JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. RL Yadav, learned counsel appearing for the appellants. Also heard Mr. SC Keyal, learned Assistant Solicitor General of India, representing the respondents. 2. The original plaintiff, Panmati Devi (since deceased), filed Title Suit No. 23/1985 (later on renumbered as Title Suit No. 45/1999) in the court of learned Sadar Munsiff No. 1 at Dibrugarh for declaration that the plaintiff is in lawful occupation of the premises described in the schedule of the plaint and the defendants/ respondents are not competent to issue notice dated 26.07.1983 for eviction nor have they any right to evict the plaintiff from premises under the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants)Act,1971 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from proceeding with the notice No. NIL dated 26.07.1983 issued by the defendant no. 3 under Section 4 of the Act. The said Panmati Devi preferred this second appeal as the appellant and on her death her legal heirs were substituted by order dated 08.11.2017. However, in this judgment the plaintiff/ appellant shall mean Late Panmati Devi. The husband of the plaintiff/ appellant was a Mali (Gardener) in the Army Department at Panitola, Dinjan in the district of Dibrugarh. About 46 years back he occupied land measuring ‘180 x 150’ within Dibrugarh Cantonment Ward at Dibrugarh. The land was low lying land and after earth filling her husband constructed the residential houses and started residing thereon along with his family. Her husband died in the year 1980 leaving behind the original plaintiff in charge of his estate. The occupation of the said land was recognised by the State Government for which she paid revenue regularly. The defendant/respondent no. 2 on 26.07.1983 issued notice directing the plaintiff/ appellant to vacate the land and deliver khas possession within 30 days from the receipt of notice which was received on 28.07.1983. The notice was purportedly issued under Section 4 of the Act. The defendants/respondents acted in bad faith and the action initiated without any power being conferred under the said Act. The land originally belonged to the State Government which the Army (Military) claimed to have acquired in 1942 from the State Government and came under occupation of Military Engineering Service (MES), Jorhat and from it to NCC Group Headquarter, Dibrugarh, Assam. The defendants/respondents acted in bad faith and the action initiated without any power being conferred under the said Act. The land originally belonged to the State Government which the Army (Military) claimed to have acquired in 1942 from the State Government and came under occupation of Military Engineering Service (MES), Jorhat and from it to NCC Group Headquarter, Dibrugarh, Assam. The plaintiff/appellant preferred an appeal against the said notice under Section 9 of the Act before the District Judge, Dibrugarh which was registered as Misc. Appeal No. 4/1983. Apprehending that the learned District Judge has only limited scope under the provision of the Act to do substantive justice in the appeal and likely to be disposed of any time, as such, she preferred the suit for declaration that she is in lawful occupation of the land and the defendants/respondents are not competent to issue the said notice under the Act. The cause of action for the suit arose on 26.07.1983, 28.08.1983 (expiry of 30 days from 26.07.1983), 13.09.1983 (institution of the appeal) and subsequent dates thereafter. On the basis of the said pleadings, the plaintiff/appellant sought for the reliefs stated here in above. 3. The defendants/respondents filed their joint written statement taking the plea that the suit is not maintainable as the same is barred under Section 10 of the Act inasmuch as, the order passed in the proceeding being final and binding the same cannot be called in question in any suit. The court has no jurisdiction as the same is barred under Section 15 of the Act. It is denied specifically that the defendant/respondent no. 2, the Estate Officer did not proceed in the manner as provided in the Act. The land being within the cantonment area, question of acquisition proceeding as alleged in the plaint is denied and further it is specifically denied that the plaintiff/appellant is in lawful occupation of the suit premises. It is admitted that the plaintiff/appellant preferred appeal before the learned District Judge, Dibrugarh against the order of Estate Officer under Section 5 of the Act, but denied the limited scope, as alleged in the plaint, of the District Judge while deciding the said appeal. Pleading the said defence the defendants/respondents sought for dismissal of the suit. 4. On the basis of the said pleadings, the learned trial court framed the following issues:- 1. Pleading the said defence the defendants/respondents sought for dismissal of the suit. 4. On the basis of the said pleadings, the learned trial court framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and manner? 2. Whether there is any cause of action for the suit? 3. Whether the suit is barred U/s 10 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971? 4. Whether the notice of 26.7.83 to the plaintiff u/s 5 of the Public Premises Act is bad in law without serving of previous show cause notice u/s 4 of the same Act? 5. Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit and so such barred U/s 15 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971? 