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2019 DIGILAW 940 (CAL)

Debasis Chatterjee v. Reserve Bank of India

2019-11-19

ARIJIT BANERJEE

body2019
JUDGMENT : ARIJIT BANERJEE, J. 1. The main prayer in this writ petition is as follows:- “(a) Writ/Order/Direction in the nature of Mandamus to issue setting aside and quashing the impugned departmental proceeding initiated under the charge sheet dated 16.05.2011, being Annexure 'P/5' hereto, the order of reopening of the disciplinary proceedings, the Enquiry Report dated 07.08.2012, being Annexure 'P/33' hereto, the findings dated 26.09.2012 of the Disciplinary Authority, being Annexure 'P/36' hereto, the tentative order dated 26.09.2012 of the Disciplinary Authority proposing punishment, being Annexure 'P/35' hereto, and the final order dated 14.02.2013, being Annexure 'P/41' hereto, and thereupon to allow the petitioner all consequential service benefits as if there had been no such departmental proceeding along with interest @ 18% per annum on all arrears and further commanding them to act and proceed strictly in accordance with law.” Case of the petitioner: 2. The petitioner was working as Assistant Manager at the Reserve Bank of India (in short ‘RBI’) Calcutta. The petitioner received a letter dated 22 December, 2010 from the RBI alleging attempted unauthorized redemption of 6.5 per cent Savings Bond, 2003 for an amount of Rs. 35 lakhs by using User ID and password of the petitioner and asking for an explanation in that regard. The petitioner responded by his letter dated 12 January, 2011. In his reply, the petitioner, inter-alia, stated that on or about 6 December, 2010 the instrument in question was placed before him for obtaining his signature from where for the first time he came to know about the incident. He searched for the relevant case papers but the same were found to be missing. Considering the serious nature and/or grave urgency of the matter he straight away brought the incident to the notice of AGM/HOD. In the said reply, the petitioner further stated as follows:- “11. During my time in PDO a serious aspect cropped up after obtaining the audit trial was that even in my sanctioned leave period the user id DCH was used on 22.11.2010 regarding which I would have been remained still in dark had the incident did not come into light. This clearly indicates although the said user id "DCH" was used presumably only by me, the same has to be very much generic in nature. This clearly indicates although the said user id "DCH" was used presumably only by me, the same has to be very much generic in nature. However, after detection of this I myself made the said user id "DCH" suspended by unsuccessfully attempting to log on by using wrong passwords. 12. It is pertinent to mention here that I was no way connected to the inward, updation, authorisation, etc. of the RBICABLO44747 as mentioned in the letter under reply. It is also pertinent to consider that being barred by the extant guidelines and/or provisions no single person can simultaneously authorise and sign on the instruments. Hence, it can easily be held beyond doubt that in no circumstances I myself authorised and got the same back to my desk for obtaining my signature on the self-same instrument. In this connection I provide a pictoral work-flow which is annexed hereto and marked with the letter-A.” 3. A show cause notice dated 18 March, 2011 was served on the petitioner wherein it was stated that the reply of the petitioner to the Bank's letter dated 22 December, 2010 was not found to be satisfactory. The petitioner was called upon to show cause as to why disciplinary action would not be taken against him in terms of Regulation 47 of the RBI (Staff) Regulations, 1948 for having committed breach of Regulation 34 read with Regulation 32 of the said Regulations. 4. The petitioner replied to the show cause notice by his letter dated 1 April, 2011. 5. A charge-sheet dated 16 May, 2011 was issued against the petitioner. The charge was as follows:- “You are, therefore, charged with having committed acts of gross misconduct and indiscipline and thereby acting in a manner detrimental to the interest of the Bank in terms of Regulation 34 read with Regulation 32 of the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations, 1948 by misusing your password to put through the transaction for generation of the above payment instrument for Rs. 35.00 lakh. Your said act amounts to misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 47 of the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations, 1948. You have thus rendered yourself liable for disciplinary action and this charge-sheet is accordingly issued to you under Regulation 47 of the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations, 1948.” 6. By his letter dated 20 June, 2011 the petitioner replied to the charge-sheet. 7. You have thus rendered yourself liable for disciplinary action and this charge-sheet is accordingly issued to you under Regulation 47 of the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations, 1948.” 6. By his letter dated 20 June, 2011 the petitioner replied to the charge-sheet. 7. An Enquiry Officer was appointed by the Bank. Enquiry proceedings were conducted against the petitioner and one Bikash Chandra Das. By his enquiry report dated 1 September, 2011, the Enquiry Officer held that the charge levelled against the petitioner and Bikash Chandra Das was not established. 