ORDER : N.V. Anjaria, J. 1. In the facts and circumstances of the case and with consent and request of parties appearing through their respective learned advocates, the petition was taken up for final consideration. 1.1. Rule, returnable forthwith. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Manan Mehta waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of the respondents. 2. The petitioner has prayed to set aside order dated 23rd April, 2018 passed by respondent No. 2- Deputy Conservator of Forests, Bhuj, whereby services of the petitioner came to be terminated. 3. Petitioner was appointed as Bit Guard by order dated 17th September, 2013 and posting was given at Kadol Bit, Bhachau Range, which was an appointment on a fixed pay and for fixed period of five years as per the conditions mentioned in the letter of appointment. 3.1. In the impugned order of termination, it was mentioned that while the petitioner was on duty, it was reported that the petitioner was caught on 11th April, 2018 for the offence of accepting bribe. An offence was registered with A.C.B. Police Station, Kutch by filing First Information Report being Crime Register No. I-02 of 2018 in relation to the alleged offence under Sections 7, 13(1)(c) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It was proved that the petitioner has accepted the amount of bribe and thus committed misconduct. The order of termination mentioned the brief facts regarding the manner of offence committed. It was mentioned that as per conditions of appointment, services of the petitioner were liable to be dispensed with. Thus, the impugned order came to be passed. 4. Learned advocate for the petitioner assailed the impugned order by submitting that it was stigmatic in nature and a ready conclusion was drawn that the offence was committed and therefore, the petitioner misconducted. He submitted that the principle of natural justice were given a complete go-bye and the order was passed without issuing even a show-cause notice. 4. Learned advocate for the petitioner assailed the impugned order by submitting that it was stigmatic in nature and a ready conclusion was drawn that the offence was committed and therefore, the petitioner misconducted. He submitted that the principle of natural justice were given a complete go-bye and the order was passed without issuing even a show-cause notice. It was additionally submitted that the State Government has issued Resolution dated 20th October, 2015 and 28th March, 2016 by which certain conditions of service for the employees appointed on a fixed pay came to be provided for and as per condition No. 14A in Schedule I to the Government Resolution dated 28th March, 2016, it is contemplated that the principles of natural justice and conducting of inquiry have to be followed in case of misconduct found to have been committed by the ad hoc employee before terminating the service. 4.1. By the very nature of contents of the order, the order was stigmatic in nature. It was passed without compliance of principles of natural justice. 5. The position of law in relation to effecting termination of service of an employee, even if on the fixed pay and who is a fixed term employee by passing an order without following principles of natural justice came to be delineated and discussed by this Court in Imranbhai Anwarbhai Majothi v. State of Gujarat being Special Civil Application No. 17872 of 2017 decided on 30th November, 2017. In that case, petitioner was appointed as Bit Guard. The allegations were raised against him inter alia that he had stolen two pass-books, that he mentioned wrong information in the Register to allow trucks to pass-by illegally. It was stated in the order leading to his termination of service that he used the pass-book for illegal purpose for which it was stolen and due to the act of negligence, caused damage to the forest's properties to a large extent. It was mentioned in the order that if the petitioner was to continue in service, it would entail greater loss and that it was not advisable to continue the petitioner in service since the petitioner was found to be negligent and careless in discharge of his duties. 5.1. The law on the aspect was discussed with reference to the decisions of the Apex Court. 5.1. The law on the aspect was discussed with reference to the decisions of the Apex Court. In judging whether termination is simpliciter or punitive, a trite distinction is made between motive of the order and foundation of the order. In Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. [ (2000) 5 SCC 152 ], the Supreme Court explained the concept of motive and foundation in respect of probationer as under: "Motive is the moving power which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently, motive is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action? It if was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the act would be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of serious misconduct against the employee and a preliminary inquiry is held behind his back to ascertain the truth of those allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to other circumstances, would be founded on the allegations of misconduct which were to be true in the preliminary inquiry." (para 29) (emphasis supplied) 5.2. The above statement of law that if the order is punitive and stigmatic in nature, even if the employee concerned is a temporary employee or holding the post as on probation, his dismissal or removal would warrant a regular inquiry and full-fledge compliance of natural justice, emanaged from the early decision of the Apex Court in Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India [ (1984) 2 SCC 369 ]. In that case, the Apex Court held that it is permissible for the Court to go behind the formal order of discharge so as to find out the real cause of action. In that case, the appellant was an IPS Officer, undergoing training