6. Whether the plaintiff has unauthorisedly occupied the suit land? 7. Whether the suit land is a part of and included in the cantonment area of the defendant No. 1 in Dibrugarh Town? 8. Whether the plaintiff has acquired any right over the suit land by occupying the same for more than 46 years? 9. Whether the plaintiff is liable to be evicted? 10. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the decree as prayed for? 5. The plaintiff/appellant examined two witnesses and on the other hand, the defendants/respondents also adduced two witnesses. The learned trial court decided issue no. 5 and held that the court has jurisdiction as the right in dispute is of civil nature and the plaintiff/appellant has rightly filed the suit in the civil court. The issue nos. 6, 7 & 8 were taken up jointly. The learned trial court took note of the evidence of the DW 1, Sanjoy Kapoor who in his cross examination deposed that as per record the land in question was handed over to the defence department by the State Government in the year 1942. But there is no evidence on record to show that the Central Government acquired the said land from the State Government. The evidence of the said DW 1 was not considered as in the cross examination the said DW 1 deposed that he had no personal knowledge about the survey of the defence department in the year 1983. The DW 2 is the Lot Mondal who produced the Chitha Book of the Cantonment Ward proved as Exhibit – ‘Ka’. The evidence of the said DW 1 was not considered as in the cross examination the said DW 1 deposed that he had no personal knowledge about the survey of the defence department in the year 1983. The DW 2 is the Lot Mondal who produced the Chitha Book of the Cantonment Ward proved as Exhibit – ‘Ka’. The learned trial court took note of the fact that the said land was classified as ‘military land’. But the same was not considered as because the said DW 2 deposed that he did not put the said remark and had no knowledge when the State Government handed over the said land to the Central Government/defendant department. 6. The plaintiff/appellant, on the other hand, exhibited Exhibits 1 to 8 which the learned trial court held that the said receipts show that the land as ‘Touji Bahira’ and does not confer any right or title over the land. But the defendants/respondents could not prove any better title over the suit land. Referring to Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the learned trial court unnecessarily discussed with regard to the adverse possession of the plaintiff/appellant when the plaintiff/appellant did not plead anything with regard to adverse possession. Discussing the said evidence on record, the learned trial court held that the plaintiff/appellant unauthorisedly occupied the suit land which includes the Cantonment Area and the plaintiff has acquired right over the suit land by occupying the same for more than 46 years. 7. The learned trial court decided the issue no. 4 and held that the notice dated 26.07.1983 to the plaintiff/appellant under Section 5 of the Act is bad in law without serving of previous show cause notice under Section 4 of the Act. The DW 1 deposed that at the time of inspection of the land, the plaintiff/appellant was found in unauthorised occupation whereon she constructed her residential house without obtaining any permission from defence authority. The defendant/ respondent no. 2 accordingly drew up the proceeding against the plaintiff/appellant under the provision of the Act and issued notice under Section 4 of the Act on 31.05.1983 asking her to show cause. The plaintiff/appellant failed to show cause in terms of the said notice within the stipulated period and thereafter notice under Section 5 of the said Act was issued and duly served on her on 23.07.1983. The plaintiff/appellant failed to show cause in terms of the said notice within the stipulated period and thereafter notice under Section 5 of the said Act was issued and duly served on her on 23.07.1983. The learned trial court took into consideration the evidence of plaintiff/appellant, PW 1 who categorically stated that she did not receive any such notice prior to notice dated 28.07.1983. On the other hand, the DW 1 in his cross examination admitted that he does not have any evidence to show that the plaintiff received the copy of notice dated 31.05.1983 purportedly under Section 4 of the Act. As such, the said issue was decided in favour of the plaintiff/appellant. 8. The issue no. 3 was decided by the learned trial court holding that Section 10 of the Act has no application in the suit. While deciding the said issue, the learned trial court took note of the submission of the defendants/respondents that the District Judge dismissed the appeal and thereafter the plaintiff could not challenge the notice issued under the Act in the Civil Court. On the other hand, the learned trial court took into consideration the cross examination of the PW 1 wherein she stated that the suit (Misc. Appeal) in the court of District Judge was dismissed for default and not on merit. Finally, holding the issue nos. 1 & 2 in favour of the plaintiff/appellant, the suit was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 04.09.2000. 9. The defendants/respondents filed Title Appeal No. 23/2000 in the court of learned Civil Judge, Dibrugarh challenging the judgment and decree of the trial court. Vide judgment and decree dated 07.09.2007 the appeal was allowed thereby dismissing the suit of the plaintiff/appellant mainly on the ground that Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Thereafter, this second appeal is preferred which was admitted on 01.02.2008 after formulating the following substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 is applicable in case of the plaintiff who is holding the suit land under State Govt. by paying Touzi Bahira land revenue? 