Judgment : 1. The present challenge has been directed against an order dated September 13, 2019 passed by the respondent no.3, the Tea Board, issuing a directive under clause 13(3) of the Tea (Marketing) Control Order, 2003, inter alia, fixing the last date for plucking/receiving of green leaves for all tea factories as December 14, 2019 and fixing subsequent time lines for the other parts of processing of the tea. The petitioner is aggrieved by the directive fixing the last date of plucking/receiving of green leaves to be December 14, 2019. 2. It is argued by learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the tea garden of the petitioner is situated in the Terai region on the foothills of the Himalayas and the onset of monsoons and winter in such area is different from that of the hilly areas of northern and north-eastern India. As such, it is argued that, in view of a similar directive having been issued last year, the petitioner faced substantial losses. After the aforesaid predicament, the present impugned order dated September 13, 2019 was again issued, which the petitioner is facing difficulty in implementing, in view of the impending huge loss to be suffered by the petitioner if the last date of plucking/receiving of green leaves remains as December 14, 2019. It is submitted that at least twenty days more for the plucking of tea leaves ought to be granted to tea gardens of the Terai region, due to late onset of winter as compared to the hilly areas. 3. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner, by placing reliance on a communication dated September 30, 2019 to the Deputy Chairman, Tea Board and Registering Authority, being the present respondent no.5, indicated such problems being faced by the petitioner, also clearly mentioning the reason for such difficulty, as indicated above. 4. However, the respondent no.2 wrote back to the petitioner vide a communication dated October 22, 2019, thereby relying on the differences in topography and climatic condition of tree growing areas between north and north-eastern India as opposed to southern India. 5. 4. However, the respondent no.2 wrote back to the petitioner vide a communication dated October 22, 2019, thereby relying on the differences in topography and climatic condition of tree growing areas between north and north-eastern India as opposed to southern India. 5. It is argued by learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the said communication did not take into consideration at all the typical distinctive topographies and climatic conditions of the Terai region, as opposed to the hilly areas of northern India, thereby missing out the issue raised by the petitioner altogether and clubbing the entire tea gardens of northern India, including the hilly areas as well as the Terai region, in the same bracket. This, it is argued, is unscientific and would create huge loss of revenue not only to the petitioner but to the country as a whole. 6. It is pointed out by learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is a distinguished producer of tea and several documents in that regard, showing that the petitioner has earned distinction from various levels for its manufacture of tea from the Government of India, have been annexed to the present writ petition which would show that the petitioner has integrity in the tea market and occupies a huge portion of the tea market. 7. Learned senior counsel argues that Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution guarantees that all citizens of India shall have the right to carry on any occupation, trade or business. 8. It is argued that Article 19(6) of the Constitution specifically provides that nothing in sub-clause (g) of clause 1 of the said Article shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing, in the interest of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to or prevent the State from making any law relating to the exceptions as provided therein. 9. 9. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that Article 19(6) specifically provides that the State may make any law imposing restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred under Article 19(1)(g), but the same has to be in the interests of the general public and the restrictions imposed have to be reasonable. 10. In the present case, Section 30(3)(c) of the Tea Act, 1953 provides that the Central Government, may, by general or special order, regulate by licences, permits or otherwise the production, storage, transport or distribution of tea or tea waste. It is submitted by learned senior counsel that undoubtedly the Central Government has such power to regulate the production of tea. However, as far as the control order issued under the said Act on January 1, 2003 is concerned, Rule 13(3) thereof provides that the Registering Authority may from time to time issue directions to registered manufacturers, registered buyers, either individually or collectively, on any matter connected with the business which are relevant for purposes of carrying out the objects of the Order and on receipt of such directions, every registered manufacturer/registered buyer shall carry out the directions within a period as specified by the Registering Authority from time to time. 11. As such, it is argued that there is provision in the control order itself to issue directions either individually or collectively. 12. In the present case, in view of the differences in topography and climate between the hilly areas and the Terai region of northern India, there ought to have been a distinction in the last dates for plucking of tea leaves based on such differences. 13. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner relies on annexure P5 at page 54 of the writ petition to argue that previously, by a circular dated December 14, 2018 such a distinction was made between tea manufacturers of West Bengal, Bihar, Sikkim, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand on the one hand and Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and Manipur on the other hand as far as the dates of plucking of green leaves were concerned. 