JUDGMENT : SURYA PRAKASH KESARWANI, J. 1. Heard Sri S. K. Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri I. S. Tomar, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. In this appeal both the learned counsels for the parties jointly state that in this appeal only a legal question is involved and therefore, this appeal may be heard finally without paper book. They jointly state that the legal question involved in this appeal is as under:- Question: "Whether an application by a Hindu for probate of will under the provisions of The Indian Succession Act, 1925 is maintainable before a Court of District Judge in the State of Uttar Pradesh?" Facts: 3. Briefly stated undisputed facts of the present case are that the plaintiff-respondents, namely, Bhagwati, Ramwati, Veerwati, Rani and Phoolwati applied for probate of will dated 23.04.1975 executed by their father Sri Ramdas, resident of Nalganj, Village Lahargird, District Jhansi, who died on 28.08.1984. The aforesaid case was registered as Misc. Probate Case No.14 of 2012 in the Court of District Judge, Jhansi. The plaintiffs are the daughters while the defendants-Mangal Singh, Shaitan Singh and Amar Singh are the sons of deceased Ramdas. An objection dated 26.11.2016 was filed by the defendants-Mangal Singh and others under Section 57 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') contending that in view of the Section 57, the provisions of the Act shall not apply to persons of Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh and Jain community and therefore, the application for probate being Misc. Probate Case No.14 of 2012 deserves to be dismissed. The aforesaid application of the defendants-Mangal Singh and others being paper No.112-A was rejected by the impugned order dated 19.01.2017 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-Ist, Jhansi observing that there is nothing in Section 57 of the Act which prohibits applicability of the Act to persons of Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh and Jain community. 4. The present appeal has been filed by Ramesh Chandra Gupta and Smt. Vimla Gupta contending that the appellants had purchased certain land from the defendants and therefore, they filed an application under Order I Rule 10 C.P.C. for being impleaded as defendants. In para 10 of the affidavit it has been stated that their application was allowed and the appellants were impleaded as defendants. Submissions: 5. In para 10 of the affidavit it has been stated that their application was allowed and the appellants were impleaded as defendants. Submissions: 5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that Section 57 read with Section 213 of the Act completely bars grant of probate to a person to whom Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 57 are not applicable. Therefore, the court below has committed a manifest error to reject the objection of the defendants. In support of his submission he relied upon judgments of this Court in Dr. Sunil Kr. Vs. Chaitanya Prasad, (2014) 10 ADJ 642 , Smt. Usha Devi Vs. Smt. Anita Devi, (2017) 11 ADJ 628 , Smt. Vimla Gainder Vs. Smt. Usha Gainder, (2004) 2 AWC 1855 , Administrative General, U.P. Vs. Shyam, (1997) AIR Allahabad 158, Pinto Vs. Shyam, 1978 Alld. 301, Bhaiya Ji Vs. Jageshwar, (1978) AIR Allahabad 268 and a judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Clarance Pias Vs. Union of India, 2001 AllCJ 1137 . 6. He submits that the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Satnam Kaur Vs. Satyendra Pal, (2015) 127 RevDec 498 is per incuriam as it neither considered the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Clarance Pias (supra) nor Section 57 and other relevant provisions of the Act. He further submits that Section 213(2) of the Act imposes restriction on entertaining any application for probate by a Court out side the areas specified in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 57 of the Act. 7. No other point has been argued by learned counsel for the appellants before me except those noted above. 8. Sri I. S. Tomar, learned counsel for plaintiff-respondents submits that there is no bar under Section 57 or Section 213 of the Act against filing of an application for probate of a will. He refers to the provisions of Sections 57, 213 and 387 of the Act. He relied upon a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Satnam Kaur (supra). Discussion and Findings: 9. I have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsels for the parties. 10. He refers to the provisions of Sections 57, 213 and 387 of the Act. He relied upon a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Satnam Kaur (supra). Discussion and Findings: 9. I have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsels for the parties. 10. Before I proceed to consider rival submissions of learned counsels for the parties it would be appropriate to reproduce the provisions of Section 57, 213 and 387 of the Act, 1925 and Chapter XXX Rules 5, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 45 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, as under:- "Indian Succession Act, 1925 57. Application of certain provisions of Part to a class of wills made by Hindus, etc.--The provisions of this Part which are set out in Schedule III shall, subject to the restrictions and modifications specified therein, apply-- (a) to all Wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina on or after the first day of September, 1870, within the territories which at the said date were subject to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal or within the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Courts of Judicature at Madras and Bombay; and (b) to all such Wills and codicils made outside those territories and limits so far as relates to immoveable property situate within those territories or limits; and (c) to all wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina on or after the first day of January, 1927, to which those provisions are not applied by clauses (a) and (b); Provided that marriage shall not revoke any such will or codicil. 