2. Whether without ascertaining that the plaintiff is an unauthorised occupant, proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 can be drawn up by the Estate Officer, against the plaintiff? 3. by paying Touzi Bahira land revenue? 2. Whether without ascertaining that the plaintiff is an unauthorised occupant, proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 can be drawn up by the Estate Officer, against the plaintiff? 3. Whether when title is in disputes, summary procedure under Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 is legal and valid? 4. Whether the judgment and decree of appellate court is sustainable if the judgment and decree of trial court is set aside without giving its own findings? 5. Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction under the Act, 1971 when the matter is in dispute are complicated and elaborate evidence is necessary? 10. Mr. Yadav, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the first appellate court decided the issue no. 3 in favour of the defendants/respondents thereby holding that the suit is barred under the provision of the Act which he submits that it is a wrong finding. In support of his submission referring to Section 2(e) (viii) of the Act, Mr. Yadav submits that Cantonment Board constituted under the Cantonments Act, 1924 was introduced within the definition of the Public Premises by the Amendment Act of 1994 w.e.f. 01.06.1994. The said classified premises/land at the relevant time of initiating the proceeding by the Estate Officer was not within the purview of the Act. As such, the proceeding initiated by the Estate Officer is null and void and if an order passed without any jurisdiction which goes to the root of the proceeding, the same can be challenged at any time before the civil court. It is further submitted that the Exhibit – Ka which is a copy of the Chitha is not a public document and the entry therein showing the land under the category ‘Military Land’ ought not to have been considered by the first appellate court. There is a dispute with respect to the land under possession of the plaintiff/ appellant inasmuch as except the Exhibit – Ka no other evidence was produced by the defendants/respondents in support of their claim that the land was acquired by the Army in the year 1942 from the State Government. There is a dispute with respect to the land under possession of the plaintiff/ appellant inasmuch as except the Exhibit – Ka no other evidence was produced by the defendants/respondents in support of their claim that the land was acquired by the Army in the year 1942 from the State Government. On the other hand, the plaintiff/appellant exhibited the Land Revenue Paying receipts and as such, that it self is sufficient to show that the suit land is not the land under the Defence department rather, it is a Government land for which the fine has been imposed upon the plaintiff/appellant for its unauthorised occupation. 11. The first appellate court also misread the provisions of Sections 10 & 15 of the Act and without going into the actual grievance of the plaintiff/appellant straightway decided that the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted. In support of his contention, Mr. Yadav relies on the case law of M.P. Electricity Board, Jabalpur vs. Vijaya Timber Coreported in (1997)1 SCC 68 . Referring the said decision, Mr. Yadav submits that it is true that where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil court’s jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. However, that does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. It is referred that the trial court came to the conclusion that no notice under Section 4 of the Act was issued nor did the defendants/respondents prove the said notice by the plaintiff/appellant. In such a situation, the civil court has the jurisdiction to decide and see as to whether the proceeding initiated by the Estate Officer was as per the provisions stipulated therein the said Act. It is further contended that the first appellate court did not discuss anything with respect to the evidence and the facts of the case and as a result the judgment of the first appellate court is hit under the provision of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). 12. Mr. Keyal, learned Asstt. SGI, objected to the submission of Mr. Yadav. Referring to the pleadings in the plaint, Mr. 12. Mr. Keyal, learned Asstt. SGI, objected to the submission of Mr. Yadav. Referring to the pleadings in the plaint, Mr. Keyal submits that the plaintiff/appellant admitted that she preferred Misc. Appeal No. 4/1983 before the District Judge, Dibrugarh against the allegation of unauthorised occupation under Section 4 of the Act. It is submitted further that the said appeal was dismissed. Once the plaintiff/appellant has submitted to the jurisdiction under the Act, subsequent thereto she cannot file a suit. Section 10 of the Act specifically bars the jurisdiction of a civil court inasmuch as every order made by an Estate Officer or by an Appellate Authority under the Act is final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority against the said action taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under the said Act. Similarly, Section 15 of the said Act is far more specific wherein it is stipulated that no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises. Referring to various pleadings in the plaint and the reply of the defendants/respondents in the written statement, Mr. Keyal submits that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the said suit. In support of his claim, Mr. Keyal relies on the case law of Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Shiva Prasad Tripathi & others reported in (1996) 7 SCC 676 wherein the Apex Court held that Section 10 of the Act had not to be viewed in isolation but had to be understood in the context of the other provisions of the Act. The suit for injunction to negate orders of the two authorities, namely, the Estate Officer and the Appellate Authority stood barred under Section 10 of the Act and the legislative mandate is clear that the court by order cannot obstruct the execution of the orders passed by the Estate Officer and the Appellate Authority. 