ORDER : 1. Heard Sri. Sachin Upadhyay and Sri. Samanvay Dhar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. U.N. Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent-High Court. 2. By means of the present writ petition, a challenge has been made to the order dated 29.01.2016 whereby the petitioner was punished with the punishment of dismissal from service. Prior to the order of punishment dated 29.01.2016, a resolution was passed by the Full Court on 01.12.2015. The said resolution has also been questioned by the petitioner by way of this writ petition. It is with the prayer to set aside the order of punishment with a direction to reinstate the petitioner. 3. The learned Counsel submits that petitioner was appointed as Munsif/Additional Civil Judge, Junior Division, after he remained successful in the competitive examination. He was given appointment/posting by the order dated 16.06.2006 in pursuant to it. The petitioner was a hard working judicial officer and thereby his service record remained unblemished throughout. Since the petitioner was a strict judicial officer, the advocates used to have grievances and as an outcome of it, petitioner was served with the charge-sheet, dated 06.11.2014 making serious allegations, but having no truth in it. The charge-sheet was nothing but an out come of the conspiracy of the Advocates. The charges were duly replied by the petitioner. The petitioner demanded certain documents at that stage. It was copy of the preliminary enquiry report so as the call details to prove conspiracy of the Advocates. The documents were not supplied to the petitioner. He filed the reply to the charge-sheet without a copy of the call details and preliminary enquiry report though subsequently, the copy of the preliminary enquiry report was furnished to the petitioner during the course of enquiry. The petitioner participated in the enquiry, however he was not given fair opportunity to defend himself. He was denied an opportunity to cross examination the then District Judge, under whom the petitioner had worked. The then District Judge was one of the listed witness of the administration but was not produced and thereby the petitioner was deprived to cross examination him to take out the truth. The said witness was crucial for the reason that whatever allegations were made by the lady victim could have been proved to be false as petitioner was called by the then District Judge in his chamber at the relevant time. The said witness was crucial for the reason that whatever allegations were made by the lady victim could have been proved to be false as petitioner was called by the then District Judge in his chamber at the relevant time. He rushed to attend the office of then District Judge and thereby whatever incident has been reported by the lady victim, should not have been accepted. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further submits that the entire enquiry was conducted in haste. The petitioner was not given a proper opportunity of hearing in as much as the enquiry was concluded within a period of four days. Looking to the period in which the enquiry was conducted itself shows that proper opportunity of hearing was not provided to the petitioner to defend his case. 5. In view of the above, the inquiry conducted by the respondents should vitiate. The reply/objections submitted after submission of the enquiry report should have been accepted by the administration on that count so as to hold enquiry afresh. 6. The prayer is to accept the first ground for the challenge to the action of respondents and accordingly set aside the order of punishment. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further submits that there exits perversity in the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The statement of lady recorded as PW-1 was not corroborated by other witnesses produced by the administration. The statements of other witnesses are quite different than what has been stated by PW-1 making serious allegation against the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer ignored the contradiction in the statement of the witnesses while recording findings against the petitioner. The reference of the statement of PW-1 and other witnesses has been given to strengthen the arguments of perversity in the findings of Enquiry Officer. 8. It is also submitted that on the day of alleged incidence, the petitioner was shouldering the responsibility of two courts. The case in which the lady came to record her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was not a case of petitioner's court. Since the court was full of litigants and advocates, the petitioner decided to record the statement of lady in the chamber and accordingly she was called there. Before the statement could have been recorded, the petitioner was called by the District Judge in his chamber and accordingly he had to left the chamber. Since the court was full of litigants and advocates, the petitioner decided to record the statement of lady in the chamber and accordingly she was called there. Before the statement could have been recorded, the petitioner was called by the District Judge in his chamber and accordingly he had to left the chamber. The lady made allegations of sexual harassment in the chamber when petitioner left it to see the then District Judge. The aforesaid has also been ignored by the Enquiry Officer and otherwise as per the statement of PW-1/complainant, she came out from the chamber running whereas no one has corroborated that part of statement yet ignored by the Enquiry Officer while recording his findings against the petitioner. 9. In view of the aforesaid also the impugned order deserves to be set aside. 