213. Right as executor or legatee when established -- (1) No right as executor or legatee can be established in any Court of Justice, unless a Court of competent jurisdiction in India has granted probate of the will under which the right is claimed, or has granted letters of administration with the will or with a copy of an authenticated copy of the will annexed. (2) This section shall not apply in the case of wills made by Muhammadans [or Indian Christians] and shall only apply -- (i) in the case of Wills made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina where such wills are of the classes specified in clauses (a) and (b) of section 57; and in the case of wills made by any Parsi dying, after the commencement of the Indian Succession (Amendment) Act, 1962 (16 of 1962), where such wills are made within the local limits of the ordinary [original] civil jurisdiction of the High Courts at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, and where such wills are made outside those limits, in so far as they relate to immoveable property situated within those limits. 387. Effect of decisions under this Act, and liability of holder of certificate thereunder -- No decision under this Part upon any question of right between any parties shall be held to bar the trial of the same question in any suit or in any other proceeding between the same parties, and nothing in this Part shall be construed to affect the liability of any person who may receive the whole or any part of any debt or security, or any interest or dividend on any security, to account therefor to the person lawfully entitled thereto. Chapter XXX of the Allahabad High Court Rules: 5. Application for probate- Application for probate shall be made by petition with the will annexed, accompanied, if the will is not in English or Hindi, with an official translation thereof in English. Such application shall contain an undertaking that an inventory and account will be filed within six and twelve months respectively after the date of issue of probate. The petition shall be in the prescribed form or as near thereto as the circumstances of the case may permit and shall be accompanied by- (a) an affidavit of one of the attesting witnesses if procurable, in the prescribed form; and (b) an affidavit of valuation in the form set forth in Schedule III of the Court Fees Act, 1870 along with an appropriate account specifying all the property in respect of which estate duty is payable upon the death of the deceased. (c) an authenticated copy of the application; and (d) a certificate of death by a competent authority or an affidavit of the person who may have actually witnessed the death or may be fully acquainted to testify about the death of the testator. A copy of the affidavit under clause (b) shall also be delivered to the Controller of Estate Duty, Uttar Pradesh. 35. Caveats- Any person intending to oppose the issuing of a grant of probate or letters of administration must either personally or by his Advocate file a caveat in Court in the prescribed form. Notice of the filing of the caveat shall be given by the Court to the petitioner or his Advocate in the prescribed form. 36. Affidavit in support of caveat-Where a caveat is entered after an application has been made for a grant of probate or letters of administration with or without the will annexed, an objection supported by affidavit shall be filed within fourteen days of the caveat being lodged. Such objection shall state the right and interest of the caveator and the ground of objection to the application. 37. When caveat is entered before application for grant is filed- Where an application for grant of probate or letters of administration with or without the will annexed is presented after a caveat has been filed, the Registrar shall forthwith issue notice to the caveator calling upon him to file his objection supported by affidavit within fourteen days from the service of such notice. 38. Consequence of non-compliance- Where the caveator fails to file any objection in compliance with Rule 36 or in compliance with the notice issued under Rule 37, the caveat may be discharged by an order to be obtained on application to the Court. 39. Conversion of application into suit- Upon the affidavit in support of the caveat being filed (notice whereof shall immediately be given by the caveator to the petitioner), the proceedings shall be numbered as a suit in which the petitioner for probate or letters of administration shall be the plaintiff and the caveator shall be the defendant, the petition for probate or letters of administration being registered as and deemed a plaint filed against the caveator and the objection filed by the caveator being treated as his written statement in the suit. The procedure in such suit shall, as nearly as may be, according to the provisions of the Code. 40. Proof in solemn form- The party opposing a will may, with his affidavit, give notice to the party setting up the will that he merely insists upon the will being proved in solemn form of law and only intends to cross-examine the witnesses produced in support of the will, and he shall thereupon be at liberty to do so and shall not, in any even, be liable to pay the costs of the other side, unless the Court shall be of opinion that there was no reasonable ground for opposing the will. 41. Trial of preliminary issue- The Court may, on the application of the petitioner, before directing that the proceedings be numbered as a suit, direct the trial of an issue as to the caveator's interest. Where, upon the trial of such issue, it appears that the caveator has no interest, the Court shall order the caveat to be discharged and may order the issue of probate or letters of administration as the case may be. 45. Application of Rule to Subordinate Courts- The Rules contained in this Chapter shall, so far as may be and with necessary modifications and adaptations, also apply to proceedings under the Act, in Subordinate Courts." Will and Principles governing Wills: 11. Will is a translation of the Latin word "voluntas", which was a term used in the texts of Roman Law to express the intention of a testator. The word `testament' is derived from 'testate menties.' It testifies the determination of the mind. As defined in Section 2(h) of the Act, "Will" is the legal declaration of the intention of testator with respect to his property which he desires to be carried into effect after his death". It is an instrument by which a person makes a disposition of his property to take effect after his death. It is revocable by him during his lifetime. Important principles governing "Will" have been well established by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Gopal vs Nand Lal, (1951) AIR SC 139, Gambol Ammal Vs. Raju Ayyar, (1951) AIR SC 103, Raj Bajrang Bahdaur Singh Vs. Thakurain Bakht Raj Kher, (1953) AIR SC 7, Pearey Lal vs. Rameshwar