13. Considered the submission of the learned counsel for the parties to this appeal. Section 2(e) (1) of the Act defines ‘public premises’ as any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government. 13. Considered the submission of the learned counsel for the parties to this appeal. Section 2(e) (1) of the Act defines ‘public premises’ as any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government. Section 2(e) of the Act defines premises which mean any land or any building or part of a building. The plaintiff/appellant wants to project her case that the land belongs to the State Government and as such, the Land Revenue Paying receipts were issued to her. To that effect, except the Land Revenue Paying receipt, the plaintiff/appellant failed to produce any documents but it is specifically pleaded in the plaint that the land appeared to be acquired in the year 1942 from the State Government by the Army (Military) and it came into occupation of MES, Jorhat. But she disputed that the land under her possession was ever in the said acquisition proceeding and as such, the defendants/respondents are not the owners of the same. In this respect, the plaintiff/appellant failed to produce any document. On the other hand, Exhibit – Ka though it is a copy of a Chitha must be taken into consideration inasmuch as the defendants/respondents had been able to bring it on record that the said land is classified as ‘Military Land’. In such a situation, it cannot be held that the suit land is not within the purview of the definition of Public Premises under Section 2(e) of the Act. The submission of Mr. Yadav that the Cantonment Board was included in the definition of Section 2(e) in the year 1994 as such, the Estate Officer has no jurisdiction, in my opinion, cannot be accepted inasmuch as from the Chitha it appears that the land belonged to “military land” as per the classification and that itself is sufficient to hold that the land belonged to the Ministry of Defence under the Central Government under Section 2(e)(1) of the Act and the Estate Officer has the jurisdiction under the Act to proceed with any unauthorised occupant. On perusal of the Exhibits 1 to 8, the alleged land revenue paying receipts, it is seen that the same is for the Cantonment Ward. Moreover, the plaintiff/appellant failed to bring on record the notice for which she sought for the declaration and purportedly issued by the defendants/respondents. On perusal of the Exhibits 1 to 8, the alleged land revenue paying receipts, it is seen that the same is for the Cantonment Ward. Moreover, the plaintiff/appellant failed to bring on record the notice for which she sought for the declaration and purportedly issued by the defendants/respondents. Under the said circumstances, I am of the considered view that the land is within the purview of the definition of Public Premises under the Act and constrained to answer the substantial question of law No. 1 against the plaintiff/appellant inasmuch as she failed to prove her case by bringing land records in order to show that the land belongs to the State Government. The land revenue paying receipts cannot be considered until and unless it is proved in a case wherein the issue as discussed hereinabove is involved. Further, an adverse inference against the plaintiff/appellant can also be drawn when the State of Assam is not made a party to the suit. 14. “Jurisdiction” of court unfolds if the court has the authority to hear and decide a particular class of controversy i.e. right to decide a case but not on the merits of a case. The same must be decided and culled out from the pleadings in a plaint. Ouster of jurisdiction of a civil court is not to be readily inferred but must be expressly or impliedly ousted by a statute. In order to examine the ouster of the jurisdiction we will have to look into the specific statute, in our case the Act, its scheme and whether the Act is intended to create a liability. If so, whether the statute creates an effective provision to decide law and facts arising while deciding the said liability? 