JUDGMENT : S.K.Medhi, J. A judgment and order dated 29.11.2016 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Nalbari in Sessions case No. 50/2007 is the subject matter in this appeal. By the impugned judgment, the appellant has been convicted under Sections 302/447/323 read with 34 of the IPC and has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. Five Thousand and in the default of which, further simple imprisonment for another 2 (two) months for the offence under Section 302 and also to undergo simple imprisonment respectively for one month for the offence under Sections 447 and 323 of the IPC with the condition that all the offences where to run concurrently. 2. Before delving into the impugned judgment, a brief narration of the facts would be necessary. i. An Ejahar was lodged on 21.09.2005 by one Smti Surujmoni Murmu (PW-1) before the Tamulpur Police Station against the accused appellant and some others alleging that on the mid night of 20.09.2005, the present appellant along with other two persons had trespassed into the house of the informant and assaulted her husband Shri Pulice Murmu by sharp weapon in various parts of his body. It has also been alleged that while informant had tried to resist, she was also assaulted causing injuries on her back. On hearing hue and cry, the landlord along with other people of the neighborhood came out when the miscreant fled away. The injured husband was taken to the Tamulpur Police Station and then to the Tamulpur Public Health Centre and had advanced to GMCH, Guwahati. However, unfortunately, he succumbed on the way to Guwahati. On the basis of the said Ejahar, the Tamulpur P.S. Case No. 122/2005 was registered. The offence in question being triable by the Court of Sessions, the same was committed to the learned Sessions Judge, Nalbari. ii. The prosecution side adduced evidence through 13 numbers of PW s. Though it appears that the I.O. of the case was examined as CW-1, it appears that there was some mistake in naming of the witnesses. After the examination of the witnesses were over, the appellant was given a scope to explain under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. The defence however, did not adduce any evidence. iii. After the examination of the witnesses were over, the appellant was given a scope to explain under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. The defence however, did not adduce any evidence. iii. The learned Sessions Judge after considering the materials on records has passed the judgment dated 29.11.2016, which is the subject matter of the present appeal. 3. We have heard Shri Madhurya Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellant. We have also heard Shri M. Phukan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam. The records of the case have also been produced before us, which we have carefully perused. 4. Shri Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the charge was framed against the appellant along with two other persons. However, by the impugned judgment, benefit of doubt has been given to the said two other persons and they were accordingly acquitted. The learned counsel submits that since, the benefit of doubt is based on the same set of evidence, the appellant is entitled to the similar treatment and therefore, the conviction is not sustainable in law. 5. The second major ground of challenge is that the prosecution s case is mainly dependent upon the evidence of PW-1, who is the informant and described to be the eye witness. However, the learned counsel submits that there are many inconsistencies in the statement of the PW-1 when compared to her versions in the FIR and the one made under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. Since the version made by the witness differs from time to time, the question would arise regarding her credibility and therefore, based upon the sole evidence of PW-1 the conviction cannot sustain. 6. Shri Choudhury further submits that the allegations of PW-1 herself suffering injuries by the hand of the appellant is wholly uncorroborated with any medical evidence, therefore, the conviction under Section 323 is wholly unsustainable. Shri Choudhury fairly submits that there is no dispute with the proposition of law that it is the quality of the evidence and not the quantity and in the instant case however, in the instant case the sole eye witness is itself varying from time to time and therefore, the conviction made on the basis of her statement is wholly unsustainable. 7. 7. On the other hand, Shri M. Phukan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam submits that the conviction is based upon cogent materials which would lead to the sole conclusion about the guilt of the appellant and therefore, there is no scope of interference by the appellate Court with the said judgment. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that the informant who is the wife of the deceased was not only an eye witness but also injured in the assault and therefore, there should not arise any doubt regarding the veracity of her statement. He further submits that the PW-1 was not confronted at the time of her deposition with her statement made earlier under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., and therefore, the issue of so-called inconsistencies with such statement cannot be raised now. Regarding the inconsistencies in the statement made in the FIR and her deposition, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that the inconsistencies is absolutely minor and when the informant was herself injured and was in state of shock on the death of her husband, such inconsistencies are normal and liable to be overlooked and that could not be a material for consideration of the present appeal. He further submits that the Ejahar is the brief narration of the incident for setting the criminal law into the motion and need not contain all minute details of the matter. 