JUDGMENT : Mohammad Rafiq, J. 1. These three appeals are directed against common judgment dated 07.03.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court whereby two writ petitions bearing No. 9008/2011 and 1248/2013 filed by Managing Director, the Rajasthan Small Industries Corporation Limited and two others (for short 'the Management') were allowed and Writ Petition No. 474/2013 filed by appellant-workman Smt. Anjali Ghosh Roy was dismissed. Writ Petition No. 9008/2011 was filed by the Management challenging order dated 27.04.2011 passed by the Labour Court First, Jaipur (for short 'the Labour Court') whereby it declared domestic enquiry against the appellant-workman as unfair and improper. Writ Petition No. 1248/2013 was filed by the Management challenging the final award dated 26.09.2012 passed by the Labour Court while answering the reference on an industrial dispute referred to it, whereby termination of services of the appellant-workman vide order dated 21.06.1990 passed by the Management was declared illegal and the Management was directed to reinstate the appellant-workman in service with continuity in service, 20% back wages and full benefit of salary, allowance, etc. from the date of award. Writ Petition No. 474/2013 was filed by the appellant-workman challenging part of the aforesaid award dated 26.09.2012 whereby payment of back wages was restricted only to 20% and prayer was made to grant full back wages with compound interest @ 18% per annum. 2. The appellant, Smt. Anjali Gosh Roy was appointed as Junior Sales Clerk on 02.06.1975 with Rajasthan Small Industrial Corporation Limited. She was served with charge sheet dated 22.06.1989, which contained two charges. First charge was about her absence from duty without permission since 22.09.1988 onward, terming the same to be misconduct under Rule 5(i) of the Rajasthan Small Industries Corporation Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1974 (for short 'the Rules of 1974'). Charge No. 2 was relating to non-reporting on duty in spite of several communications thereby violating the orders of superior officers which amounted to insubordination and indiscipline. After receiving reply of the appellant to the aforesaid charge sheet, the Management appointed Shri P.C. Parihar (OSD) as the Enquiry Officer vide order dated 20.12.1989. The appellant-workman moved an application on 22.03.1990 praying that considering the implications of the departmental enquiry, she may be permitted to nominate a defence representative from outside the Corporation. After receiving reply of the appellant to the aforesaid charge sheet, the Management appointed Shri P.C. Parihar (OSD) as the Enquiry Officer vide order dated 20.12.1989. The appellant-workman moved an application on 22.03.1990 praying that considering the implications of the departmental enquiry, she may be permitted to nominate a defence representative from outside the Corporation. She further moved an application on 20.04.1990 praying to the Enquiry Officer to allow her to appoint a lawyer as her defence nominee. The Management vide order dated 28.05.1990 informed the appellant that as per the Conduct Rules of the Corporation, no employee from outside the Corporation can be appointed as defence representative and she was required to nominate any employee of the Corporation with his consent to be her defence representative. The appellant, however, did not participate in the enquiry. The Enquiry Officer submitted the enquiry report on 08.06.1990 wherein both the charges were found proved against the appellant. The Enquiry Officer noted that the appellant was granted adequate opportunity to produce any document on record in the nature of joining report or of medical certificate showing her intimation to join duties back. The Enquiry Officer found Charge No. 2 also proved which was with regard to not joining the duty in spite of several letters served on her calling her to resume the duties. Thus, the Enquiry Officer found the charge of indiscipline and insubordination fully proved against the appellant. The Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 21.06.1990 finally passed order of penalty invoking Rule 6(vi) of the Rules of 1974 and inflicted penalty of dismissal from service upon the appellant holding period of her absence from duty not to be counted in service and she being not entitled to any payment for the intervening period. 3. Aggrieved by order of the dismissal, the appellant filed an application before the Prescribed Authority under the Shop and Commercial Establishment Act, 1958 in Jaipur City, Jaipur. The Prescribed Authority vide its order dated 18.09.1992 held the appellant-workman entitled to reinstatement in service within 30 days and awarded compensation of Rs. 5,000/-. Aggrieved thereby, the Management filed Writ Petition No. 345/1993 before this Court. During the pendency of the writ petition, this Court vide order dated 16.02.1993 directed the Management to take the appellant back on duty. The Management passed an order on 14.06.1993 reinstating the appellant back in service subject to outcome of the writ petition. 