10. The other argument is in reference to the conspiracy of the Advocates to get involved the petitioner through a lady. The petitioner was denied an opportunity to prove conspiracy of the Advocates. The conspiracy of the Advocates was on account of strict management of the petitioner. He was maintaining discipline in the Court and was strict in delivery of judgment. It was not accepted by the Bar Members and thereby conspired to get the petitioner involved in the case of sexual harassment. The allegation of conspiracy has also been ignored by the respondents. 11. The other argument is about non speaking order by the disciplinary authority. It is at the stage when petitioner submitted reply/explanation after a copy of the enquiry report. He raised many objections against the findings recorded by the enquiry officer but has not been considered by the Administrative Committee of High Court or the Full Court and lastly the disciplinary authority i.e. by the Governor of State of U.P. The impugned order is non speaking and therefore, the prayer is to set aside the impugned order of punishment, and also the resolution passed by the Administrative Committee/Full Court. 12. On the aforesaid grounds a prayer is to allow the writ petition. No other argument has been raised though pleaded in the writ petition. It includes even the competence of the High Court to take disciplinary action against the subordinate judicial officer. We are dealing with only those arguments, which have been raised before us leaving others. 13. 12. On the aforesaid grounds a prayer is to allow the writ petition. No other argument has been raised though pleaded in the writ petition. It includes even the competence of the High Court to take disciplinary action against the subordinate judicial officer. We are dealing with only those arguments, which have been raised before us leaving others. 13. The arguments have been contested by the learned Counsel appearing for the opposite parties. It is submitted that a charge-sheet was served on the petitioner containing serious allegations. It is a case where a complaint was made by PW-1 about the incidence took place in the chamber of the judicial officer. The delinquent called the lady victim in his chamber when she appeared in the Court to depose her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Instead of recording her statement in the Court, she was called in the chamber alongwith the lady constable and other police personnel. 14. The victim appeared in the chamber of the Judicial Officer alongwith the Investigation Officer and Police Constable. The Police officials were directed to go out of the chamber after putting curtain rather instructed to close the door. The Reader of the Court was then called to close the door properly. The door was properly closed by him. After closing the door, the petitioner sexually harassed the lady in the manner alleged in the charge-sheet. The lady victim came out after opening of the door with the efforts. She immediately rushed to the Court. She was crying and reported the incidence took place in the chamber. 15. The charge sheet was containing serious allegations, as reported by the complainant. She alongwith all the relevant witnesses were called by the Administration to prove the charges. The statements of all the witnesses other than one i.e. the then District Judge were recorded by the Enquiry Officer in the presence of the petitioner. He was provided opportunity to cross examine the witnesses and was availed by him. The then District Judge did not appear to depose his statement. Thus, the said witness was dropped. In view of the aforesaid, the allegation of denial of an opportunity of cross examination of the then District Judge is not made out. An opportunity of cross examination is given when the statement of witness is recorded and not otherwise. The then District Judge did not appear to depose his statement. Thus, the said witness was dropped. In view of the aforesaid, the allegation of denial of an opportunity of cross examination of the then District Judge is not made out. An opportunity of cross examination is given when the statement of witness is recorded and not otherwise. When the then District Judge did not appear in the witness box, question of his cross examination does not arise. It is stated that twelve witnesses appeared in the witness box and depose statements against the petitioner. Their testimony has not been questioned. The petitioner has questioned only non production of the then District Judge in evidence. 16. In view of the aforesaid, there was no denial of opportunity of hearing to the petitioner in the enquiry. He had cross examined all the witnesses produced by the administration, thus the first ground of challenge to the order of punishment is not made out. 17. The learned Counsel for the respondents further submitted that there is no perversity in the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The statement of complainant/PW-1 has been corroborated by the other witnesses. The statements of PW-2, PW-5 and other witnesses were referred to show that all of them have stated about the incident by giving one and same version. All the witnesses have stated that the lady was called by the delinquent officer in his chamber. She was brought by one lady constable and Sub Inspector, who were asked to go out of the chamber, after putting curtain on the door, rather to close the door. The Reader was called and directed to close the door properly. The Police Officials were asked to wait outside the chamber. After sometime, the door was opened and for that efforts had to be made. The complainant came out from the chamber with different mood then she was having, while entering. She went in the Court room and reported the incident of sexual harassment to everyone, which includes the Advocates/Lawyers. She repeated the allegations, as contained in the charge-sheet. 