8. To appreciate the rival contentions of the learned counsels, let us examine the evidence led by the prosecution to prove the case. (a) PW-1, Smti Surujmoni Murmu, is the wife of the deceased. She deposed that on the fateful night, when she and her husband (deceased) had to go out of their house on hearing certain sounds made by the cows which were in the cowshed, she had seen the present appellant assaulting her husband on his head, both sides of the abdomen, near the nose and various part of his body by a Khukri. She reiterated of seeing the appellant cut her husband with a Khukri from the flashlight which she had carried. She further deposed that she was herself attacked on her back for which she had suffered injuries. She had further seen the other two accused namely, Sunil Mardi and Narayan Tudu at the place of occurrence. She reiterated of seeing the appellant cut her husband with a Khukri from the flashlight which she had carried. She further deposed that she was herself attacked on her back for which she had suffered injuries. She had further seen the other two accused namely, Sunil Mardi and Narayan Tudu at the place of occurrence. It has further been deposed that during the hue and cry, the landlord Satyanath Kalita (PW-4) had come out along with other people when the accused appellant and other persons fled away. She had also narrated that the deceased was immediately taken to the Tamulpur Public Health Centre via Tamulpur Police Station and had been taken to Guwahati for treatment. However, on the way her husband succumbed to his injuries and after that the Ejahar was lodged. She had also stated that her statement was recorded before the Judicial Magistrate that because of certain land dispute with the appellant, the appellant had killed her husband. She deposed that on the date when the incident had taken place, it was moonlit night. As indicated above, the cross examination does not reflect that she was confronted with her earlier statement made under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. where there is any alleged inconsistencies. No question also appears to have been put to her regarding any so called inconsistencies with the narration made in the FIR. (b) PW-2, Shri Robin Murmu, is the brother of the deceased. Though he claims to have been present at the time of occurrence, he is not the eye witness to the occurrence and rather admits that he could not recognize the assailants. He was produced as PW as he was the signatory in the case records. (c) PW-3, is one Kalicharan Deka, who is a neighbor. He stated that he had come to the place of occurrence on hearing hue and cry and saw that the deceased in injured condition with cut marks on his body. The said PW-3 who was the pharmacist also states that he had given some primary treatment in his pharmacy so that the deceased could be taken to the hospital. The said witness is neither an eye witness nor he knows anything about the incident. (d) PW-4 is Shri Satyanath Kalita (the landlord) deposed that the deceased and his family were his tenant. The said witness is neither an eye witness nor he knows anything about the incident. (d) PW-4 is Shri Satyanath Kalita (the landlord) deposed that the deceased and his family were his tenant. He deposed that on hearing the hue and cry of PW-1 that somebody was killing them, he had come to the place of occurrence and saw that the deceased lying in injurious condition having blood around his body. However, he admits that he did not see anybody who committed the offence. He further corroborated with the version of the PW-1 that she was also injured at her back while trying to resist the assault on her husband. Though, the said PW-4 was not an eye witness, he stated that he overheard the deceased telling his wife that the appellant is involved in the assault. The said statement is also supported by his statement in cross examination that the name of the appellant was mentioned by the deceased. (e) PW-5, Smti Monika Kalita (landlady), PW-6, Shri Gokul Kalita who was the domestic help in the house, PW-7, Shri Keshab Thakuria who is the neighbor and PW-8, Shri Sukuram Malakar are the fellow villagers who had come on hearing the hue and cry and therefore, their deposition are not required to be examined in detail. (f) PW-9, Shri Dilip Bhuyan is a seizure witness. (g) PW-10, Shri Umesh Thakuria is also a neighbor who stated that he was present at the place of occurrence after the incident had taken place and later on came to know from the wife of the deceased (PW-1) that the present appellant along with two other youths had committed the offence. Admittedly, no incriminating statements have been made by the said PW-10. (h) PW-11, Shri Maneswar Das had also reached at the place of occurrence on hearing hue and cry and could learn from the villagers about the incident. He had further deposed that as no doctors were available at that time, one pharmacist was taken to the house of the deceased. He further deposed that later on he heard that the deceased had succumbed to his injuries on his way to the hospital. (i) PW-12 is the Doctor, who had conducted post mortem upon the deceased. The following external