ORDER : M.R. Pathak, J. 1. Heard Mr. Monojit Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Indraneel Chowdhury, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. Sandeepjoy Biswakarma, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. Being aggrieved with the order dated 26.06.2019 passed by learned District Judge, West Sessions Division, Yupia in Arbitration No. 01/2018 rejecting its prayer to grant it some time to file its reply, the petitioner (respondent in said Arb. No. 01/2018) has preferred this revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 3. The respondent, State Council of Information and Technology & E-Governance, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, represented by its Director-cum-Member Secretary, on 22.12.2008 entered into an agreement with the petitioner Corporation for the work of 'Setting up State Wide Area Network'. It is stated that though it has successfully completed the work order under the said contract agreement dated 22.12.2008, the respondent is yet to pay a huge amount to the petitioner, due to which dispute arose between both the parties regarding implementation of the work involved under the said agreement. As per the terms of agreement between the parties said dispute was referred to the concerned Arbitrator, pursuant to which an Arbitration proceeding, being ARB. Reference No. 08/2015 was registered, wherein both the parties placed and supported their respective claims. After hearing the parties, the concerned Arbitrator on 07.09.2018 passed the Arbitral Award in said ARB. Reference No. 08/2015 in favour of the petitioner. 4. Being dissatisfied with the said award of the Arbitrator dated 07.09.2018, the respondent as petitioner preferred application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Court of learned District Judge, West Sessions Division, Yupia, Arunachal Pradesh along with an application under Section 36(2) of said 1996 Act for stay of the said award. Said application of the respondent filed under Section 34 of 1996 Act along with its application for stay are registered and numbered as Arb. No. 01/2018 and Misc Case No. 44/2018, respectively, which is pending for disposal before the Court of learned District Judge, West Sessions Division, Yupia. 5. Learned District Judge, Yupia by order dated 04.12.2018 admitted the said Arb. No. 01/2018 and Misc Case No. 44/2018, respectively, which is pending for disposal before the Court of learned District Judge, West Sessions Division, Yupia. 5. Learned District Judge, Yupia by order dated 04.12.2018 admitted the said Arb. No. 01/2018 of the respondent allowing the petitioner herein to file its reply directing respondent to take necessary steps on the petitioner and fixed the matter on 11.02.2019 for submission of report by the said petitioner regarding the steps taken on the petitioner and also for filing of reply by it. 6. The petitioner took time for more than five occasions to file its reply in said Arb. No. 01/2018 on grounds like non furnishing of annexures by the respondent, due to illness of the counsel for the petitioner etc. and the learned Court granted such prayer. On 26.06.2019 when petitioner prayed for further time to file its reply in said Arb. No. 01/2018, it was rejected by the said Court and by order dated 26.06.2019 fixed the said case on 26.07.2019 for final hearing of the case ex parte. 7. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Court below by order dated 04.12.2018 allowed the petitioner herein to file its reply in said Arb. No. 01/2018. Mr. Biswas also stated that on 09.05.2019 when it was placed before the said Court that as the respondent did not furnish all the annexures of said Arb. No. 01/2018 to the petitioner, reply could not be filed by it. As per the order of the Court dated 09.05.2019, when the respondent furnished the annexures of said Arb. No. 01/2018, Mr. Biswas submitted that he had forwarded the entire materials to the petitioner in its registered office at Bangalore. Mr. Biswas also stated that due to his illness, he was admitted in GD Hospital & Diabetes Institute at Kolkata on 21.05.2019, wherein he was operated on 22.05.2019 and was discharged from the said hospital on 25.05.2019. To that extent Mr. Biswas had annexed his medical document with this petition that was issued by said GD Hospital. 8. Mr. Biswas further submits that the reply was made ready by the petitioner at Bangalore, Karnataka and its Assistant Manager (Technical), being the authorized signatory, signed the said reply and affidavit before the Notary at Bangalore on 24.06.2019 and forwarded the same to his (Mr. 8. Mr. Biswas further submits that the reply was made ready by the petitioner at Bangalore, Karnataka and its Assistant Manager (Technical), being the authorized signatory, signed the said reply and affidavit before the Notary at Bangalore on 24.06.2019 and forwarded the same to his (Mr. Biswas) address at Guwahati on 24.06.2019 itself through Blue Dart Courier Service vide Customer Code No. 129404 for its necessary filing. 9. Said reply of the petitioner signed, registered and stamped before the Notary at Bangalore on 24.06.2019 along with the invoice of the Blue Dart Courier originated from Bangalore that was issued on 24.6.2019 are annexed to this petition. 10. It is stated by Mr. Biswas that though said reply of the petitioner was suppose to be delivered to him on 25.06.2019 but for the reasons beyond control, the said courier service could not deliver it on 25.06.2019 as the same was on transit, which was expected to receive by him on 26.6.2019. Mr. Biswas, stated that he being the engaged counsel for the petitioner in said Arb. No. 01/2018 pending before learned District Judge at Yupia, instructed a local counsel at Itanagar to pray for an adjournment of the said case for a day only so as to file its reply. However, the prayer on behalf of the petitioner was not considered and learned District Judge, Yupia passed the impugned order dated 26.6.2019. 