8. By a letter dated 29 December, 2011 issued by the Assistant General Manager (Personnel) the petitioner was informed that on a perusal of the Enquiry Officer's report and examination of the defence representative's argument, the competent authority was of the view that there had been procedural impropriety in the conduct of the proceedings and as such serious infirmity had crept in. In the interest of justice as also for proper appreciation of the evidence, it would be proper to reopen the proceeding from the stage of evidence. 9. By letters dated 16 January, 2012 and 30 January, 2012 the petitioner recorded his protest to the decision of the authorities to reopen the proceedings. 10. In response, the Bank by its letter dated 2 February, 2012 informed the petitioner that the Competent Authority had issued the order for reopening the enquiry proceeding in the interest of justice. 11. The enquiry proceeding was reopened against the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer was the same person as the previous one. He submitted his report dated 7 August, 2012 wherein his conclusion was as follows:- “(a) The User ID DCH was used to authorise the impugned transaction and that Sri Debasis Chatterjee, CSO is the valid owner of that DCH User ID. This stands established beyond doubt. (b) However, as regards the charge that CSO himself put through the said transaction in favour of Rs. 35 lacs - stands not established.” 12. The Enquiry Officer's report was forwarded to the Competent Authority. By his letter dated 26 September, 2012 the Competent Authority proposed to impose penalty of reduction of substantive pay of the petitioner by four stages from the date of final order. It was clarified that the reduction shall have the effect of withholding the increments in the intervening period and shall have the effect of postponing his future date of increment. It was clarified that the reduction shall have the effect of withholding the increments in the intervening period and shall have the effect of postponing his future date of increment. However, the period for which the petitioner would not be drawing pay at the maximum of the pay scale from the date of final order as the result of penalty proposed/imposed, shall be excluded for the purpose of grant of post scale special pay, stagnation increments etc, if any. 13. The usual show cause notice in respect of the proposed penalty was served on the petitioner who gave a detailed reply dated 9 November, 2012. 14. The final order was issued by the Competent Authority on 14 February, 2013 imposing on the petitioner the penalty that he had proposed. The operative portion of the final order of penalty reads as follows:- “I, therefore, in terms of Regulation 47(1)(c) of the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations, 1948 read with Regulation 47(1)(b) ibid, order that the substantive pay of the CSO shall be reduced by 4 (four) stages from the date of this order. The reduction shall have the effect of withholding the increments, in the intervening period and shall have the effect of postponing his future date of increment. Accordingly, the substantive pay of the CSO as on the date shall be fixed at Pay Rs. 29100/- + S.P. 1100/- + PA 550/- + FPA 1180/- + SA 2500/- + other admissible allowances as per extant rules in the scale of pay Rs. 17100-1000(11)-28100-EB-1000(4)-32100-1100(1)-33200 (17 years). His next increment shall fall due to him after expiry of a period of 1 (one) year from the date of this order and his substantive pay will be re-fixed as admissible as per the provisions of the Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulations, 1948.” 15. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that it was the petitioner himself who brought the attempted unauthorized redemption of the Savings Bond to the attention of the higher authorities. He played the role of a whistle blower. Instead of appreciating the petitioner for averting a case of fraud as is recommended by Art. 18.5 of the RBI's Circular on Staff Discipline, the authorities tried to make the petitioner a scapegoat. Their entire endeavour was to nail the petitioner by hook or by crook to protect some other employees' vested interest. Instead of appreciating the petitioner for averting a case of fraud as is recommended by Art. 18.5 of the RBI's Circular on Staff Discipline, the authorities tried to make the petitioner a scapegoat. Their entire endeavour was to nail the petitioner by hook or by crook to protect some other employees' vested interest. Learned Counsel submitted that it would appear from the enquiry reports that there was system failure and the petitioner's User ID DCH was used by somebody even on a day when the petitioner was not present in the office. The only finding is that DCH is the User ID of the petitioner and that the same was used to authorise the attempted unauthorised transaction. There is no finding that the petitioner shared his User ID with anybody. Further, there is a clear finding that the petitioner did not put through the unauthorised transaction. In that view of the matter, the penalty imposed by the Competent Authority is entirely arbitrary and unreasonable. 