JUDGMENT : 1. By this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the petitioner prays for setting aside the order dated 23.02.2018, passed in CR Case No.1496/2018, whereby, learned Judicial Magistrate has taken cognizance of offence under Sections 500/501 IPC against the petitioner, and also for quashing the proceeding in the said complaint case. 2. The respondent No.2, as complainant lodged a complaint against the present petitioner under Section 500/501 IPC, alleging that the petitioner with the intention to harm the reputation of the respondent No.2, brought certain defamatory allegations against the respondent No.2 by way of a press release, which was published in the newspaper entitled “Axomia Pratidin” in its issue dated 17.12.2018 and 18.12.2018. On the basis of such complaint, the learned Magistrate took cognizance and issued process against the petitioner. The petitioner stated in the petition that the allegations brought against the petitioner in the complaint were not true and the alleged publication was neither defamatory nor the petitioner had any intention to defame the respondent No.2. 3. Mr. KN Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr. AM Bora, learned senior counsel for the respondent No.2 as well as learned Addl. PP for the State respondent were heard. 4. Mr. KN Choudhury, learned senior counsel placing reliance on a decision of this Court in Haider Hussain Vs. Ramesh Saikia,2017 (5) GLT 561, submitted that the proceeding against the present petitioner was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, being the editor and publishers etc of the newspaper, “Axomia Pratidin”. Mr. KN Choudhury further contended referring to Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, that for publication of any news item, the editors, printers and publishers could be held liable and not the present petitioner. Further submission of the learned counsel was that the alleged publication was neither defamatory nor was the same intended to defame anyone and the statement and publication was for public good and in the interest of the public. 5. Refuting the submission of Mr. Choudhury, Mr. Further submission of the learned counsel was that the alleged publication was neither defamatory nor was the same intended to defame anyone and the statement and publication was for public good and in the interest of the public. 5. Refuting the submission of Mr. Choudhury, Mr. AM Bora, learned senior counsel would submit, that the news item was published on the basis of a press release issued by the petitioner and it was not a news item prepared and published by the newspaper of its own and as such, only the petitioner who caused the publication or made defamatory statement, by way of press release, was liable for his own act. It was also submitted that the editor or publisher of the newspaper were not necessary parties, nor the complaint in a criminal proceeding can be thrown away on the ground of non joinder of necessary parties, unless the statute provides so. 6. Thus, from the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, it appears that the criminal proceeding is sought to be quashed essentially on the following three grounds: (i) The complaint was bad for non joinder of editor, publisher, printers of the newspaper; (ii) The publication nor press release, made bonafide for public good and public interest by a responsible citizen, cannot be construed as offence; (iii) The publication made in the newspaper was not defamatory, and the allegations made in the complaint did not make out any offence. 7. Mr. K. N. Choudhury learned sr. counsel submitted, that the instant criminal proceeding for defamation cannot proceed against the petitioner, for non-joinder of the editor of the newspaper, inasmuch as, it is the editor, who controls the selection of the news item to be published and is responsible for any publication. Mr. Choudhury also referred to Section 7 of the Press and Registration of the Books Act, 1867 (for short “Press Act”) to contend, that there could be presumption against the editor or printer, publisher, whose names were printed in the newspaper. The present petitioner not being editor or printer or publisher cannot be fastened with criminal liability for the publication made in the alleged newspaper “Asomiya Pratidin” and therefore, the criminal proceeding cannot proceed against the petitioner alone, in absence of editor of the newspaper. In support of the above submission, as already indicated above, Mr. The present petitioner not being editor or printer or publisher cannot be fastened with criminal liability for the publication made in the alleged newspaper “Asomiya Pratidin” and therefore, the criminal proceeding cannot proceed against the petitioner alone, in absence of editor of the newspaper. In support of the above submission, as already indicated above, Mr. Choudhury has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Haider Hussain& Ors. -VS-Ramesh Saikia (supra). 8. Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1967 reads as follows: “OFFICE COPY OF DECLARATION TO BE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE.— In any legal proceeding whatever, as well as civil or criminal, the production of a copy of such declaration as is aforesaid, attested by the seal of some Court empowered by this Act to have the custody of such declarations, [or, in the case of the editor, a copy of the newspaper containing his name printed on it as that of the editor] shall be held [unless the contrary be proved] to be sufficient evidence, as against the person whose name shall be subscribed to such declaration, [or printed on such newspaper, as the case may be] that the said person was printer or publisher, or printer and publisher [ accordingly as the words of the said declaration may be] of every portion of every [newspaper] whereof the title shall correspond with the title of the [newspaper] mentioned in the declaration, [or the editor of every portion of that issue of the newspaper of which a copy is produced].” 