JUDGMENT : Soumen Sen, J. 1. This appeal arises out of judgment and order dated March 31, 2014 in Misc. Case No. 1941 of 2004 passed by the 10th Bench of City Civil Court, Calcutta in an application filed by the respondents under Order 21 Rule 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the "C.P.C.") in connection with Title Execution Case No. 65 of 2003 for enforcement and execution of the judgment and decree passed in Title Suit No. 1694 of 1995. 2. The suit premises, being Premises No. 28, Nabin Sarkar Lane, Kolkata - 700 003, P.S. Shyampukur, was earlier owned by one Mr. Gour Chandra Banerjee. Mr. Gour Chandra Banerjee executed a deed of lease dated September 19, 1952 commencing from October 1, 1952 for a period of 16 years till September 30, 1968 at a monthly rate of Rs. 65/- in favour of the predecessor-in-interest (father) of one Mr. Raghu Nath Shaw. Thereafter, Mr. Raghu Nath Shaw started to reside in the property. Mr. Gour Chandra Banerjee died intestate on October 11, 1974 and was survived by his legal heirs. Mr. Raghu Nath Shaw too passed away leaving behind Mr. Dilip Kumar Shaw as his legal heir. No fresh tenancy was created after the expiry of the lease and the legal heirs of the lessor refused to accept rent from the occupants of the premises who were earlier the lessees; yet, for a number of reasons, the erstwhile lessors did not move to have the suit premises vacated. The legal heirs of Mr. Gour Chandra Banerjee sold the suit premises to Mr. Rabi Sen, the present appellant, on September 20, 1991 by a registered deed of conveyance. 3. Mr. Rabi Sen instituted Title Suit No. 1694 of 1995 against Dilip Kumar Shaw. Mr. Dilip Kumar Shaw contested the suit, inter alia, on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation. Mr. Dilip Kumar Shaw admitted that he was a trespasser since October 1, 1968 with the full knowledge of Mr. Gour Chandra Banerjee and, subsequently, his legal heirs. Mr. Dilip Kumar Shaw asserted that his possession of the property matured into good title by virtue of adverse possession. On March 8, 2002, the suit was decreed in favour of Mr. Rabi Sen and it was ordered that he was entitled to khas possession of the suit premises. Mr. Gour Chandra Banerjee and, subsequently, his legal heirs. Mr. Dilip Kumar Shaw asserted that his possession of the property matured into good title by virtue of adverse possession. On March 8, 2002, the suit was decreed in favour of Mr. Rabi Sen and it was ordered that he was entitled to khas possession of the suit premises. Mr. Dilip Kumar Shaw was directed to hand over peaceful possession within three months of the date of decree, failing which the appellant would be at liberty to execute the decree in accordance with the law. 4. On June 17, 2003, at about 2.00 P.M., Mr. Rabi Sen along with the Court Bailiff went to the suit premises and requested the respondents herein, the wife and children of Mr. Dilip Kumar Shaw, to vacate the premises since there was a decree for the same. The impugned judgment (in Misc. Case No. 1941 of 2004) records that Mr. Rabi Sen was unable to produce the decree at that time and, therefore, the respondents resisted him. Thereafter, the respondents enquired and found that Mr. Rabi Sen had obtained a decree against Mr. Dilip Kumar Shaw without impleading the respondents as parties to that suit. The respondents filed an application under Order 21 Rule 101, C.P.C. The said application was allowed by the learned Trial Judge. This has given rise to the present appeal. 5. Mr. Aniruddha Chatterjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, has submitted that the learned Trial Judge has completely misdirected his mind in dismissing the said application on the ground that for eviction of the respondents, the appellant would be required to file a separate suit for eviction of the respondents. It is further submitted that the application filed by the respondents is also not maintainable in law as the respondents in an application under Order 21 Rule 101 of the C.P.C. cannot challenge the decree. In such a proceeding, the respondents are required to establish their independent right, title and interest in respect of the suit property to resist the decree. It is submitted that in a proceeding under Order 21 Rule 101, the executing court cannot act as a court of appeal and go behind the decree for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of the decree. 6. Mr. Chatterjee has argued that the respondents are bound by the decree passed against Mr. It is submitted that in a proceeding under Order 21 Rule 101, the executing court cannot act as a court of appeal and go behind the decree for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of the decree. 6. Mr. Chatterjee has argued that the respondents are bound by the decree passed against Mr. Dilip Kumar Shaw and cannot avoid the enforcement of the said decree against them. The interest of the respondents, if any, has been sufficiently represented by Mr. Dilip Kumar Shaw in the suit. It is submitted that the said application has been filed by the respondents to circumvent the decree. 