ORDER : The petitioner herein has been arrayed as the sole accused in the impugned Anx.A Crime No.513/2019 of Wadakkanchery Police Station, Thrissur for offences punishable under Sections 341, 323, 353, 354 and 506 of the IPC. The said crime has been registered on the basis of the First Information Statement given by the lady defacto complainant on 08.09.2019 at about 6.30 P.M in respect of the alleged incidents which have happened on the previous day (07.09.2019) at about 11.00 A.M in the morning. 2. The prosecution case in short is that the petitioner is a member of the Board of Directors of the Wadakkancherry Block Multi Purpose Co-operative Society and that the lady defacto complainant in this case is the Secretary of the said Co-operative Society and that on 07.09.2019 at about 11 A.M a meeting of the Board of directors of the said Co-operative Society was convened and due to lack of quorum the meeting could not be officially met. The petitioner who had come there in connection with the said meeting demanded the lady defacto complainant, who is the Secretary of the said Co-operative Society, that she should give him certain documents for his perusal, which she refused and thereupon he pushed her away and took the files and perused it and had also photographed some of the documents using his mobile phone and that thereby he has obstructed her from discharging her official duty and thereby committed the above said offences, etc. 3. Heard Sri.Ajay Ben Jose, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner (accused) and Sri.Suman Chakravarthy, learned Prosecutor appearing for the respondent -State. 4. Sri.Ajay Ben Jose, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/accused would point out that the abovesaid allegations are false and baseless and further that the petitioner is a founder member of the abovesaid Co-operative Society registered in the year 2002 and that ever since the formation of the said Co-operative Society, the petitioner has been continuously elected as a member of the Board of Directors of the said Co-operative Society and that he has been the Vice President of the said Co-operative Society in the year 2002 and that in the election held in February, 2018 he was again elected as a Director, and the Board of Directors had in turn elected him as the Vice President of the said Cooperative Society. Later, due to political animosity steps were taken on behalf of the Co-operative Society to disqualify the petitioner under Section 44(1)(c) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, on the allegation that he had stood surety for a loan availed by one Thomas on 03.04.2019 from the said Co-operative Society and that the said loanee had committed default and liability accrued, etc. The petitioner was accordingly disqualified by the Joint Registrar, Thrissur, which was challenged by the petitioner before this Court and this Court as per Anx.B judgment dated 26.06.2019 in W.P.(C) No. 15499/2019 had quashed the impugned order and remitted the matter for fresh consideration in accordance with law. Thereafter, the Joint Registrar (General), Co-operative Societies, Thrissur, issued a notice dated 09.08.2019 to the petitioner to appear for personal hearing on 22.08.2019 and in pursuance thereof the petitioner had appeared before the Joint Registrar on 22.08.2019 and Anx.C statement has also been recorded on the same day. Later, the Joint Registrar by Anx.D order dated 23.09.2019 had disqualified the petitioner for the post of Director of the said Co-operative Society. Further that, the First Information Statement given by none other than the Secretary of the said Cooperative Society would make it clear that the meeting in question was convened on 07.09.2019 which is well after Anx.C recording of statement of the petitioner on 22.08.2019 and therefore there is no necessity for the petitioner to get any documents in relation to the above disqualifying proceedings and the allegations in the impugned First Information Statement has been made only at the behest of the rival faction in the said Co-operative Society, who have instigated the Secretary to raise a false allegation against the petitioner. Further, that a bare reading of the First Information Statement would make it clear like the daylight that the allegations therein will not disclose the offence of Section 354 of the IPC, which is in relation to violating the modesty of the woman. Further, that a bare reading of the First Information Statement would make it clear like the daylight that the allegations therein will not disclose the offence of Section 354 of the IPC, which is in relation to violating the modesty of the woman. Further that, the Secretary of a Co-operative Society like the Wadakkancherry Block Multi Purpose Co-operative Society, which has been registered under the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act and Rules framed thereunder will not fulfill the definition of 'Public Servant' as understood in Section 21 of the IPC and therefore the offence as per Section 353 of the IPC (which deals with assault or criminal force to deter a public servant from discharge of his duty) will not apply in this case. Section 353 of the IPC comes under the class of offences dealing with criminal force and assault under the Chapter XVI of the IPC, etc. Further it is argued that even if offence as per Section 353 of the IPC is disclosed in this case, the custodial interrogation of the petitioner is not necessary for effectuating the smooth and proper conduct of the investigation, as is discernible from the facts narrated herein above. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner also would point out that, if it is held that the Secretary or other employees of a Co-Operative Society registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 is to be treated as a 'public servant' in terms of Section 21 of the IPC, then employees of other privately controlled Societies like those registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, the Travancore Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1986 or Central Societies Registration Act etc will also have to be treated as 'public servant' as understood in Section 21 of the IPC, which will have far reaching and illogical consequences. 6. Sri.Suman Chakravarthy, learned Prosecutor has opposed the plea for anticipatory bail and has also filed a statement on behalf of the Investigating Officer. It is contended that, the Secretary of a Cooperative Society like the instant one would fulfill the definition of 'Public Servant' as understood in Section 21 (Clause Twelfth) thereof and therefore the offence as per Section 353 of the IPC is brought out in this case, etc. 7. It is contended that, the Secretary of a Cooperative Society like the instant one would fulfill the definition of 'Public Servant' as understood in Section 21 (Clause Twelfth) thereof and therefore the offence as per Section 353 of the IPC is brought out in this case, etc. 7. One of the issue thus raised in this case is as to whether the Secretary of the abovesaid Co-operative Society would fulfill the definition of 'Public Servant' as understood in Section 21 of the IPC, more particularly clause Twelfth (b) thereof which reads as follows. “21. “Public Servant”.-The words “Public Servant” denote a person falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following; namely :- [***] [(Twelfth) - Every person- (a) x x x x (b) in the service or pay of a local authority, a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act or a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956).] Illustration A Municipal Commissioner is a public servant. Explanation 1.-Persons falling under any of the above descriptions are public servants, whether appointed by the Government or not. Explanation 2.-Wherever the words “Public Servant” occur, they shall be understood of every person who is in actual possession of the situation of a public servant, whatever legal defect there may be in his right to hold that situation. [Explanation 3.-The word “election” denotes an election for the purpose of selecting members of any legislative, municipal or other public authority, of whatever character, the method of selection to which is by, or under, any law prescribed as by election.] 8. Section 9 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 stipulates that the registration as a Co-operative Society shall render it a body Corporate by the name under which it is registered, having perpetual succession and a common seal and with power to hold property, enter in to contracts, institute and defend suits and other legal proceedings and do all things necessary for the purposes for which it was constituted, etc. 9. The Apex Court has held in decisions as in S.S.Dhanoa Vs. 9. The Apex Court has held in decisions as in S.S.Dhanoa Vs. Municipal Corporation, Delhi and Others [ 1981 (3) SCC 431 ] that a Co-operative Society registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 even if it is a 'body corporate' by virtue of the provisions of the said Co-operative Societies Act, cannot be treated as a “Corporation established by or under an Act” as envisaged in clause Twelfth (b) of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Hence, it was held by the Apex Court that the employee concerned (General Manager) of the Co-operative Society involved in that case cannot be treated as a 'Public Servant' as understood in clause Twelfth (b) of Section 21 of the IPC. In the said decision, the Apex Court dealt with a case involving a Co-operative Society registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925. The appellant therein was a member of the IAS and was a Joint Commissioner (State Liaison) in the Ministry of Agriculture and by a notification issued by the Government of India, the services of the appellant therein were placed at the disposal of the Department of Cooperation, for his appointment as the General Manager Super Bazaar of the said Co-Operative Society at the material time. The Municipal Corporation later filed a complaint against the appellant and other officials of the said Co-operative Societies Super Bazaar and as also against the manufacturer of the food item, etc for offences as per Section 7 read with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. At the trial, the appellant therein raised a preliminary objection that the cognizance of the case by the Metropolitan Magistrate was barred under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as he was a 'Public Servant' within the meaning of clause Twelfth of Section 21 of the IPC. The learned Magistrate and the High Court had rejected the said plea of the appellant. 10. The learned Magistrate and the High Court had rejected the said plea of the appellant. 10. The Apex Court in the said decision noted that Section 23 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act provides that :- “The registration of the Society shall render it a body corporate by the name under which it is registered, with perpetual succession and a common seal and with power to hold property and to enter into contracts, to institute and defend suits and other legal proceedings and to do all things necessary for the purposes of its Constitution.” The Central Government held more than 97 per cent shares in the total share holding of the Society. The Central Government had given advance by loan to the tune of Rs. 40,00,000/- to the said Society for establishment and management of Super Bazaars, etc. 11. The Apex Court held in Para 8 of the said decision in S. S. Dhanoas' Case (Supra) that a Corporation is an artificial being created by law having a legal