18. In view of the above, there is no perversity in the findings of the Enquiry Officer and otherwise the statement of complainant/PW-1 has been corroborated by other witnesses. 19. She went in the Court room and reported the incident of sexual harassment to everyone, which includes the Advocates/Lawyers. She repeated the allegations, as contained in the charge-sheet. 18. In view of the above, there is no perversity in the findings of the Enquiry Officer and otherwise the statement of complainant/PW-1 has been corroborated by other witnesses. 19. The learned Counsel for the respondents has further submitted that standard of proof in the departmental enquiry is not similar to that in the criminal cases. In the criminal cases, the charge has to be proved beyond doubt whereas in the departmental enquiries, it can be on preponderance of probability. To support the arguments, a reference of judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay vs. Udai Singh, 1997 (5) SCC 129 , has been given. 20. Para 10 and 11 deals with the issue of standard of proof in the disciplinary enquiry viz-a-viz in the criminal case. 21. In the instant case the respondents, had led the evidence to prove the charges against the petitioner. 22. The judgment in the case Supra was followed by the Apex Court throughout and the latest judgment on it is in the case of Mihir Kumar Hajara Chaudhary vs. Life Insurance Corporation, 2017 (9) SCC 404 . A reference of paragraph no. 30 of the said judgment has been given, which is reproduced as under:- “30. As held supra, the departmental proceedings were conducted strictly in accordance with law by following the principle of natural justice in which the appellant duly participated. The appellant neither set up any defence nor denied the factum of charges, yet the respondent proved the charges with the aid of relevant evidence, which found acceptance with the Division Bench and this Court too. As an appellate court, neither we can sit over the findings of the enquiry officer and find fault in it nor can we re-appreciate the evidence of witnesses examined in departmental enquiry.” 23. The prayer of learned Counsel for the respondents is thus, not to cause interfere in the order of punishment. The enquiry report does not contain any illegality or perversity. 24. The third ground to question the order of punishment is in reference to the conspiracy of the Advocates. Learned Counsel for the respondents submits that there is no material on record to prove the allegations aforesaid. The enquiry report does not contain any illegality or perversity. 24. The third ground to question the order of punishment is in reference to the conspiracy of the Advocates. Learned Counsel for the respondents submits that there is no material on record to prove the allegations aforesaid. The petitioner has not named any Advocate with reasons to cause conspiracy and therefore only they have not been impleaded as a party-respondents. Whenever allegation of conspiracy or mala-fide are levelled, the party need to be impleaded as respondents so as to defend the allegations. Since none of the Advocates have been impleaded as respondents, the allegation of conspiracy against them may not be accepted. It is further submitted that there is no conspiracy of the Advocates because complaint was made by the lady victim and not by the Advocates though they may be instrument in pursuing the cause of the lady suffered sexual harassment in the hands of the petitioner. 25. The last argument is in reference to the impugned order of punishment. It is submitted that when a detailed enquiry report dealing with the facts of the case was furnished alongwith the decision of Administrative Committee of the High Court, the impugned order was passed. It was not necessary for the disciplinary authority to pass a detailed order on a collective decision of the Administration Committee and the Full Court. The impugned order of punishment otherwise indicates the conduct of the petitioner and decision of Administrative Committee/Full Court to justify the order of punishment. 26. The reply/explanation to the enquiry report was otherwise dealt with by the Administrative Committee of the High Court so as the Full Court. After considering all issues, they had disagreed on the grounds raised by the petitioner and accordingly proposed the punishment of dismissal. The order was then passed by the disciplinary authority i.e. the Governor of State of U.P. 27. It is stated that some irregularities in procedure does not vitiate disciplinary action automatically and that too when the allegations are of grave nature. The learned Counsel for the respondents has given reference of the judgment of the Apex Court to support his arguments. 28. It is submitted that petitioner has failed to show any prejudice on alleged procedural lapse in conducting the enquiry, which include the allegation of non consideration of the reply/explanation to the enquiry report. The learned Counsel for the respondents has given reference of the judgment of the Apex Court to support his arguments. 28. It is submitted that petitioner has failed to show any prejudice on alleged procedural lapse in conducting the enquiry, which include the allegation of non consideration of the reply/explanation to the enquiry report. A reference of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of ECIL vs. Karunakaran, (1993) 4 SCC 727 has been given. A further reference of the judgment in the case of State Bank of Patiala vs. S.K. Varma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 has been given apart from the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Haryana Financial Corporation vs. Kailash Chandra Ahuja, (2008) 9 SCC 31 . Therein it has been held that any procedural irregularities would not vitiate the enquiry or the disciplinary action unless prejudice out of it is established. 