7. Mr. Kashinath Dey, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, submitted that the decree is a nullity and it is a well- established principle of law that the executing court can refuse execution of a decree passed without jurisdiction if it is a nullity. The learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the basis of the application is that the decree sought to be executed is a nullity, as the appellant has no right, title and interest over the property as the appellant has lost such right over the property in view of Article 67 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is submitted that it would appear from the decree passed against Mr. Dilip Kumar Shaw that the appellant, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that he became the owner of the property by purchasing the property from the original owner, could not have instituted the suit for possession since the suit for eviction was filed later than 12 years from the date of determination of the tenancy. The right to recover the property by the original owner had been lost by the time the appellant purchased the property from the owner. The appellant, accordingly, lost its right to the property at the time of purchase, being out of possession. The right to recover property by him as owner is extinguished by reason of Article 67 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The learned Senior Counsel has, however, fairly conceded that the said application has not been argued on the aforesaid basis. For these arguments Mr. Dey places reliance on the following cases:- (a) Mohunt Bhugwan Ramanuj Das v. Ramkrishna Bose & Anr., (1919) XXVL C.W.N. 722. (b) Kumar Kamekhya Narain Singh v. Bechu Sing & Anr., A.I.R. 1925 Pat. 499. The learned Senior Counsel has, however, fairly conceded that the said application has not been argued on the aforesaid basis. For these arguments Mr. Dey places reliance on the following cases:- (a) Mohunt Bhugwan Ramanuj Das v. Ramkrishna Bose & Anr., (1919) XXVL C.W.N. 722. (b) Kumar Kamekhya Narain Singh v. Bechu Sing & Anr., A.I.R. 1925 Pat. 499. (c) Sidram Lachmaya v. Mallaya Lingaya Chilaka, A.I.R. 1949 Bom. 137. (d) Thailammai v. Batumalai, 1965 (1) M.L.J. 383 . (e) Rame Gowda (Dead) by LRs. v. M. Varadappa Naidu (Dead) by LRs. & Anr., (2004) 1 S.C.C. 769 . (f) Prem Singh & Ors. v. Birbal & Ors., (2006) 5 S.C.C. 353 . (g) Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi, (2012) 4 S.C.C. 307 . (h) Prabhat Kumar Didwania v. Juthika Nath & Ors, 2015 (3) I.C.C. 350 (Cal.). (i) Eureka Builders & Ors. v. Gulabchand, (2018) 8 S.C.C. 67 . (j) Dilip Kumar Mondal v. Sakti Dhar Mondal, (2018) 4 I.C.C. 913 (DB.). (k) Gopalkrishna (Dead) by LRs. & Ors. v. Narayanagowda (Dead) by LRs. & Ors., (2019) 4 S.C.C. 592 . 8. We feel that it is not required to consider the aforesaid decisions at all in view of the fact that the impugned order suffers from lack of understanding of Order 21 Rule 101 of the C.P.C. The learned Trial Judge did not allow the application filed by the defendants on the ground that the decree is a nullity but on the premise that the applicants cannot be evicted without due process of law. The learned Trial Judge was completely remiss of the fact that in an application under Order 21 Rule 101 of the C.P.C. it is incumbent upon the court to decide the right, title and interest of the applicants vis-a-vis the property. 9. All questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree are to be adjudicated in the executing court and not via a separate suit between the parties to the suit. The executing court cannot go behind the correctness of the decree except where the decree is a nullity or is passed without jurisdiction, as held the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rameshwar Das Gupta v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 410 at para 4 and in Bhawarlal Bhandari v. Universal H.M.L. Enterprises, (1999) 1 S.C.C. 558 . The executing court cannot go behind the correctness of the decree except where the decree is a nullity or is passed without jurisdiction, as held the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rameshwar Das Gupta v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 410 at para 4 and in Bhawarlal Bhandari v. Universal H.M.L. Enterprises, (1999) 1 S.C.C. 558 . If it is seen that the court had the jurisdiction to pass the decree, the decree once passed cannot be otherwise challenged during execution, no matter how good or bad the decree may be on facts or in law, since the only recourse for the judgment-debtor would be to challenge the decree in appeal under Section 96 of the C.P.C. or in review under Order 47 Rule 1, as held in P.N. Pharma Marketing Pvt. Ltd., Guwahati v. Nicholas Piramal (I) Ltd., Mumbai, A.I.R. 2014 Gau. 84. The court executing the decree cannot go behind the decree. Any objection to the decree that it is incorrect in law or in fact cannot be entertained until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in an appeal or in revision. A decree even if it is erroneous is still binding between the parties. When a decree is a nullity, i.e. where the same is made by a court which had no inherent jurisdiction to make it, its nullity can be taken up in an execution proceeding, as a lack of inherent jurisdiction goes to the root of competence of the court to try the case, and, in such a situation, the executing court would not be going behind the decree since the decree, being null and void, is no decree at all in the eyes of law. 10. However, for the purposes of the present case, it must be noted that the expression "between the parties to the suit in which the decree is passed" occurring in sub-section 1 of Section 47 of the C.P.C. has its own significance - the prohibition only applies to those who were made a party to the suit and not to those who were not parties in the suit, as held in Mandwa Sreeramamurthy v. The Manager, Andhra Bank, A.I.R. 2012 A.P. 66. 