9. Section 7 of the Press Act provides that the declaration made under section 5 (2) of the Press Act is a prima-facie evidence for fastening criminal or civil liability in respect of any publication and that there could be a rebuttable presumption against the editor, whose name is printed in the newspaper to fasten such liability. Section 7 of the Press Act does not speak about any joint liability. If any other person not being editor, printer etc not covered by Section 7 is sought to be fastened with criminal liability for any publication, the law requires, that there must be specific allegation against such person and there cannot be any presumption against such person under Section 7 of the Press Act. If any other person not being editor, printer etc not covered by Section 7 is sought to be fastened with criminal liability for any publication, the law requires, that there must be specific allegation against such person and there cannot be any presumption against such person under Section 7 of the Press Act. It is pertinent to note, that though, the same set of facts may be amenable to both civil as well as criminal action, nonetheless, civil and criminal proceeding shall be governed by its own procedure prescribed by law and the provision of code of civil procedure cannot be invoked in a criminal proceeding and vice-versa, though both the proceeding may arise out of the same set of facts. The concept of non-joinder of necessary parties as engraved in Order 1 Rule 9 CPC cannot be invoked in a criminal proceeding which is governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, unless the statute which makes the offence provides otherwise. 10. Section 4(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “all offences under the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of Cr.P.C. lays down that all offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, i.e., Cr.P.C. but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. 11. 11. The code of criminal procedure does not contemplate joint trial of more than one accused, save and except-provided in Section 223Cr.P.C. Section 223 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under: “The following persons may be charged and tried together, namely :- (a) Persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction ; (b) Persons accused of an offence and persons accused of abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence; (c) Persons accused of more than one offence of the same kind, within the meaning of section 219 committed by them jointly within the period of twelve months; (d) Persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction; (e) Persons accused of an offence which includes theft, extortion, cheating, or criminal misappropriation, and persons accused of receiving or retaining, or assisting in the disposal or concealment of, property possession of which is alleged to have been transferred by any such offence committed by the first-named persons, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such last-named offence; (f) Persons accused of offences under sections 411 and 414 of the Indian Penal Code or either of those sections in respect of stolen property the possession of which has been transferred by one offence; (g) Persons accused of any offence under Chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code relating to counterfeit con and persons accused of any other offence under the said Chapter relating to the same coin, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such offence, and the provisions contained in the former part of the Chapter shall, so far as may be, apply to all such charges : Provided that where a number of persons are charged with separate offences and such persons do not fall within any of the categories specified in this section, the [Magistrate or Court of Session) may, if such persons by an application in writing, so desire, and that such persons would not be prejudicially affected thereby, and it is expedient so to do, try all such persons together.” 12. The expression may be charged and tried together, more particularly, the use of word ‘may’ makes it amply clear that the section 223 is an enabling provision. The expression may be charged and tried together, more particularly, the use of word ‘may’ makes it amply clear that the section 223 is an enabling provision. This provision gives discretion to the Court to charge and try more than one accused jointly under the circumstances as enumerated in Section 223 Cr.P.C. obviously such discretion has to be exercised judiciously depending on the facts of each case. The above provision does not lay down, that in case of multiple offender, any one or two cannot be prosecuted without joining the other. 13. Section 319 Cr.P.C. empowers the Court to proceed against any person, not being an accused, if such person appears to be guilty of offence, and the Court is of the view, that such person could be tried together with the other accused. Therefore, even if anyone, who may be involved in the commission of offence or needs to be tried along with the other accused, he can be proceeded against at any time, if the Court deems such joint trial necessary. Therefore, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument, that the editors/publishers/printers of the newspaper is/are required to be prosecuted, along with the petitioner, the Court can proceed against them at any point of time in the exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and the fact that, they were not prosecuted initially, cannot be a ground for quashing the proceeding against the petitioner, who has been