injuries were found in the body of the deceased: A young male body of average height and built. Rigor mortis present. He further deposed that later on he heard that the deceased had succumbed to his injuries on his way to the hospital. (i) PW-12 is the Doctor, who had conducted post mortem upon the deceased. The following external injuries were found in the body of the deceased: A young male body of average height and built. Rigor mortis present. Body stained with blood. Injuries are1. Incised wound over left chest below left axilla. Size 18cm x3cm x1cm. 2. Incised wound over left scapular region. Size 12cm x 3 cm x 1cm. 3. Incised wound over frontal area. Size 16cm x 2cm. 4. Incised wound over right parietal area extending up to right zygomatic area. Size 15 x 2 x 1 cm Scalp, skull and vertebrae-fracture frontal bone, fracture of right parietal, right bon orbit and right zygomatic bone Membrane of the brain are lacerated. Brain matter of frontal lofer and part of right parietal bone are lacerated, mixed with blood which could not wash out with water. Thorax-Multiple rib fracture in left chest. Pleurae are lacerated, Larynx and trach are Healthy, Left lung lacerated. As per the opinion of the doctor, the death was caused by multiple injuries of vital organs like brain and left lung which are of ante mortem in nature. (j) PW-13 is the I.O. of the case namely S.I. Md. Habibuddin Ahmed. He deposed that on receipt of Ejahar, the same was registered and he started the investigation. The inquest was done by an Executive Magistrate and the said report was exhibited as Ext. No. 1. The relevant materials which were available in the site were seized. The seizure reports were prepared in the presence of the witnesses and the said witnesses were also examined as PWs in the case. The statements of the wife and the brother of the deceased were recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and after completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was prepared by the S.I. Sanjib Gogoi, which was forwarded to the learned Court. After the statements of the PWs were recorded, the appellant was given a scope to explain under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. Though, the appellant has apparently denied his involvement, against the question No. 7, the following answer was given; Q7. What do you have to say? Ans: I am absolutely innocent. PW1 and other witnesses have adduced false evidence. I am not involved with the incident. What do you have to say? Ans: I am absolutely innocent. PW1 and other witnesses have adduced false evidence. I am not involved with the incident. In 2005, a communal clash had taken place between the Bodos and the Muslims in our locality. At that time some brothers of Bodo community, asked Pulice Murmu to make some bows and arrows. We are Saontal (Santhal) people. The Saontal people of our village assaulted Police Murmu since he made bows and arrows for the Bodo people. After the incident, the police asked Surujmoni Murmu(PW-1) at the P.S. whom he had enmity with. The PW 1 mentioned our names before the Police(IO) since we had enmity with them since before. Accordingly, police held us accused. The deceased had suit against us over land. PW1 has adduced false evidence following former grudge over a land suit. 9. Let us now examine the grounds urged by the learned counsel for the appellant. i. As regards the first ground that two other persons have been given the benefit of doubt under same set of evidence, we are of the opinion that the said ground cannot be taken as the matter of course as the evidence are to be examined with regard to the involvement of the particular accused. In the instant case, the learned Sessions Court has come to a categorical finding that the prosecution has failed to prove the case qua, the other two accused namely Sunil Mardi and Narayan Tudu beyond reasonable doubt. A careful exercise of the materials before us, mainly the examination of the witnesses, there is no allegation of the involvement of the other two accused in the assault except a passing reference that they were seen at the place of occurrence. Even the same eye witness (PW-1) has not made any specific allegation other than making a statement on seeing the aforesaid two accused at the place of occurrence. In absence of any materials against the two accused, the conviction against them could not have been sustainable and the said reason cannot be a ground for interference with the impugned judgment. Rather, we are required to examine as to whether there are sufficient materials to come to a finding of the guilt of the appellant before us. ii. In the instant case, PW-1 is admittedly the sole eye witness. Rather, we are required to examine as to whether there are sufficient materials to come to a finding of the guilt of the appellant before us. ii. In the instant case, PW-1 is admittedly the sole eye witness. The said PW-1 in more than one occasion categorically named the present appellant and his direct involvement in the assault committed upon her husband. The credibility of the said PW-1 attains further significance as she herself was injured while she was trying to resist the assault on her husband and the said fact has been corroborated by other witnesses. Though the medical report of this witness which was a part of the charge-sheet ought to have been exhibited, the testimony of the PW-1 being corroborated by other PWs, there is no ground to disbelieve the said PW-1 regarding her injuries. iii. As the matter abundant caution, the records which are