5,000/-. Aggrieved thereby, the Management filed Writ Petition No. 345/1993 before this Court. During the pendency of the writ petition, this Court vide order dated 16.02.1993 directed the Management to take the appellant back on duty. The Management passed an order on 14.06.1993 reinstating the appellant back in service subject to outcome of the writ petition. The appellant also filed separate Writ Petition No. 3265/1995 claiming the entitlement of her re-fixation and grant of increments, selection grades, etc. A learned Single Judge of this Court vide common judgment dated 06.05.1998 decided both the aforesaid writ petitions. While writ petition filed by the Management was dismissed, writ petition filed by the appellant was partly allowed giving her benefit of selection grades etc. The Management aggrieved by the aforesaid order, filed two separate Appeals No. 601/1998 and 656/1998 before Division Bench of this Court. The Division Bench vide judgment dated 19.08.1998 allowed the appeals of the Management and set aside the judgment passed by the Prescribed Authority as also learned Single Judge. The Division Bench further held that if the employee wanted to approach the Industrial Court for redressal of her grievance, she was not required to go in conciliation proceedings and can directly approach the appropriate authority for reference of the industrial dispute to the Industrial Court. The Management again discontinued the appellant from service vide order dated 25.08.1998. 4. After the reference was made to the Labour Court, the appellant filed her statement of claim alleging that her dismissal from service was made in illegal manner in breach of principles of natural justice and therefore the same was liable to be set aside and she ought to be reinstated in service with full back wages and continuity in service. The Management, however, contested the same by filing reply thereto alleging that the appellant was absent from duty since 22.09.1988 and despite several letters sent to her, she failed to resume duties. She was therefore not entitled to any relief. It was submitted that full opportunity of hearing was afforded to the appellant to defend her case and the enquiry was held following the principles of natural justice. Opportunity was granted to the appellant to nominate any employee of the Corporation as her defence nominee but the same was not availed. She was therefore not entitled to any relief. It was submitted that full opportunity of hearing was afforded to the appellant to defend her case and the enquiry was held following the principles of natural justice. Opportunity was granted to the appellant to nominate any employee of the Corporation as her defence nominee but the same was not availed. The Labour Court held the act of the Management in rejecting the request of the appellant to bring defence representative from outside the Corporation as violative of her right to defend herself in disciplinary proceedings. The Labour Court vide order dated 27.04.2011 held the domestic enquiry to be unfair and improper. It is this order, which has been challenged by the Management by filing Writ Petition No. 9008/2011. It may be noted that an application was filed by the Management before the Labour Court allowing it to lead the evidence in support of the fairness of the enquiry before the Labour Court. The Labour Court rejected that application on the ground that no such prayer was made by the Management in reply to the statement of claim. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Smt. Lakshmidevamma & Another, AIR 2001 SC 2090 , the Labour Court held that the Management was required to file an application to lead the evidence before it either with reply to the statement of claim or immediately thereafter and not any time it wished. The application field by the Management was dismissed. The Labour Court passed final award dated 26.09.2012 observing that since the domestic enquiry has already been declared unfair and the Management has failed to prove the charges, dismissal of the appellant from service vide order dated 21.06.1990 was arbitrary and illegal. The Labour Court therefore directed reinstatement of the appellant-workman in service with continuity in service and 20% back wages. It is this award, which has been subjected to challenge by the Management by filing Writ Petition No. 1248/2013 as also by the appellant-workman by filing Writ Petition No. 474/2013. 5. Mr. Jugal Kishore Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that writ petition against interlocutory order dated 27.04.2011 holding the domestic enquiry to be unfair and improper was not maintainable. 