standing trial. Therefore, unless there is any statutory provision which obliges the Court, not to proceed against any of the accused, in absence of the other co-accused, who may be involved in the commission of offence and can be tried together, the criminal proceeding against any accused cannot be quashed on the ground of non-joinder of the co-accused. Therefore, this Court is of the view, that in absence of any statutory provision, the concept of non-joinder of necessary parties cannot be invoked in a criminal proceeding, reason being that as a general rule, the criminal liability is personal and each person is individually liable for the offence committed by him, except the statute provides specifically otherwise. Therefore, this Court is of the view, that in absence of any statutory provision, the concept of non-joinder of necessary parties cannot be invoked in a criminal proceeding, reason being that as a general rule, the criminal liability is personal and each person is individually liable for the offence committed by him, except the statute provides specifically otherwise. Even if the provision of Section 34 and 149 of the Cr.P.C. provides for constructive and joint liability in certain circumstances, such joint liability or constructive liability enunciated by Section 34 and 149 Cr.P.C. cannot come in the way of a criminal proceeding against a single accused person, though he may be constructively or jointly liable with other accused persons. To put it differently, even if more than one person may be liable for the commission of an offence by virtue of constructive and joint liability, there is no bar in proceeding against any one of such person, who may be jointly or constructively labile with others, in absence of specific statutory bar. 14. The decision of Haider Hussain’s case (supra) was rendered in a regular first appeal against the decree of a civil suit and on the facts of the suit, this Court held that the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. Therefore, the decision in Haider Hussain& Ors Vs. Ramesh Saikia (supra), is of no help to the petitioner, inasmuch as, the ratio laid down by the above decision, on the basis of Order I Rule 9 CPC, cannot be applied in a criminal proceeding. For the reason stated above, the contention of Mr. Choudhury that the proceeding against the present petitioner is not maintainable for non-joinder of necessary parties i.e., editor, printer is not acceptable. 15. Second contention of Mr. Choudhury is that the respondent No.2 has been a minister and at present he is an MLA associated with the public activities and as such, bona fide criticism of public functionary by a citizen for public good or public interest cannot be defamation. Refuting the above submission Mr. AM Bora contended that the public good, though, may be a valid defence in a criminal proceeding for defamation under the 10th exception to section 499 IPC, public good being a question of fact, which needs to be established by evidence, the same can be considered only during trial and not in a quashing proceeding. Refuting the above submission Mr. AM Bora contended that the public good, though, may be a valid defence in a criminal proceeding for defamation under the 10th exception to section 499 IPC, public good being a question of fact, which needs to be established by evidence, the same can be considered only during trial and not in a quashing proceeding. To buttress his submission, Mr. Bora, though, placed reliance on a number of decisions of the Apex Court, quoting the following decisions would suffice. 16. The Apex Court in M.A. Ramugam Vs. Kittu alias Krishnamoorty (2009) 1 SCC 101 , observed in para 19, 20, 21 as follows : “19. For the purpose of bringing his case within the purview of the Eight and the Ninth Exception appended to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, it would be necessary for the appellant to prove good faith for the protection of the interests of the person making it or of any other person or for the public good. 20. It is now a well-settled principle of law that those who plead exception must prove it. The burden of proof that his action was bonafide would, thus, be on the appellant alone. 21. At this stage, in our opinion, it would have been premature for the High Court to consider the materials placed by the appellant before it so as to arrive at a definite conclusion that there was no element of bad faith on the part of the appellant in making the said complaint before the police authorities.” 17. In Chaman Lal Vs. State of Punjab 1970(1) SCC 590 , observed as under in para 8 and 15. “8. Public good is a question of fact. Good faith has also to be established as a fact. 15. In order to come within the First Exception to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code it has to be established that what has been imputed concerning the respondent is true and the publication of the imputation is for the public good. The onus of providing these two ingredients, namely, truth of the imputation and the publication of the imputation for the public good is on the appellant. The appellant totally failed to establish these pleas. On the contrary, the evidence is that the imputation concerning the respondent is not true but is motivated by animus of the appellant against the respondent.” 18. The appellant totally failed to establish these pleas. On the contrary, the evidence is that the imputation concerning the respondent is not true but is motivated by animus of the appellant against the respondent.” 18. In Balraj Khanna and Ors Vs. Moti Ram AIR (1971) 3 SCC 399 , the Apex Court observed, that it is needless to state that the question of applicability of the exceptions to Section 499 IPC as well as other definition that may be available to the appellants will have to be gone into during trial of the complaint . 