JUDGMENT : V.M. Pancholi, J. 1. By way of this petition, which is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs: "(A) Be pleased to allow present petition; (B) Be pleased to issue writ of mandamus, writ in the nature of mandamus and be pleased to quash and set aside impugned order dated 30.07.2019 passed by Respondent No. 2 herein passed in appeal filed by the petitioner against decision dated 6.03.2019 of learned Collector, Kheda in application filed by the petitioner for declaring Respondent No. 4 as disqualified member of the municipalities and further be pleased to quash and set aside the order dated 6.03.2019 of learned Collector, Kheda in application filed by the petitioner for declaring Respondent No. 4 as disqualified council/member of Nadiad Municipalities. (C) Be pleased to issue writ of Quo Warranto or writ, in the nature of Quo warranto and be pleased to declare Respondent No. 4 herein disqualified for continuing on the post of councilor and president of Nadiad Municipality and further be pleased to pass appropriate orders for removing Respondent from the post of Councilor and president of Nadiad Municipality. (D) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the present petition be pleased to restrain Respondent No. 4 herein from discharging her duties as president of Nadiad Municipality; (E) Be pleased to expedite hearing of present petition as the tenure of the present council is likely to be over in the year 2020; (F) Be pleased to grant such other and further relief/s which may be fit in the facts and circumstances of the case." 2. The factual matrix of the present case is as under: 2.1 It is stated in the petition that the last election of Nadiad Municipality was held in the year 2015. In the said election, respondent No. 4 was only candidate, who has submitted her nomination form from Ward No. 11. She was declared as elected uncontested Member of Ward No. 11. It is alleged that at the time of filing her nomination form for the post of Member of Nadiad Municipality, one affidavit was filed by her. It is stated that respondent No. 4 accepted that she is the mother of three children, amongst whom, one has expired on 28.12.2012. As per the said affidavit, respondent No. 4 was having two children as on 04.08.2005. It is stated that respondent No. 4 accepted that she is the mother of three children, amongst whom, one has expired on 28.12.2012. As per the said affidavit, respondent No. 4 was having two children as on 04.08.2005. It is further stated that as per the said affidavit, Dhruvesh Sanjaybhai Patel was born on 04.12.1994 and Chaula Sanjaybhai Patel was born on 20.11.1996. Thereafter, her elder son Dhruvesh Sanjaybhai Patel died on 28.12.2012. After his death, on 30.05.2014, respondent No. 4 became mother of another child i.e. Kalp Sanjaybhai Patel. It is also stated in the affidavit that on the date of the filing of the nomination, she was mother of two children and, therefore, she is eligible for contesting election. 2.2 It is stated that when the petitioner came to know about the said aspect, he preferred application requesting respondent No. 3 to declare respondent No. 4 as disqualified as per the provisions contained in Section 11(1)(h) of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 ("the Act" for short). The said application came to be rejected by the respondent Collector vide order dated 06.03.2019. The petitioner, therefore, filed a petition being Special Civil Application No. 5837 of 2019 before this Court. However, the said petition was withdrawn with a view to file an appeal before respondent No. 2. The petitioner, thereafter, filed an appeal before respondent No. 2 under Section 38(4) of the Act. Respondent No. 2 rejected the said appeal vide order dated 30.07.2019 and, therefore, the present petition is filed. 3. Heard Mr. Subhash G. Barot, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Hardik Soni, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent Nos. 1 and 3. 4. Mr. Subhash G. Barot, learned advocate for the petitioner, at the outset, referred the provisions contained in Section 11(1)(h) of the Act and submitted that respondent No. 4 was having three children after the Amendment dated 04.08.2005 came into force and, therefore, respondent No. 4 was disqualified. In spite of that, the respondent authorities have not properly considered the said important aspect and, therefore, the impugned orders be quashed and set aside. 4.1. Mr. Barot, learned advocate for the petitioner, has placed reliance upon the order dated 17.03.2015 rendered by this Court in the case of Vanaji Ranchhodji Karkata (Rabari) Vs. District Development Officer and others, passed in Special Civil Application No. 4587 of 2015. 