JUDGMENT : This is an appeal filed by the complainant against the judgment and order of acquittal of the accused passed by the Additional Senior Civil Judge & JMFC, Ranebennur dated 22.12.2018 in C.C.No.131/2018 for the offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC. 2. The facts of the case in brief are that, a private complaint was filed by the complainant alleging offences punishable under Section 420, 463, 464, 468 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, against accused Nos.1 and 2 who are husband and wife. The 2nd accused was running Vijayaweekly Share Company since many years at Ranebennur. The complainant was also having transaction with accused No.2 in the said Company. During his transaction he has never issued any promissory note to accused No.2. Accused No.1 is not the member of the said share Company. Even the complainant has no acquaintance of this accused. He has no monitory transaction with the accused. Even then accused No.1 and 2 in collusion with each other taking undue advantage of innocence of the complainant got created an on demand pro-note alleging that the complainant had borrowed an amount of Rs.3,35,000/- from 1st accused on 18.02.2005. Whereas no such transaction or any kind of transaction had taken place between the complainant and accused No.1. The said promissory note was created and the signature of this complainant was forged. 1st accused had filed the suit in O.S.No.139/2006 against the complainant on the said promissory note before the 1st Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranebennur. When the notice of the suit came to the complainant, he along with other persons went to the house of the accused on 14.03.2007 at about 6.30 p.m. The 2nd accused when enquired stated that the matter is pending before the Court and to say whatever he has to say in the said suit. The accused No.1 was also present in the house. Even she had insulted the complainant and Sadashivappa, Banukumar, Mahadevappa and Gurubasappa who had accompanied the complainant. Complainant has no acquaintance with the witnesses who have attested the said on demand promissory note. But even then in order to defraud the complaint accused No.1 has filed the said suit that has caused mental agony and defamed the complainant. As such this private complainant came to be filed seeking for taking cognizance against accused No.1 and 2 for the above said offences. 3. But even then in order to defraud the complaint accused No.1 has filed the said suit that has caused mental agony and defamed the complainant. As such this private complainant came to be filed seeking for taking cognizance against accused No.1 and 2 for the above said offences. 3. The case against accused No.2 was quashed by virtue of the order passed in Crl.P.No.7947/2009. As regards accused Nos.1 is concerned he was discharged from the offence punishable under Sections 463, 464 and 468 of IPC. But accused No.1 was prosecuted for offences punishable under Section 420 of IPC. Accused pleaded not guilty therefore the learned magistrate after trial of the case, based on the evidence available on record came to the conclusion that the offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC is not proved against the accused therefore, the accused was acquitted for the said offence. 4. The said judgment has been challenged by the complainant under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on the following grounds. The order of the trial court is illegal, perverse and opposed to law on the facts of the case and the evidence available on record. The Trial Court mainly relied on the judgment passed in O.S.No.139/2006, the said proceedings have not attained finality and R.S.A.No.100852/2015. The judgment is contrary to sections 41 to 43 of the Indian Evidence Act. The findings given by the Civil Court do not have any bearing so far as the criminal case is concerned. The standard of proof is different in criminal and civil cases. The civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance and probabilities of the case, whereas in criminal case the guilt has proved beyond any reasonable doubt. Therefore, the trial court committed error in relying on the finding given in the suit. The Trial Court wrongly came to the conclusion that the signature of the complainant on the pro-note at Ex.P.1(a) and the signature appearing in the Bank records are not similar. Therefore, the trial court ought to have presumed that the signature of the complainant on the pro-note is fabricated. The Trial court committed error in rejecting the application filed under Section 311(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to send the pro-note for handwriting analysis. Rejection of the said order was also challenged in Criminal Petition No.101998/2018. Therefore, the trial court ought to have presumed that the signature of the complainant on the pro-note is fabricated. The Trial court committed error in rejecting the application filed under Section 311(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to send the pro-note for handwriting analysis. Rejection of the said order was also challenged in Criminal Petition No.101998/2018. Inspite of that the Trial Court proceeded with the matter without giving an opportunity to the appellants. Hence the appellant sought for setting aside the order passed by the Trial Court and convict the accused for the offences punishable under Sections. 