entity, entirely separate and distinct from the individuals who compose it with the capacity of continuous existence and succession, notwithstanding changes in its membership, and in addition thereto, to possess the capacity, as such legal entity of taking, holding and conveying property, entering into contracts, suing and being sued and exercising such other powers and privileges as may be conferred on it by the law of its creation just as a natural person may. 12. Further it has been held by the Apex Court in Paragraphs 7, 9 and 10 thereof, that the expression 'corporation' must, in the context of clause Twelfth (b) of Section 21 of the IPC, mean a corporation created by the Legislature and not a body or society brought into existence by an act of a group of individuals and the Apex Court clearly held therein that clause Twelfth of Section 21 of the IPC does not use the words 'body corporate' as is used in Section 23 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act and a Co-operative Society is, therefore, not a corporation established by or under an Act of the Central or State Legislature as understood in the context of clause Twelfth (b) of Section 21 of the IPC. It was held that the Co-operative Store Ltd. is not a statutory body because it is not created by a Statute. It was held that the Co-operative Store Ltd. is not a statutory body because it is not created by a Statute. It is a body created by an act of group of individuals in accordance with the provisions of a Statute like the Co-operative Societies Act. It may be profitable to refer to paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the above said decisions of the Apex Court in S.S.Dhanoas' Case (Supra) [ 1981 (3) SCC 431 ] which reads as follows: “7. Clause Twelfth of s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code protects two classes of public servants, viz., (a) every person in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the Government, and (b) every person in the service or pay of a local authority, a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act or a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. The appellant does not answer any of these descriptions. During his period of deputation, he was not an officer in the service or pay of the Government, nor was he in the service of a local authority, a corporation established by or under an Act or a Government company. It is, however, urged that the expression 'corporation' appearing in sub-cl. (b) of cl. Twelfth of s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code is wide enough to include not only a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, but also a body corporate. The submission proceeds on the basis of s. 23 of the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, which reads: 23. The registration of a society shall render it a body corporate by the name under which it is registered, with perpetual succession and a common seal, and with power to hold property, to enter into contracts, to institute and defend suits and other legal proceedings and to do all things necessary for the purposes of its constitution. Clause Twelfth does not use the words "body corporate", and the question is whether the expression "corporation" contained therein, taken in collocation of the words "established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act" would bring within its sweep a cooperative society. Indubitably, the Cooperative Store Limited is not a corporation established by a Central or State Act. Clause Twelfth does not use the words "body corporate", and the question is whether the expression "corporation" contained therein, taken in collocation of the words "established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act" would bring within its sweep a cooperative society. Indubitably, the Cooperative Store Limited is not a corporation established by a Central or State Act. The crux of the matter is whether the word 'under' occurring in cl. Twelfth of s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code makes a difference. Does the mere act of incorporation of a body or society under a Central or a State Act make it a corporation within the meaning of cl. Twelfth of s. 21? In our opinion, the expression 'corporation' must, in the context, mean a corporation created by the Legislature and not a body or society brought into existence by an act of a group of individuals. A cooperative society is, therefore, not a corporation established by or under an Act of the Central or State Legislature. 8. A corporation is an artificial being created by law having a legal entity entirely separate and distinct from the individuals who compose it with the capacity of continuous existence and succession, notwithstanding changes in its membership. In addition, it possesses the capacity as such legal entity of taking, holding and conveying property, entering into contracts, suing and being sued, and exercising such other powers and privileges as may be conferred on it by the law of its creation just as a natural person may. The following definition of corporation was given by Chief Justice Marshall in the celebrated Dartmouth College case : A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only these properties which the charter of its creation, confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created. Among the most important are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality; proper ties, by which a perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the same, and may act as a single individual. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created. Among the most important are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality; proper ties, by which a perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the same, and may act as a single individual. They enable a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold property, without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity, of perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to hand. It is chiefly for the purpose of clothing bodies of men, in A succession, with these qualities and capacities, that corporations were invented, and are in use. By these means, a perpetual succession of individuals are capable of acting for the promotion of the particular object, like one immortal being. The term 'corporation' is, therefore, wide enough to include private corporations. But, in the context of cl. Twelfth of s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code, the expression 'corporation' must be given a narrow legal connotation. 9. Corporation, in its widest sense, may mean any association of individuals entitled to act as an individual. But that certainly is not the sense in which it is used here. Corporation established by or under an Act of Legislature can only mean a body corporate which owes its existence, and not merely its corporate status, to the Act. For example, a Municipality, a Zilla Parishad or a Gram Panchayat owes its existence and status to an Act of Legislature. on the other hand, an association of persons constituting themselves into a Company under the Companies Act or a Society under the Societies Registration Act owes its existence not to the Act of Legislature but to acts of parties though, it may owe its status as a body corporate to an Act of Legislature. 10. There is a distinction between a corporation established by or under an Act and a body incorporated under an Act. The distinction was brought out by this Court in Sukhdev Singh & ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & ors. It was observed: A company incorporated under the Companies Act is not created by the Companies Act but comes into existence in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The distinction was brought out by this Court in Sukhdev Singh & ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & ors. It was observed: A company incorporated under the Companies Act is not created by the Companies Act but comes into existence in accordance with the provisions of the Act. There is thus a well-marked distinction between a body created by a statute and a body which, after coming into existence, is governed in accordance with the provisions of a statute. In Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India and ors the question arose whether the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research which was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, was a statutory body. It was urged that because the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research had government nominees as the President of the body and derived guidance and financial aid from the Government, it was a statutory body. Repelling the contention, the Court observed: [SCC pp.486, 487: SCC (L&S)p.100, para 4]. The Society does not have a statutory character like the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, or the Life Insurance Corporation or Industrial Finance Corporation. It is a society incorporated in accordance with the provisions of the Societies Registration Act. The fact that the Prime Minister is the President or that the Government appoints nominees to the Governing Body or that the Government may terminate the membership will not establish anything more than the fact that the Government takes special care that the promotion, guidance and co-operation of scientific and industrial research, the institution and financing of specific researches, establishment or development and assistance to special institutions or departments of the existing institutions for scientific study of problems affecting particular industry in a trade, the utilisation of the result of the researches conducted under the auspices of the Council towards the development of industries in the country are carried out in a responsible manner. Whatever has been said with regard to the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, which was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, equally applies to the Cooperative Store Limited, which is a society registered under the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925. It is not a statutory body because it is not created by a statute. It is a body created by an act of a group of individuals in accordance with the provisions of a statute.” 13. In State of Maharashtra Vs. It is not a statutory body because it is not created by a statute. It is a body created by an act of a group of individuals in accordance with the provisions of a statute.” 13. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Laljit Rajshi Shah and Others [ 2000 (2) SCC 699 ] the Apex Court dealt with a case where Section 161 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act provided that the officials mentioned therein shall be deemed to be 'Public Servants' within the meaning of Section 21 of the IPC. The Apex Court held in Laljit Rajshi Shah's Case (Supra) that the mere amendment of the provisions contained in the Co-operative Societies Act introducing a legal fiction that the employees concerned shall have to be treated as 'Public Servant' within the meaning of Section 21 of the IPC, will not make such officials public servants as understood in Section 21 of the IPC and for that the State Legislature will have to amend the provisions contained in Section 21 of the IPC by virtue of its legislative competence to make laws in relation to the criminal offences and then adhere to the provisions contained in Section 254(2) of the Constitution of India, etc and only after such amendment made to Section 21 of the IPC in the manner known to law, that such class of employees could be