16. Further, the Competent Authority in the final order did not discuss any of the points raised by the petitioner in his reply to the second show cause notice. The order is in effect a non-speaking order and on that ground alone should be set aside. 17. Learned Counsel also submitted that the decision to reopen the enquiry proceeding was unilaterally taken by the respondent authorities. In all fairness, an opportunity of hearing should have been given to the petitioner before taking such decision. The conduct of the respondent authorities adequately demonstrates that they were looking for a scapegoat on whom they could fix the fault and they chose the petitioner for reasons best known to them although the petitioner himself brought the entire episode to the notice of the higher authorities and had averted an attempted unauthorised redemption of Savings Bond belonging to an investor. 18. Learned counsel submitted that initiation of the departmental proceeding against the petitioner suffered from the vice of malice in law and malice in fact and was a colourable exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction for mala fide purposes to shield the actual culprits as well as to send out a message that anyone acting contrary to the wishes of the coterie of higher-ups would be dealt with in a similar manner as the petitioner whistleblower. The Master Circular on staff Discipline that came into force on July 01, 2011, did not have any provision for reopening of proceedings. By enquiry report dated September 01, 2011 the Enquiry Officer had exonerated the petitioner. In terms of the Master Circular, the Competent Authority was duty bound to pronounce final order within seven days. However, with a view to fix the petitioner somehow, the enquiry report was put under the carpet and a letter dated 11th November, 2011 was sent by the Competent Authority to the Deputy Legal Adviser, Legal Department Central Office seeking advice as to whether it would be valid in law if he ordered a fresh enquiry by issuing fresh show cause notice, charge- sheet and by appointing another set of Enquiry Officer and presenting officer. The Deputy Legal Advisor in his reply dated 14th December, 2011 stated that the bank may conduct fresh enquiry with the earlier Enquiry Officer and presenting officer. This advice was illegal and contrary to the Master Circular. During the course of fresh enquiry the petitioner repeatedly raised this issue through his representative but no heed was paid to the same. The enquiry was reopened from the stage of evidence regarding which the Staff Regulation was silent. In this connection, learned counsel relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Civil Appeal No. 9043 of 2014, Vijay Sankar Pandey vs. Union of India and Another. 19. It was then submitted that the enquiry proceeding was vitiated on all three counts, that is, non-compliance of procedural formalities, violation of natural justice and perversity of the Enquiry Officer's findings. The enquiry proceeding was reopened in terms of the Competent Authority's order dated 22nd December, 2011 by stating that there were procedural infirmities in the conduct of the proceedings. Such procedural infirmities were purely administrative in nature and had cropped up due to administrative lapses for which the petitioner was in no way responsible, but the petitioner had to face enquiry again. 20. Furthermore, the first enquiry was held jointly with another employee but after the order passed by the Competent Authority on 22nd December, 2011, enquiries were held separately for the two employees. There was no instruction from the Competent Authority to hold the enquiries separately. Regulation 47(2A) of the Staff Regulations directs holding of common enquiry in case of a common incident. 21. Mr. There was no instruction from the Competent Authority to hold the enquiries separately. Regulation 47(2A) of the Staff Regulations directs holding of common enquiry in case of a common incident. 21. Mr. Samanta submitted that there was utter violation of principles of procedural justice. During the relevant point of time, Mr. Chari who was impleaded as the respondent no. 3 in this writ petition but whose name was deleted pursuant to court's order at the motion stage, was not the Competent Authority. However, he issued the show cause notice to the petitioner as “General Manager and Competent Authority.” Mr. Chari acted as the Competent Authority without having the authority to do so. He was at the point of time General Manager (Banking) and the reporting head of the public debt office. Hence, for the incident in question, being the reporting head of the public debt office he was also answerable to the bank. However, to save himself he assumed the role of Competent Authority and issued charge-sheet to the petitioner. 22. The charge mentioned in the charge-sheet was considered by the Enquiry Officer twice as not established. The charge which the Enquiry Officer after the second enquiry found to be proved was not mentioned in the charge-sheet. 