JUDGMENT : This writ petition is filed at the instance of a Co-operative Society challenging the judgment of the Co-operative Tribunal in an appeal filed by the respondent challenging an award passed by the Co-operative Arbitration Court directing him to vacate the shoproom occupied by him under the petitioner. All Co-operative Societies are exempted by a notification issued by the Government under Section 25 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 from the purview of the aforesaid enactment. 2. The petitioner filed a suit before the Munsiff Court, Palakkad, to obtain vacant possession of the building from the respondent. The respondent raised a preliminary objection of maintainability of the suit in the light of Section 100 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (for short, the 'Act'). According to the respondent, the remedy available to the petitioner is to invoke Section 69 of the Act. 3. The Munsiff Court sustained the objection and dismissed the suit as not maintainable. The petitioner instituted an arbitration case to obtain vacant possession of the building before the Co-operative Arbitration Court, Calicut. The Arbitration Court allowed the prayers and directed the respondent to vacate the building. Challenging the award, the respondent filed an appeal before the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram. The respondent raised an objection in regard to jurisdiction of the Arbitration Court in deciding the dispute under Section 69 of the Act. The Tribunal, noting that letting of the building cannot be treated as a part of the business of the Society, held that the dispute cannot be treated as a 'dispute' as referable under Section 2(i) of the Act. The judgment of the Tribunal is called in question invoking Article 226 of the Constitution. The dispute being one relating to jurisdictional issue, factual matters relating to jurisdiction can be considered by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The authority and jurisdiction of the appropriate Arbitration Court would depend upon the factual existence of a dispute touching the business of the Society. Therefore, this Court has to find out whether the Tribunal was misdirected in referring to the dispute, as a dispute not coming within the ambit of Section 2(i) of the Act. 4. The authority and jurisdiction of the appropriate Arbitration Court would depend upon the factual existence of a dispute touching the business of the Society. Therefore, this Court has to find out whether the Tribunal was misdirected in referring to the dispute, as a dispute not coming within the ambit of Section 2(i) of the Act. 4. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in O.N.Bhatnagar v. Rukibai Narsindar and others [ AIR 1982 SC 1097 ] after referring to the nature of a dispute in regard to ejectment of a person who was permitted to occupy the premises as a part of the business upon revocation of licence, was of the opinion that it is a dispute falling within the purview of Section 91(1) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. In Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. M/s.Dalichand Jugraj Jain and Others [ AIR 1969 SC 1320 ] the Apex Court, after adverting to the meaning of 'business', and referring to the dispute touching the conduct of the society as referable under Section 91(1) of the Mahatrashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, was of the opinion that the word 'touching' was very wide and would include any matter which relates to or concerns the business of the society and held that if the business of a society is to construct and buy houses and let them out to its members, such a letting of property is part of its business. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Mukundan v. Cannanore Co-op. House Constn. Society [1992 KHC 425] also had taken the view that if letting is taken as a part of the society, it would come within the ambit of touching its business and drew a distinction between 'touching the business of the society' and 'for the purpose of its business'. 5. In the impugned judgment also the Tribunal was of the firm view that if letting was the object of the society, the dispute would necessarily fall within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Act. However, the Tribunal assumed that the object of letting cannot be treated as a part of the business of the society. 6. The object of the society is referred to in the bye-law. It is specifically mentioned therein that the society itself is a 'House Building Society'. The very business of the society itself is, building, buying, selling, hiring, letting and developing the land. 6. The object of the society is referred to in the bye-law. It is specifically mentioned therein that the society itself is a 'House Building Society'. The very business of the society itself is, building, buying, selling, hiring, letting and developing the land. The society is engaged in the real estate business. Therefore, letting is a part of its main business. It is not an incidental activity. It is not for the purpose of any other business being carried out by the society. When the business of the society itself is letting, there is no difficulty to hold that any dispute in relation to letting is a part of 'touching' business as referred under Section 2(i) read with Section 69 of the Act. It is to be noted that the respondent is also a 'B’ class member of the society. In such circumstances, I have to hold that the Tribunal is misdirected while analysing the factual matters involved. The jurisdictional error committed by the Tribunal can be corrected by invoking Article 226 as well as Article 227 of the Constitution. 7. There is no other ground made out by the respondent to resist the relief sought for by the petitioner. Therefore, the impugned judgment is set aside. The award of the Arbitrator is restored. The writ petition is allowed. No costs.