14. Hence, it is not unprecedented that different directions have been issued for different States. 15. Under such circumstances, it is argued that intelligible differentia must exist either for imposing classifications on reasonable basis or for adjudging the reasonableness of classifications already in place. 14. Hence, it is not unprecedented that different directions have been issued for different States. 15. Under such circumstances, it is argued that intelligible differentia must exist either for imposing classifications on reasonable basis or for adjudging the reasonableness of classifications already in place. Learned senior counsel relies on the judgment reported at (2001) 2 SCC 259 [K. Thimmappa and others vs. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, State Bank of India and another] (at page 270), in support of such proposition. 16. Learned senior counsel also relies on paragraph nos. 34 and 38 of the judgment reported at (1970) 1 SCC 189 [Twyford Tea Co. Ltd. and another vs. State of Kerala and another], for the proposition that imposing an uniform rate of tax in respect of lands where tea is grown without classifying them on the basis of their productivity, actual or potential and without differentiating the inferior from the superior kind of soil or without taking into consideration the fact that some of these lands being situated in more advantageous position than the rest, must therefore, inevitably result in unequal incidents of tax. The said case was one where inequality was held to emerge as a result of imposing an ad hoc tax uniformly levied without making any rational or intelligible classification. Such imposition of tax would result in inequality among the holders who used their lands for tea growing though they are similarly situated. 17. It is submitted that there were several other factors than the onset of winter which were not considered by the respondents. Learned senior counsel argues that, due to better irrigation facilities in a tea garden and other technological advances employed, rainfall and other climatic changes may be handled more efficiently in a particular tea garden than others, making most of the factors relied on by the respondents in their reports irrelevant or having negligible impact. 18. By drawing analogy from such judgments, learned senior counsel argues that in the present case also the Tea Board ought to have taken into consideration the intelligible differentia existing between the Terai region and the hilly regions of northern India, as far as topography and climate are concerned, in fixing the last date of plucking/receiving or green leaves for all tea factories. Thus, it is argued that the impugned order dated September 13, 2019 is based on a violation of natural justice as well as the rights emanating under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution read with clause (6) of the said Article. Moreover, the said order would hit public revenue since the petitioner is a major part of the tea industry in India and contributes fairly to the revenue earned by the country from exports and sale of tea within the country, thereby contributing to the economy of the country. That apart, the amount of quality tea leaves which could be obtained if the time was extended as per the petitioner's prayer, would enhance the volume of quality tea production as well. 19. It is next argued on behalf of the petitioner that, in view of non-imposition of reasonable classification on the basis of intelligible differentia between the Terai region and the hilly regions, as far as tea estates are concerned, the fundamental right of equality of the petitioner on the basis of reasonable classification, as in-built in Article 14 of the Constitution, is also violated. 20. Moreover, it is argued by the petitioner, by relying on certain portions of the reports, on the basis of which the respondents fixed the timelines for plucking, etc. of tea plants, that those very reports were in favour of the petitioner's case. The recommendation in the said reports were also that it is important to implement adaptation measures in tea plantations, aiming at minimizing adverse impacts of climate without a delay, as it takes a considerable period of time to bring about changes to a tree crop system such as tea cultivation. Several proposed measures were also suggested in the reports, like soil and moisture conservation, intercropping, crop diversification, establishment and management of shade trees. Instead of taking such measures, it is submitted, the Tea Board had resorted to archaic yardsticks on a baseless generalization, instead of making a garden-specific survey. 21. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the judgment of Brij Mohan Lal vs. Union of India & Ors. [ (2012) 6 SCC 502 ], in paragraph no. 100 of which the Supreme Court summed up the tests whether the court should or not interfere in the policy decisions of the State. 21. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the judgment of Brij Mohan Lal vs. Union of India & Ors. [ (2012) 6 SCC 502 ], in paragraph no. 100 of which the Supreme Court summed up the tests whether the court should or not interfere in the policy decisions of the State. Out of the tests laid down therein, the tests of reasonableness, arbitrariness and unfairness were applicable to the present case, as per the petitioner. 