23. Learned counsel submitted that there was bias against the petitioner on four counts, namely, personal bias, subject matter bias, departmental bias and preconceived notion bias. There was personal bias since Mr. Chari was acting as the Competent Authority. Since Mr. Chari was answerable for the incident in question i.e. subject matter, there was subject matter bias. The petitioner was fixed to save the actual perpetrators who was/were in all probability working within the department i.e. the public debt office; hence, the petitioner became a victim of departmental bias also. There was also a preconceived notion from the inception that the petitioner's User-ID had been used for authorising the payment in question. Although, no report pointed a finger to the petitioner as the culprit, yet no stone was left unturned to fix the petitioner for the incident in question. Thus, the petitioner became a victim of preconceived notion bias. 24. On the question of alternative remedy, learned counsel submitted that the same does not operate as an absolute bar but is only a rule of discretion. Thus, the petitioner became a victim of preconceived notion bias. 24. On the question of alternative remedy, learned counsel submitted that the same does not operate as an absolute bar but is only a rule of discretion. In this connection, he referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Harbanslal Sahnia and Another vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. AIR 2003 SC 2120 . He further submitted that the statutory appeal would be an empty formality since the highest authority, being the RBI Services Board, has confirmed the penalty. 25. It was further submitted that in the present case the writ petition was entertained in April, 2013 when an interim order was passed keeping the point of maintainability open. Such interim order was extended from time to time and finally was extended till disposal of the writ petition. Hence, the initial order of keeping the point of maintainability open has lost its force due to efflux of time and extension of the interim order from time to time. In this connection, reliance was placed on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Hirday Narain vs. Income-Tax Officer, Bareilly, AIR 1971 SC 32 and Ganga Retreat and Towers Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan, Appeal (Civil) No. 5188 of 2001. Contention of RBI: 26. Appearing for RBI Mr. Choudhuri, learned Senior Counsel submitted that certain procedural improprieties regarding preparation of the Enquiry Officer's report were pointed out by the defence representative as a result of which the Competent Authority decided to reopen the proceedings. Hence, it was at the instance of the petitioner that the proceeding was reopened. The petitioner participated in the fresh enquiry without any protest. The bank considered the petitioner's reply to the show cause notice and altered the charge against the petitioner from committing the offence to authorising the commission of the offence. Learned counsel submitted that Vijay Sankar Pandey (supra) itself recognises that in some circumstances there may be reopening of the enquiry proceeding. 27. Mr. Choudhuri then submitted that the petitioner's password should have been kept a secret. It was a highly confidential information. The fact that it was used by somebody else indicates that there was some negligence on the part of the petitioner justifying the second enquiry report. 27. Mr. Choudhuri then submitted that the petitioner's password should have been kept a secret. It was a highly confidential information. The fact that it was used by somebody else indicates that there was some negligence on the part of the petitioner justifying the second enquiry report. It is pertinent to note that in the past also somebody else had used the petitioner's password as would appear from the enquiry report. Further, in the last paragraph of his reply dated 9th November, 2012, the petitioner himself requested for being given benefit of doubt. This indicates that there was a possibility that the petitioner had acted negligently. Hence, there was material supporting the finding of the Enquiry Officer and it cannot be said that such finding is based on no evidence. 28. As regards the submission that the petitioner has been framed only to shield the real culprits, Mr. Chowdhury strongly disputed the same. He submitted that RBI instituted an audit to unearth the truth. The Central office in Bombay was also informed. The Services' Board was approached. Everything was done in a transparent manner. There was no mala fide on the part of RBI. 29. Learned Senior Counsel relied on the following three decisions in support of his submissions that in view of availability of an efficacious alternative remedy in the form of departmental appeal, the instant writ petition should not be entertained: (i) Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603 (ii) Transport and Dock Workers Union vs. Mumbai Port Trust, (2011) 2 SCC 575 (iii) State of Uttar Pradesh and Another vs. Uttar Pradesh Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh Samiti and Others, (2008) 12 SCC 675 30. The writ petitioner has challenged the charge-sheet dated 16th May, 2011, the order directing reopening of the disciplinary proceedings after the first enquiry report exonerated the petitioner, the second enquiry report dated 7th August, 2012, the Disciplinary Authority's findings dated 26th September, 2012 and his tentative order of the same date proposing punishment that was to be imposed on the petitioner and the final order dated 14th February, 2013 whereby the punishment proposed was imposed on the petitioner. It is settled law that the High Court while exercising power of judicial review is not generally concerned with the decision impugned but with the decision making process. It is settled law that the High Court while exercising power of judicial review is not generally concerned with the decision impugned but with the decision making process. So long as the decision under challenge has been taken following due procedure of law and observing the principles of natural justice, the Writ Court will be slow to interfere. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court is ordinarily not concerned with the merits of the decision but with the manner in which such decision has been arrived at. The Court generally ensures that the rules of fair play have been complied with by the Authority concerned in taking a decision having adverse civil consequences for the aggrieved party. 31. However, even if there may be no infirmity in the decision making process, the Writ Court may also intervene if the decision is arbitrary or not supported by any evidence or perverse or not warranted on an overall appreciation of the facts on record by any stretch of imagination or is so unreasonable that no reasonable person applying his mind properly to the facts of the case could arrive at such a decision (Wednesbury unreasonable: Associated Provincial Picture Homes Ltd. vs. Wednesbury Corporation, (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680). The Writ Court is a court of equity, a court of conscience. If a decision of an Authority is such that on an evaluation of the undisputed facts on record it appears to the Writ Court that under no circumstances the decision can be supported and/or if the decision is such that it shocks the conscience of the court, the Writ Court shall interfere with the decision. Keeping these principles of law in mind let me now consider how far the punishment imposed on the writ petitioner can be sustained. 32. The essence of the charge brought against the petitioner is authorization of a transaction by misusing his user ID and password for generation of payment order no. 5960829 dated December 02, 2010 for Rs. 35,00,000/- without valid documents. This was stated to be an attempt to put through a transaction which cannot be deemed bona fide. The petitioner's detailed reply to the charge-sheet was not found satisfactory by the Authorities and an enquiry proceeding was initiated against the petitioner. 5960829 dated December 02, 2010 for Rs. 35,00,000/- without valid documents. This was stated to be an attempt to put through a transaction which cannot be deemed bona fide. The petitioner's detailed reply to the charge-sheet was not found satisfactory by the Authorities and an enquiry proceeding was initiated against the petitioner. There is nothing on record as regards why the Authorities did not find the petitioner's reply to the charge-sheet to be satisfactory. Any decision/conclusion of a Public Authority which is likely to have adverse consequence for a person must be informed with reasons. Without reasons, an order or a decision becomes arbitrary. 33. The enquiry proceeding took place. The petitioner participated in the proceeding. By his report dated 1st September, 2011 the Enquiry Officer held that the charge levelled against the petitioner stands not established. The Enquiry Officer recorded detailed reasons in support of his conclusion. In my view, that should have been the end of the matter. 34. However, by a letter dated December 29, 2011 issued on behalf of RBI by the Assistant General Manager (Personnel), the petitioner was informed that on a perusal of the Enquiry Officer's report and examination of defence representative's arguments “the Competent Authority is of the view that there has been procedural impropriety in the conduct of the proceedings, thereby serious infirmity has crept in, as such in the interest of justice as also for proper appreciation of the evidence it would be proper to reopen the proceedings from the stage of evidence.” In my view, this was completely unwarranted. The petitioner was not responsible for any 'procedural impropriety' or of any administrative lapses. The decision to reopen the enquiry proceeding was wholly unfair and unjust. The petitioner duly protested by writing letters dated January 16, 2012 and January 30, 2012. However, the Authorities in their letter dated February 02, 2012 recorded that the order for reopening the enquiry proceeding was issued “in the interests of justice.” In my considered view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, this course of conduct on the part of the Authorities is completely unsupportable. The petitioner had been exonerated by the Enquiry Officer who had been appointed by the bank. I find no justifiable reason for the bank to have subjected the petitioner to a second round of enquiry. The petitioner had been exonerated by the Enquiry Officer who had been appointed by the bank. I find no justifiable reason for the bank to have subjected the petitioner to a second round of enquiry. Further, no provision could be pointed out on behalf of RBI in the applicable