5. Mr. Jugal Kishore Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that writ petition against interlocutory order dated 27.04.2011 holding the domestic enquiry to be unfair and improper was not maintainable. The only remedy available to the Management against such order was to challenge the same while challenging the award itself. Learned counsel, in support of his argument, relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in D.P. Maheshwari Vs. Delhi Administration & Others, AIR 1984 SC 153 and Dena Bank Vs. D.V. Kundadia, 2011 (131) FLR 775. It is argued that if the interlocutory order is not challenged while challenging the award, it would be deemed that the interlocutory order passed by the Labour Court has become final and the same would be finality to the award itself. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of Single Bench of this Court in Rajasthan Small Industries Corporation Limited Vs. The Judge Labour Court, Jaipur & Omprakash Nigam (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6166/2011 decided on 05.10.2016) wherein the same view has been taken in the case of the Management. 6. Learned counsel argued that the learned Single Judge has erred in acting like an appellate court over the award passed by the Labour Court. The Single Bench in writ of certiorari can interfere only with limited scope available to it to find out whether the award suffers from any error apparent on the face of the record or lack of jurisdiction. Impugned judgment has thus been passed exceeding the jurisdiction available with the Single Bench. It is argued that the appellant having attained age of superannuation has retired from service in June, 2012, domestic enquiry against her having been held to be unfair and no opportunity of leading evidence before the Labour Court being granted to the Management, the disciplinary proceeding against the appellant stood lapse. Learned Single Judge erred in law in not declaring the domestic enquiry to be fair. Learned counsel, in support of his argument, relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Bhagirathi Jena Vs. Board of Directors, OSFC & Others, AIR 1999 SC 1841 ; C.L. Verma Vs. State of M.P. & Others, 1990 (1) SLR SC 134; State Bank of India Vs. A.K. Gupta, 1998 (1) LLN 9 . Learned counsel, in support of his argument, relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Bhagirathi Jena Vs. Board of Directors, OSFC & Others, AIR 1999 SC 1841 ; C.L. Verma Vs. State of M.P. & Others, 1990 (1) SLR SC 134; State Bank of India Vs. A.K. Gupta, 1998 (1) LLN 9 . It is argued that the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Smt. Lakshmidevamma & Another (supra) in para 42 has also taken the same view. The Division Bench of this Court in Rajasthan Small Industries Corporation Ltd. Vs. Balbir Singh Khandekar, 2018 (2) WLC (Raj.) UC 183 has also taken the same view in the case of Management itself. 7. Learned counsel argued that once domestic enquiry has been held to be unfair, the record produced in the domestic enquiry ceased to be material record and only such material, which is produced before the Labour Court with its permission to lead evidence, cannot be looked into. Since no such record was produced as per the law by the Management, the termination of the appellant from service was liable to be declared illegal and void. There being no evidence of her gainfully employed elsewhere, she was entitled to reinstatement with full back wages rather than 20% back wages. It is argued that the Management acted in breach of Disciplinary and Appeal Rules of 1973 and sub-rule (5) of Rule 8 of the Rules of 1974 which empowered the disciplinary authority to decline to avail the services of an advocate in the disciplinary proceedings in appropriate circumstances, which decision has been acknowledged by learned counsel for the Management in para 10 of the impugned judgment. 8. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in C.L. Subramanian Vs. Collector of Customs, Cochin, 1972 Lab IC 1049 SC and J.K. Agarwal Vs. Haryana Seeds Developments Corporation Limited & Others, 1991 (2) SCC 283 , learned counsel argued that the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases has held that if the domestic enquiry is held for awarding major penalty, permission ought to be granted to the delinquent to avail services of a legal practitioner as defence nominee. As regards willful absence, learned counsel relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Krushnakant B. Parmar Vs. As regards willful absence, learned counsel relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Krushnakant B. Parmar Vs. Union of India & Others, (2012) 3 SCC 178 argued that if the absence was owing to compelling circumstances, it cannot be considered as willful absence amounting to misconduct. It is argued that Rule 38(iv), (vi) and (ix) of the Rajasthan Small Industries Corporation Limited Service Rules, 1972 clearly provide for grant of leave. Rule 42 of the same rules also provides for sick leave. Since the appellant has served for more than 15 years, she could avail sick leave of 150 days. Rule 45 of the aforesaid Rules provides for leave without pay for the period ranging from 3 months to 18 months. Proviso to Rule 45(3) envisages grant of leave of six months without pay. Reliance in support of this argument has been placed on judgment of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Tin Works Private Limited Vs. The Employees of Hindustan Tin Works Private Limited & Others, AIR 1979 SC 75 and judgment of this Court in Rameshwar Lal Meena Vs. State of Rajasthan, WLC 2009 (4) 526. 