JUDGMENT : Bela M. Trivedi, J. 1. The present appeal stems from the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 25th March, 2015 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Deesa at Deodar (hereinafter referred to as "the Sessions Court") in Sessions Case No. 120 of 2011, by which the appellant accused has been convicted for the offence punishable under sections 302, 392 and 201 of Indian Penal Code ("IPC" for short). The appellant has been ordered to undergo imprisonment for Life and pay fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default thereof, to undergo further Simple Imprisonment for a period of three months for the offence under section 302 of IPC and to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of three years and pay fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default thereof, to undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of one month for the offence under section 392 of IPC and to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of two years and pay fine of Rs. 1,000/-, and in default thereof, to undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of one month for the offence under section 201 of IPC. 2. As per the case of the prosecution before the Sessions Court, a complaint came to be lodged by one Uttamsinh Bhikhaji Vaghela on 30/6/2011 before the Tharad Police Station, Camp Mangrol, thereby it was alleged inter-alia that on 29/6/2011 at about 9.30 p.m. when he (complainant) was at his village Forna, the family members of Jetji Jivji Vaghela telephoned him that some untoward incident had taken place with Mangalsingh (who happened to be the nephew of the complainant), at village Mangrol. Subsequently, he learnt that the said Mangalsingh was murdered in his studio run by him in the name of Senal Studio at Mangrol. The complainant, therefore, along with Mafaji Joraji Vaghela and Dilipsingh Bhavsingh Vaghela hired a Jeep Car and went to the Senal Studio of Mangalsingh at Mangrol at about 11.00 a.m. and saw that many persons had gathered there, and there were footprints in the blood found on the floor and that his nephew-Mangalsingh Jetji Vaghela was lying on the floor in injured condition and was profusely bleeding. Therefore, an FIR being CR No. I-132 of 2011 was registered against an unknown person for the offence under sections 302, 392 and 201 of IPC and under section 135 of Gujarat Police Act. 3. Therefore, an FIR being CR No. I-132 of 2011 was registered against an unknown person for the offence under sections 302, 392 and 201 of IPC and under section 135 of Gujarat Police Act. 3. During the course of the investigation, the name of the accused Manoj @ Vasrambhai Koli - appellant herein was disclosed and therefore, the investigating officer arrested the accused on 4/7/2011. After carrying out necessary investigation and collecting sufficient evidence against the accused, the Investigating Officer laid Chargesheet in the court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Tharad, where it was registered as Criminal Case No. 694 of 2011. The offence being triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Sessions Court under section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where it was registered as Sessions Case No. 120 of 2011. 4. The Sessions Court, framed the Charge against the accused at Ex. 8 for the offence under sections 302, 392 and 201 of IPC and section 135 of G.P. Act, and recorded plea of the accused at Ex. 9. The accused denied the charges levelled against him and claimed to be tried. The prosecution examined nine witnesses and produced various documentary evidence to prove the Charge against the accused. The Sessions Court, after appreciating the evidence on record, convicted and sentenced the accused - appellant herein, as stated hereinabove. 5. Out of the witnesses examined by the prosecution, PW No. 1 - Dr. Mahadevbhai Khemrajbhai Fok, was examined at Ex. 11. The said witness had carried out the postmortem of the deceased Mangalsingh on 30/6/2011 when he was CHO at Tharad Hospital. He had reiterated the internal and external injuries found on the dead-body of the deceased, as recorded in the Postmortem Report at Ex. 14. He had stated that the cause of death was hemorrhage and shock due to rupture of vital organs (heart and lungs). He had also stated that the said injuries found on the dead-body of the deceased were sufficient to cause the death of the deceased in the ordinary course of nature and that such injuries were possible if the knife blows were given to the person. The Doctor was cross-examined with only one question and he had admitted that the seven injuries mentioned in Ex. 17 were possible by a sharp edged weapon. The Doctor was cross-examined with only one question and he had admitted that the seven injuries mentioned in Ex. 17 were possible by a sharp edged weapon. In this regard, it may be noted that though it was stated that seven injuries were mentioned in Ex. 17, it has to be Ex. 14, which is Postmortem Report, as Ex. 17 was the Inquest Panchnama in which such seven injuries have not been noted. Be that as it may, from the evidence of the said Doctor witness and the Postmortem Report, it was duly established by the prosecution that the death of the deceased Mangalsingh was a homicidal, and not a natural death. However, the court would have to see as to whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had caused the said injuries while committing robbery, and that the said deceased succumbed to the said injuries. 