rules/regulations governing enquiry proceedings, permitting the Authorities to reopen the enquiry proceeding after submission of the Enquiry Officer's report on the flimsy ground of alleged procedural impropriety having crept into the conduct of the proceeding. It would have been a different matter had the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the Enquiry Officer's report with supporting reasons. But that is not the case here. There seems to be some substance in the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that he was sought to be made a scapegoat and responsibility for the attempted irregular transaction was sought to be fastened on the petitioner at any cost. In this connection, it may be noted that it was the petitioner who brought the attempted irregular transaction to the notice of the higher Authority and prevented a transaction from going through which otherwise would have caused substantial financial loss to RBI. On the ground of procedural impropriety alone, I would be inclined to set aside the order of the bank directing that the enquiry proceeding be reopened and all subsequent orders. 35. However, even assuming that the Disciplinary Authority was entitled in law to direct that the enquiry proceeding be reopened, the resultant second enquiry report also does not establish the guilt of the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer was the same person who had submitted the first enquiry report. His conclusion was that User ID "DCH" that was assigned to the petitioner, was used to authorize the impugned transaction. However, the charge that the petitioner put through the said transaction stood not established. In the course of discussing the facts of the case and the submission of the parties, the Enquiry Officer made, inter-alia, the following observations: “User management activities done by the department were not as per extant norm of IS policy, since IDs were not deactivated/suspended in case of absence/transfer of the user. On November 22, 2010 DCH user-id was used to process a transaction although user was on leave on that day. This confirmed the fact that somebody else must know his user-id and password. On November 22, 2010 DCH user-id was used to process a transaction although user was on leave on that day. This confirmed the fact that somebody else must know his user-id and password. It may not be out of context to mention that few witnesses including Mr. Sirin Kumar, AGM, FMD and the then System Administrator of PDO, Kolkata under whose supervision CSO worked for long time, had commented during enquiry proceedings that CSO, Shri Chatterjee cannot do this fraudulent transaction. In the conclusion para of CSAA report dated January 28, 2011 initiated by Shri Shreedhar Behera, GM, DBS, it was mentioned that “there were 16 instances when the user-id of the officers/employees absent from duty were used to inward/process/authorise the transactions. It was indicative fact that the passwords of various user-ids were shared.” Finally, it was observed that although on November 22, 2010 CSE was absent from his duty, one genuine transaction was authorised by using the user-id and password of “DCH” i.e. CSO Shri Chatterjee and payment was made to the bonafide holder. This clearly proved that the password was very much shared/known by some other in the department. This reaffirmed GM Shri Behera's observation in the earlier para. 36. The aforesaid would indubitably indicate that there were systematic flaws on the part of the bank administration. DCH could well be a generic User ID. It is on record that previously, even when the petitioner was on leave, the User ID "DCH" had been used by somebody to authorize a valid transaction. Hence, the possibility of there being a practice of more than one officer sharing the same User ID cannot be ruled out. No technical personnel was examined by the bank in the course of the enquiry proceeding as, in my opinion, should have been done. There is nothing on record to establish that the petitioner in breach of his duty to maintain confidentiality, shared his User ID with any other officer. I am also unable to believe that the petitioner connived with some other officer and shared his User ID enabling such officer to authorize the impugned transaction. If that was so, the petitioner would not have drawn the attention of the higher Authority to this irregularity immediately upon the transaction being referred to him for approval. I am also unable to believe that the petitioner connived with some other officer and shared his User ID enabling such officer to authorize the impugned transaction. If that was so, the petitioner would not have drawn the attention of the higher Authority to this irregularity immediately upon the transaction being referred to him for approval. The petitioner was indeed the whistleblower who averted an attempted fraud and prevented substantial financial loss being caused to the bank. 37. Once it is established that the petitioner did not put through the impugned transaction, I am at a loss to understand on what basis the Disciplinary Authority imposed the punishment that it has on the petitioner. It may be noted that the charge against the petitioner was not that he authorized or enabled another officer to put through the impugned transaction. The charge was that the petitioner himself did so. This charge has been negated by the Enquiry Officer. The petitioner cannot be punished or penalized for some act that he was not charged with. I do not find any basis for imposition of the penalty on the petitioner as has been done by the Disciplinary Authority. It is common knowledge that a password is not a coded language which no one can crack. It can be hacked without much difficulty by use of modern technology. The petitioner's User ID was used even when he was on leave. Obviously, someone else had knowledge of such User ID. Once this came to the knowledge of the bank, it should have taken appropriate steps in the matter including holding requisite enquiry. The bank did nothing. 