Das, (1963) AIR SC 1703, Ramachandra Shenoy And Another vs Mrs. Hilda Brite, (1964) AIR SC 1323, Navneet Lal Vs. Raju Ayyar, (1951) AIR SC 103, Raj Bajrang Bahdaur Singh Vs. Thakurain Bakht Raj Kher, (1953) AIR SC 7, Pearey Lal vs. Rameshwar Das, (1963) AIR SC 1703, Ramachandra Shenoy And Another vs Mrs. Hilda Brite, (1964) AIR SC 1323, Navneet Lal Vs. Gokul, (1976) AIR SC 794, Uma Devi Nambiar & Or. V T. C. Sidhan, (2004) 2 SCC 321 (para-10)] and K.S. Palanisami (Dead) through Legal Representatives Vs. Hindu Community in General and Citizens of Gobichettipalayam and others, (2017) 13 SCC 15 (paras 42, 45 and 61)], etc. Nature and proceeding of Grant of Probate, Letters of Administration and Succession Certificate under the Act: 12. The proceeding for grant of certificate is a summary proceeding. Even if the question of law and fact are intricate or difficult, the court can still grant certificate of succession on the basis of prima facie title, which is not final between the parties. The principles of res-judicata cannot be made applicable to such a case in a subsequent suit. The effect of grant of certificate under Section 372 has been given in Section 381 of the Act, which merely affords full indemnity to the debtor for payment he makes to the person holding such certificate. In Madhvi Amma Bhawani Amma And Ors vs Kunjikutty Pillai Meenakshi, (2000) 6 SCC 301 (Paras- 17 and 18], Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the provisions of Section 372, 381 and 387 of the Act and held as under: "17. No doubt Explanation VIII to Section 11 enlarges the field of res judicata, by including in its field the decisions on the same issue, between the same parties even by a court of limited jurisdiction even though such court may not have the competence of deciding such an issue in a suit. But as we have held above this grant of certificate would not fall within the field of Explanation VIII of Section-11. 18. As far back as in 1937, this principle was upheld and recognised. In Charjo and Anr. v. Dina Nath and Ors., (1937) AIR Lahore 196 (2).(AIR Headnote) "The enquiry in proceedings for grant of succession certificate is to be summary, and the Court, without determining questions of law or fact, which seems to it to be too intricate and difficult for determination, should grant the certificate to the person who appears to have prima facle the best title thereto. In such cases the Court has not to determine definitely and finally as to who has the best right to the estate. All that it is required to do is to hold a summary enquiry into the right to the certificate, with a view, on the one hand, to facilitate the collection of debts due to the deceased and prevent their being time-barred, owing (for instance) to dispute between the heirs inter se as to their preferential right to succession, and, on the other hand, to afford protection to the debtors by appointing a representative of the deceased and authorising him to give a valid discharge for the debt. The grant of a certificate to a person does not give him an absolute right to the debt nor does it bar a regular suit for adjustments of the claims of the heirs inter se." 13. In FGP Ltd. vs Saleh Hooseini Doctor, (2009) 10 SCC 223 (Paras-47, 48, 51 and 52], Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "47. Therefore, it is Section 211 and not Section 213 that deals with the vesting of property. This vesting does not take place as a result of probate. On the executor's accepting his office, the property vests on him and executor derives his title from the Will and becomes the representative of the deceased even without obtaining probate. The grant of probate does not give title to the executor. It just makes his title certain. 48. Under Section 213, the grant of probate is not a condition precedent to the filing of a suit in order to claim a right as an executor under the will. This vesting of right is enough for the executor or administrator to represent the estate in a legal proceeding. 51. But Section 213 operates in a different field. Section 213 enjoins that rights under the Will by executor or a legatee cannot be established unless probate or letters of administration are obtained. Therefore, Section 211 and Section 213 of the said Act have different areas of operation. 52. Even if Will is not probated that does not prevent the vesting of the property of the deceased on the executor/administrator and consequently any right of action to represent the estate of the executor can be initiated even before the grant of the probate." (Emphasis supplied by me) 14. 52. Even if Will is not probated that does not prevent the vesting of the property of the deceased on the executor/administrator and consequently any right of action to represent the estate of the executor can be initiated even before the grant of the probate." (Emphasis supplied by me) 14. .In Crystal Developers v Smt. Asha Lata Ghosh, (2005) 9 SCC 375 (paras-28, 35, 36 and 37)], Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the provisions of Section 213 of the Act and held as under: "28. Section 211 falls in Part VIII which deals with representative title to the property of the deceased on succession. Section 211(1) declares that the executor or the administrator, as the case may be, of a deceased person is his legal representative for all purposes and that all the property of the deceased vests in him, as such. Under section 212, it is inter alia provided that no right to any property of a person who has died intestate can be established in any Court, unless letters of administration are granted by a probate Court. Under section 213, no right as an executor or a legatee can be established in any Court, unless probate of the will is granted, by the Probate Court, under which the right is claimed. Similarly, no right as executor or legatee can be established in any Court unless the competent Court grants letters of administration with the will annexed thereto. Sections 211, 212 and 213 brings out a dichotomy between an executor and an administrator. They indicate that the property shall vest in the executor by virtue of the will whereas the property will vest in the administrator by virtue of the grant of the letters of administration by the Court. These sections indicate that an executor is the creature of the will whereas an administrator derives all his rights from the grant of letters of administration by the Court. Section 214 states inter alia that no debt owing to a deceased testator can be