6. The prosecution to prove the involvement of the present appellant had examined the complainant - PW No. 2 - Uttamsinh Khikhaji Vaghela at Ex. 19. The said witness - complainant reiterated the contents of the complaint given by him, which was produced on record at Ex. 20. The said witness had further stated inter-alia that the deceased Mangalsingh happened to be his nephew i.e. son of his elder brother Jetji. The said Mangalsingh was running a studio in the name of Senal Studio at Mangrol and was staying with his family at village Kumbhariya. The accused Manojbhai alias Vasrambhai Ranabhai, the resident of village Forna, was working in his studio. On the date of incident, on receiving the phone call from Manvarsingh Bhikhaji that somebody had murdered Mangalsingh in his studio, he along with others had gone to the studio of Mangalsingh, where they had found that Mangalsingh was murdered. He, therefore, had given the complaint to the police. He had stated that they had seen many injuries on the body of the said Mangalsingh. In the cross-examination, he had pleaded ignorance as to whether the deceased had any illicit relations with one Mayaben belonging to Rabari community and that his nephew was assaulted by some Rabaries. 7. The PW No. 3 - Ganpatsinh Radmalji Chauhan was examined at Ex. 21. He was the panch witness in whose presence the mobile of the accused was seized in the Police Station at Tharad, as per the Panchnama Ex. 22. 7. The PW No. 3 - Ganpatsinh Radmalji Chauhan was examined at Ex. 21. He was the panch witness in whose presence the mobile of the accused was seized in the Police Station at Tharad, as per the Panchnama Ex. 22. PW No. 5-Kesarbhai Dhanabhai Rajput was examined at Ex. 26. He was the other Panch witness in whose presence the mobile of the accused was seized as per Panchnama Ex. 22. Nothing material turns out from the said two panch witnesses except that mobile of the accused was seized in their presence. 8. The prosecution had examined PW No. 4 - Dr. Panchvani Ajitkumar at Ex. 25. He had stated before the Sessions Court that he was running a clinic at Mangrol. On the date of incident, the wife of one Virabhai Bhikhabhai had come to his clinic for some medicine and at that time, she had seen the accused Manoj Thakor going on a red motorcycle. According to the said witness, he also saw the accused Manoj going on a red motorcycle, wearing a cream coloured shirt. In the cross-examination, he admitted that he had seen accused Manoj going on the motorcycle from his backside. He also admitted that he could know that the person going on the motorcycle was Manoj, only as the wife of Virabhai Bhikhabhai told him that he was Manoj. 9. In light of the evidence of aforesaid PW No. 4 - Dr. Panchvani Ajitkumar - Ex. 25, it would be relevant to refer to the evidence of the PW No. 7 - Agariben Sedhabhai Vadi, who was examined at Ex. 36. She happened to be the wife of Virabhai. She had stated inter-alia that on the date of incident, she had gone to the clinic of Dr.Ajitbhai and when she along with her son were coming out of the clinic, Dr.Ajitbhai also came out, and they saw the servant of Mangalbhai going on the red motorcycle. He had worn cream coloured shirt and sleeve of his shirt was seen torn. She, therefore, asked Dr.Ajitbhai as to who that person was, and Dr.Ajitbhai told her that he was Manoj Thakor. In the cross-examination, she had denied that she had not gone to the clinic of Dr.Ajitbhai and she had not seen any person going on the motorcycle. 10. Thus, having regard to the evidence of these two witnesses namely PW No. 4 - Dr. In the cross-examination, she had denied that she had not gone to the clinic of Dr.Ajitbhai and she had not seen any person going on the motorcycle. 10. Thus, having regard to the evidence of these two witnesses namely PW No. 4 - Dr. Panchvani Ajitkumar Ex. 25 and PW No. 7 - Agariben Sedhabhai Vadi Ex. 36, it appears that material contradictions in their respective evidence have surfaced, inasmuch as the PW No. 4 - Dr. Ajitbhai had stated that he came to know that the person going on the Motorcycle was Manoj Kumar from the lady i.e. Agariben wife of Hirabhai - PW No. 7, whereas, the said witness Agariben had stated that she came to know from Dr. Ajitkumar that the person going on the red motorcycle was Monoj. It is significant to note that except the evidence of these two witnesses, the prosecution had not bothered to examine any other independent witness or any other relatives of the deceased Mangalsingh to connect the accused Manoj with the alleged crime. 11. The prosecution had placed heavy reliance on the evidence of panch witness Narpatsinh Lakhji Chauhan - PW No. 6, who was examined at Ex. 27. In his presence the discovery of muddamal articles, such as, motorcycle, knife, shirt, and ornaments, was made as per the Panchnama Ex. 35. It is true that the said panch witness had stated in his evidence that on 8/7/2011 when he was passing by the Tharad Police Station, he was called by the police and asked him to act as panch witness. At that time, one person was present in the Police Station, whose name was Manoj. He had further stated that the said Manoj had shown where the motorcycle and ornaments were lying in his house at village Forna. He had also shown the place where he had thrown his torn shirt with blood stains. According to this witness, the accused had also shown the place in the studio where he had kept the muddamal knife after the commission of the crime. Though the said panch witness was not very accurate in giving details of the discovery of the muddamal articles, by and large, he had supported the contents of the Panchnama Ex. 35. 12. According to this witness, the accused had also shown the place in the studio where he had kept the muddamal knife after the commission of the crime. Though the said panch witness was not very accurate in giving details of the discovery of the muddamal articles, by and large, he had supported the contents of the Panchnama Ex. 35. 