22. Learned counsel for the respondents argues that there are 1586 large tea estates in India and 2,10,000 small tea estates in the country. India is the fourth largest exporter of tea and the Tea Board is responsible for the improvement and maintenance of the quality of the tea produced in India and is not a mere profit making concern. Relying on Section 10 of the Tea Act, 1953, learned counsel for the respondents argues that the functions of the Tea Board encompass promotion, by such measures as it thinks fit, the development under the control of the Central Government of the tea industry, including various aspects of the matter, such as regulating the production and extent of cultivation of tea, improving the quality of tea, promoting cooperative efforts among growers and manufacturers of tea, undertaking, assisting or encouraging scientific, technological and economic research and maintaining or assisting in the maintenance of demonstration farms, and manufacturing stations etc. As such, the decision taken in the impugned order was based not merely on the whims of the respondent no. 2 but on extensive and elaborate scientific research and was a result of a consensus of several stakeholders, including representatives of the workers of the tea gardens, eminent scientists and other associations, including owners of the tea estates. 23. It is further argued on behalf of the respondents that Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution would not be applicable to juristic persons. Since the petitioner is a juristic person and not an individual, the question of applicability of Article 19(1)(g) does not arise at all. The only premise on which the petitioner could argue would at best be Article 14 of the Constitution, which is also not available to the petitioner, since there has gone behind the impugned order, several years and resources of research and consultation between the stakeholders. 24. The only premise on which the petitioner could argue would at best be Article 14 of the Constitution, which is also not available to the petitioner, since there has gone behind the impugned order, several years and resources of research and consultation between the stakeholders. 24. On the proposition that the provisions of Article 19 of the Constitution of India could not be invoked by a juristic person, learned counsel for the respondents cites two judgments - State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. [ AIR 1963 SC 1811 ] and Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited & Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [ (2011) 3 SCC 193 ]. 25. Referring to (2019) 5 SCC 119 [Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. vs. Rafiqunnisa M. Khalifa (Deceased) through His Legal Heir Mohd. Muqueen Qureshi & Anr.], it is argued that a writ of mandamus under Article 226 is issued, when there is a right and correspondingly there is a legal duty to perform, both of which are absent in the present case. 26. Relying on AIR 1955 S.C. 191 [Budhan Choudhry & Ors. vs. State of Bihar], learned counsel for the respondents argues that classification must not only be founded on an intelligible differentia but such differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases; namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. 27. The same principle was reiterated in Virendra Krishna Mishra vs. Union of India & Ors. [ (2015) 2 SCC 712 ] and in (2002) 4 SCC 34 [Ashutosh Gupta vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.]. In the latter case, it was further held that Article 14 of the Constitution does not require that the legislative classification should be scientifically or logically perfect. 28. Learned counsel for the respondents also cites Transport and Dock Workers Union & Ors. vs. Mumbai Port Trust & Anr. [ (2011)2 SCC 575 ], it was laid down that if a classification is conducive to the functioning of modern society then it is certainly reasonable and rational. 28. Learned counsel for the respondents also cites Transport and Dock Workers Union & Ors. vs. Mumbai Port Trust & Anr. [ (2011)2 SCC 575 ], it was laid down that if a classification is conducive to the functioning of modern society then it is certainly reasonable and rational. It was further held that judges must maintain judicial self-restraint while reviewing administrative or legislative decisions. Excessive interference is not proper. The machinery of the Government would not work if it were not allowed some free play in its joints. 29. It was held in University Grants Commission vs. Sadhana Chaudhary & Ors. [ (1996) 10 SCC 536 ] that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide off the reasonable mark. 30. In Ramrao & Ors. vs. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Association & Ors. [ (2004)2 SCC 76 ], a cut off date classification was held to have a reasonable nexus with the object which the decision of the Bank to promote seeks to achieve. It was further held that whenever a cutoff date is fixed, a question may arise as to why a person would suffer only because he comes within the wrong side of the cutoff date, but, the fact that some persons or a section of society would face hardship, by itself cannot be a ground for holding that the cut off date so fixed is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. 31. In the present case, it is argued, the classification had to be seen from the perspective of the object of the Act and Rules, which is for the general quality of tea all over India and to stop the malpractice of plucking tea leaves long after the winter dormancy sets in, for profiteering at the expense of down gradation of the quality of tea. 32. 32. Citing (2005) 1 SCC 625 [Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.], the respondents argue that a restriction cannot be said to be unreasonable merely because in a given case, it operates harshly. Canalisation of a particular business in favour of a specified individual is reasonable where the interest or the economy of the country is affected. 33. That apart, it is argued, the Tea Research Association, which is an established research body in the field, undertook detailed data collection from various centers at Jorhat, Nagrakata, Darjeeling and Terai, including the Dooars region and came to specific findings that, in the Dooars and Terai regions, the symptoms of winter dormancy starts showing in mid-November and manifests fully in mid-December. 34. Apart from oral arguments, notes of arguments were filed by both sides. 