recovered through the Court except by the holder of probate or letters of administration or succession certificate. Section 216 inter alia lays down that after any grant of probate or letters of administration, no person other than such grantee shall have power to sue or otherwise act as a representative of the deceased, until such probate or letters of administration is recalled or revoked. Section 216 inter alia lays down that after any grant of probate or letters of administration, no person other than such grantee shall have power to sue or otherwise act as a representative of the deceased, until such probate or letters of administration is recalled or revoked. Part IX of the Act deals with probate, letters of administration and administration of assets of deceased. Under section 218(1), if the deceased is a Hindu, having died intestate, administration of his estate may be granted to any person who, according to the rules for the distribution of the estate applicable to such deceased, would be entitled to. Under section 218(2), when several such persons apply for letters of administration, it shall be in the discretion of the Court to grant letters of administration to any one or more of such persons. Section 220 refers to effect of letters of administration. It inter alia states that letters of administration entitles the administrator to all rights belonging to the intestate. Section 221 inter alia states that letters of administration shall not render valid any intermediate acts of the administrator which acts diminish or damage the estate of the intestate. Sections 218, 219, 220 and 221 are relevant in the present case as they indicate that nothing prevented the intestate heirs of Balai Chand to apply for letters of administration, particularly when they alleged that Balai Chand died without making a will. Moreover, section 221 indicates that intermediate acts of the administrator which damage or diminish the estate are not validated. This section brings out the difference between letters of administration and probate. Section 221 expressly states that certain intermediate acts of the administrator are not protected as the authority of the administrator flows from the grant by the competent court unlike vesting of the property in the executor under the will (see: section 211). Section 222 states that probate shall be granted only to an executor appointed by the will. Section 227 deals with effect of probate. It lays down that probate of a will when granted establishes the will from the date of the death of the testator and renders valid all intermediate acts of the executor. Section 227 is, therefore, different from section 221. Section 227 deals with effect of probate. It lays down that probate of a will when granted establishes the will from the date of the death of the testator and renders valid all intermediate acts of the executor. Section 227 is, therefore, different from section 221. As stated above, in the case of letters of administration, intermediate acts of the grantee are not protected whereas in the case of probate, all such acts are treated as valid. Further, section 227 states that a probate proves the will right from the date of the death of the testator and consequently all intermediate acts are rendered valid. It indicates that probate operates prospectively. It protects all intermediate acts of the executor as long as they are compatible with the administration of the estate. Therefore, section 221 read with section 227 brings out the distinction between the executor and holder of letters of administration; that the executor is a creature of the will; that he derives his authority from the will whereas the administrator derives his authority only from the date of the grant in his favour by the Court. Section 235 inter alia states that letters of administration with the will annexed shall not be granted to any legatee, other than universal or residuary legatee, until a citation has been issued and published calling on the next-of-kin to accept or refuse letters of administration. Such provision is not there in respect of grant of probate. In the circumstances, the judgment in the case of Debendra Nath Dutt & another v. Administrator-General of Bengal, (1906) 33 ILR(Cal) 713 will not apply to the present case. 35. In Cherichi v. Ittianam & others, (2001) AIR Kerala 184, it has been held that the prohibition under section 213 of Indian Succession Act is regarding establishing any right under the will without probate and that section cannot be understood as one by which the vesting of right as per the provisions of the will is postponed until the obtaining of probate or letters of administration. The will takes effect on the death of the testator and what section 213 says is that the right as executor or legatee can be established in any Court only if probate is obtained. Therefore, section 213(1) does not prohibit the use of will which is un-probated as evidence for purposes other than establishment of right as executor or legatee. The will takes effect on the death of the testator and what section 213 says is that the right as executor or legatee can be established in any Court only if probate is obtained. Therefore, section 213(1) does not prohibit the use of will which is un-probated as evidence for purposes other than establishment of right as executor or legatee. Therefore, the requirement of obtaining probate becomes relevant at the time when the establishment of right as executor or legatee is sought to be made on the basis of a will in a court of justice. 36. In Sheonath Singh v. Madanlal, (1959) AIR Raj. 243, it was held that Section 213 does not vest any right. It only regulates the procedure of proving a will. It is distinct from section 211. It lays down a rule of procedure and not of any substantive right. 37. In Mrs. Hem Nolini Judah v. Mrs. Isolyne Sarojbashini Bose & others, (1962) AIR SC 1471, it has been held that section 213 does not say that no person can claim as a legatee or executor unless he obtains a probate of the will. It only says that no right as an executor or legatee can be established in any Court without probate." (Emphasis supplied by me) 15. In Commissioner, Jalandhar vs Mohan Krishan Abrol, (2004) 7 SCC 505 (para-10], Hon'ble Supreme Court held that property vests in the executors by virtue of the will and not by virtue of the probate. "Will" gives property to the executor; the grant of probate is only a method by which the law provides for establishing the Will. Section 213 of the Act is merely a bar to the establishment of rights under the will by an executor or a legatee unless probate or letters of administration have been obtained. This bar comes into play only when a right as an executor or a legatee under Will is sought to be established. 