9. Mr. R.P. Garg, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Management while supporting the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge argued that order dated 27.04.2011 passed by the Labour Court declaring the domestic enquiry to be unfair was illegally passed in contravention of Rule 7 and 8 of the Rules of 1974. Rule 8 of the Rules of 1974 provides for full procedure for imposing major penalty. As per Rule 8.5 of the Rules of 1974, the delinquent was permitted to present her case with the assistance of any other employee of the Corporation and no employee outside the Corporation could be permitted. Learned Single Judge has therefore rightly reversed the aforesaid order passed by the Labour Court. Learned counsel argued that charges against the appellant were not complicated or technical in nature. Simple charge against her was with regard to willful absence which even otherwise did not require availing services of a legal practitioner as defence nominee. In fact, after getting married, the appellant shifted to Delhi and thereafter did not turn up to attend the duties. Learned counsel argued that charges against the appellant were not complicated or technical in nature. Simple charge against her was with regard to willful absence which even otherwise did not require availing services of a legal practitioner as defence nominee. In fact, after getting married, the appellant shifted to Delhi and thereafter did not turn up to attend the duties. The Labour Court ought not to have proceeded with the matter further and passed the final award even when order dated 27.04.2011 declaring domestic enquiry unfair and improper was under challenge before this Court. Learned counsel denied that the Management does not have right to challenge the order declaring domestic enquiry to be unfair and has to wait till passing of final award. In support of his argument, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Crescent Dyes & Chemicals Limited Vs. Ram Naresh Tripathi, (1993) 2 SCC 115 and the judgment of this Court in M/s. Derby Textiles Limited, Jodhpur Vs. Mahamantri, Derby Textiles Karamchari & Shramik Union, Jodhpur, 1991 (1) RLR 585 . 10. We have given our anxious consideration to rival submissions and carefully perused the material on record. 11. Undeniably, the premise on which the Labour Court has declared the domestic enquiry to be unfair is the decision of the Management in denying the permission to the delinquent to avail services of a legal practitioner as defence nominee. The award dated 26.09.2012 was founded on order passed by the Labour Court declaring the domestic enquiry to be unfair. This was done despite application filed by the Management to give it opportunity to lead evidence before the Labour Court, which was rejected by the Labour Court on the ground that the Management ought to have made such prayer in reply to statement of claim asking for opportunity to lead evidence in case the domestic enquiry was declared unfair. 12. Rule 8 of the Rules of 1974 provides for the procedure for imposing major penalties. Sub-rule 5 of Rule 8 reads as under: "8. Procedure for imposing major penalties; 1. xxxxx 2. xxxxx 5. 12. Rule 8 of the Rules of 1974 provides for the procedure for imposing major penalties. Sub-rule 5 of Rule 8 reads as under: "8. Procedure for imposing major penalties; 1. xxxxx 2. xxxxx 5. The Disciplinary Authority may nominate any person to present the case in support of the charges before the authority enquiring into the charges (hereinafter referred to as the Enquiring Authority), the delinquent employee may present his case with the assistance of any other employee of the Corporation, approved by the Disciplinary Authority, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose, unless the Disciplinary Authority having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits." 13. Rule 8.5 thus clearly postulates that the Disciplinary Authority may nominate any person to present the case in support of the charges before the authority enquiring into the charges and the delinquent employee may present his case with the assistance of any other employee of the Corporation approved by the Disciplinary Authority, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose, unless the Disciplinary Authority having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits. As has rightly been argued, there was no such legal complication that would have needed assistance of a legal practitioner. The decision of the Disciplinary Authority not to provide services of a legal practitioner cannot be said to be wholly