately considered the jurisdictional aspect, the Industrial Court erred in reversing that aspect. It was thus submitted that the order passed by the Industrial Court was liable to be set aside and the petitioners were entitled for the relief of reinstatement with continuity in service. 4. Shri S.S. Ghate, learned counsel for the respondent nos.1 and 2 opposed aforesaid submissions. It was thus submitted that the order passed by the Industrial Court was liable to be set aside and the petitioners were entitled for the relief of reinstatement with continuity in service. 4. Shri S.S. Ghate, learned counsel for the respondent nos.1 and 2 opposed aforesaid submissions. He referred to the appointment orders of both the petitioners and submitted that it was specifically mentioned therein that their services would be governed by the provisions of the Special Code. Having accepted the appointment orders, it was not permissible for the petitioners to make a grievance as regards absence of jurisdiction of the School Tribunal. Referring to the orders of termination, it was submitted that the same were issued in terms of the orders of appointment itself especially when the services of the petitioners were not found to be satisfactory during probation. Referring to the complaint as filed, it was submitted that there were no pleadings therein that the petitioners were workmen or that the Institution where they were serving was an ‘Industry’. He submitted that there was no question of breach of the provisions of Sections 25F and 25G of the Act of 1947. He also referred to the pleadings in the written statement to urge that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court had been specifically challenged. He also referred to Rule 72 of the Special Code in which it was stated that an employee could be removed from services if it was found that his services were not satisfactory. It was then submitted without prejudice that even the Labour Court did not record any finding that the petitioners had completed services for a period of more than 240 days. The Institution in question was receiving grant-in-aid and therefore it was not an ‘Industry’. Referring to the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act of 1947, it was submitted that the appointment of the petitioners came to an end in terms of orders of appointment and therefore they were not entitled for any relief whatsoever. It was thus submitted that the Industrial Court rightly came to the conclusion that the jurisdiction vested with the School Tribunal under Section 9 of the Act of 1977 and that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction. It was thus submitted that the Industrial Court rightly came to the conclusion that the jurisdiction vested with the School Tribunal under Section 9 of the Act of 1977 and that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions in Most.Rev.P.M.A. Metropolitan & Others Versus Moran Mar Marthoma & Another, (1995) AIR SC 2001, Narendra Dev Versus The Labour Court, Bikaner & Another, (1996) 2 CurLR 691, Krishnadevaraya Education Trust Versus L.A. Balakrishna, (2001) 1 CurLR 534, Oshiar Prasad & Others Versus Employers in Relation to Management of Sudamdih Coal Washery of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., Dhanbad, Jharkhand, (2015) 5 MhLJ 554, Nagpur District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. Versus Prashant Ashokrao Salunke & Another, (2016) 1 MhLJ 706 , Rashtrasant Tukadoji Maharaj Nagpur University & Another Versus Hon ble Member, Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Nagpur Bench & Others, (2016) 2 MhLJ 454 and Ajit Rameshkumar Patni & Another Versus Dr.Vijay Sarathi, (2017) 4 MhLJ 773 . 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and I have also gone through the documents placed on record. The petitioners were appointed on 18.04.1995 initially for a period of one year on probation. On completion of that period of probation, fresh orders of appointment came to be issued for a further period of one year. In the orders of appointment, it was stated that the same was subject to the provisions of the Special Code. The services of the petitioners came to be approved by the District Social Welfare Officer. The order of approval came to be modified on 23.09.1996 and it was stated that if the conduct of the concerned employees was found to be not satisfactory, their services would be put to an end after giving one months notice. Further the provisions of the Special Code for employees of schools imparting education to handicapped children would be applicable. In the complaint as filed, it was pleaded by the petitioners that the establishment was governed by the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 and that the provisions of the Model Standing Orders were applicable to the workshops where the petitioners were working. It was further pleaded that the orders of termination were arbitrary and without complying with the provisions of Sections 25F and 25G of the Act of 1947. It was further pleaded that the orders of termination were arbitrary and without complying with the provisions of Sections 25F and 25G of the Act of 1947. In response thereto, the respondent nos.1 and 2 took the stand that since the services of the petitioners were governed by the Special Code, the provisions of the Act of 1977 were attracted due to which the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to decide the complaint. 6. For the purposes of considering this aspect of the matter, it would be necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act of 1977. Under provisions of Section 2(20) of the Act of 1977, a private school means a recognized school established or administered by a management other than the Government or a Local Authority. Section 2(21) defines the expression ‘recognized’ to mean recognized by the Director, the Divisional Board or the State Board. Section 2(6) defines the expression ‘Director’ to mean the Director of Education or the Director of Technical Education. Section 2(4) of the said Act defines ‘Department’ to mean the Education Department of the Government of Maharashtra. In the present case, the appointments of the petitioners were approved by the Director of Social Welfare, Nagpur. Similarly, revised orders were issued by the District Social Welfare Officer. The Department of Social Welfare is distinct from the Department of Education. Similarly, there is no involvement of the Director of Education as contemplated by the provisions of Section 2(6) of the Act of 1977. It can thus be seen that the vital ingredients for treating the Institution run by the respondent no.1 as a private school defined by Section 2(20) of the said Act is not satisfied. The provisions