12. In light of the above discussed evidence, the pivotal question that arises for consideration before this Court is, as to whether the conviction could be sustained merely on the basis of the discovery of the muddamal articles, allegedly made at the instance of the accused, in absence of any other independent and reliable evidence connecting the accused with the crime. It is needless to say that the case of prosecution was based on circumstantial evidence as there were no eye witness to the alleged incident. The law as regards the appreciation of evidence in the case based on circumstantial evidence, is no more res-integra and is well settled in catena of decisions right from the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 . The Supreme Court in the said case had laid down five golden principles for proving the guilt in the case based on circumstantial evidence, which read thus: "A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1). The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned "must or should" and not "may be" established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between "may be proved" and "must be proved or should be proved" as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade Vs. State of Maharashtra where the following observations were made: "Certainly, it is primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between "may be" and must be" is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2). State of Maharashtra where the following observations were made: "Certainly, it is primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between "may be" and must be" is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2). The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3). the circumstances should be of conclusive nature and tendency, (4). they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5). there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to levy any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must be shown that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence." 13. At this juncture, it would also be relevant to note that section 27 of the evidence Act is based on the doctrine of information of subsequent events. The said doctrine is founded on the principle that if any fact is discovered in a search made on the strength of any information obtained from the accused, such a discovery is a guarantee that the information supplied by the accused is true. It is also well settled that discovery of object as a result of such disclosure by the accused, is not discovery of a fact as envisaged in section 27 but the mere knowledge of the accused as to the said discovery of object would be relevant. However, simply on the discovery of the articles at the instance of the accused, no inference can be drawn that he was guilty of the offence. The culpability for the alleged offence would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and nature of evidence adduced. 14. The learned APP Ms. C.M. Shah has relied upon the decision in the case of Gulabchand v. Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1995 S.C. 1598 , in which it has been observed and held as under:- "4. The culpability for the alleged offence would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and nature of evidence adduced. 14. The learned APP Ms. C.M. Shah has relied upon the decision in the case of Gulabchand v. Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1995 S.C. 1598 , in which it has been observed and held as under:- "4. We have considered the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge and also by the High Court and we have been taken through the evidence adduced in this case. It has been established in the instant case that the appellant Gulab Chand was taken into custody on 27th April, 1979 by the police and when the police searched his house with the key supplied by the accused, a musical instrument called Banjo was found in his room and from inside the said instrument, the police seized golden Tabij (Article 10), two pairs of Jhumkas (Article 11), Shringaridan (Article 9), silver bangles (Art. 7), one brass bungari (Art 21) and currency notes worth Rs. 1200/-. It has also been established in this case that on the information given by the said accused, the police seized certain silver ornaments from P.W. 12. Balram from his shop at Jabalpur and it has been established that the accused sold the said ornaments to Balram and signed in the register maintained by Balram in proof of selling the said ornaments. It has also been established by cogent evidence that the said ornaments belonged to the deceased. It may be stated that on 29th May, 1979, a test identification parade was held in which the recovered ornaments were duly identified as belonging to the deceased by Durgaprasad and other witnesses. It is true that simply on the recovery of stolen articles; no inference can be drawn that a person in possession of the stolen articles is guilty of the offence of murder and robbery. But culpability for the aforesaid offences will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of evidence adduced. It has been indicated by this Court in Sanwat Khan v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1956 SC 54 ) that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what inference should be drawn from certain circumstances. It has been indicated by this Court in Sanwat Khan v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1956 SC 54 ) that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what inference should be drawn from certain circumstances. It has also been indicated that where only evidence against the accused is recovery of stolen properties, then although the circumstances may indicate that the theft and murder might have been committed at the same time, it is not safe to draw an inference that the person in possession of the stolen property had committed the murder. A note of caution has been given by this Court by indicating that suspicion should not take the place of proof. It appears that the High Court in passing the impugned judgment has taken note of the said decision of this Court. But as rightly indicated by the High Court the said decision is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The High Court has placed reliance on the other decision of this Court rendered in Tulsiram v. State ( AIR 1954 SC 1 ). In the said decision, this Court has indicated that