unjustified. The appellant could not have claimed assistance of a legal practitioner as a matter of right. Since the appellant was required to participate in the disciplinary proceedings and she was permitted to avail services of any other employee of the Corporation as defence nominee but she did not do so, the appellant cannot be allowed to complain of breach of principles of natural justice. It is trite that principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straight jacket formula and would have to be appreciated in the context of the fact situation of a given case. Learned Single Judge, in our view, has rightly held that if statutory rules provide for procedure for holding departmental enquiry, violation of the same cannot be permitted. It has to be adhered to particularly when such rule is not under challenge on the alleged inconformity with any other statutory provision or act or the Constitution of India. No such plea was set up by the appellant. 14. It has to be adhered to particularly when such rule is not under challenge on the alleged inconformity with any other statutory provision or act or the Constitution of India. No such plea was set up by the appellant. 14. Division Bench of this Court in M/s. Derby Textiles Limited, Jodhpur (supra) dealt with somewhat identical controversy and on consideration of Clause 29 of the Standing Orders, the Division Bench held that enough safeguards with regard to principles of natural justice have been provided therein and simply because said Clause 29 does not provide for the assistance of any outsiders, it does not mean that the Standing Orders are unfair and unreasonable or otherwise violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Learned Single Judge has also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Crescent Dyes & Chemicals Limited (supra) wherein it has been held that a delinquent cannot insist on being represented during domestic enquiry by an officer bearer of a union, who is not a clerk or workman in the same department. Cited judgment in C.L. Subramanian (supra) is also distinguishable on the facts of the present case because in that case the Government appointed a trained prosecutor to present its case against the government servant in disciplinary enquiry and refused permission to the government servant to engage a legal practitioner. 15. Contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that order holding domestic enquiry to be unfair being interlocutory in nature, writ petition challenging the same would not be maintainable and correctness of such order can be questioned only in writ petition challenging the final award itself is also without any substance, firstly for the reason that the award is solely founded on the earlier order declaring domestic enquiry to be unfair and secondly, not only order, declaring domestic enquiry as unfair, is under challenge in writ petition, but award itself has also been subjected to challenge by way of separate writ petition by both the parties, i.e. the Management and the workman. The argument therefore loses its strength and becomes only a technical. The argument therefore loses its strength and becomes only a technical. Cited judgments, especially D.P. Maheshwari (supra) and Dena Bank (supra), which were intended to discourage writ petitions against interlocutory orders for the purpose of ensuring expeditious decision in the reference cases are therefore distinguishable on the facts of the present case because in the present case, the final award is also under challenge. Since the very order holding domestic enquiry to be unfair has been found to be illegal in consideration of the correctness of the award as well as order itself, the argument with regard to the failure of the Management in not making prayer in the reply to statement of claim also becomes irrelevant. 16. The argument that since the domestic enquiry has been held to be unfair and the Management failed to adduce evidence before the Labour Court, there is no material on record to support the penalty and the disciplinary proceedings cannot be continued against a retired employee, also cannot be countenanced for the reason that very order of holding domestic enquiry to be unfair has been held to be legally valid. Therefore, it cannot be said that the enquiry was not proper. The appellant, who deliberately abstained from participating in the disciplinary enquiry despite repeatedly required to do so, cannot be allowed to take advantage of her own wrong. The charges against the appellant that she absented from duty and despite repeated communications, she did not report back on duty, in the absence of any satisfactory explanation, in our view, have rightly been proved. 17. In view of above discussion, we do not find any infirmity in the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. There is no merit in these appeals, which are accordingly dismissed. 18. Office is directed place a copy of this judgment on record of each connected appeal.