19. In Jeffrey J. Diermeier and Anr Vs. State of West Bengal and Another (2010)6 SCC 243 held as under : “39. The question has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case, having regard to the nature of imputation made; the circumstances on which it came to be made and the status of the person who makes the imputation as also the status of the person against whom imputation is allegedly made. These and a host of other considerations would be relevant and required to be considered for deciding appellants' plea of “good faith” and “public interest”. Unfortunately, a these are questions of fact and matters for evidence. 40. In the instant case, the stage for recording of evidence had not reached and, therefore, in the absence of any evidence on record, we find it difficult to return a finding whether or not the appellants have satisfied the requirements of “good faith” and “public good” so as to fall within the ambit of the Tenth Exception to Section 499IPC. Similarly, it with neither be possible nor appropriate for this Court to comment on the a ellegations levelled by respondent No.2 and record a final opinion whether these a ellegations do constitute defamation. Reading the complaint as a whole, we find it difficult to hold that a case for quashing of the complaint under Section 482 of the Code has been made out. At this juncture, we say no more lest it may cause prejudice to either of the parties.” 20. What therefore, follows from the above authorities is that the defence of public good or public interest or any other exception to Section 499 IPC being a question of fact and required to be proved, can only be considered during trial and as such, the submission of learned counsel Mr. What therefore, follows from the above authorities is that the defence of public good or public interest or any other exception to Section 499 IPC being a question of fact and required to be proved, can only be considered during trial and as such, the submission of learned counsel Mr. Bora appears to be pre-ponderous. 21. Mr. KN Choudhury with his usual eloquence further submitted that right to freedom of expression enshrined in the constitution is an invaluable right of the citizen, which obviously encompasses fair criticism. Citizenry right to fair criticism should be encouraged to keep the democracy vibrant and effective and such fundamental right cannot be crippled by criminal prosecution for defamation. There is no gain saying, that freedom of expression is a robust right enshrined in Article 19 1(a) of the Constitution of India. But nonetheless, such right is not unrestricted or unfettered, so as to jeopardize the fundamental right of any citizen. Therefore, one cannot lose sight of the fact, that the freedom of expression does not extend to infringe the fundamental right of others, nor such right can be extended to injure the reputation of other citizen, because the right to reputation is also a part of fundamental right within the purview of Article 21 of the Constitution and therefore, under the garb of freedom of expression a person’s reputation cannot be tarnished. The Apex Court in Subramaniam Swamy Vs. Union of India, Ministry of Law and other (2016) 7 SCC 221 extensively dealt with the freedom of expression vis-à-vis the offence of defamation under Section 500/501 IPC, and para 195 of the said judgment may, profitably be quoted here :- “195. One cannot be unmindful that right to freedom of speech and expression is a highly valued and cherished right but the Constitution conceives of reasonable restriction. In that context criminal defamation which is in existence in the form of Sections 499 and 500 IPC is not a restriction on free speech that can be characterized as disproportionate. Right to free speech cannot mean a citizen can defame the other. Protection of reputation is a fundamental right. It is also a human right. Cumulatively it serves the social interest. Thus, we are unable to accept that provisions relating to criminal defamation are not saved by doctrine of proportionality because it determines a limit which is not impermissible within the criterion of reasonable restriction. Protection of reputation is a fundamental right. It is also a human right. Cumulatively it serves the social interest. Thus, we are unable to accept that provisions relating to criminal defamation are not saved by doctrine of proportionality because it determines a limit which is not impermissible within the criterion of reasonable restriction. It has been held in D.C. Saxena v. Chief Justice of India, (1996) 5 SCC 216 , though in a different context, that if maintenance of democracy is the foundation for free speech, society equally is entitled to regulate freedom of speech or expression by democratic action. The reason is obvious viz, that society accepts free speech and expression and also puts limits on the right of the majority. Interest of the people involved in the acts of expression should be looked at not only from the perspective of the speaker but also the place at which he speaks, the scenario, the audience, the reaction of the publication, the purpose of the speech and the place and the forum in which the citizen exercises his freedom of speech and expression. The Court had further observed that the State has legitimate interest, therefore, to regulate the freedom of speech and expression which liberty represents the limits of the duty of restraint on speech or expression not to utter defamatory or libelous speech or expression. There is a correlative duty not to interfere with the liberty of others. Each is entitled to dignity of person and of reputation. Nobody has a right to denigrate others’ right to person or reputation.” 