legally treated as 'Public Servant' for the purpose of Section 21 of the IPC. 14. However, the definition 'Public servant' as contained in the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and its subsequent version as per the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 includes a very broadened clause. The Full Bench of this Court in the decisions as in Kochu Devassy and Others v. The State of Kerala [1977 (1) ILR (Kerala) 439] has dealt with a case concerning the applicability of Sections 2 and 3 of the Criminal Law amendment Act 27 of 1962 made by the Kerala State Legislature, whereby certain important amendments were made to the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Sections 2 and 3 of the said amendment act has been referred to in paragraph 12 of the above said Full Bench decision Kochu Devassy's Case (supra) and the same provided as follows: “12. Sections 2 and 3 of the said amendment act has been referred to in paragraph 12 of the above said Full Bench decision Kochu Devassy's Case (supra) and the same provided as follows: “12. Meanwhile, by an amendment effected by the Kerala State Legislature, by Act 27 of 1962, certain important amendments were effected to the Indian Penal Code and to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. As these amendments are important for the purpose of these cases, sections 2 and 3 thereof are quoted in full: “2. Amendment of section 161, Central Act XLV of 1860.-In section 161 of the Indian Penal Code (Central Act XLV of 1860), after the explanation relating to ‘A motive or reward for doing’, the following explanation shall be inserted, namely:-‘public servant’. For purposes of this section and sections 162, 163, 164, 165 and 165A, the words ‘public servant’ shall denote, besides those who are public servants under section 21 or who are deemed to be ‘public servants’ within the meaning of that section under any law for the time being in force, persons falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following, namely:- (i) Every officer in the service or pay the Travancore Devaswom Board or the Cochin Devaswom Board; (ii) Every officer in the service or pay and every member of the Wakfs Board constituted under the Wakfs Act, 1954 (Central Act XXIX of 1954); (iii) The President and every member of a Village Court or Village Panchayat Court; (iv) Every member of the Board of Directors or the executive or managing committee and every officer or servant of a cooperative society registered or deemed to be registered under the law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force; (v) Every member of the governing body and every officer or servant in the service or pay of a society registered under the Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act,1955 or the Societies Registration Act,1860, and receiving aid or grant from the Government; (vi) Every teacher or other officer or servant of the University of Kerala; (vii) Every examiner of a University Examination or a Government Examination; (viii) Every manager or teacher or servant of an educational institution which receive or has received aid or grant from the Government or the University of Kerala.” 3. Amendment of Central Act II of 1947.-In the prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Central Act II of 1947)- (i) for section 2, the following section shall be substituted, namely:- “2. Interpretation-For the purposes of this Act, 'public servant’ shall have the meaning assigned to it under the explanation to section 161 of the Indian Penal Code as amended by the Kerala Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1962”; (ii) in Section 5 A, for the words, figures and letter, “under section 161, section 165 or section 165A,” the words, figures, and letter “under sections 161, 162,163, 164,165 or 165A” shall be substituted; (iii) in sub-section (1) of section 6, after clause (b), the following clause shall be inserted, namely:- “(bb) in the case of a person falling under any descriptions mentioned in items (i) to (viii) in the Explanation relating to ‘public servant’ in section 161 of the Indian Penal Code as amended by the Kerala Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1962, save by or with the sanction of the State Government.” 15. The Full bench held in Kochu Devassy's case (supra) held that taking into account the objects sought to be achieved in the said Amendment Act, it has to be held therein that the term 'Public Servant' effected by Section 2 of the said amendment Act would apply not only in respect of offences as per Sections 161, 162, 163, 164, 165 and 165 A of IPC but also for the purpose of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 as well. 16. Accordingly, the Full bench held in Kochu Devassy's case (supra) that the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Sahadevan v. State of Kerala ( 1976 KLT 134 ) on the same lines is correct. Hence, in view of the above said specific amendments then made, the Full Bench has held that the definition of 'Public Servant' as understood in the said Amendment Act would apply not only in respect of the above said offences as per the Sections 161, 162, 163, 164, 165 and 165 A of IPC but also to the offences as per Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. However the said decision is only in the context of the above enumerated offences as per Chapter IX of the IPC (see 161, 162, 163, 164, 165 or 165A) which comes under the heading 'Offences by or relating to 'Public Servants'. However the said decision is only in the context of the above enumerated offences as per Chapter IX of the IPC (see 161, 162, 163, 164, 165 or 165A) which comes under the heading 'Offences by or relating to 'Public Servants'. Whereas the instant offence as per Section 353 of the IPC which deals with 'Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty' which comes under the heading (Of Criminal force and assault) is in chapter XVI of the IPC. Therefore, the said decision of the Full Bench will not have any effect as far as the definition of 'Public Servant' as per Section 21 of the IPC vis-a-vis Section 353 of the IPC is concerned. 