11. Hence this revision petition by the petitioner praying to quash and set aside the said impugned order dated 26.06.2019 and to allow the petitioner to file its reply in said Arb. No. 01/2018 within the time that may be specified by this Court. 12. Referring to sub-Section (6) of Section 34 of 1996 Act, Mr. Biswas submits that any such application filed under Section 34 of said Act needs to be disposed of within a period of one year from the date on which the notice is served upon the other party in terms of sub-Section (5) of said Section 34 and in the present case the respondent had furnished all the documents and annexures of the said Arb. No. 01/2018 to the petitioner only on 9.5.2019, after the order of the Court passed on the same date. No. 01/2018 to the petitioner only on 9.5.2019, after the order of the Court passed on the same date. He stated that only after receipt of all the documents and annexures from the respondent, he had forwarded the entire application to the petitioner in its given address at Bangalore and thereafter, said reply was made ready by the petitioner on 24.06.2019 as noted above within a reasonable time. Mr. Biswas stated that by the impugned order dated 26.06.2019 while the Court rejected the prayer made by the petitioner, declining to give it some time to file its reply, at the same time also passed the order that the said case will proceed ex parte, fixed it on 26.07.2019 for final hearing as ex parte, though the petitioner has entered appearance in the said matter appointing him (Mr. Biswas) as its counsel. Mr. Biswas placed that by order dated 26.07.2019, the Court below fixed the said Arb. No. 01/2018 on 27.07.2019 and that it reflects that there was no urgency for the said Court to reject the prayer of the petitioner allowing it to file its reply. 13. Mr. Biswas learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that as per the amendments of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 with regard to Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015, on the failure of the defendant to file its written statement within the period of 30 days he shall be allowed to file the written statement on such other day that may be specified by the Court for reasons to be recorded in writing and on payment of such costs as the Court deems fit, but the same should not be later than 120 days from the date of service of summons. Mr. Biswas submits that after the order dated 09.05.2019 and on furnishing the relevant annexures and documents by the respondent the reply of the petitioner was made ready by 24.06.2019, but it could not be filed on or before 26.06.2019 in said Arb. No. 01/2018 as it was on transit from Bangalore. 14. It is further submitted by Mr. Biswas that the Arbitral award dated 07.09.2018 in ARB Reference No. 08/2015 was passed in favour of the petitioner against which the respondent has filed Arb. No. 01/2018 as it was on transit from Bangalore. 14. It is further submitted by Mr. Biswas that the Arbitral award dated 07.09.2018 in ARB Reference No. 08/2015 was passed in favour of the petitioner against which the respondent has filed Arb. No. 01/2018 under Section 34 of said 1996 Act and after due consideration of the matter learned District Judge, Yupia on 04.12.2018 while admitting the said Arb. No. 01/2018 allowed the petitioner to file its reply. 15. It is submitted that such reply of the petitioner/respondent in said Arb. No. 01/2018, if allowed to be filed, shall aid the learned Court to arrive at a just and proper decision since the hearing of said Arb. No. 01/2018 is yet to take place. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, submits that the impugned order dated 26.06.2019 passed by learned District Judge, West Sessions Division, Yupia in Arb. No. 01/2018 needs to be set aside and quashed by which the said Court rejected the prayer of the petitioner declining to give an opportunity to file its reply and to proceed with the hearing of said case ex-parte, which according to the petitioner was passed hastily by the Court, without even calling for the records of ARB Reference No. 08/2015, curtailing the valuable legal right of the petitioner to rebut the contentions of the respondent. As such, the petitioner has urged to set aside the impugned order dated 26.06.2019 being arbitrary and bad in law. Mr. Biswas submitted that the petitioner has filed this revision petition on reopening of the Court after the summer vacation. 16. Mr. Chowdhury, learned counsel for the respondent submits that after the initial order dated 04.12.2018 passed in Arb. No. 01/2018, the Court of learned District Judge, West Sessions Division, Yupia while allowing the petitioner to file its reply fix the matter on 11.02.2019. He stated that on 11.02.2019 the Court allowed the petitioner to file its reply by 01.04.2019. On 01.04.2019 the said Court fixed the matter on 09.05.2019 for filing reply by the petitioner, granting time as a last opportunity. On 09.05.2019 for the first time petitioner placed before the Court that it could not file the reply, as the respondent did not furnish all the annexures of said Arb. No. 01/2018. On 01.04.2019 the said Court fixed the matter on 09.05.2019 for filing reply by the petitioner, granting time as a last opportunity. On 09.05.2019 for the first time petitioner placed before the Court that it could not file the reply, as the respondent did not furnish all the annexures of said Arb. No. 01/2018. Considering such prayer, the Court by order dated 9.5.2019 directed the respondent to furnish the copy of the annexures on the same day itself and allowing the petitioner to file its reply on 28.05.2019 granting it as last opportunity. On 28.05.2019 the Court, considering the illness of its counsel, granted time to the petitioner as a last opportunity and to file its reply by 26.6.2019. Mr. Chowdhury stated that on 26.06.2019 when the petitioner failed to file its reply, the Court passed the impugned order and therefore, he stated that the impugned order, as such, cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal warranting interference of the Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 