16. In Binapani Kar Chowdhury vs Sri Satyabrata Basu, (2006) 10 SCC 442 (paras-4 an 5)], Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the provisions of Section 213 of the Act and held as under: "4. Section 213 of the Indian Succession Act (`Act' for short) provides as to when the right of the executor or legatee is established. 16. In Binapani Kar Chowdhury vs Sri Satyabrata Basu, (2006) 10 SCC 442 (paras-4 an 5)], Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the provisions of Section 213 of the Act and held as under: "4. Section 213 of the Indian Succession Act (`Act' for short) provides as to when the right of the executor or legatee is established. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that no right as executor or legatee can be established in any court unless a court of competent jurisdiction in India, has granted probate of the Will under which the right is claimed (or has granted letters of administration with the Will or with a copy of the Will annexed.) It is not in dispute that the said Section applies in the case of Wills made by a Hindu who is a resident of Calcutta. The trial court and the High Court have proceeded on the basis that having regard to section 213 of the Act, the suit cannot be decided unless the executor of the Will produces the probate. Section 213 clearly creates a bar to the establishment of any right under a Will by the executor or legatee unless probate or letters of administration of the Will have been obtained. This Court in Mrs. Hem Nolini Judah v. Mrs. Isolyne Sarojbashini Bose, (1962) AIR SC 1471, held as follows : (SCR p.303) "The words of S.213 are not restricted only to those cases where the claim is made by a person directly claiming as a legatee. The section does not say that no person can claim as a legatee or as an executor unless he obtains probate or letters of administration of the will under which he claims. What it says is that no right as an executor or legatee can be established in any Court of Justice, unless probate or letters of administration have been obtained of the will under which the right is claimed, and therefore, it is immaterial who wishes to establish the right as a legatee or an executor. What it says is that no right as an executor or legatee can be established in any Court of Justice, unless probate or letters of administration have been obtained of the will under which the right is claimed, and therefore, it is immaterial who wishes to establish the right as a legatee or an executor. Whosoever wishes to establish that right, whether it be a legatee or an executor himself on somebody else who might find it necessary in order to establish his right to establish the right of some legatee or executor from whom he might have derived title, he cannot do so unless the will under which the right as a legatee or executor is claimed has resulted in the grant of a probate or letters of administration." 5. Therefore, where the right of either an executor or a legatee under a Will is in issue, such right can be established only where probate (where an executor has been appointed under the Will) or letters of administration (where no executor is appointed under a Will) have been granted by a competent court. Section 213 does not come in the way of a suit or action being instituted or presented by the executor or the legatee claiming under a Will. Section 213, however, bars a decree or final order being made in such suit or action which involves a, claim as an executor or a legatee, in the absence of a Probate or Letters of Administration in regard to such a will. Where the testator had himself filed a suit (seeking a declaration and consequential reliefs) and he dies during the pendency of the suit, the executor or legatee under his will, can come on record as the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff under Order 22 Rule 3 CPC and prosecute the suit. Section 213 does not come in the way of an executor or legatee being so substituted in place of the deceased plaintiff, even though at the stage of such substitution, probate or letters of administration have not been granted by a competent court." (Emphasis supplied by me) 17. Section 213 does not come in the way of an executor or legatee being so substituted in place of the deceased plaintiff, even though at the stage of such substitution, probate or letters of administration have not been granted by a competent court." (Emphasis supplied by me) 17. In Balbir Singh Wasu vs. Lakhbir Singh Wasu, (2005) 12 SCC 503 (Para-5)], Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the question of competence of courts out side the Presidency Towns of Kolkata, Madras and Bombay to entertain applications for probate and held as under: "The appellant's counsel then contended that Section 213 of the Succession Act which requires an executor to obtain probate before establishing his claim under the Will was not applicable outside the Presidency Towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. Assuming this to be correct, we do not read Section 213 as prohibiting the executor from applying for probate as a matter of prudence or convenience to the courts in other parts of the country not covered by Section 213. Those courts are competent to entertain such applications if made." (Emphasis supplied by me) 18. In Clarance Pais & Ors vs. Union Of India, (2001) 4 SCC 325 (para-6)], Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the provisions of Section 213(1)/(2) read with Section 57 of the Act and held, as under: "The scope of Section 213(1) of the Act is that it prohibits recognition of rights as an executor or legatee under a will without production of a probate and sets down a rule of evidence and forms really a part of procedural requirement of the law of forum. Section 213(2) of the Act indicates that its applicability is limited to cases of persons mentioned therein. Certain aspects will have to be borne in mind to understand the exact scope of this section. The bar that is imposed by this section is only in respect of the establishment of the right as an executor or legatee and not in respect of the establishment of the right in any other capacity. The section does not prohibit the will being