5. The learned counsel reiterated the appeal grounds during the course of his arguments. The learned counsel has also relied on a ruling reported in 2005 AIR SCW 1929 (Iqbal Singh Marwah and Another Vs. Meenakshi Marwah and another) and prayed to allow the appeal. 6. On the above said facts and circumstances and arguments, the following point would arises for consideration of this Court. “(1) Whether the appellant had made out a ground to grant special leave to prefer an appeal against the impugned order? (2) Whether the appellant had made out the grounds that the accused had committed an offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC by producing a created promissory note by forging the signature of the complainant and filed the same in O.S.No.138/2006? 3) What order? 7. Points are answered in the negative. 8. In I.A.No.1/2019 filed seeking leave to prefer this appeal. I have examined the appeal grounds to find out whether there are any grounds to grant special leave to the complainant to prefer this appeal. No reasons are made out for grant of leave to prefer this appeal against the order of acquittal. 9. In this case, the complainant initially sought to prosecute the accused Nos.1 and 2 for the offence punishable under Sections 420, 463, 464, 468 read with Section 34 of IPC. The matter was referred to the jurisdictional police for investigation and after completion of investigation ‘B’ came to be filed. Further complainant had filed sworn statement and other witnesses were examined and produced documents at Ex.P-1 to 6. on the basis of the sworn statement, the trial Court took the cognizance against the accused Nos.1 and 2 for the aforesaid offences. Being aggrieved by the order of taking cognizance, the second accused filed Crl.A.No.7947/2009. Further complainant had filed sworn statement and other witnesses were examined and produced documents at Ex.P-1 to 6. on the basis of the sworn statement, the trial Court took the cognizance against the accused Nos.1 and 2 for the aforesaid offences. Being aggrieved by the order of taking cognizance, the second accused filed Crl.A.No.7947/2009. The said criminal appeal was allowed and the case against the accused No.2 was quashed. The proceedings continued insofar as the accused No.1 is concerned. The trial Court after hearing both the sides, discharged the accused No.1 for the offences punishable under Sections 463, 464, 468 of IPC. Charges were framed only for the offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC. The said order has become final and the complainant has not challenged the same. The points for determination raised by the trial Court read as under: (1) Whether prosecution proves beyond all reasonable doubts that on 18.2.2005 at Ranebennur accused No.1 dishonestly induced the complaint to deliver the promissory note in order to commit cheating and thereby committed the offices punishable U/Sec 420 of IPC? (2) What order?” 10. After hearing both the parties, the trial Court answered the points in the negative. 11. It is relevant to extract Section 420 of IPC which reads as under: “420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 12. The case of the complainant is that the accused Nos.1 and 2 are husband and wife. Complainant had no transaction with accused No.1. The complainant had the transaction with the husband of the accused No.2 who was running a share company. The proceedings initiated by the complainant against the husband of the accused No.1 have been quashed. If the complainant had no transaction with accused No.1 then how the complaint could have been maintainable for the offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC. Because the ingredients of Section 420 of IPC were not attributed to accused No.2. The proceedings initiated by the complainant against the husband of the accused No.1 have been quashed. If the complainant had no transaction with accused No.1 then how the complaint could have been maintainable for the offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC. Because the ingredients of Section 420 of IPC were not attributed to accused No.2. The foundation of the private complaint that the complainant never handed over any promissory note either to accused No.1 or to her husband. It is the specific allegation that taking advantage of the innocence of the complainant got created the promissory note and forged the signature of the complainant and filed a false suit in O.S.No.139/2006. The said suit is decreed and Regular Second Appeal is pending before this Court. With these facts, reasonable doubt would arise whether the complainant could have prosecuted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC. The records in O.S.No.139/2006 have not been produced in the criminal Court. From the evidence, it is brought out that the complainant was acquainted with the accused persons. As regards, signature of PW-1 deposes visit of time and there is variance in this signature. According to the complainant, on 14.03.2007, in the evening when he had gone to the house of the husband of the accused No.1 at that time, accused No.1 loudly asked them to go to Court. Admittedly, the complainant was a member of share company run by the husband of the accused No.1. He contends that he has not received any loan amount under the said promissory note. The written statement filed in O.S.No.139/2006 has