the presumption permitted to be drawn under Section 114, illustration (a) of the Evidence Act has to be read along with the important time factor. If the ornaments in possession of the deceased are found in possession of a person soon after the murder, a presumption of guilt may be permitted. But if several months had expired in the interval, the presumption cannot be permitted to be drawn having regard to the circumstances of the case. In the instant case, it has been established that immediately on the next day of the murder, the accused Gulab Chand had sold some of the ornaments belonging to the deceased and within 3-4 days, the recovery of the said stolen articles was made from his house, at the instance of the accused. Such close proximity of the recovery, which has been indicated by this Court as an "important time factor," should not be lost sight of in deciding the present case. Such close proximity of the recovery, which has been indicated by this Court as an "important time factor," should not be lost sight of in deciding the present case. It may be indicated here that in a later decision of this Court in Earabharappa v. State of Karnataka (1983) 2 SCC 330 : ( AIR 1983 SC 446 ), this Court has held that the nature of the presumption and illustration (a) under Section 114, of the Evidence Act must depend upon the nature of evidence adduced. No fixed time limit can be laid down to determine whether possession is recent or otherwise and each case must be judged on its own facts. The question as to what amounts to recent possession sufficient to justify the presumption of guilt varies according as the stolen article is or is not calculated to pass readily from hand to hand. If the stolen articles were such as were not likely to pass readily from hand to hand, the period of one year that elapsed cannot be said to be too long particularly when the appellant had been absconding during that period. In our view, it has been rightly held by the High Court that the accused was not affluent enough to possess the said ornaments and from the nature of the evidence adduced in this case and from the recovery of the said articles from his possession and his dealing with the ornaments of the deceased immediately after the murder and robbery a reasonable inference of the commission of the said offence can be drawn against the appellant. Excepting an assertion that the ornaments belonged to the family of the accused which claim has been rightly discarded, no plausible explanation for lawful possession of the said ornaments immediately after the murder has been given by the accused. In the facts, of this case, it appears to us that murder and robbery have been proved to have been integral parts of the same transaction and therefore the presumption arising under illustration (a) of Section 114, Evidence Act is that not only the appellant committed the murder of the deceased but also committed robbery of her ornaments. We therefore do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned decision of the High Court and accordingly this appeal fails and is dismissed." 15. We therefore do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned decision of the High Court and accordingly this appeal fails and is dismissed." 15. Now, in the light of aforestated observations made by the Supreme Court, if the evidence in the instant case is appreciated, it appears that the alleged incident had taken place on 30/6/2011, the appellant - accused was arrested on 4/7/2011 and the alleged discovery of the muddamal articles was made at the instance of the accused on 8/7/2011. There was nothing on record to suggest that the ornaments allegedly discovered belonged to the deceased. Though, the close relations including the brother as Arvindbhai had allegedly identified the ornaments as per the Panchnama Ex. 35, the prosecution had not bothered to examine him or other relatives to prove the allegations made against the accused. The prosecution, except examining PW No. 4 - Dr. Panchvani Ajitkumar Ex. 25 and PW No. 7 - Agariben Sedhabhai Vadi Ex. 36, had also not examined any other persons, who had gathered at the scene of offence to substantiate the charges leveled against the accused. Hence, even if the evidence of PW No. 6 - Narpatsinh Lakhji Chauhan - Ex. 27 is accepted in the light of the Panchnama of discovery made at the instance of the accused, it would be very risky to hold the accused guilty of the alleged offences. Even in the evidence of the said two witnesses - PW Nos. 4 and 7, material and major contradictions have surfaced so far as identification of the accused was concerned. Such contradictions assume significance in absence of the evidence of any other witnesses examined by the prosecution. 16. Ms. C.M. Shah, learned APP appearing for the State is also not in a position to point out any cogent or reliable evidence to complete the chain of circumstances which would unerringly lead to the guilt of the appellant accused. It is pertinent to note that though the prosecution had also examined the investigating officers i.e. PW No. 8 - Visnukumar Ramjibhai Chaudhari Ex. 42 and PW No. 7 - Agariben Sedhabhai Vadi Ex. 36, nothing material turns out from their evidence. The complaint was also registered against an unknown person. 17. It is pertinent to note that though the prosecution had also examined the investigating officers i.e. PW No. 8 - Visnukumar Ramjibhai Chaudhari Ex. 42 and PW No. 7 - Agariben Sedhabhai Vadi Ex. 36, nothing material turns out from their evidence. The complaint was also registered against an unknown person. 17. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record, we are of the opinion that there was a very scant evidence adduced by the prosecution against the appellant - accused and the Sessions Court has committed a grave error in convicting and sentencing the appellant - accused merely relying upon the Panchnama - Ex. 35, which was not corroborated by any independent evidence. 