29. The petitioner has failed to show any prejudice on any of the ground raised by him to challenge to the order of punishment. 30. The prayer is accordingly to dismiss the writ petition. 31. We have considered the rival submissions of the parties and scanned the matter carefully. 32. The facts relevant to the present matter is that after the appointment of the petitioner as a Judicial Officer, he remained posted at different places. A complaint against the petitioner came and after a preliminary enquiry report, charge-sheet was served on him containing serious allegations and for ready reference, the allegations contained in the charge-sheet are reproduced hereunder:- “1. That on 03.09.2014 you were posted as Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Azamgarh. On the said date, one Ruchi Gupta D/o Shyam Narain, the Complainant in Case Crime No. 246 of 2014 was produced in your Court for recording of her statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. At about 3:30 P.M. the complainant was required to come yours' Chamber and thereafter you instructed the Inspector and Constables, who had brought the complainant, to go out of your Chamber and to wait outside. You further instructed the Constable namely, Smt. Mithlesh Rai, to close the door while leaving the Chamber. Thereafter your required your peon to ensure that the door of the Chamber is closed completely and nobody enters in the Chamber. You further instructed the Constable namely, Smt. Mithlesh Rai, to close the door while leaving the Chamber. Thereafter your required your peon to ensure that the door of the Chamber is closed completely and nobody enters in the Chamber. After making certain queries from the complainant, you enquired as to whether she has been medically examined or not. Thereafter, you insisted upon her to take off her lower garments (Salvar) and not to be afraid of you to treat you as friend. You inserted your two fingers in her vagina. Thus, you have outraged her modesty. 2. After such behaviour you threatened the lady to not to disclose the incident to any one, otherwise you will sent her to jail. Thus, you have behaved in a manner unbecoming of a judicial officers and your aforesaid misconduct involves moral turpitude. You have failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and have misused your official position. Your conduct was not in accordance with the orders of Government regulating behaviour and conduct thus you have committed a misconduct within the meaning of Rule 3 of Government Servant Conduct Rules, 1956.” 33. After service of charge-sheet, the petitioner was given a chance to submit the reply/explanation. It was submitted by him, though allegations have been made that proper opportunity for it was not given. The petitioner demanded copy of the preliminary enquiry report so as the call details of the cell phone to prove the allegation of conspiracy of the Advocates. The documents alleged to have not supplied enabling the petitioner to submit his reply to the charge-sheet. 34. We find that along with the charge-sheet, reference of the document has been given. Neither the preliminary enquiry report nor the call details, as demanded by the petitioner, were one of the listed documents. Thus, it was not supplied along with the charge-sheet. It is also a fact that a preliminary enquiry report was not relied in the enquiry thus, even if the first argument regarding non-supply of the copy of the preliminary enquiry report is accepted, no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner on that account. It is even in reference to the call details having not relied by the Administration. The call details were not summoned by the petitioner during the enquiry despite an opportunity. The argument regarding non supply of documents is thus not made out. 35. It is even in reference to the call details having not relied by the Administration. The call details were not summoned by the petitioner during the enquiry despite an opportunity. The argument regarding non supply of documents is thus not made out. 35. After the reply/explanation to the charge-sheet by the petitioner, the enquiry was conducted. The administration produced all the witnesses other than the then District Judge who did not appear despite a direction. In absence of the statement of the District Judge, the question of his cross-examination does not arise. The cross-examination of the witness is possible if his statement-in-chief has been recorded. 36. The perusal of the letter given by the petitioner to the enquiry officer shows his prayer to allow cross-examination of the witness not produced by the administration. When statement-in-chief was not recorded, question of cross-examination does not arise and accordingly, no cognizance on the request of the petitioner could have been given to allow cross-examination of a witness not produced by the administration. The petitioner did not submit an application to summon the then District Judge. 37. All the witnesses produced by the administration made their statement in the presence of the delinquent. They were duly cross-examined by the petitioner. The enquiry officer has relied on the statements of those witnesses after considering the cross-examination. 38. In view of the above, we find no illegality in the action of the respondents in causing enquiry. It cannot vitiate only for the reason that one witness did not appear to depose his statement. We are also enable to accept the plea raised by the petitioner that no proper opportunity of hearing was given because enquiry was completed within a period of few days. 39. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to give reference of any provision which requires that enquiry cannot be completed in a period of few days or provides minimum period for completion of the enquiry. 