15. The appellant is aggrieved by the order passed by the Estate Officer under Section 5 of the Act and under Section 9 of the Act, provision of appeal is prescribed before the competent District Judge. The appellant even filed an appeal but on the ground that the jurisdiction of the District Judge is of limited scope so she preferred the suit. That explanation in avoiding a prescribed authority under the Act cannot be accepted. The appellant even filed an appeal but on the ground that the jurisdiction of the District Judge is of limited scope so she preferred the suit. That explanation in avoiding a prescribed authority under the Act cannot be accepted. The order is to be put under challenge before the prescribed authority because of the fact that such branding of the appellant as an unauthorised occupant of the premises under her possession is by the Estate Officer under Section 5 of the Act and to test its correctness, the appellate authority has wide jurisdiction at least to examine whether the order of the Estate Officer is correct or not. The issue is also whether the appellant is an unauthorised occupant of the premises under her possession and liable to be evicted. Such liability that she is an unauthorised occupant can very well be decided by the appellate authority. So Section 15 has specifically barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 9 of the CPC. 16. In B. Sharma Rao H. Ganeshmal v. Head Quearters Asstt. reported in (1998) 9 SCC 577 the petitioners filed suit challenging eviction proceedings on the ground that they were not unauthorised occupants but occupants as tenants under Section 116 of the T.P. Act. The Apex Court held that question whether they were unauthorised occupants are to be determined by the Estate Officer under Section 5 of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974 and such determination is appealable before Appellate Authority. Civil court’s jurisdiction is barred under Section 16 of the said Act of 1974. Similarly here also an order is passed under Section 5 of the Act by the Estate Officer so the appellant is to file an appeal under Section 9 of the Act when Section 15 of the Act specifically bars the jurisdiction of civil court. Question of complicacy of the matter is no excuse to challenge an order passed under Section 5 of the Act by the Estate Officer in a suit inasmuch as hereinabove discussed the burden on the appellant is to show that the Estate Officer has no jurisdiction to invoke the authority given to it under Section 2(e), 4 and 5 of the Act. Accordingly, the substantial question No. 5 is held against the appellant i.e., the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide correctness of an order passed by the Estate Officer under Section 5 of the Act but the remedial measure is vested on the Appellate authority prescribed in the Act. 17. The procedure as prescribed under the Act is admittedly a summary procedure. The question of title is not involved in a proceeding before the Estate Officer but it is the issue to be decided as to whether the plaintiff/appellant is an unauthorised occupant of the public premises. The burden is not to prove the title of the plaintiff/appellant but to show that she is not an unauthorised occupant of the land in question and she is not required to seek any licence or permission from the Estate Officer in order to possess the premises under her occupation. While doing so, it cannot be inferred that the dispute of title is relevant in a proceeding before the Estate Officer. But it is the burden to be discharged once the plaintiff/appellant decides to contest the finding of the Estate Officer and the burden is the principal burden inasmuch as the plaintiff/appellant is required to show that the land under the possession of the plaintiff/appellant is not within the ambit and scope of the definition of the public premises. Moreover, the issue involved and the cause of action for the suit is with respect to the notice under Section 5 of the Act which itself centres around unauthorised occupants over the premises defined within the ambit and scope of the Act. The order passed by the Estate Officer has its finality including the one passed by the prescribed appellate authority and there is a specific provision ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court. Because Section 10 of the Act speaks about the finality of the order and Section 9 prescribes the remedial measure if the Estate Officer fails to take any steps before declaring her as the unauthorised occupant. In my considered view the Act is sufficiently equipped for redressal of the grievances of the appellant and must also be held that there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a civil suit. For the said reason, the substantial questions of law No. 2 and 3 are also decided against the plaintiff/appellant. 18. In my considered view the Act is sufficiently equipped for redressal of the grievances of the appellant and must also be held that there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a civil suit. For the said reason, the substantial questions of law No. 2 and 3 are also decided against the plaintiff/appellant. 18. From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the provision under Section 10 of the Act and the nature of the relief claimed by the plaintiff/appellant, I am of the considered opinion that the jurisdiction of the civil court cannot be invoked in deciding the issues raised subsequent to the issuance of the notice under Section 5 of the Act more so, when the plaintiff/appellant submitted herself to the circumscribed jurisdiction of the Act and sought her remedial measures before the appellate authority prescribed by the Act. The first appellate court discussed the evidence on record issue-wise and finally held that the finding in issue no. 3 is wrong and as such, in my opinion, substantial questions of law No. 4 & 5 are liable to be decided against the plaintiff/appellant. Accordingly, this second appeal is dismissed. However, keeping in view that the plaintiff/appellant is having her residence over the land, the defendants/ respondents shall not initiate action for her eviction within the next 4 (four) months starting w.e.f. the date of judgment. 19. Send down the LC Rs. No costs. Prepare a decree accordingly.