4.1. Mr. Barot, learned advocate for the petitioner, has placed reliance upon the order dated 17.03.2015 rendered by this Court in the case of Vanaji Ranchhodji Karkata (Rabari) Vs. District Development Officer and others, passed in Special Civil Application No. 4587 of 2015. He has also placed reliance upon the order dated 07.04.2016 passed in Special Civil Application No. 4625 of 2016 in the case of Maheshkumar Ramsinh Parmar Vs. State of Gujarat and others. Copy of the said order is placed on record at Page-53 of the compilation. He has also placed reliance upon a decision rendered by the Honourable Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 6525 of 2010 in the case of Minasingh Majhi Vs. The Collector, Nuapada and Anr. etc. After relying upon the aforesaid decisions, it is contended that when respondent No. 4 has given birth to the third child after the Amendment Act of 2005, provisions contained in Section 11(1)(h) would be applicable. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Hardik Soni, learned Assistant Government Pleader, has supported the reasoning recorded by the respondent authorities and contended that the third child was born after the death of the first child and, therefore, it cannot be said that respondent No. 4 was having more than two living children on a particular date. It is, therefore, urged that no error is committed by the respondent authorities while not entertaining the request of the petitioner. He, therefore, urged that this petition be dismissed. 6. For considering the issue involved in the present petition, provisions contained in Section 11(1)(h) of the Act is required to be considered. Section 11(1)(h) of the Act provides as under: Section 11: General disqualifications for becoming a councillor. Vacation of seat. Decision of State Government in case of disputes (1) No person may be a councillor- xxx xxx xxx (h) who has more than two children: Provided that a person having more than two children on the date of commencement of the Gujarat Local Authorities Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005 (Guj. Vacation of seat. Decision of State Government in case of disputes (1) No person may be a councillor- xxx xxx xxx (h) who has more than two children: Provided that a person having more than two children on the date of commencement of the Gujarat Local Authorities Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005 (Guj. 17 of 2005) (hereinafter in this clause referred to as "the date of such commencement"), shall not be disqualified under this clause, so long as the number of children he had on the date of such commencement does not increase: Provided further that a child or more than one child born in a single delivery within the period of one year from the date of such commencement shall not be taken into consideration for the purpose of disqualification under this clause. Explanation.-For the purpose of this clause,- (i) where a couple has only one child on or after the date of such commencement, any number of children born out of single subsequent delivery shall be deemed to be one entity; (ii) 'child' does not include an adopted child or children." 7. From the aforesaid provision, it is clear that the said provision is introduced with an object to prevent a person having more than two children to be a Member of the Panchayat or the Councilor of Municipality or the Municipal Corporation and for implementation of National Population Policy. When the aforesaid provision is read in light of the object with which the amendment came to be introduced, it becomes clear that the moment a child in excess of two children (or in excess of children on the cut-off date) is born, after the commencement of the Amendment Act, the provision would immediately be attracted and, thereby, the disqualification will automatically get attached to the said person. The provision merely provides that any person, who has more than two children, shall not be a member of the Panchayat or councilor in the Municipality etc. 8. Thus, from the aforesaid provision, it can be said that the Legislature has used the phrase "having more than two children". Thus, it is required to be considered in the present case that whether respondent No. 4 was having more than two children at any point of time after the Amendment Act of 2005, or not. 9. Thus, once again the facts of the present case are required to be examined minutely. Thus, it is required to be considered in the present case that whether respondent No. 4 was having more than two children at any point of time after the Amendment Act of 2005, or not. 9. Thus, once again the facts of the present case are required to be examined minutely. First child of respondent No. 4, namely, Dhruvansh Sanjaybhai Patel was born on 04.12.1994. Second child, namely, Chaula Sanjaybhai Patel was born on 20.11.1996. Elder son of respondent No. 4 i.e. first child, namely, Dhruvansh Sanjaybhai Patel died on 28.12.2012. 10. After the death of the first child i.e. the elder son, another child namely, Kalp Sanjaybhai Patel, was born on 30.05.2014. Thus, from the facts of the present case, it is revealed that at no point of time, respondent No. 4 had three living children and it was only after the unfortunate death of elder son aged about eighteen years of respondent No. 4, she was blessed with second living child in the year 2014. Thus, at no point of time, there were three living children of respondent No. 4. 