JUDGMENT : S. MANIKUMAR, J. 1. Assailing the correctness of the judgment made in W.P.(C)No.16058 of 2019 dated 13th June 2019, directing the writ petitioners to move the alternative Statutory Forum provided under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 instant writ appeal is filed. 2. Short facts of the case are as follows: Appellants have availed loan from Syndicate Bank/respondent No.1 and offered certain properties as secured assets. Since the appellants committed default, the bank initiated recovery proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002. Appellants approached the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) by filing S.A.No.831 of 2012 and the same was dismissed holding that the land offered is not an agricultural property. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the DRT, appellants approached the writ court, by filing W.P.(C)No.16058 of 2019. Writ court rejected writ petition by holding thus: “6. It is now well settled in law that the availability of alternative remedy does not always impair this Court from exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if it is found that the order impugned has been issued without jurisdiction and is perverse. However, in the case at hand, the petitioners do not have a case that the Debts Recovery Tribunal has issued Ext.P5 without jurisdiction; and on the contrary, they concede that the said Tribunal had full jurisdiction under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. Pertinently, their contention is that this order is in error, both factually and in law, because the property is an agricultural land but that the Tribunal has concluded otherwise in spite of the alleged overwhelming evidence against such conclusion. 7. Obviously therefore, the petitioners' case is that Ext.P5 is a wrong order, issued erroneously by the DRT but not that the DRT did not have jurisdiction to pass it at all. This is clear from the fact that the petitioners themselves have invoked the remedy of filing of Securitisation Application before the DRT, without being under any doubt regarding the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; and therefore, to now say that the Tribunal has acted without jurisdiction in having issued Ext.P5 order cannot appeal to reason or to logic. This is clear from the fact that the petitioners themselves have invoked the remedy of filing of Securitisation Application before the DRT, without being under any doubt regarding the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; and therefore, to now say that the Tribunal has acted without jurisdiction in having issued Ext.P5 order cannot appeal to reason or to logic. In the afore circumstances, I am certainly of the view that this is a case where the petitioners ought to challenge Ext.P5 order by approaching the alternative statutory Forum under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, rather than approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, since not even a whisper is made in the pleading that Ext.P5 has been issued by the DRT without valid jurisdiction.” 3. Heard Sri.Titus Mani Vettom, learned counsel appearing for the appellants. Also heard Sri.K.P.Sujesh Kumar, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Syndicate Bank. We have gone through the materials available on record. 4. Mr.Titus Mani Vettom, learned counsel for the appellants began his arguments by stating that it is lingering in the mind of some Judges of this court that no writ is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, against the orders passed by Debt Recovery Tribunal, which according to him is contrary to the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others reported in 1998 (8) SCC 1 . He further submitted that the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) went wrong, in arriving at the conclusion that the secured asset is not an agricultural land, and therefore interference of this court is needed by exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance has also been placed on a decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore and another v.Mathew K.C. reported in (2018) 3 SCC 85 . Relevant portions quoted by the learned counsel read as under: “15. It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex-parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payers expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in Satyawati Tandon (supra), has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order:- “46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbans lal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order.” 16. v. Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbans lal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order.” 16. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the Appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference. 17. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the Appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference. 18. We cannot help but disapprove the approach of the High Court for reasons already noticed in Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. vs. Prem Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd. and Another, 1997 (6) SCC 450 , observing :- “32. When a position, in law, is well settled as a result of judicial pronouncement of this Court, it would amount to judicial impropriety to say the least, for the subordinate courts including the High Courts to ignore the settled decisions and then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary to the settled legal position. Such judicial adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly deprecate the tendency of the subordinate courts in not applying the settled principles and in passing whimsical orders which necessarily has the effect of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of the parties. It is time that this tendency stops.” 5. In a catena of decisions, Honourable Supreme Court has held that ordinarily the relief under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person. It is time that this tendency stops.” 5. In a catena of decisions, Honourable Supreme Court has held that ordinarily the relief under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person. In United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and others [ (2010) 8 SCC 110 ], the High Court restrained further proceedings under Section 13(4) of the Act. Upon a detailed consideration of the statutory scheme under the SARFAESI Act, availability of remedy to the aggrieved under Section 17 before the Tribunal and the appellate remedy under Section 18 before the Appellate Tribunal, object and purpose of the legislation, Honourable Apex Court observed that a writ petition ought not to be entertained in view of the alternate statutory remedy available, “43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.” 6. In Civil Appeal Nos.10243-10250 of 2018 [ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Umakanta Mohapatra and Others], by order dated 5.10.2018, the Honourable Apex Court reaffirmed the legal position that High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, relating to matters coming under the purview of SARFAESI Act, 2002, where a statutory remedy is available by filing an application under Section 17 of the said Act. 7. Section 31(i) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 specifically excludes “any security interest created in agricultural land”. Eventhough the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the issue as to whether the property in question is an agricultural or not, is a jurisdictional issue which requires adjudication and decision, by a writ court, without availing the alternative forum, which is a final fact finding forum, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that it is purely a question of fact. Moreover, after considering the material on record as to nature of the subject property, the Debt Recovery Tribunal vide order dated 30.3.2019 has dismissed the S.A.No.831 of 2012 holding the subject property is not an agricultural land. Moreover, after considering the material on record as to nature of the subject property, the Debt Recovery Tribunal vide order dated 30.3.2019 has dismissed the S.A.No.831 of 2012 holding the subject property is not an agricultural land. In our view, correctness of the said fact can be redressed only before the Appellate Forum, which is a final fact finding forum. 8. Before parting with the case, we only deem it fit to state that the arguments of Sri.Titus Mani Vettom, learned counsel for the appellants that it is lingering in the minds of some learned Judges, when there is an alternative remedy, writ petitions should not be entertained, cannot be accepted not only on the facts and circumstances of this case, but on the binding precedents of the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court on SARFAESI matters, as to how the High Courts are bound to respect and bound by the rules of the Honouble Supreme Court. 9. In the light of the decision and discussions, we find no error in the findings recorded by the writ court. Hence, interference of this court is not warranted. Appeal fails and it is dismissed.