40. In view of the above, merely for the reason that enquiry was completed within few days, a presumption cannot be drawn for denial of fair opportunity to the petitioner to defend his case. 41. It is more so when, all the witnesses produced by the administration were duly cross-examined by the delinquent and he was having an opportunity to lead evidence from his side. 42. Accordingly, we do not find any procedural irregularity in the enquiry. 41. It is more so when, all the witnesses produced by the administration were duly cross-examined by the delinquent and he was having an opportunity to lead evidence from his side. 42. Accordingly, we do not find any procedural irregularity in the enquiry. Accordingly, the first argument regarding denial of opportunity to cross-examination a witness not produced by the administration cannot be accepted so as to cause interference in the order of punishment. The argument regarding non supply of documents is also not accepted. The first argument is thus, rejected. 43. The second argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is about the perversity in the finding in the enquiry report. The reference of the statement of the witnesses has been given to show that the statement of the complainant has not been corroborated by the other witnesses. None of the witnesses have stated that when the chamber was opened, the complainant came running out of it whereas the complainant had stated so. 44. To appreciated the argument aforesaid, we have gone through the statement of each witness. The complaint has stated about the incidence. She has categorically stated that the delinquent called her in the chamber. She entered into the chamber along with the police constable and the Sub Inspector. The petitioner asked the police to go out of the chamber, after putting curtain on the door. They were even directed to close the door. The instruction was followed and accordingly, the door was also closed. They were asked to remain outside the chamber and in the meanwhile, the Reader was called to close the door properly. If the statement of all the witnesses are seen, it would prove the fact that the complainant was called in the chamber when she appeared in the Court to depose her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. The purpose to call the complainant in the chamber was to record her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. The statement was not recorded, as admitted by the delinquent himself in his statement. The delinquent in his statement has admitted that the complainant was called in the chamber and she remained there for five minutes. He has further admitted that her statement was not recorded during the intervening period. Thus, the fact of calling the complainant in the chamber get established even by the statement of the petitioner without any contradiction. The delinquent in his statement has admitted that the complainant was called in the chamber and she remained there for five minutes. He has further admitted that her statement was not recorded during the intervening period. Thus, the fact of calling the complainant in the chamber get established even by the statement of the petitioner without any contradiction. What happened in the chamber, could not have been witnessed by witnesses standing outside and accordingly, the statement of the complainant was accepted to be correct. 45. She has made serious allegation against the petitioner about his conduct as a Judicial Officer. The delinquent asked the complainant to open her clothes. He thereupon sexually harassed the victim. 46. We find no serious contradiction in the statement of any witnesses rather all the witnesses have stated one and same thing. Small variation in the story after opening of the door is not so material to discard the version of the complainant making serious allegation against the petitioner. 47. Accordingly, even after going through the statement of each witness, we find no perversity in the finding in the report. Accordingly, we are unable to accept even the second ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 48. The third ground to challenge the order of punishment is of conspiracy of the Advocates. We find allegation to be quite vague and therefore, non of the Advocate, as alleged to be involved in the conspiracy, has been impleaded in this petition to prove the allegation. We otherwise find no reason for the Advocates to get involved in the matter when the complaint was given by the lady/victim. It cannot be only for the reason, it was pursued through the Advocate. The allegation of conspiracy thus cannot be accepted. Accordingly, the third ground to challenge the order is summarily rejected. 49. The last ground raised by the counsel for the petitioner is about non speaking order. It has also been stated that the reply/explanation to the enquiry report was submitted but it has not considered either by the Administrative Committee or the Full Court of the High Court. We have gone through the record and find that the reply/explanation to the enquiry report was considered by the Administrative Committee so as the Full Court and finding no merit, the grounds raised by the petitioner was not accepted. We have gone through the record and find that the reply/explanation to the enquiry report was considered by the Administrative Committee so as the Full Court and finding no merit, the grounds raised by the petitioner was not accepted. The disciplinary authority then passed the order of punishment dated 29.01.2016. It of the dismissal from the service looking to conduct of the petitioner. The decision was taken by the High Court in exercise of Power under Article 235 of Constitution of India. 