11. In the case of Vanaji Ranchhodji Karkata (Rabari) Vs. District Development Officer and others (supra), the facts of the said case were that the first child of the concerned petitioner was born on 28.02.2006. Thereafter, second child was born on 20.10.2007 and, thereafter, on 25.09.2009, the wife of the concerned petitioner gave birth of the third child. However, after a period of three months, second child died on 19.12.2009 and at the time of election, the petitioner was having only two children. This Court has considered another decision rendered in the case of Naynaben Babubhai Hathila Vs. State of Gujarat reported in 2015(1) GLR 464 and, thereafter, held that after the Amendment Act came into force, if the child is born in excess of two children, then the moment the child in excess of two children is born, the provision and prohibition will be immediately attracted and the disqualification will immediately and automatically get attached. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the aforesaid decision would not be helpful to the petitioner. On the contrary, the same would be helpful to the private respondent. 12. In the case of Maheshkumar Ramsinh Parmar Vs. State of Gujarat and others (supra), the concerned petitioner was the father of three children. First child was born on 30.05.2001. On the contrary, the same would be helpful to the private respondent. 12. In the case of Maheshkumar Ramsinh Parmar Vs. State of Gujarat and others (supra), the concerned petitioner was the father of three children. First child was born on 30.05.2001. Second was born on 12.01.2004 and the third child was born on 14.05.2005. Thereafter, the fourth child was born to the wife of the concerned petitioner on 14.03.2007 and the said fourth child did not survive and passed away on 19.03.2007. Thus, in the facts of the said case, the Division Bench of this Court has held that third child was born after coming into force of the Act and after the grace period as per the proviso and thus, the concerned petitioner suffered disqualification. However, in the facts of the present case, this decision would not be applicable. 13. In the case of Minasingh Majhi Vs. The Collector, Nuapada and Anr. etc. (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court was considering the fact whether the concerned appellant had two children born to him on 06.09.1995 and 12.10.1998 respectively. Thereafter, the third child was born to the said appellant on 03.08.2002. The first child was given in adoption way back on 10.09.1999. The Honourable Supreme Court has considered the fact that the appellant was the biological father of the third child and looking to the legislative intent of the concerned proviso of the Orissa Gram Panchayats Act, 1965, it was observed that intent is to restrict the number of children that a prospective elected member of the Gram Panchayat should have. Emphasis is on the number of children that a prospective elected member has given birth to and not whether under the provisions of different statutes in force, including the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. Thus, in the said case, though the third child was given in adoption, the Honourable Supreme Court has considered the said adopted child as a child of the concerned appellant for the purpose of provisions of the Orissa Gram Panchayats Act. Thus, in the facts of the present case, the said decision would not render any assistance to the petitioner. 14. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court as well as the Honourable Supreme Court, it can be said that the moment the third child was born to the concerned petitioner, provision of the relevant Act would immediately be attracted. Thus, in the facts of the present case, the said decision would not render any assistance to the petitioner. 14. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court as well as the Honourable Supreme Court, it can be said that the moment the third child was born to the concerned petitioner, provision of the relevant Act would immediately be attracted. However, in the present case, as discussed hereinabove, respondent No. 4 was not having three living children at any point of time. Kalp Sanjaybhai Patel was born on 30.05.2014. The first child of respondent No. 4 died on 28.12.2012. Thus, on the date of the birth of the so-called third child of respondent No. 4, respondent NO. 4 was having only one child, namely, Chaula Sanjaybhai Patel and Kalp Sanjaybhai Patel was in fact her second child. 15. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the view that respondent No. 4 was not having more than two living children at any point of time after the Amendment Act. Thus, respondent authorities have not committed any error while not entertaining the application filed by the petitioner. 16. In light of the above observations, no interference is required while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petition is accordingly dismissed.