as a probationer, arrived late by about 22 minutes at the place, even though prior intimation was sent about the time on which, the candidates were required to reach the venue. The incident of delayed reporting was considered to be one by the authorities calling for an inquiry and an explanation was sought for from the petitioner and all other probationer-trainees who had arrived late. The incident of delayed reporting was considered to be one by the authorities calling for an inquiry and an explanation was sought for from the petitioner and all other probationer-trainees who had arrived late. On the basis of explanation, the Director recommended the Government for discharge of the appellant from service. The Government passed order of discharge on the basis of recommendation of the Director with whom, the only ground prevailing was that the appellant did not show any sign of repentance. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition. However, the Supreme Court allowed the Appeal and held that the order was punitive. The appellant was directed to be reinstated with full benefits. 5.3. The principle stated was that even the form of the order may be merely a camouflage for order of dismissal actually passed on the basis of misconduct. In such circumstances, the Apex Court stated, it is always open to the court before which the order is challenged, to go beyond the form and ascertain the true character of the order. The Supreme Court held, "If...the court reaches the conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for that incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order of discharge should fall to the ground where the aggrieved officer is not afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Article 311(2). It is wrong to assume that it is only when there is a full scale departmental enquiry any termination made thereafter will attract the operation of Article 311(2)." (Paras 11 and 13) 5.4. It is the foundation of the order which really matters. The Supreme Court in Anoop Jaiswal (supra) stated that if from the record and the attendant circumstances of the present case it becomes clear that the real foundation for the order of discharge of the appellant-probationer was the alleged act of misconduct, the impugned order would amount to termination of service by way of punishment and in absence of any enquiry held in accordance with Article 311(2), it was liable to be struck down. The Supreme Court thereafter directed reinstatement of the appellant of the said case in service with the same rank of seniority he was entitled to before the impugned order passed as if it had not been passed at all. 5.5. The Supreme Court thereafter directed reinstatement of the appellant of the said case in service with the same rank of seniority he was entitled to before the impugned order passed as if it had not been passed at all. 5.5. The Supreme Court in Gujarat Steel Tubes Limited v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha [ (1980) 2 SCC 593 ] stated and observed thus, "53. Masters and servants cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the law of dismissals and the plain and proper criteria are not to be misdirected by terminological cover-ups or by appeal to psychic processes but must be grounded on the substantive reason for the order, whether disclosed or undisclosed. The Court will find out from other proceedings or documents connected with the formal order of termination what the true ground for the termination is. If, thus scrutinised, the order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal. If it falls short of this test, it cannot be called a punishment. To put it slightly differently, a termination effected because the master is satisfied of the misconduct and of the consequent desirability of terminating the service of the delinquent servant, is a dismissal, even if he had the right in law to terminate with an innocent order under the standing order or otherwise. Whether, in such a case the grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the formal order does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that, after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate. Given an alleged misconduct and a live nexus between it and the termination of service the conclusion is dismissal, even if full benefits as on simple termination, are given and non-injurious terminology is used." (Emphasis supplied) (Para 9) 5.5.1. Having delineated the aforesaid principles, the Apex Court held that the order in the case before it could not be treated as a simple order of retrenchment and that it was an order passed by way of punishment. It was held that such order of dismissal which was passed without holding a regular departmental inquiry cannot be allowed to be sustained. 5.6. In Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary (supra) also the Supreme Court considered its own various decisions on the aspect and after referring to the decision in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corpn. It was held that such order of dismissal which was passed without holding a regular departmental inquiry cannot be allowed to be sustained. 5.6. In Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary (supra) also the Supreme Court considered its own various decisions on the aspect and after referring to the decision in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd. [ (1999) 2 SCC 21 ] observed that the proposition of law operating two ways. In certain cases of temporary servants and probationers if the inquiry undertaken about the very conduct forms the motive of termination order, then the termination could not be said to be punitive merely because principles of natural justice have not been followed. In such circumstances, without becoming stigmatic, the employer can exercise its right to terminate service of the employee concerned. In the other line of decisions, the Supreme Court has ruled that if the facts revealed in the inquiry or from the narration of the order itself that the inquiry into the conduct was not the motive but it was a foundation and the allegation of misconduct considered against employee becomes foundation of termination of service of temporary servant or probationer, such action would become punitive and it would make the order legally unsound. The Supreme Court in Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary (supra) thereafter referred to the above quoted observations from Gujarat Still Tubes Limited (supra) terming them as instructive. 