11. 11. The legislature made drastic amendments in the provisions to Order 21, particularly Rule 101, and it is categorically declared that all questions including questions relating to the right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties to a proceeding or on an application under Rule 97 or 99 shall be determined by the court in execution and not by a separate suit (See Mulla, Code of Civil Procedure, 2017, Vol. I at 641). In N.S.S. Narayana Sarma v. Goldstone Exports (P.) Ltd., A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 251: (2002) 1 S.C.C. 662 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that on a fair reading of the rule it is manifest that the legislature has enacted the provision with a view to remove, as far as possible, technical objections to an application filed by the aggrieved party whether he is the decree-holder or any other person in possession of the immovable property under execution. The legislature has vested the power in the executing court to deal with all questions arising in the matter, irrespective of whether the court otherwise has jurisdiction to entertain a dispute of the nature. This clear statutory mandate and the object and purpose of the provisions should not be lost sight of by the courts seized of an execution proceeding. The court cannot shirk its responsibility by skirting around the relevant issues arising in the case. The position is manifest that when any person claiming title to the property in his possession is obstructing the attempt by the decree-holder to dispossess him from the said property, the executing court is competent to consider all questions raised by the persons offering obstruction against execution of the decree and to pass an appropriate order, which under the provisions of Order 21 Rule 103 is to be treated as a decree. The relevant paragraphs of the N.S.S. Narayana Sarma case (supra) that elucidate on these points are reproduced hereinbelow - "15. Provision is made in the Civil Procedure Code for delivery of possession of immovable property in execution of a decree and matters relating thereto. In Order 21 Rule 35 provisions are made empowering the executing court to deliver possession of the property to the decree holder if necessary, by removing any person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the property. In Order 21 Rule 35 provisions are made empowering the executing court to deliver possession of the property to the decree holder if necessary, by removing any person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the property. In Rule 36 provision is made for delivery of formal or symbolical possession of the property in occupancy of a tenant or other person entitled to occupy the same and not bound by the decree to relinquish such occupancy. Rules 97 to 101 of Order 21 contain the provisions enabling the executing court to deal with a situation when a decree holder entitled to possession of the property encounters obstruction from "any person". From the provisions in these rules which have been quoted earlier the scheme is clear that the legislature has vested wide powers in the executing court to deal with "all issues" relating to such matters. It is a general impression prevailing amongst the litigant public that difficulties of a litigant are by no means over on his getting a decree for immovable property in his favour. Indeed, his difficulties in real and practical sense, arise after getting the decree. Presumably, to tackle such a situation and to allay the apprehension in the minds of litigant public that it takes years and years for the decree holder to enjoy fruits of the decree, the legislature made drastic amendments in provisions in the aforementioned Rules, particularly, the provision in Rule 101 in which it is categorically declared that all questions including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions. On a fair reading of the rule it is manifest that the legislature has enacted the provision with a view to remove, as far as possible, technical objections to an application filed by the aggrieved party whether he is the decree holder or any other person in possession of the immovable property under execution and has vested the power in the executing court to deal with all questions arising in the matter irrespective of whether the Court otherwise has jurisdiction to entertain a dispute of the nature. This clear statutory mandate and the object and purpose of the provisions should not be lost sight of by the Courts seized of an execution proceeding. The Court cannot shirk its responsibility by skirting the relevant issues arising in the case...... 19. From the principles laid down in the decisions noted above, the position is manifest that when any person claiming title to the property in his possession obstructing the attempt by the decree-holder to dispossess him from the said property the executing Court is competent to consider all questions raised by the persons offering obstruction against execution of decree and pass appropriate order which under the provisions of Order 21 Rule 103 is to be treated as a decree...." (emphasis supplied). 