35. The basis of the petitioner's arguments is that the impugned directive has been issued under Clause 13 (3) of the Tea (Marketing) Control Order, 2003, which provides for both individual and collective directions. The impugned directive, however, was collective in nature, generalizing the plucking dates of the hilly as well as foothill regions, which admittedly have different climatic conditions and winter onset timings. As such, it is argued that the Tea Board did not resort to intelligible differentia in generalizing such plucking dates for regions having different climatic characters on all yardsticks, including temperature, rainfall, soil condition, etc. This, according to the petitioner, is violative of Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. The exceptions stipulated in clause (6) of Article 19 do not apply according to the petitioner, since the restrictions imposed are neither reasonable nor for public purposes. 36. The second limb of the petitioner's argument is that the Board derives its power to issue the directive-in-question from Section 30(3)(C) of the Tea Act, 1953, which provides for control of price and distribution of tea or tea waste, to regulate, by licences, permits or otherwise the production, storage, transport or distribution of tea or tea waste. 37. On the other hand, Section 10 of the 1953 Act stipulates the functions of the Board which includes measures providing for regulating the production and extent of cultivation of tea and improving the quality of tea. 38. 37. On the other hand, Section 10 of the 1953 Act stipulates the functions of the Board which includes measures providing for regulating the production and extent of cultivation of tea and improving the quality of tea. 38. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner has been producing quality tea for years and ranks amongst the topmost producers of CTC tea in India and as such its credentials in the field cannot be denied. There has been no change in the tea industry to justify timelines, which were introduced only since the last year, although the last 150 years of tea plantation has never seen such imposition. 39. Apart from the judgments initially cited, the petitioners also rely on Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India & Ors., reported at (2012) 6 SCC 502 , wherein the Supreme Court stipulated six specific points when the Court can interfere in policy matters. 40. The impugned order does not take into account the differences in temperature, moisture, daylight timings, soil quality and fixes December 14, 2019 arbitrarily as the last day for plucking tea leaves, thereby giving a go bye to the quality control, which is its primary function. 41. On the other hand, the Respondent no. 3 takes the plea that the writ petitioner has not filed the writ in representative capacity and is not concerned with the other tea gardens of the same region, who accepted the impugned order. Therefore, the writ petitioner cannot seek a blanket cancellation of the impugned order as a whole. This will adversely affect the other tea gardens, who have already arranged their schedules according to the time-line provided. 42. Moreover, the respondent no. 3 argues that extensive research by expert panels have culminated in the fixation of the disputed timeline. Without a concrete rebuttal to the same on the basis of counter reports by experts of equal standing, the petitioner could not, in any event, dispute the legality or constitutionality of the cut-off dates. 43. In the present case, it is seen that one of the objects of the Tea Board is to control the quality of the production of tea. The documents produced by the respondents extensively show that the Terai region conditions were also scientifically studied by data collection and extensive reports of experts in the field. 43. In the present case, it is seen that one of the objects of the Tea Board is to control the quality of the production of tea. The documents produced by the respondents extensively show that the Terai region conditions were also scientifically studied by data collection and extensive reports of experts in the field. It appears that the reports suggest that the symptoms of winter dormancy starts showing in mid November and manifests fully in mid-December in the Terai region. 44. As such, it is clear that, pursuant to such reports, the decision to fix the last date for plucking tea leaves, by the impugned memo, at December 14, 2019 was sufficiently reasonable. There is, on the other hand, no basis for the petitioner's contention of getting another twenty days for plucking, since such plucking may, as per the report of the Tea Board, cause a deterioration in the quality of the tea, which is within the domain of the Tea Board to decide. 45. Merely because of its high standing as a tea producer, the petitioner cannot claim a special advantage in that regard. Theoretically, it may very well be that the petitioner will pluck tea leaves over such additional period only to add to its volume of collection, thereby boosting its overall profits at the expense of quality. Merely because the petitioner is in the upper echelons of tea producers in CTC tea, it does not mean that all the tea produced by it is of superior quality. In the absence of a time-line in place, the tea producers of the Terai region could be rampantly abusing the extra period exceeding the onset of winter dormancy to produce sub-standard tea for profiteering, thereby hitting the very purpose of the control introduced by the Tea Board at its roots. 46. Even if the petitioner is scrupulous and honest, it has to bear a part of the collateral damage suffered while introducing new schemes and timelines for public good, to serve the object of enhancing the quality of Indian tea in general, since all the producers of tea in the Terai region may not be equipped with the advanced system of irrigation and other technical advancements allegedly employed by the petitioner. 47. 47. While fixing cut off dates, an ingredient of generality has to be there, since it is not a feasible project to differentiate each and every individual tea garden on an examination of the stage of advancement in the system of tea plantation it deploys. 