looked into for purposes other than those mentioned in the section. The bar to the establishment of the right is only for its establishment in a court of justice and not its being referred to in other proceedings before administrative or other Tribunal. The section does not prohibit the will being looked into for purposes other than those mentioned in the section. The bar to the establishment of the right is only for its establishment in a court of justice and not its being referred to in other proceedings before administrative or other Tribunal. The section is a bar to everyone claiming under a will, whether as plaintiff or defendant, if no probate or Letters of Administration are granted. The effect of Section 213(2) of the Act is that the requirement of probate or other representation mentioned in sub-section (1) for the purpose of establishing the right as an executor or legatee in a court is made inapplicable in case of a will made by Muhammadans and in the case of wills coming under Section 57(c) of the Act. Section 57(c) of the Act applies to all wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain, on or after the first day of January, 1927 which does not relate to immovable property situate within the territory formerly subject to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal or within the local limits of the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the High Courts of Judicature at Madras and Bombay, or in respect of property within those territories. No probate is necessary in the case of wills by Muhammadans. Now by the Indian Succession [Amendment] Act, 1962, the section has been made applicable to wills made by Parsi dying after the commencement of the 1962 Act. A combined reading of Sections 213 and 57 of the Act would show that where the parties to the will are Hindus or the properties in dispute are not in territories falling under Section 57(a) and (b), sub-section (2) of Section 213 of the Act applies and sub-section (1) has no application. As a consequence, a probate will not be required to be obtained by a Hindu in respect of a will made outside those territories or regarding the immovable properties situate outside those territories. The result is that the contention put forth on behalf of the Petitioners that Section 213(1) of the Act is applicable only to Christians and not to any other religion is not correct." (Emphasis supplied by me) 19. The result is that the contention put forth on behalf of the Petitioners that Section 213(1) of the Act is applicable only to Christians and not to any other religion is not correct." (Emphasis supplied by me) 19. In Nobat Ram and another vs. Gayatri Devi,1968 AllLJ 69, this court held that where the parties to the Will are Hindus but the properties in dispute are in Bengal, Bombay and Madras, subsection (2) of Section 213 of the Indian Succession Act applies and sub-section (1) has no application and, therefore, for the maintenance of a suit, it is not necessary that the Will should be probated. 20. In Satnam Kaur vs. Satyendra Pal Singh and others, (2015) 127 RevDec 498 (paras-10, 11 and 12)], a Division Bench of this court considered the provisions of Section 213 of the Act and held as under: "10. From the perusal of the impugned order passed by the learned court below we find that the learned court below, has rejected the application for grant of probate on the ground that the probate of Will is not required in view of the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court. The learned court below has not rejected the applications for grant of probate on the ground of maintainability. 11. We have observed herein above that a beneficiary under a will may not be required to obtain a probate of Will under the provision of Section 213 of the Act but in case he wants to get a probate of Will to be used before the other authorities, there is no bar for him to apply for grant of probate. We may clarify our view by giving an example. If a person has bank deposits and other movable property kept in locker of the bank or anywhere else, executes a Will providing that after his death the movable property will devolve upon a particular person and after the death when such person approaches the bank claiming possession of such movable property and demands money on the basis of such Will, the bank authorities always demand either a succession certificate or a probate of a Will in order to ascertain the genuineness and authenticity of the Will. Similarly if a person executes a Will about the post retiral benefits then in that case also, the concerned department demands either succession certificate or in case of a Will, a probate to pay him post retiral dues. In all such cases although the beneficiary of the will may not be required to obtain a probate for will in view of the Section 213 of the Act, but for the payment of such amount and possession of movable property, he has to approach the competent authority for grant of succession certificate or probate of a will, as the case may be. 12. It will also not be out of place to mention here that the applications for grant of probate of will are cognizable by the High Court also as provided under Chapter XXX of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952. Thus it cannot be said that the applications for grant of probate of will are not required in Uttar Pradesh." (Emphasis supplied by me) 21. The judgments of this court in the cases of Smt. Vimla Gainder vs. Smt. Usha Gainder (supra), Administrative General, U.P. Vs. Shyam (supra), Pinto Vs. Shyam (supra), Bhaiya Ji Vs. Jageshwar (supra), are of no help to the appellants on the facts of the present case and also in view of the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Balbir Singh Wasu (supra) and Clarance Pais (supra). In the aforesaid judgments relied by the appellants, Division Bench of this Court merely held that a probate is not necessary for establishment of a right under a Will by Hindu where the provisions of clauses (a) and (b) of Section 57 are not attracted. It has been merely held that the probate of Will is inquired to be obtained by a Hindu in respect of Will of immovable property situated in Uttar Pradesh. The judgment does not lay down the law that if a Hindu applies for probate of a Will, then the application for probate, shall not be maintainable under the Act. 22. In the testamentary case of Rajendra Chandra Sen Gupta, (1934) AIR Allahabad 958 : 1934 A.L.J.R. 800, a Division Bench presided over by Hon'ble