12. The rationale behind such a position was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in an earlier decision of Shreenath & Anr. v. Rajesh & Ors., (1998) 2 S.C.R. 709 , which is quoted with approval in N.S.S. Narayana Sarma (supra), the relevant portion of the Shreenath (supra) decision is reproduced below - 'So, under Order 21 Rule 101 all disputes between the decree-holder and any such person is to be adjudicated by the executing court. A party is not thrown out to relegate itself to the long-drawn-out arduous procedure of afresh suit. This is to salvage the possible hardship both to the decree-holder and the other person claiming title on their own right to get it adjudicated in the very execution proceedings. We find that Order 21 Rule 35 deals with cases of delivery of possession of an immovable property to the decree-holder by delivery of actual physical possession and by removing any person in possession who is bound by a decree, while under Order 21 Rule 36 only symbolic possession is given where the tenant is in actual possession. We find that Order 21 Rule 35 deals with cases of delivery of possession of an immovable property to the decree-holder by delivery of actual physical possession and by removing any person in possession who is bound by a decree, while under Order 21 Rule 36 only symbolic possession is given where the tenant is in actual possession. Order 21 Rule 97, as aforesaid, conceives of cases where delivery of possession to the decree-holder or purchaser is resisted by any person. "Any person", as aforesaid, is wide enough to include even a person not bound by a decree or claiming right in the property on his own including that of a tenant including a stranger.' 13. However, it is incumbent on the court dealing with the applicable under Order 21 Rule 97 and 99 to first satisfy itself that the applicants can in fact maintain and bring such a proceeding before it. Such a caveat is more explicitly sounded out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its decision in H. Seshadri v. K.R. Natrajan & Anr., (2003) 10 S.C.C. 449 , where the Court observed that - "14. For the purpose of considering an application under Order 21 Rules 99 and 100 CPC what was required to be considered was as to whether the applicant herein claimed a right independent of the judgment-debtor or not. A person claiming through or under the judgment-debtor may be dispossessed in execution of a decree passed against the judgment-debtor but not when he is in possession of the premises in question in his own independent right or otherwise." (emphasis supplied). 14. In Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust and Anr., (1998) 3 S.C.C. 723 , it is stated that only such questions as would legally arise for determination between the applicants and the decree-holder could be decided by the court entertaining the application under Order 21 Rules 97 and 99. The relevant portion of Silverline (supra) is reproduced below:- "The words "all questions arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97" would envelop only such questions as would legally arise for determination between those parties. In other words, the court is not obliged to determine a question merely because the resister raised it. The questions which the executing court is obliged to determine under Rule 101, must possess two adjuncts. In other words, the court is not obliged to determine a question merely because the resister raised it. The questions which the executing court is obliged to determine under Rule 101, must possess two adjuncts. First is that such questions should have legally arisen between the parties, and the second is, such questions must be relevant for consideration and determination between the parties, e.g., if the obstructer admits that he is a transferee pendente lite it is not necessary to determine a question raised by him that he was unaware of the litigation when he purchased the property. Similarly, a third party, who questions the validity of a transfer made by a decree-holder to an assignee cannot claim that the question regarding its validity should be decided during execution proceedings. Hence, it is necessary that the questions raised by the resister or the obstructer must legally arise between him and the decree holder. In the adjudication process envisaged in Order 21 Rule 97(2) of the Code, the executing court can decide whether the question raised by a resister or obstructer legally arises between the parties. An answer to the said question also would be the result of the adjudication contemplated in the sub-section." 15. The aforementioned decisions have clearly stated that as a condition-precedent for resisting a decree by a third party, it is incumbent upon the said third party to establish their independent right, title and interest over the said premises, which exercise, however, has not been carried out in the impugned judgment. It is equally incumbent upon the executing court to determine and adjudicate only such questions which should have legally arisen between the parties and such questions must be relevant for consideration and determination between the parties and no other questions. 