50. When a collective decision is taken by a body or committee, the speaking order need not be passed. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dr. Bishambhar Dayal Gupta vs. The Visitor/President of India, 2006 (1) AWC 608 decided the issue aforesaid. In para 11 of the judgment, question aforesaid was considered and relevant paras are reproduced as under: “(a) Whether the orders passed by the Executive Council and the Visitor are unsustainable in the eyes of law as they do not record separate reasons. (b) Whether it was necessary for the Executive Council to have recorded a finding of guilt in respect of the charges found proved by the Enquiry Officer in its resolution dated 16/17th May, 1989 by imposing punishment, even after the enquiry report was accepted earlier under the resolution of the Executive Council dated 28/29th March, 1989, where under the Executive Council had specifically held that the charges against the petitioner were proved and the enquiry report was accepted.” “(d) Whether in the facts of the present case, this Court would exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in favour of the petitioner.” 11. Referring to the provisions whereby decision was to be taken by Executive Council of the University, the Court in paras 23, 25 and 31 held as under: “23. From the provisions, which have been quoted herein above, it is apparently clear that the decision to dismiss a teacher of the University from service on the ground of misconduct, is to be taken after following the procedure prescribed under Clause (c) of the said statute by the Executive Council. The said Section does not require recording of reasons for such a decision. The said Section does not require recording of reasons for such a decision. Even otherwise, where a collective decision by a body of person is required to be taken (like in the facts of the present case), it is neither practically possible nor legally required that opinion of all the members participating in the deliberations must be recorded, inasmuch as the decision of such bodies are collective in nature, and only the decision as a whole, is required to be recorded in writing and not the deliberation which had to such a decision. The deliberations which took place in the meeting of the Executive Council, are, therefore, not necessarily to be recorded in its decision.” “25. In these circumstances, the first contention that the order of the Executive Council as well as of the Visitor, being not supported by reasons in writing is unsustainable in the eyes of law, and therefore, rejected.” “31. This Court has no hesitation to record that decision taken in the meeting of Executive Council cannot be faulted with and does not call for interference in the writ proceedings. Issue No. (b) is answered accordingly.” 51. In the present case also, counsel for the petitioner could not place before us any provision to show that the decision of Administration Committee or Full Court should be reasoned and to be communicated to the petitioner. In absence of any such provision, the collective decision taken by a body, can not to be assailed on the ground urged before us. 52. In our view, where a decision is to be taken collectively, whether at the initia stage or appellate stage, as the case may be, need not to be speaking. It is the common intention expressed by all the members constituting a body, which is reflected in the ultimate decision and need not to be speaking one. 53. The requirement of reasons by the individual is neither possible nor required unless it is specifically provided in the statute. 54. The perusal of the charges shows the seriousness therein and in view of the above and the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of C. Ravichandran Iyer vs. A.M. Bhattacharjee, (1995) 5 SCC 457 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 953 at page 473, the Court is under obligation of take a proper view in this matter. 54. The perusal of the charges shows the seriousness therein and in view of the above and the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of C. Ravichandran Iyer vs. A.M. Bhattacharjee, (1995) 5 SCC 457 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 953 at page 473, the Court is under obligation of take a proper view in this matter. For ready reference para 21, 22 and 23 of the said judgment are quoted hereunder:- “21. Judicial office is essentially a public trust. Society is, therefore, entitled to expect that a Judge must be a man of high integrity, honesty and required to have moral vigour, ethical firmness and impervious to corrupt or venial influences. He is required to keep most exacting standards of propriety in judicial conduct. Any conduct which tends to undermine public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the court would be deleterious to the efficacy of judicial process. Society, therefore, expects higher standards of conduct and rectitude from a Judge. Unwritten code of conduct is writ large for judicial officers to emulate and imbibe high moral or ethical standards expected of a higher judicial functionary, as wholesome standard of conduct which would generate public confidence, accord dignity to the judicial office and enhance public image, not only of the Judge but the court itself. It is, therefore, a basic requirement that a Judge's official and personal conduct be free from impropriety; the same must be in tune with the highest standard of propriety and probity. The standard of conduct is higher than that expected of a layman and also higher than that expected of an advocate. In fact, even his private life must adhere to high standards of probity and propriety, higher than those deemed acceptable for others. Therefore, the Judge can ill-afford to seek shelter from the fallen standard in the society. 