the Chief Justice (Sir Shah Mohd. 22. In the testamentary case of Rajendra Chandra Sen Gupta, (1934) AIR Allahabad 958 : 1934 A.L.J.R. 800, a Division Bench presided over by Hon'ble the Chief Justice (Sir Shah Mohd. Sulaiman) considered the testamentary jurisdiction of Allahabad High Court and District Judge and held that the testamentary jurisdiction is conferred upon the Allahabad High Court by Clause 25 of the letters patent. There is specific provision in Section 300 of the Act that the High Court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the District Judge in exercise of powers for grant of probate or letters of administration in Part-IX of the Act. But no such power has been made in Part-X of the Act, which relates to the grant of succession certificate. The power is exclusively conferred upon District Judge for grant of succession certificate. Therefore, an application for grant of succession certificate cannot be made to the High Court. The relevant portion of the judgment in the testamentary case of Rajendra Chandra Sen Gupta (supra) is reproduced below: "I quite agree. Before 1925 the proceedings under the Succession Certificate Act used to be taken in the Court of the District Judge and were treated as a civil proceeding. The General Clauses Act, Section 3, Sub-section 15, defined a "District Judge" as meaning a Judge of the principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction, not including a High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction. The result was that an application for the grant of succession certificate could not be made to a High Court Judge exercising its ordinary or extraordinary civil jurisdiction. This obviously caused some inconvenience in presidency towns where the High Court was the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction and there was no District Judge having such jurisdiction. In 1925 the provisions of the Succession Act were incorporated in the Indian Succession Act. In 1929 the Indian Succession Act was amended and "District Judge" was defined as meaning the Judge of the principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction. Accordingly the bar contained in the General Clauses Act against a High Court Judge was removed and a High Court Judge could be a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. It does not however follow that applications for grant of succession certificates in all cases can be made to a High Court. Accordingly the bar contained in the General Clauses Act against a High Court Judge was removed and a High Court Judge could be a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. It does not however follow that applications for grant of succession certificates in all cases can be made to a High Court. Even as regards Presidency High Courts only such applications would be cognizable by a High Court Judge as invoke his jurisdiction as a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction. For cases arising in territories outside presidency towns, where he has no such original jurisdiction, the application cannot be made to him. So far as the Allahabad High Court is concerned testamentary jurisdiction is conferred upon us by Clause 25, Letters Patent, and relates to the grant of probates of last wills and testaments, Letters of Administration of goods, chattels, credits and all other effects of persons dying intestate. No jurisdiction is conferred by that clause upon us for granting succession certificates. The last mentioned proceeding is a civil proceeding and not a testamentary or intestate proceeding within the meaning of Clause 25 and our High Court has no ordinary original civil jurisdiction at all. Clause 9 only confers extraordinary original jurisdiction to try a suit by transferring it on to its own file. So far as the grant of probate or Letters of Administration in Part IX of the Succession Act, is concerned, there is a specific provision in Section 300 that the High Court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the District Judge in the exercise of such powers. But no such provision has been made in Part X of the Act which relates to the grant of succession certificates. On the other hand Sections 384 and 388 clearly show that the High Court is distinct from the District Judge. The position now is that although there is no longer any statutory bar against a High Court Judge granting a succession certificate, if he otherwise possesses the necessary jurisdiction. But he cannot grant it unless he is the Judge of a principal civil court of original jurisdiction. A Judge of the Allahabad High Court is not such a Judge, but a District Judge is. An application for grant of the succession certificate cannot therefore be made to the High Court." 23. But he cannot grant it unless he is the Judge of a principal civil court of original jurisdiction. A Judge of the Allahabad High Court is not such a Judge, but a District Judge is. An application for grant of the succession certificate cannot therefore be made to the High Court." 23. Thus the scheme of the Act as explained by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments afore noted, is that Will is the legal declaration of the intention of testator with respect to his property which he desires to be carried into effect after his death. An executor of a Will is the creature of the will whereas an administrator derives all his rights from the grant of letters of administration by the Court. Thus, the grant of probate does not give title to the executor. It is not a condition precedent to the filing of a suit in order to claim a right as an executor under the Will. On grant of probate or letters of administration, no person other than such grantee shall have power to sue or otherwise act as a representative of the deceased, until such probate or letters of administration is recalled or revoked. The grant of probate is only a method by which the law provides for establishing the Will. In Clarance Pais & Ors (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a combined reading of Sections 213 and 57 of the Act would show that where the parties to the will are Hindus or the properties in dispute are not in territories falling under Section 57(a) and (b), sub-section (2) of Section 213 of the Act applies and sub-section (1) has no application. As a consequence, a probate will not be required to be obtained by a Hindu in respect of a will made outside those territories or regarding the immovable properties situate outside