16. It is trite law that a decree passed without jurisdiction is a nullity and a void order can be challenged even in a collateral proceeding. Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edn. (Re-issue), Vol. 10 summarises the concept of jurisdiction at para 314. The said paragraph reads:- "314. Meaning of 'jurisdiction'. By 'jurisdiction' is meant the authority which a court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edn. (Re-issue), Vol. 10 summarises the concept of jurisdiction at para 314. The said paragraph reads:- "314. Meaning of 'jurisdiction'. By 'jurisdiction' is meant the authority which a court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. The limits of the authority are imposed by the statute, charter or commission under which the court is constituted, and may be extended or restricted by similar means. If no restriction or limit is imposed the jurisdiction is said to be unlimited. A limitation may be either as to the kind and nature of the claims and matters of which the particular court has cognizance, or as to the area over which the jurisdiction extends, or it may partake of both these characteristics. If the jurisdiction of an inferior court or tribunal, including an arbitrator, depends on the existence of a particular state of facts, the court or tribunal must inquire into the existence of the facts in order to decide whether it has jurisdiction; but, except where the court or tribunal has been given power to determine conclusively whether the facts exist, the correctness of its decision may be inquired into by means of proceedings for judicial review. Where a court takes it upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction which it does not possess, its decision amounts to nothing. Jurisdiction must be acquired before judgment is given." (emphasis supplied) Furthermore, in American Jurisprudence, Vol. 32A at para. 581, it is said that:- "Jurisdiction is the authority to decide a given case one way or the other. Without jurisdiction, a court cannot proceed at all in any case; jurisdiction is the power to declare law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to a court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." And, finally, in Indian Farmers Fertilizer Co-Operative Limited v. Bhadra Products, (2018) 2 S.C.C. 534 , it is noted:- '21. That "jurisdiction" is a coat of many colours, and that the said word displays a certain colour depending upon the context in which it is mentioned, is well-settled. That "jurisdiction" is a coat of many colours, and that the said word displays a certain colour depending upon the context in which it is mentioned, is well-settled. In the classic sense, in Official Trustee v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee, (1969) 3 SCR 92 at 99, "jurisdiction" is stated to be: In the order of Reference to a Full Bench in the case of Sukhlal v. Tara Chand [(1905) ILR 33 Cal 68] it was stated that jurisdiction may be defined to be the power of a Court to hear and determine a cause, to adjudicate and exercise any judicial power in relation to it: in other words, by jurisdiction is meant the authority which a Court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. An examination of the cases in the books discloses numerous attempts to define the term 'jurisdiction', which has been stated to be 'the power to hear and determine issues of law and fact', the authority by which the judicial officer take cognizance of and 'decide causes'; 'the authority to hear and decide a legal controversy', 'the power to hear and determine the subject-matter in controversy between parties to a suit and to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them;' 'the power to hear, determine and pronounce judgment on the issues before the Court'; 'the power or authority which is conferred upon a Court by the Legislature to hear and determine causes between parties and to carry the judgments into effect'; 'the power to enquire into the facts, to apply the law, to pronounce the judgment and to carry it into execution'.' (emphasis added) 17. Article 67 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is a special provision which would apply in a case where a tenant has ceased to be a tenant in terms of the provisions of the rent -control legislation. A statutory tenant continues to be a tenant despite termination of tenancy. Article 67 would not be attracted where tenant remains a statutory tenant (See Kamakshi Builders v. Ambedkar Educational Society, (2007) 12 S.C.C. 27 ). 18. Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the cases in which the adverse possession of property is in question. A statutory tenant continues to be a tenant despite termination of tenancy. Article 67 would not be attracted where tenant remains a statutory tenant (See Kamakshi Builders v. Ambedkar Educational Society, (2007) 12 S.C.C. 27 ). 18. Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the cases in which the adverse possession of property is in question. It is settled law that the adverse possession must be actual, open, hostile, exclusive and continuous (See Tribhuvan Shankar v. Amrutlal, (2014) 2 S.C.C. 788 ). 