been produced by the complainant at Ex.P-3. In that statement, he has pleaded that the husband of the accused No.1 was carrying money transaction, he has obtained blank promissory note from the complainant. One of such promissory notes was misused by the accused No.1 whereas in the private complaint, he comes with the story that the promissory note has been created and his signature was forged. Therefore, on material evidence on record as of PWs-1 and 2, the trial Court found that the guilt of the accused No.1 and 2 not proved beyond any reasonable doubt. Even assuming the allegations made in the complaint are taken into consideration, the offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC does not appear to have been proved beyond doubt. Therefore, on material evidence on record as of PWs-1 and 2, the trial Court found that the guilt of the accused No.1 and 2 not proved beyond any reasonable doubt. Even assuming the allegations made in the complaint are taken into consideration, the offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC does not appear to have been proved beyond doubt. Therefore, having regard to the merits of this appeal, I find that it is not a fit case to grant special leave to prefer the appeal. No purpose will be served by allowing said application. 13. The trial Court has rightly disbelieved the evidence of PW-2. They are found to be interested. Therefore, the point No.1 is answered in the negative. 14. This is a private complaint instituted by the complainant alleging certain offences and that the document has been used to file a civil suit to obtain a decree for money recovery. Therefore, on questioning the learned counsel with regard to the applicability of bar under Section 195 of Cr.P.C. is concerned, learned counsel has relied on authority reported in 2005 AIR SCW 1929 between Iqbal Singh Marwah and another Vs. Meenakshi Marwah and another. The entire scope, applicability and definition of Section 195 of Cr.P.C. has been decided by a Full Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court. “9. The scheme of the statutory provision may now be examined. Broadly, Section 195, Cr.P.C. deals with three distinct categories of offences which have been described in clauses (a), (b)(i) and (b)(ii) and they relate to (1) contempt of lawful authority of public servants, (2) offences against public justice, and (3) offences relating to documents given in evidence. Clause (a) deals with offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188, IPC which occur in Chapter X of the IPC and the heading of the Chapter is— 'Of Contempts of The Lawful Authority of Public Servants'. These are offences which directly affect the functioning of or discharge of lawful duties of a public servant. Clause (b)(i) refers to offences in Chapter XI of IPC which is headed as— 'Of False Evidence And Offences Against Public Justice'. These are offences which directly affect the functioning of or discharge of lawful duties of a public servant. Clause (b)(i) refers to offences in Chapter XI of IPC which is headed as— 'Of False Evidence And Offences Against Public Justice'. The offences mentioned in this clause clearly relate to giving or fabricating false evidence or making a false declaration in any judicial proceeding or before a Court of justice or before a public servant who is bound or authorized by law to receive such declaration, and also to some other offences which have a direct correlation with the proceedings in a Court of justice (Sections 205 and 211, IPC). This being the scheme of two provisions or clauses of Section 195, viz., that the offence should be such which has direct bearing or affects the functioning or discharge of lawful duties of a public servant or has a direct correlation with the proceedings in a court of justice, the expression "when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in a Court" occurring in clause (b)(ii) should normally mean commission of such an offence after the document has actually been produced or given in evidence in the Court. The situation or contingency where an offence as enumerated in this clause has already been committed earlier and later on the document is produced or is given in evidence in Court, does not appear to be in tune with clauses (a)(i) and (b)(i) and consequently with the scheme of Section 195, Cr.P.C. This indicates that clause (b)(ii) contemplates a situation where the offences enumerated therein are committed with respect to a document subsequent to its production or giving in evidence in a proceeding in any Court. 10. Section 195(1) mandates a complaint in writing of the Court for taking cognizance of the offences enumerated in clauses (b) (i) and (b)(ii) thereof. Sections 340 and 341, Cr.P.C. which occur in Chapter XXVI give the procedure for filing of the complaint and other matters connected therewith. The heading of this Chapter is— 'Provisions As To Offences Affecting The Administration Of Justice'. Sections 340 and 341, Cr.P.C. which occur in Chapter XXVI give the procedure for filing of the complaint and other matters connected therewith. The heading of this Chapter is— 'Provisions As To Offences Affecting The Administration Of Justice'. Though, as a general rule, the language employed in a heading cannot be used to give a different effect to clear words of the Section where there cannot be any doubt as to their ordinary meaning, but