17. However, a more broadened definition has been made by the Legislature in the definition of 'Public Servant' as contained in Section 2 (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which reads as follows: “Section 2(c) “public servant” means,— xxxxx (iii) any person in the service or pay of a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, or an authority or a body owned or controlled or aided by the Government or a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956); xxxxx (ix) any person who is the president, Secretary or other office-bearer of a registered Co-operative society engaged in agriculture, industry, trade or banking, receiving or having received any financial aid from the Central Government or a State Government or from any corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, or any authority or body owned or controlled or aided by the Government or a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956).” 18. In view of the specific provisions in Section 2(c)(ix) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, any person who is the President or Secretary or other office-bearer or a registered Co-operative Society, which is engaged engaged in agriculture, industry, trade or banking, receiving or having received any financial aid from the Central Government or State Government or from any Corporation, etc. would come within the definition of 'Public Servant'. would come within the definition of 'Public Servant'. It has been held by the Apex Court in decisions as in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Rameshwar and Others [ 2009 (11) SCC 424 ], State of Maharashtra and Others vs. Brijlal Sadasukh Modani [2016 (4) SCC 417] that a sprinkle of aid to the Co-operative Society will bring an employee within the definition of 'Public Servant' as far as the definition of 'Public Servant' as per Section 2 (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is concerned. That is an entirely different issue and will have no bearing as far the present question is concerned. Suffice it to say that in view of the afore stated decisions, Secretary or such other employee of the Co-operative Society will not fulfill the definition of 'Public Servant' as understood in Section 21 of the IPC vis-a-vis application to Section 353 of the IPC which comes under Chapter XVI of the IPC and it is accordingly held so. 19. Hence, in the light of these aspects, it has to be held that the word “corporation” as is used in clause Twelfth (b) of Section 21 of the IPC will have to be understood in its context of that provision and the said word “corporation” will partake the character of a statutory corporation established or created by a Statute and not a Co-operative Society or a Society registered in accordance with the applicable Statutes. 20. In that view of the matter, the Counsel for the petitioner is fully right in contending that the invocation of the offence as per Section 353 of the IPC in this case is not right and proper. A bare perusal of the allegations in the First Information Statement would make it clear that the main allegation is regarding petitioner pushing away the Secretary and taking the papers and perusing it, etc and that by itself does not disclose any serious offence as per Section 354 of the IPC. The above said views have been taken by this Court only for the limited purpose of the consideration of the anticipatory bail plea in this case. All the other proceedings in relation to this crime will have to decided independently and untrammeled and uninfluenced in any manner by the above said observations and findings made herein above. The above said views have been taken by this Court only for the limited purpose of the consideration of the anticipatory bail plea in this case. All the other proceedings in relation to this crime will have to decided independently and untrammeled and uninfluenced in any manner by the above said observations and findings made herein above. The upshot of the above discussion is that the petitioner is able to succeed in this case and this Court is inclined to take the view on evaluation of the facts and circumstances of the case that the petitioner has made out a strong probable case that his custodial interrogation may not be warranted or necessary for effectuating the smooth and proper conduct of investigation in this Case. 21. Accordingly, it is ordered that, in the event of the petitioner being arrested by police in connection with the abovesaid crime, he shall be released on bail on his executing a bond for Rs.40,000/- each and on furnishing two solvent sureties for the like-sum, both to the satisfaction of the Investigating Officer concerned. 22. Further it is ordered that grant of bail will be subject to following conditions:- (1) The petitioner shall not involve in any criminal offences of similar nature. (2) The petitioner shall fully co-operate with the investigation. (3) The petitioner shall fully co-operate with the IO in the conduct of investigation process and will report before the investigating officer as and when required in that connection. (4) The petitioner shall not influence witness or shall not tamper or attempt to tamper evidence in any manner, whatsoever. (6) If there is any violation of the abovesaid conditions by the petitioner then the jurisdictional court concerned stand hereby empowered, to consider the plea for cancellation of bail at the appropriate time. With these observations and directions, the above Bail Application will stand disposed of.