Sreekanth Nayaka S/o T. Ratnakara v. Deputy Commissioner Ballari Food, Civil Supplies And Consumer Affairs Department, Ballari, Dist: Ballari
2019-04-26
KRISHNA S.DIXIT
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : The petitioners who have been running Fair Price Shop with the authorization and licence granted under the Karnataka Essential Commodities Public Distribution System (Control) Order 2016, are calling in question the order dated 26.12.2018 made by the respondent-Deputy Commissioner, a copy whereof is at Annexure-A suspending the operation of licence and authorization on the complaints made in that regard. 2. Learned AGA, Smt. Veena Hegde on request having accepted notice submits that, the impugned order is made keeping in view the best interest of the consumers of Public Distribution System and regardless of lacuna therein, if any, the Court should not interfere in such matters. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the respondent. I have perused the petition papers and the decision cited at the Bar. 4. Under the Karnataka Essential Commodities Public Distribution System (Control) Order 2016 as amended by the Notification dated 05.06.2017 at Annexure-H, the “Authorized Authority” for making the kind of impugned order is the Deputy Director of Food & Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs Department of the Revenue District concerned, and not the Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue District. The separate Notification again dated 05.06.2017 has appointed the Deputy Commissioner as the Appellate Authority. Thus, obviously “the Authorized Authority” and “the Appellate Authority” are different from each other. 5. Where the power is vested in a particular Authority, only such an Authority should exercise the said power. The original power being exercised by the Appellate Authority straightaway, is unsustainable. This view is supported by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of the State of Punjab and another v. Hari Kishan Sharma reported in AIR 1966 SC 1081 . Learned authors, M P Jain & S N Jain in their “Principles of Administrative Law”, 6th Edition at page 699 discuss the said decision as under: “In Punjab, the Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1952 prohibits exhibition of cinema in any place other than the one licensed under the Act. Subject to the control of the state Government, the licensing authority can grant licenses to such persons as it thinks fit if rules made by the Government under the Act have been complied with and adequate safety-measures have been taken. A person aggrieved by the decision of the licensing authority can appeal to the government.
Subject to the control of the state Government, the licensing authority can grant licenses to such persons as it thinks fit if rules made by the Government under the Act have been complied with and adequate safety-measures have been taken. A person aggrieved by the decision of the licensing authority can appeal to the government. In State of Punjab v. Hari Kishan, an application for the grant of a cinema licence made to the licensing authority, instead of being dealt with by it, was forwarded to the State Government which rejected the same. Such a procedure was adopted under instructions issued by the Government to the licensing authorities. The Supreme Court held that the Act conferred the jurisdiction to deal with applications for licences on the licensing authority which could grant or reject the same. The State Government only came into the picture as an appellate authority when the licensing authority refused to grant a licence. It was, therefore, not proper for the State Government to assume to itself the power and authority to deal with the applications on merits in the first instance. Explaining the ambit of the “control” of the Government on the licensing authority, the court held that howsoever wide its ambit might be, it could not justify the Government to completely oust the licensing authority and itself usurp its functions. Under its “control” function, the Government may justifiably issue general instructions to the licensing authorities as to how to deal with applications for licences; the Government may also exercise revisional power over the orders passed by licensing authorities. But it did not justify the Government to assume the powers of licensing authorities. The legislature had contemplated a licensing authority as distinct from the government. The result of the instructions issued by the Government “is to change the statutory provision” and “to obliterate the licensing authority from the statute-book altogether”.” 6. In the above circumstances, these writ petitions succeed; a Writ of Certiorari issues quashing the impugned order dated 26.12.2018 at Annexure-A reserving liberty to the Authorized Authority to take appropriate action in accordance with law. 7. The observations herein above being confined to the disposal of these writ petitions shall not influence any order being made by the Competent Authority, in the fact situation.