they are not to be treated as if they were marginal notes or were introduced into the Act merely for the purpose of classifying the enactments. They constitute an important part of the Act itself, and may be read not only as explaining the Sections which immediately follow them, as a preamble to a statute may be looked to explain its enactments, but as affording a better key to the constructions of the Sections which follow them than might be afforded by a mere preamble. (See Craies on Statute Law, 7th Ed. Pages 207, 209). The fact that the procedure for filing a complaint by Court has been provided in Chapter XXVI dealing with offences affecting administration of justice, is a clear pointer of the legislative intent that the offence committed should be of such type which directly affects the administration of justice, viz., which is committed after the document is produced or given in evidence in Court. Any offence committed with respect to a document at a time prior to its production or giving in evidence in Court cannot, strictly speaking, be said to be an offence affecting the administration of justice. 17. Section 190, Cr.P.C. provides that a Magistrate may take cognizance of any offence (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence, (b) upon a police report of such facts, and (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. Section 195, Cr.P.C. is a sort of exception to this general provision and creates an embargo upon the power of the Court to take cognizance of certain types of offences enumerated therein. The procedure for filing a complaint by the Court as contemplated by Section 195(1), Cr.P.C. is given in Section 340, Cr.P.C. and sub-section (1) and (2) thereof are being reproduced below : “340. The procedure for filing a complaint by the Court as contemplated by Section 195(1), Cr.P.C. is given in Section 340, Cr.P.C. and sub-section (1) and (2) thereof are being reproduced below : “340. Procedure in cases mentioned in Section 195 - (1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary - (a) record a finding to that effect; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing; (c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate. (2) The power conferred on a Court by sub-section (1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a complaint under sub-section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of Section 195. 18. In view of the language used in Section 340, Cr.P.C. the Court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the Section is conditioned by the words "Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice." This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the Court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(i)(b). Before filing of the complaint, the Court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(i)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the Court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. It is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in Court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the Court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint. The broad view of clause (b)(ii), as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants, would render the victim of such forgery or forged document remedyless. Any interpretation which leads to a situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remedyless, has to be discarded. 19. There is another consideration which has to be kept in mind. Sub-section (1) of Section 340, Cr.P.C. contemplates holding of a preliminary enquiry. Normally, a direction for filing of a complaint is not made during the pendency of the proceeding before the Court and this is done at the stage when the proceeding is concluded and the final judgment is rendered. Section 341 provides for an appeal against an order directing filing of the complaint. The hearing and ultimate decision of the appeal is bound to take time. Section 343(2) confers a discretion upon a Court trying the complaint to adjourn the hearing of the case if it is brought to its notice that an appeal is pending against the decision arrived at in the judicial proceeding out of which the matter has arisen. The hearing and ultimate decision of the appeal is bound to take time. Section 343(2) confers a discretion upon a Court trying the complaint to adjourn the hearing of the case if it is brought to its notice that an appeal is pending against the decision arrived at in the judicial proceeding out of which the matter has arisen. In view of these provisions, the complaint case may not proceed at all for decades specially in matters arising out of civil suits where decisions are challenged in successive appellate fora which are time consuming. It is also to be noticed that there is no provision of appeal against an order passed under Section 343(2), whereby hearing of the case is adjourned until the decision of the appeal. These provisions show that, in reality, the procedure prescribed for filing a complaint by the Court is such that it may not fructify in the actual trial of the offender for an unusually long period. Delay in prosecution of a guilty person comes to his advantage as witnesses become reluctant to give evidence and the evidence gets lost. This important consideration dissuades us from accepting the broad interpretation sought to be placed upon clause (b)(ii). 