22. Coming to the third contention of Mr. K.N. Choudhury, it is trite law, that when a criminal proceeding is sought to be quashed at the initial stage, the primary test to be applied is, whether the allegations made in the complaint or the FIR, in their face value, prima-facie make out any offence. If the allegations made in the FIR or complaint, in their face value, fail to make out any offence, the Court should not hesitate to quash the proceeding for securing ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of the Court. As a corollary to the same, when the allegations made in the complaint or F.I.R prima-facie make out an of fence, the High Court should stay it’s hands. As a corollary to the same, when the allegations made in the complaint or F.I.R prima-facie make out an of fence, the High Court should stay it’s hands. It would therefore be necessary, at the out set to go through the complaint in order to see, whether the allegations made the rein make out any of fence of defamation as defined under Section 499 of the IPC, which is punishable under Section 500/501 IPC. Section 499 IPC reads as under : “499. Defamation.—Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter expected, to defame that person. Explanation 1.—It may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased person, if the imputation would harm the reputation of that person if living, and is intended to be hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near relatives. Explanation 2.—It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such. Explanation 3.—An imputation in the form of an alternative or expressed ironically, may amount to defamation. Explanation 4.—No imputation is said to harm a person’s reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful. Following ten exceptions are provided to the above definition- First Exception.—Imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or published.—It is not defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any person, if it be for the public good that the imputation should be made or published. Whether or not it is for the public good is a question of fact. Whether or not it is for the public good is a question of fact. Second Exception –Conduct of public servants.–It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of a public servant in the discharge of his public functions, or respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further. Third Exception.—Conduct of any person touching any public question.—It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of any person touching any public question, respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further. Fourth Exception.-Publication of reports of proceedings of Courts.- It is not defamation to publish substantially true report of the proceedings of a court of justice, or of the result of any such proceedings. Fifth Exception.—Merits of case decided in Court or conduct of witnesses and others concerned. It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the merits of any case, civil or criminal, which has been decided by a court of justice, or respecting the conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent, in any such case, or respecting the character of such person, as far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further. Sixth Exception.—Merits of public performance.-It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion respecting the merits of any performance which its author has submitted to the judgment of the public, or respecting the character of the author so far as his character appears in such performance, and no further. Seventh Exception.—Censure passed in good faith by person having lawful authority over other.-It is not defamation in a person having over another any authority, either conferred by law or arising out of a lawful contract made with that other, to pass in good faith any censure on the conduct of that other in matters to which such lawful authority relates. Eight Exception.—Accusation preferred in good faith to authorized person.—It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-matter of accusation. Eight Exception.—Accusation preferred in good faith to authorized person.—It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-matter of accusation. Ninth Exception.—Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other’s interests.—It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interests of the person making it, or any other person, or for the public good. Tenth Exception.—Caution in tended for good of person to whom conveyed or for public good.—It is not defamation to convey a caution, in good faith, to one person against another, provided that such caution be intended for the good of the person to whom it is conveyed, or of some person in whom that person is interested, or for the public good.” 23. It has been alleged in the complaint, that the respondent No. 2 is an MLA and he was also administer in the Government of Assam and also associated with various socio cultural organizations. It was further alleged in the complaint that the petitioner forwarded a letter written by him on 16.12.2018 to the news paper, namely, “Axomia Patidin”, where in he had made certain false and defamatory statement against the complainant alleging inter-alia, that the complainant has accumulated huge movable and immovable properties in different places in the State of Assam as well as in Delhi, Gurgaon etc in the name of his wife and other relatives by illegal means in connivance with one DFO, namely, Aftabuddin Ahmed. It was further alleged that on the basis of the aforesaid letter forwarded by the accused (petitioner), the Assamese daily “Axomia Pratidin” published the news item along with the copy of the said letter dated 16.12.2018 written by the petitioner under the headline–”Sarkarakbyabasthagrahanarahbanere Anil Rajarbibriti-prakaran bon mantriHussain or parbatsomosampattirtalikafadil congress netar.” It was also alleged that in the aforesaid news item various false, baseless, imaginary, concocted and derogatory allegations have been leveled against the respondent No.2 on the basis of the letter dated 16.02.2018 issued by the petitioner with ill intention to tarnish the image and injure the reputation of the respondent No.2 (complainant). 