19. We, however, record that Mr. Dey, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, has submitted that the resistance to the decree is not on the basis of adverse possession but on the basis that the appellant failed to institute a proceeding to recover possession from the respondents within a period of 12 years after the determination of tenancy. We have also noticed that before the Trial Court the plea of adverse possession was consciously abandoned. The enforceability of the decree against the respondents is challenged before us on the strength of Article 67 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The decision in the suit is not one of inherent lack of jurisdiction. The Trial Court had the jurisdiction to decide the suit but according to the respondents, the suit could not have been decreed since the purchaser had lost its right in view of Article 67 of the Limitation Act. 20. Article 67 (old Art. 139) prescribes 12 years' limitation for a suit by a landlord to recover possession from a tenant, and the starting point for limitation is the date when the tenancy is determined. It is a well-settled rule of construction of the Limitation Act that when there is a specific Article dealing with a specific subject, then that Article is applicable in preference to a general and residuary Article. When in a suit for possession it is proved that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that relationship came to an end, then the limitation for the suit would be regulated by Article 67. When that Article applies, then the question of whether the possession is adverse or not does not arise, as held in Shri Mahadeoli Idol v. Dasai, A.I.R. 1964 M.P. 207 at 210. 21. When that Article applies, then the question of whether the possession is adverse or not does not arise, as held in Shri Mahadeoli Idol v. Dasai, A.I.R. 1964 M.P. 207 at 210. 21. The arguability of a point on the basis of Article 67 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is to be assessed by the Trial Court, if raised on the basis of the pleadings and evidence on record. This order should not be construed as an expression of opinion as to the applicability of the said Article 67 nor does it express any opinion as to whether the respondents can at all raise the plea of Article 67 to resist the execution of the decree against the respondents. 22. The property cannot remain in vacuum. It has to settle and devolve on someone in accordance with the law of the land. The Trial Court shall consider the application afresh on the basis of the materials and evidence on record in accordance with law keeping in mind that in an application under Order 21 Rule 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the right, title and interest of the obstructers vis-a-vis the property in question needs to be decided. The binding effect of the decree passed against Mr. Dilip Kumar Shaw upon the respondents is also relevant and requires consideration. The challenge to the decree as a nullity, if raised, may also be decided if it is found relevant and necessary on the basis of the materials on record. It is reiterated that the respondents are not claiming any adverse possession. 23. The impugned order dated March 31, 2014 is accordingly set aside. 24. Before we part with the appeal, we take note of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Babu Lal v. Raj Kumar, (1996) 3 S.C.C. 154 , where it is stated that the objections are prima facie found to be false, frivolous or vexatious, and were filed only to delay the execution, it would amount to abuse of process of the court. It is a settled principle of law that it is not incumbent upon the executing court that it must put to trial every objection which is filed in any execution proceedings. It is a settled principle of law that it is not incumbent upon the executing court that it must put to trial every objection which is filed in any execution proceedings. As stated by the Court in Babu Lal (supra):- "Now for a considerable period it is not only the judicial trend which has declined to interfere to protect unlawful possession or possession of rank trespasser etc but on the other hand, judicial anxiety has been to give effective relief to the successful parties by expeditious execution of the decree in favour of the parties. Unnecessary prolongation of litigation sometimes results even in frustrating the decree itself. Such attempt on the part of the objector to frustrate a decree is a mischief and has to be prevented by due process of law and expeditious decision of such ill-founded and frivolous objections and would be in the interest of justice and within the permissible field of jurisdiction of the execution." (emphasis supplied). Therefore, there is an imperative requirement for the purchaser of the property to be able to enforce a decree in his favour, if he is entitled to it in law, as soon as possible, since delay in his enjoyment of the decree can end up frustrating the decree itself. In the present case, the purchaser claims to have acquired the property in 1991. It is now 2019 - almost 30 years have passed since the purchaser purchased the property. 1. In such circumstances, we direct the learned Trial Judge to dispose of the application under Order 21 Rule 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 within four months from the date of communication of this order by either of the parties. The Trial judge is directed not to allow any adjournment to either of the parties unless there are compelling reasons to do so. The appeal is allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Ravi Krishan Kapur, J. - I agree.