those territories. In Balbir Singh Wasu vs Lakhbir Singh Wasu (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Section 213 does not prohibit the executor from applying for probate as matter of precedence or convenience to the courts in other parts of the country not covered by Section 213 and those courts are competent to entertain such applications if made. In Balbir Singh Wasu vs Lakhbir Singh Wasu (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Section 213 does not prohibit the executor from applying for probate as matter of precedence or convenience to the courts in other parts of the country not covered by Section 213 and those courts are competent to entertain such applications if made. Thus, there is no provision in the Act which prohibits an executor to apply for probate as a matter of precedence or convenience to the courts in other parts of the country not covered by Section 213 and if any application for probate is made to the courts in the State of Uttar Pradesh, then such a court is competent to entertain applications for probate. Similar is the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of Satnam Kaur (supra). 24. The view taken by me in preceding paragraphs No.22 and 23, is not only supported by the above referred judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court and this court but it also finds support from the provisions of the Act as well as from the provisions of Chapter XXX of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the High Court Rules, 1952'). Rule 45 has made applicable the provisions of Chapter XXX, so far as may be and with necessary modifications and adaptations, also apply to proceedings under the Indian Succession Act, 1925, in Subordinate Courts. Thus, the provisions of Chapter XXX of the High Court Rules, shall be applicable to subordinate courts as provided in Rule 45. Rule 5 of the High Court Rules prescribes the manner in which application for probate shall be made. Rule 35 provides for caveat and Rule 36 provides for affidavit in support of caveat. Rule 37 provides the procedure when caveat is entered before application for grant is filed. Rule 38 provides for consequence when a caveator fails to file any objection in compliance to Rule 36 or in compliance to the notice issued under Rule 37. Rule 39 provides for conversion of application for probate into suit. Rule 41 provides for trial of preliminary issue. 25. Rule 38 provides for consequence when a caveator fails to file any objection in compliance to Rule 36 or in compliance to the notice issued under Rule 37. Rule 39 provides for conversion of application for probate into suit. Rule 41 provides for trial of preliminary issue. 25. Thus, complete procedure for filing application for probate and its trial and conversion of the application in a suit, have been provided in Chapter XXX of the High Court Rules which are applicable with necessary modifications and adaptations to proceedings under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 in subordinate courts. Clause (c) was added after Clause (b) in Section 57 of the Act by Act No.18 of 1929 which clearly provides that the provisions of Part-VI of the Act (Section 57 to Section 191) shall, subject to the restrictions and modifications specified therein, apply to all wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina on or after the first day of January, 1927, to which those provisions are not applied by clauses (a) and (b). Section 213 of the Act also does not prohibit filing of an application for probate of a Will and codicils made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina on or after first day of January 1927, to which the provisions of clauses (a) and (b) of section 57, are not applied. 26. Part IX (Section 217 to 369 of the Act) providing for probate, letters of administration and administration of assets of deceased, also does not contain any prohibition against a Hindu to apply for probate of a Will. Section 217 provides for application of Part IX. It provides that save as otherwise provided by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, all grants of probate and letter of administration with the will annexed and the administration of the assets of the deceased in cases of intestate succession shall be made or carried out, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of this Part. Subsection (1) of Section 264 of the Act falling under Part-IX provides that the District Judge shall have jurisdiction in granting and revoking probates and letters of administration in all cases within his district. Subsection (1) of Section 264 of the Act falling under Part-IX provides that the District Judge shall have jurisdiction in granting and revoking probates and letters of administration in all cases within his district. Subsection (2) of Section 264 does not prohibit a court of District Judge to entertain an application for probate or letters of administration beyond limits of town of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay where the deceased is a Hindu, Muhammadan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina or an exempted person. On the contrary, it provides for receiving application in matters provided under Section 57 of the Act including clause (c) thereof. 27. Thus, the scheme of the Act, the provisions of Chapter XXX of the High Court Rules and the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Clarance Pais (supra) and Balbir Singh Wasu (supra), leads to an irresistible conclusion that there is no prohibition for an executor of a Will to apply for probate to the courts in other parts of the country not covered by Section 213 of the Act. Those courts are competent to entertain applications for probate, if made. Therefore, an application by a Hindu for probate of Will under the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 read with Chapter XXX of the High Court Rules, is maintainable in the State of Uttar Pradesh before a court of District Judge within its territorial limits. The question framed in para-2 above is answered accordingly. 28. In view of the above discussion, I do not find any error in the impugned order of the court below rejecting the objection of the defendants appellants (Application No.112A) and holding that there is no prohibition under Section 57 of the Act for filing application for probate of Will by a Hindu. 29. For all the reasons afore-stated, I do not find any merit in this appeal. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.