18. At this juncture a very relevant observations made by the Supreme Court in the latest case of Digamber Vaishnav and another v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in 2019 (4) SCC 522 are required to be referred to:- "14. One of the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence is undeniably that the burden of proof squarely rests on the prosecution and that the general burden never shifts. There can be no conviction on the basis of surmises and conjectures or suspicion howsoever grave it may be. Strong suspicion, strong coincidences and grave doubt cannot take the place of legal proof. The onus of the prosecution cannot be discharged by referring to very strong suspicion and existence of highly suspicious factors to inculpate the accused nor falsity of defence could take the place of proof which the prosecution has to establish in order to succeed, though a false plea by the defence at best, be considered as an additional circumstance, if other circumstances unfailingly point to the guilt. 15. This Court in Jaharlal Das v. State of Orissa, (1991) 3 SCC 27 , has held that even if the offence is a shocking one, the gravity of offence cannot by itself overweigh as far as legal proof is concerned. In cases depending highly upon the circumstantial evidence, there is always a danger that the conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof. The court has to be watchful and ensure that the conjecture and suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. In cases depending highly upon the circumstantial evidence, there is always a danger that the conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof. The court has to be watchful and ensure that the conjecture and suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of evidence should be established clearly and that the completed chain must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. In order to sustain the conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the following three conditions must be satisfied: (i). the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (ii). those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused; and (iii). the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else, and it should also be incapable of explanation on any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. 16. In Varkey Joseph v. State of Kerala, 1993 Suppl (3) SCC 745, this Court has held that suspicion is not the substitute for proof. There is a long distance between 'may be true' and 'must be true' and the prosecution has to travel all the way to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 17. In Sujit Biswas v. State of Assam, (2013) 12 SCC 406 , this Court, while examining the distinction between 'proof beyond reasonable doubt' and 'suspicion' has held as under: "13. Suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof, and there is a large difference between something that "may be" proved, and something that "will be proved". In a criminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannot and must not be permitted to take place of proof. This is for the reason that the mental distance between "may be" and "must be" is quite large, and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. This is for the reason that the mental distance between "may be" and "must be" is quite large, and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The large distance between "may be" true and "must be" true, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution, before an accused is condemned as a convict, and the basic and golden rule must be applied. In such cases, while keeping in mind the distance between "may be" true and "must be" true, the court must maintain the vital distance between mere conjectures and sure conclusions to be arrived at, on the touchstone of dis-passionate judicial scrutiny, based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case, as well as the quality and credibility of the evidence brought on record. The court must ensure, that miscarriage of justice is avoided, and if the facts and circumstances of a case so demand, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused, keeping in mind that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely probable doubt, but a fair doubt that is based upon reason and common sense". 18. It is also well-settled principle that in criminal cases, if two views are possible on evidence adduced in the case, one binding to the guilt of the accused and the other is to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused, should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence [See Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808 ]" 19. Considering the entire evidence on record and applying the ratio of the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the opinion that the entire chain of circumstances was not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Under the circumstances, the conviction and sentence cannot sustain and the appellant accused is required to be given benefit of doubt. 20. For the reasons stated above, this Criminal Appeal is allowed. Under the circumstances, the conviction and sentence cannot sustain and the appellant accused is required to be given benefit of doubt. 20. For the reasons stated above, this Criminal Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Deesa Camp at Deodar in Sessions Case No. 120 of 2011 dated 25th March, 2015 is hereby quashed and set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the offences punishable under sections 302, 392 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, by giving benefit of doubt. The appellant - original accused-Manojbhai alias Vasrambhai Ranabhai Koli Thakor is ordered to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. The appellant to furnish Bail Bond of Rs. 25,000/- afresh with one surety of the like amount, before the trial court, as prescribed under section 437(A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.