of the Act of 1977 would be applicable only to private schools as defined in view of provisions of Section 3(1) of the Act of 1977. It is thus clear from the aforesaid definitions that the respondent no.2-Institution was not a private school under the provisions of the Act of 1977. The Full Bench in Suryakant Sheshrao Panchal (supra) has held in clear terms that a school which does not fall within the ambit of the term ‘private school’ would not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the School Tribunal under Section 9 of the Act of 1977. The Full Bench in Suryakant Sheshrao Panchal (supra) has held in clear terms that a school which does not fall within the ambit of the term ‘private school’ would not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the School Tribunal under Section 9 of the Act of 1977. In other words, unless the school in question is a private school as required by the Act of 1977, the question of its employees invoking the jurisdiction of the School Tribunal under Section 9 for redressal of their grievances would not arise. Mere reference to the services of the petitioners being governed by the Special Code would not confer jurisdiction on the School Tribunal. Unless the school in question is a ‘private school’ there is no question of its employees approaching the School Tribunal. By way of such administrative instructions/Special Code, jurisdiction cannot be conferred on the School Tribunal especially when the Institution in question is not a ‘private school’. The learned Judge of the Industrial Court erred in referring to the provisions of Rule 72(1)(b) of the Special Code. Rule 72 by itself can hardly be the basis of conferring jurisdiction on the School Tribunal in respect of an Institution that is not a ‘private school’. In the light of the provisions of the Act of 1977, it is found that the learned Judge of the Industrial Court misdirected himself for holding that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. 7. Another aspect of the matter is that the respondent nos.1 and 2 in Writ Petition No.999 of 2014 had raised a similar plea as to it not being an ‘Industry’. The facts therein indicate that an Instructor appointed by the respondent nos.1 and 2 had invoked the jurisdiction of the Labour Court being aggrieved by the order of termination. It was held that the said Instructor therein was a Workman under Section 2(s) of the Act of 1947 and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was rightly invoked. The order of reinstatement was maintained. This decision was challenged by the respondent nos.1 and 2 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Considering the short span of service rendered by the Workman therein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed payment of monetary compensation of Rupees One Lakh in lieu of reinstatement without back wages. The order of reinstatement was maintained. This decision was challenged by the respondent nos.1 and 2 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Considering the short span of service rendered by the Workman therein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed payment of monetary compensation of Rupees One Lakh in lieu of reinstatement without back wages. However, the aspect of jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the proceedings at the instance of the Workman therein was not disturbed. It is therefore not permissible now for the respondent nos.1 and 2 to contend that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was wrongly invoked by the petitioners especially when the petitioner no.2 is also an Instructor. It is thus held that the finding recorded by the Industrial Court that the petitioners ought to have invoked the jurisdiction of the School Tribunal is an erroneous finding and is liable to be set aside. 8. The contention sought to be raised by the respondent nos.1 and 2 as to the absence of any plea with regard to jurisdiction being raised by the petitioners also cannot be accepted. On a reading of the complaint as a whole, it is clear that the petitioners had stated that it was the Labour Court which had jurisdiction. Hence, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondent nos.1 and 2 on the observations in Most. Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan (supra) would not be useful. It is seen that the Labour Court has recorded a clear finding that both the petitioners were Workmen as defined by Section 2(s) of the Act of 1947. Further there was breach of the provisions of Sections 25F and 25G of the Act of 1947. A further finding has been recorded in paragraph 18 of the judgment of the Labour Court that the complainants had rendered continuous services for more than 240 days. The Industrial Court however has reversed the order of the Labour court merely on the aspect of lack of jurisdiction. The other aspects on the basis of which the petitioners were held entitled for the relief have not been considered by the Industrial Court. Once it is found that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was rightly invoked by the petitioners, it would be necessary to direct the Industrial Court to reconsider the revision application on its merits on the basis that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was rightly invoked. Once it is found that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was rightly invoked by the petitioners, it would be necessary to direct the Industrial Court to reconsider the revision application on its merits on the basis that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was rightly invoked. Since no findings in that regard have been recorded by the Industrial Court such exercise would be necessary. 9. In that view of the matter, the following order is passed:- I. The judgment of the Industrial Court dated 02.05.2009 in Revision (ULPN) No.41 of 2008 is set aside. II. The proceedings in the revision application are restored before the Industrial Court for being adjudicated on its own merits. III. For such purpose, the parties shall appear before the Industrial Court on 02.05.2019. The Industrial Court shall decide the revision application expeditiously and preferably within a period of four months from that date. IV. It is clarified that this Court has not examined the correctness of the findings recorded by the Labour Court on the merits of the dispute. The revision application shall be decided on its own merits and in accordance with law. V. All contentions on the merits of the dispute other than the jurisdictional aspect are kept open for being urged before the Industrial Court. 10. The Writ Petition is accordingly allowed. Rule is made absolute in aforesaid terms. The parties are left to bear their own costs.