22. In Krishna Swami vs. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 605 (SCC at pp. 650-651) one of us (K. Ramaswamy, J.) held that the holder of office of the Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court should, therefore, be above the conduct of ordinary mortals in the society. The standards of judicial behaviour, both on and off the Bench, are normally high. There cannot, however, be any fixed or set principles, but an unwritten code of conduct of well-established traditions is the guidelines for judicial conduct. The standards of judicial behaviour, both on and off the Bench, are normally high. There cannot, however, be any fixed or set principles, but an unwritten code of conduct of well-established traditions is the guidelines for judicial conduct. The conduct that tends to undermine the public confidence in the character, integrity or impartiality of the Judge must be eschewed. It is expected of him to voluntarily set forth wholesome standards of conduct reaffirming fitness to higher responsibilities. 23. To keep the stream of justice clean and pure, the Judge must be endowed with sterling character, impeccable integrity and upright behaviour. Erosion thereof would undermine the efficacy of the rule of law and the working of the Constitution itself. The Judges of higher echelons, therefore, should not be mere men of clay with all the frailties and foibles, human failings and weak character which may be found in those in other walks of life. They should be men of fighting faith with tough fibre not susceptible to any pressure, economic, political or of any sort. The actual as well as the apparent independence of judiciary would be transparent only when the officeholders endow those qualities which would operate as impregnable fortress against surreptitious attempts to undermine the independence of the judiciary. In short, the behaviour of the Judge is the bastion for the people to reap the fruits of the democracy, liberty and justice and the antithesis rocks the bottom of the rule of law. The finding of the Court in para quoted above applies to the facts of this case and keeping the aforesaid into mind, we are of the opinion that after consideration of the case extensively by the Administrative Committee and Full Court nothing remain. It is not necessary that while not accepting any of the plea, always a detailed order to be passed.” 55. For the reasons given in the judgment referred above, no ground is made out to cause interference in the order of punishment. 56. It is otherwise a fact that we have considered each and every aspect of the matter and passed a speaking order. It therefore, not required to remand the case to the respondents to pass a speaking order. We have recorded our finding on each and every issue and otherwise there was no requirement to pass a speaking order. 56. It is otherwise a fact that we have considered each and every aspect of the matter and passed a speaking order. It therefore, not required to remand the case to the respondents to pass a speaking order. We have recorded our finding on each and every issue and otherwise there was no requirement to pass a speaking order. Accordingly, we do not find any substance even in the last argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 57. It is otherwise a fact that a challenge to the disciplinary action can be accepted only when a prejudice is caused to the delinquent. What prejudice has been caused to the petitioner, has not been pointed out on the alleged irregularities in the enquiry, though we are of the view that the enquiry was conducted in fair and proper manner. In view of finding recorded by us as well as the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of B. Karunakaran (supra) so as the other judgment on the issue, we do not find any reason to cause interference in the order. 58. It is more so when, the standard of proof in the disciplinary enquiry is different than in the criminal case where charges has to be proved beyond doubt whereas those standards does not apply in the disciplinary enquiry. To support the findings para 10 and 11 of the judgment in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay vs. Udai Singh, (supra) are quoted hereunder:- “10. The Tribunal then embarked upon the reference and by award dated 15.6.1998 held that the departmental enquiry was defective and, therefore, bad in law. The Tribunal, therefore, granted an opportunity to the respondent employer to prove the charges levelled against the appellant on merits by adducing evidence. The respondent LIC, accordingly, adduced evidence before the Tribunal and proved the charges. The Tribunal, however, held that the evidence adduced by the respondent LIC was not credible and, therefore, charges were not proved against the appellant. 11. In other words, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the respondent LIC failed to prove the charges against the appellant for want of adequate evidence and, therefore, the dismissal order was liable to be set aside. 11. In other words, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the respondent LIC failed to prove the charges against the appellant for want of adequate evidence and, therefore, the dismissal order was liable to be set aside. It was, accordingly, set aside with a further direction to the respondent LIC to pay the entire retiral benefits to the appellant because, in the meantime, the appellant had attained the age of superannuation.” 59. The para quoted above refers about the standards of proof in the disciplinary enquiry. 60. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we are unable to accept any of the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. We find no merit in the writ petition. 61. The writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.