24. 24. Having regard to the definition of offence of defamation contained in Section 499 IPC and the imputation made in the alleged letter forwarded by the petitioner to the newspaper, which has been published and the news item published on the basis of the said letter, it cannot be said that such allegation if remain uncontroverted would not make out any offence under Section 499 IPC. However, the Section 499 IPC provided ten exceptions, which decriminalizes any imputation, and as such, any imputation to person, which comes under any of the exceptions to Section 499 shall not constitute the offence of defamation. Therefore, exceptions 1 to 10 appended to Section 499 are valid defence in a prosecution for defamation. Necessarily the burden to prove any exception as defence rest on the accused, which can only be proved at the time of trial. It is needless to say, that such burden of the accused is not that strict, as the burden of the prosecution to prove the offence or guilt of the accused. It may not always be necessary for the accused to adduce positive evidence to prove any defence plea or exception, inasmuch as, the exception can also be discernible from the prosecution evidence itself. In any case, such exercise to ascertain, as to whether imputation leveled against any person would come under any exception or not, can be decided only at the time of trial on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties. Therefore, at this stage, it cannot be said that the allegations made in the complaint, in its face value, have not prima facie made out any offence. 25. It was also contended by Mr. Choudhury, that whatever has been attributed to the petitioner having published in the news item were not untrue or baseless, and to embolden such submission, learned counsel referred to certain documents annexed to the petition, being an FIR lodged by one Karuna Bordoloi, DSP, against a DFO, a letter written by the Additional Secretary, Government of Assam, Vigilance Department vide No. PLA (V) 115/2018/76 dated 17.03.2018 (Annexure-8), as well as, a letter dated 11.04.2018 vide Memo No. DGVA which shows that vide letter dated 17.03.2018, the Government has accorded approval for initiating an enquiry against respondent No.2 being an MLA. By letter dated 11.04.2018, the Superintendent of Police sought for information as to the immovable property of the respondent No.2. By letter dated 11.04.2018, the Superintendent of Police sought for information as to the immovable property of the respondent No.2. The approval of the govt. for initiation of vigilance enquiry against the respondent No.2 shows, the bonafide of the allegations or criticism, which is alleged to have been published at the instance of the petitioner, submits Mr. Choudhury. 26. Mr. AM Bora, learned sr. counsel for the petitioner contended that the documents referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner are only defence materials, which cannot be looked into by this Court, while exercising inherent power to quash the criminal proceeding, and such defence materials can be considered only, during trial upon being proved. 27. It has been consistently held by the Apex Court, that while dealing with the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing a criminal proceeding, the Court should go by the allegations made in the complaint or FIR in its face value. The High Court is not supposed to embark upon an enquiry as to the merit of the accusation or the defence plea, which is something to be done by the trial Court. The Apex Court in Rao Narain Singh(dead) By LRS Vs. Union of India (1993) 3 SCC 60 , observed that “this Court has repeatedly pointed out that the High Court should not, while exercising power under Section 482 of the Code, usurp the jurisdiction of the trial Court. The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., has been vested in the High Court to quash a prosecution which amount to abuse of the process of the Court but that power cannot be exercised by the High Court to held parallel trial.” 28. The documents relied by the petitioner as mentioned herein before, no doubt, may be materials or documents, which the petitioner can rely in his defence, during trial. None the less, it is the settled principle, that usually the High Court cannot look into the defence material while exercising inherent power for quashing the criminal proceeding at the threshold. If the allegations made in the complaint, or in the FIR, in its face value, prima facie make out an offence, the High Court should stay it s hand in the quashing proceeding . However, the Apex Court in Rabindra Kumar Madanlal Goenka & Anr. Vs. If the allegations made in the complaint, or in the FIR, in its face value, prima facie make out an offence, the High Court should stay it s hand in the quashing proceeding . However, the Apex Court in Rabindra Kumar Madanlal Goenka & Anr. Vs. Rukmini Ram Raghav Spinners Private Limited, (2009)11SCC 529 dealing with the scope of looking into the defence material, held as under : “While entertaining a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the material furnished by the defence cannot be looked into and the defence materials can be entertained only at the time of trial. It is a well-settled position of law that when there are prima facie materials available, a petition for quashing the criminal proceedings cannot be entertained. The investigating agency should have had the freedom to go into the whole gamut of the allegations and to reach a conclusion of its own. Pre-emption of such investigation would be justified only in extreme cases.” 