20. An enlarged interpretation to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), whereby the bar created by the said provision would also operate where after commission of an act of forgery the document is subsequently produced in Court, is capable of great misuse. As pointed out in Sachida Nand Singh, after preparing a forged document or committing an act of forgery, a person may manage to get a proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or revenue court, either by himself or through someone set up by him and simply file the document in the said proceeding. He would thus be protected from prosecution, either at the instance of a private party or the police until the Court, where the document has been filed, itself chooses to file a complaint. The litigation may be a prolonged one due to which the actual trial of such a person may be delayed indefinitely. Such an interpretation would be highly detrimental to the interest of society at large. 21. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the Courts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a criminal complaint and such a course is rarely adopted. Such an interpretation would be highly detrimental to the interest of society at large. 21. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the Courts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a criminal complaint and such a course is rarely adopted. It will not be fair and proper to give an interpretation which leads to a situation where a person alleged to have committed an offence of the type enumerated in clause (b)(ii) is either not placed for trial on account of non-filing of a complaint or if a complaint is filed, the same does not come to its logical end. Judging from such an angle will be in consonance with the principle that an unworkable or impracticable result should be avoided. In S.J. Grange Ltd. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners (1979) 2 All ER 91, while interpreting a provision in the Finance Act, 1972, Lord Denning observed that if the literal construction leads to impracticable results, it would be necessary to do little adjustment so as to make the section workable. Therefore, in order that a victim of a crime of forgery, namely, the person aggrieved is able to exercise his right conferred by law to initiate prosecution of the offender, it is necessary to place a restrictive interpretation on clause (b)(ii). 23. That apart, the section which we are required to interpret is not a penal provision but is part of a procedural law, namely, Code of Criminal Procedure which elaborately gives the procedure for trial of criminal cases. The provision only creates a bar against taking cognizance of an offence in certain specified situations except upon complaint by Court. A penal statute is one upon which an action for penalties can be brought by a public officer or by a person aggrieved and a penal act in its wider sense includes every statute creating an offence against the State, whatever is the character of the penalty for the offence. The principle that a penal statute should be strictly construed, as projected by the learned counsel for the appellants can, therefore, have no application here. 24. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal Courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. 24. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal Courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein. While examining a similar contention in an appeal against an order directing filing of a complaint under Section 476 of old Code, the following observations made by a Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff vs. State of Madras AIR 1954 SC 397 give a complete answer to the problem posed: "(15) As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No hard and fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal Courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one Court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment. (16) Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust. This, however, is not a hard and fast rule. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust. This, however, is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered under S. 476. But in this case we are of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished." 15. Even according to the complainant, when he received the notice of the suit then he went there and found that the accused had filed a suit against him and it is pending before the Court. Therefore, the document is used and produced in the Court to make a false claim as alleged. Therefore, the bar under Section 195 of Cr.P.C. squarely applies. On this ground also complaint was not maintainable. Therefore, having regard to these facts and circumstances, I find that it is not a fit case to grant special leave. Moreover, there are no grounds to admit the appeal also. Hence, on both the grounds, appeal is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the point Nos.1 and 2 answered in the negative. Consequently, I.A.No.1/2019 filed under Section 378(4) of Cr.P.C. is rejected. Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed. The judgment of acquittal dated 22.12.2018 passed by Addl. Senior Civil Judge & J.M.F.C., Ranebennur, in C.C.No.131/2018 is hereby confirmed. Send back the records to the trial Court forthwith along with a copy of this order.