placed before us are also examined and it appears that the allegation of suffering injuries in the assault by the PW-1 is a part of the records. According to the opinion of the Senior Medical Health Officer, Tamulpur Public Health Centre, the PW-1 had suffered simple fresh injuries caused by blunt weapon. It appears that the examination of the PW-1 by the doctor was done on 21.09.2005 at 2 am which matches with the incident in question. iv. The second ground urged by Shri Choudhury is the so called inconsistencies in the narration of PW-1 in her deposition made under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and in the FIR. v. As has been discussed above, the statement of the PW-1 made under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was not exhibited and conviction is not passed on the basis of the said statement. Further, the appellant did not confront the witnesses by any such inconsistencies with her statement made under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., while he had deposed on PW-1. However, a reading of the FIR and her statement as PW-1 does not reveal that there is any major inconsistencies and inconsistencies whatsoever, are absolutely minor and is natural when the informant (PW-1) was herself injured in the incident and was in state of shock as her husband was killed in front of her own eyes. One may gainfully refer to the decision rendered by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the Case of Putchelepalli Naresh Reddy Vs. One may gainfully refer to the decision rendered by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the Case of Putchelepalli Naresh Reddy Vs. State of A.P., (2014) 12 SCC 457 that minor discrepancy cannot take away the substratum of the testimony of an witness who himself was injured in the assault. In view of above, we are not in a position to accept the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant that the impugned judgment is not sustained in this ground. 10. It is a settled law that it is the quality of the evidence and not the quantity which will depend while coming to a conclusion in a trial. The Apex Court in the case of Chitter Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 6 SCC 397 , in paragraph 7 of the said judgment held as follows; ....The other plea was that conviction should not have been made on the basis of a single witness (PW3)'s testimony. This plea is equally without essence. The legislative recognition of the fact that no particular number of witnesses can be insisted upon is amply reflected in Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'Evidence Act'). Administration of justice can be affected and hampered if number of witnesses were to be insisted upon. It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of unknown occurrence where determination of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If plurality of witnesses would have been the legislative intent cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available, in number of crimes offender would have gone unpunished. It is the quality of evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be tested on the touchstone of credibility and reliability. If the testimony is found to be reliable, there is no legal impediment to convict the accused on such proof. It is the quality and not the quantity of evidence which is necessary for proving or disproving a fact. This position has been settled by a series of decisions. The first decision which has become locus classicus is Mohamad Gugal Esa Mamasan Ger Alalah v. The King, (1946) AIR PC 3). It is the quality and not the quantity of evidence which is necessary for proving or disproving a fact. This position has been settled by a series of decisions. The first decision which has become locus classicus is Mohamad Gugal Esa Mamasan Ger Alalah v. The King, (1946) AIR PC 3). The Privy Council focused on the difference between English Law where a number of statutes make conviction impermissible for certain categories of offences on the testimony of a single witness and Section 134 of Evidence Act. The view has been echoed in Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras, (1957) AIR SC 614), Guli Chand and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, (1974) AIR SC 276), Vahula Bhushan alias Vehuna Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1989) AIR SC 236), Jagdish Prasad and Ors. v. State of M.P., (1994) AIR SC 1251), and Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar, (1996) 1 SCC 614 ). 11. In the instant case, though there is only one eye witness, the deposition of the said eye witness is found to be credible, trustworthy and sufficient to maintain the conviction. It is also required to be kept in mind that the said eye witness was herself the victim of the assault and had suffered injuries while resist the murder assault upon her husband by the appellant. In the instant case, nothing has been able to be shown which would lead us to doubt the credibility of the testimony of the PW-1. The material on records also does not persuade us to doubt the said testimony and rather the testimony appears to be trustworthy and credible. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we are of the view that the impugned judgment does not suffer from any infirmity and no case for interference has been able to be made out. 13. Accordingly, the criminal appeal stands dismissed. 14. Send back the LCR along with a copy of this judgment to the learned Sessions Judge, Nalbari for onward transmission to the appellant.