29. The Apex Court in Harshendra Kumar D Vs. Rebatilata Koleyand Others (2011)3 SCC35 observed as under : “It is fairly se led now that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under section 482 or revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code in a case where complaint is sought to be quashed, it is not proper for the High Court to consider the defence of the accused or embark upon an enquiry in respect of merits of the accusations. However, in an appropriate case, if on the face of the documents – which are beyond suspicion or doubt – placed by accused, the accusations against him cannot stand, it would travesty of justice if accused is relegated to trial and he is asked to prove his defence before the trial Court. In such a matter, for promotion of justice or to prevent injustice or abuse of process, the High Court may look into the materials which have significant bearing on the matter at prima facie stage.” 30. The Apex Court in Rajiv Thapar & Ors. Vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, reported in (2013)3 SCC 330 , while enunciatin g the detailed guidelines as to when and how the defence materials relied by the accused should be considered in a petition u/s 482, held as follows : - 22. The Apex Court in Rajiv Thapar & Ors. Vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, reported in (2013)3 SCC 330 , while enunciatin g the detailed guidelines as to when and how the defence materials relied by the accused should be considered in a petition u/s 482, held as follows : - 22. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482of the Cr.P.C., if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are a stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without a owing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482of the Cr.P.C. the High Court has to be fu y satisfied, that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 31. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 31. What therefore, follows from the above authorities is t hat the exclusion of defence material from consideration, while exercising inherent power for quashing a criminal proceeding at the initial stage is not an absolute rule. In exceptional cases there can be departure. When the defence materials or the documents sought to be relied by the accused are not disputed and of such starling and impeccable quality, having potential to completely negate the accuation made by the complainant, the High Court can very well look into such materials for quasing the proceeding in order to secure the ends of justice. Reason being t hat if the defence materials are of such nature, that under any circumstances the accusation cannot stand in the face of such defence material, allowing the proceeding to continue in such situation would amount to abuse of the process of the Court . 32. In the present case, the documents sought to be relied by the petitioner as indicated above is an FIR lodged against an officer (DFO) and a letter of the Govt. according approval to initiate enquiry against respondent No. 2 and the third one is a letter written by the Investigating Agency to the revenue authority, seeking information regarding the immovable property of the respondent No.2. Even if it is accepted that an enquiry is initiated against the respondent No. 2 at the instance of the petitioner, unless the enquiry culminates in holding the respondent No. 2 guilty of the accusation, or establishing the allegations to be true, the same may or may not be of any help to the petitioner, reason being that such defence material remains to be a matter of evidence and proof in the criminal proceeding which can be done only during trial. Therefore, the documents, sought to be relied by the petitioner, can by no stretch of imagination be held to be undisputed documents of such starling quality, before which the accusation made in the complaint cannot stand, though petitioner may rely on such documents or materials to prove his defence at the time of trial. 33. Therefore, the documents, sought to be relied by the petitioner, can by no stretch of imagination be held to be undisputed documents of such starling quality, before which the accusation made in the complaint cannot stand, though petitioner may rely on such documents or materials to prove his defence at the time of trial. 33. Situated thus, when the complaint has apparently made out a prima-facie offence as defined in Section 499 IPC, the proceeding cannot be quashed at this stage. It is to be borne in mind that the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly in rarest of the rare cases only to achieve the twin object of securing the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. The Apex Court, in Bhajanlal Vs. State of Haryana (1992Suppl.1SCC335), sounding a note of caution in this regard, observed that the inherent power for quashing the proceeding should be exercised very sparingly in rarest of the rare cases. The Apex Court in para 103 of the judgment held as under : “103.We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to there liability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice.” 34. Thus having regard to the allegations made in the complaint as indicated above and the submission of the learned counsel for both the sides as well as the scope of interference with the criminal proceeding in the exercise of inherent power, I am unable to persuade myself to concur with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner for quashing the proceeding. In view of what has been discussed herein above, this criminal petition is found to be devoid of merit and hence, dismissed. 35. Send down the LCR along with a copy of this order .