38. The primary argument of Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the bank hinged on the existence of an alternative remedy by way of departmental appeal. He has relied on the three Supreme Court decisions noted above. All the three decisions reiterate the established law that existence of an efficacious alternative remedy is not a bar to the maintainability of a writ petition. It is essentially a rule of policy, a rule of self-imposed limitation, rather than a rule of law. It is well within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution in spite of availability of an alternative remedy. 39. It is essentially a rule of policy, a rule of self-imposed limitation, rather than a rule of law. It is well within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution in spite of availability of an alternative remedy. 39. The petitioner's Learned Counsel relied on the Apex Court's decision in Ganga Retreat and Towers Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 12 SCC 1991. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in a number of cases, even after recording a finding that the writ petition was not maintainable and that the High Court ought not to have entertained it, the Supreme Court declined to interfere on the ground of non-maintainability where it found that the matter has been pending for long and/or the High Court has already entertained the writ petition [albeit wrongly] and/or when to send the writ petitioner back would cause grave delay or harassment. 40. In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Uttar Pradesh Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh Samiti and Others, (2008) 12 SCC 675 the Supreme Court, at Paragraph-38 of the judgment, observed as follows: “True it is that issuance of rule nisi or passing of interim orders is a relevant consideration for not dismissing a petition if it appears to the High Court that the matter could be decided by a Writ-Court. It has been so held even by this Court in several cases that even if alternative remedy is available, it cannot be held that a writ-petition is not maintainable.” In the same decision however, the Supreme Court also observed that it cannot be laid down as a proposition of law that once a petition is admitted, it could never be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. Ultimately it is a question of exercise of discretion by the High Court which has to be done in a judicious manner. 41. Keeping the facts of the case in mind, I am of the considered view that it would be improper, unfair and unconscionable to relegate the petitioner to the alternative remedy of departmental appeal at this stage. The writ petition was filed in 2013. An interim order was passed in favour of the petitioner which was extended from time to time and continues still date. The petitioner is due to superannuate by the end of this year. The writ petition was filed in 2013. An interim order was passed in favour of the petitioner which was extended from time to time and continues still date. The petitioner is due to superannuate by the end of this year. No disputed question of fact is involved which would make it difficult for the Writ Court to decide the writ petition. Dismissing the writ petition at this stage on the ground of availability of efficacious alternative remedy would cause immense and unwarranted hardship to the petitioner. Further, it is not in dispute that the RBI Services Board has confirmed the penalty imposed on the petitioner. The Board is a much higher Authority than the Authority before whom a departmental appeal would lie. Such an appeal, in my view, would be an idle exercise in futility. Hence, I am not inclined to deny relief to the petitioner only on the ground of existence of alternative remedy. 42. The contention of the Bank that the Enquiry Proceeding was reopened at the instance of the petitioner is not factually correct and is not borne out from the records of the case. It is absolutely incredible that having been exonerated by the Enquiry Officer by his first report, the petitioner would ask for the Enquiry Proceeding to be reopened. No sane man would do that. 43. I have already recorded my opinion that the order directing reopening of the enquiry proceeding after submission of enquiry report by the Enquiry Officer and of subsequent acts and orders of the respondent bank are bad in law and cannot be sustained as being contrary to the basic tenets of justice. There will be an order in terms of Prayer "a" of the writ petition. There will however, be no order as to costs.