48. Moreover, since the documents produced by the respondents show that the winter dormancy period starts for the Terai region from mid November and ends by mid December, the maximum laxity possible was given to the petitioner. The petitioner cannot rely on a negative argument of unreasonable classification by castigating the same timeline for plucking tea leaves for hilly areas also, where the cut off date for plucking tea leaves should be mid November, but has been granted also till mid December. Even if the hilly areas have been given an extra month on the premise that the producers there are more conscious about propriety and such premise itself is biased, that itself does not justify the present challenge, since two wrongs do not make a right. 49. The argument of loss suffered by the petitioner is a private detriment suffered by the petitioner, but the petitioner itself has stated that, though it has lost in volume, no significant improvement in quality has been noticed, indicating that there has neither been any significant deterioration of quality by introduction of the timeline system. 50. While formulating a general cutoff date and corresponding timelines, it was sufficient that the Tea Board took the aid of several expert bodies and had extensive consultations with all stake holders, particularly taking into consideration the factors pertaining to the Terai region as well. It was not feasible to undertake research on the techniques employed, advanced or backward, in each of the tea gardens individually. 51. Since the initiative taken is just two years old, it would require a gestation period of some years to put in place the recommendation of the expert bodies to employ advance techniques of tea plantation and adaptive methods in improving the quality of tea. 52. For the time being, sufficient basis for the fixation of cut off dates for the Terai region, being extensive data collection and research work, was shown by the respondents. Adaptation and deployment of new techniques would take some more years and as such cannot form a basis of vitiating the fixation of the timelines. 53. 52. For the time being, sufficient basis for the fixation of cut off dates for the Terai region, being extensive data collection and research work, was shown by the respondents. Adaptation and deployment of new techniques would take some more years and as such cannot form a basis of vitiating the fixation of the timelines. 53. Hence, on the materials on record, mere non-examination of the feasibility of techniques used by each tea plantation cannot be a sufficient ground for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. Sufficient basis, being the data collected and the research on all major components, was enough in that regard. 54. The loss suffered by the petitioner individually would be superseded by the public purpose of enhancing the quality of tea in the country. 55. Of course, it would be expected that the recommendations of its own outsourced experts, as to employing advanced techniques and adaptation by collection of more extensive data on all major tea plantations individually would have to follow suit in future, but that is a time consuming process and the immediate steps taken, taking into consideration the reasonable timelines fixed for plucking tea leaves, etc. upon taking note of specific requirements of the Terai region as well, provided sufficient intelligent differentia for fixing the cut off date for plucking tea leaves even at the Terai region uniformly as December 14, 2019. 56. The apparently unfair extra month given to hilly regions would be a negative application of reasonable classification which the petitioner could not take advantage of. As far as the Terai region is concerned, there are sufficient materials on record to show that the onset of winter by mid-December in the region was established by research work, and that various other factors such as sunshine hours, soil condition etc. were also taken into consideration. 57. Hence, the said time-frame did not affect adversely the quality of the tea produced, but at best prevented the volume of tea plucked, apparently of inferior quality after the onset of winter, which would affect adversely the individual profits of the petitioner but benefit the public interest of improving quality of tea at large. 58. 57. Hence, the said time-frame did not affect adversely the quality of the tea produced, but at best prevented the volume of tea plucked, apparently of inferior quality after the onset of winter, which would affect adversely the individual profits of the petitioner but benefit the public interest of improving quality of tea at large. 58. Hence, even taking into account the decisions cited, the present impugned notification about the last date of plucking tea and a consequent time-schedule did not amount to unreasonable classification or absence of intelligible differentia of such magnitude that the policy decision of the Tea Board could be struck down. 59. There is no doubt that this Court expresses the hope and trust that, with time, the Tea Board shall undertake more extensive research on adaptation and deployment of advanced techniques, in the process making a distinction between plantations already employing such techniques, who were entitled to extended cut off dates, and others, by a more detailed survey of individual plantations, at least of some stature. However, the same will take place gradually and does not justify interference with the policy decision of the Tea Board, which is an instrumentality of the Union of India, upon taking into consideration the suitable time for plucking in the Terai region as well. 60. In such view of the matter, no interference with the impugned order dated September 13, 2019 is called for. 61. Accordingly, W.P. No. 21194 (W) of 2019 is dismissed on contest. 62. There will be no order as to costs. 63. Urgent certified website copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.