5.7. In Imranbhai Anwarbhai Majothi (supra), it was thereafter observed and held, "6. When the impugned order is assessed, evaluated and considered in light of the aforesaid principles, it is even not necessary to adopt the process of lifting of veil. It is not necessary to remove the facade even, for, the order in these very recitals could be manifestly said to be based on allegations of misconduct. The plain reading of order castes stigma. It is a stigmatic action of termination of petitioner's service. Such an action could not have been taken, eventhough the petitioner was a fixed period employee, without giving the petitioner a full-fledge opportunity to defend and thus by holding a regular departmental inquiry. The employer is not allowed to hire and fire employee. The plain reading of order castes stigma. It is a stigmatic action of termination of petitioner's service. Such an action could not have been taken, eventhough the petitioner was a fixed period employee, without giving the petitioner a full-fledge opportunity to defend and thus by holding a regular departmental inquiry. The employer is not allowed to hire and fire employee. Even if the temporary, ad-hoc or probationer employee is driven out of service on the ground of misconduct without holding inquiry and stigma is caste on his career by the punitive order, it is also a facet of behaving with hire and fire attitude by the employer." 5.8. Also stand to support the petitioner another decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 1095 of 2016 decided on 21st September, 2016 in which, it was observed in paragraph 8 of the judgment that the order ex facie indicated that the basis of the order of termination was criminal complaint lodged against the petitioner. As the order was passed without compliance of natural justice, it was required indulgence of the Court, stated the Court, after discussing the position of law in that regard. 6. Having surveyed the principles of law as above, adverting to revisit the basic facts of the present case, the petitioner was appointed by order dated 17th September, 2013 as Bit Guard on a fixed pay for a period of five years. Therefore, his term of appointment was upto 16th September, 2018. However, petitioner's services came to be terminated by impugned order dated 23rd April, 2018 for the grounds stated in the order. 6.1. As recorded above, the impugned order proceeded on the basis of the First Information Report filed against the petitioner for the offences under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act to conclude that by accepting the amount of bribe, petitioner had committed misconduct. It was mentioned in the order of termination that the petitioner had committed misconduct under the Gujarat Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971 and since the petitioner was on a fixed pay, on the ground of taking and accepting bribe, his services were liable to be terminated. Stigma was cast against the petitioner which terminating his services as per the impugned order. 6.2. Stigma was cast against the petitioner which terminating his services as per the impugned order. 6.2. Thus, it was clear from the bare reading of the recitals in the impugned order that the foundation of the order of termination was alleged events taking bribe and registration of First Information Report for such alleged offence. The authority passing the order of termination readily concluded that the petitioner has committed offence of taking bribe and thus had misconducted under the disciplinary rules. The order proceeded to terminate services with retrospective effect on the ground that misconduct as above was committed. Since the allegations of misconduct were the foundation for penal action taken against the petitioner, the above discussed principles of law would apply to grant relief to the petitioner. 6.3. While the impugned order would be liable to be set aside and the petitioner would be liable to be reinstated, since the petitioner's appointment was for a fixed term and was to come to an end at the end of five years on 16th September, 2018, as provided in the initial order, reinstatement which is being directed as per the present order shall be operative upto the said period to make up the total period of five years as per the conditions of the original order of appointment dated 17th September, 2013. This does not imply non-employment of the petitioner thereafter. 6.4. As a result of above discussion and reasons, the impugned order dated 23rd April, 2018 passed by Deputy Conservator of Forests is hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to treat the petitioner to have been reinstated on the original post of Bit Guard with continuity of service and with salary/wages to be paid for interregnum, as well as with consequential benefits as if the order of termination was never passed. Reinstatement of the petitioner directed as above shall be upto 16th September, 2018 so as to make up the total period of employment of five years as per the conditions of appointment. Resultant monetary benefits arising by virtue of the present order shall be paid to the petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the present order. 7. Petition is allowed accordingly. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. Direct service is permitted.