17. Referring Section 5 and Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Mr. Chowdhury submits that those being non ostensible clause, the impugned order dated 26.06.2019 cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary more particularly, since 11.02.2019, when the Court granted three last opportunities to the petitioner to file its reply and on all those occasions, petitioner failed to file its reply. Mr. Chowdhury also stated that considering the ill health of its counsel, the Court on 28.05.2019 granted time to the petitioner to file its reply fixing 26.06.2019 and the impugned order was passed on 26.06.2019, whereas the petitioner did not file this revision petition immediately after the said impugned order dated 26.06.2019 and/or immediately on receipt of its reply from Bangalore on 26.06.2019 as stated, but filed this revision petition on 20.07.2019 only. Therefore, Mr. Chowdhury submits that the argument and submissions of the petitioner is not tenable, which does not need any consideration and submitted that the prayers made by the petitioner as well as this revision petition filed by it should be rejected and dismissed. Regarding the exercise of power by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, Mr. Chowdhury in support of his argument has placed the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani Vs. Regarding the exercise of power by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, Mr. Chowdhury in support of his argument has placed the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani Vs. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 576 and State Vs. Navjot Sandhu, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 641 . 18. Considered the arguments advanced by the parties as well as the judgments cited. 19. With regard to the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, referring its earlier judgments, in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329 have held that- (a) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Waryam Singh, reported in AIR 1954 SC 215 which have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of the said Hon'ble Court. (b) The ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench in said Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, is that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, "within the bounds of their authority". (c) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 have declared that Article 227 is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (d) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (e) The power under Article 227 is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle and in an appropriate case, the said power can be exercised suo motu. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (e) The power under Article 227 is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle and in an appropriate case, the said power can be exercised suo motu. (f) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (g) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (h) The High Court cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (i) High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (j) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (k) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (k) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. (l) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest. The power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline. (m) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. 20. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pranab Kumar Mitra Vs. State of W.B., reported in AIR 1959 SC 144 had held that - the power to revise an order is a discretionary power, which is to be exercised in aid of justice and the exercise of that power will depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case. 21. In Akalu Ahir Vs. Ramdeo Ram, reported in (1973) 2 SCC 583 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that - the power of revision is invested in a superior court, which is an "extraordinary discretionary power" to set right grave injustice and that it cannot be said that a litigant has a "right" to have an adverse order revised by a superior court. 22. It is also settled that the revisional power of a superior court actually enables it to correct a grave error, but the existence of that power does not confer any corresponding right on a litigant and for that reason, in a given case, if the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant the exercise of its discretion, a superior court may decline to exercise its power of revision. For the said reason it is stated that a revision is not a right but only a "procedural facility" available to a party. 23. Considering the above and the case in hand, it is seen that pursuant to the order dated 28.05.2019, the petitioner was to file its reply on 26.06.2019 before the Court of learned District Judge, West Sessions Division, Yupia in Arb. No. 01/2018. For the said purpose petitioner had made ready its reply before 26.06.2019, duly notarized on 24.06.2019 with due Serial and Volume Number at Bangalore, where its office is registered and forwarded it to its counsel at his Guwahati address on 24.06.2019 itself by Blue Dart Courier Service. But as it was on transit, the said reply of the petitioner could not be filed on 26.06.2019 as directed. 24. It is also seen that the respondents herein did not deny that it had furnished all the annexures of its case Arb. No. 01/2018 to the petitioner on 09.05.2019 only, where the Court concerned in said Arb. No. 01/2018 on 11.02.2019 and 01.04.2019 already granted last chances to the petitioner to file its reply in that case. Moreover, it is placed before the Court that the counsel for the petitioner had undergone surgery on 21.5.2019 at Kolkata and he was discharged from Hospital on 25.05.2019, with the advice to take rest at home and to consult the Doctor in the said Hospital at Kolkata after fifteen days. Regarding the ill health of petitioner's counsel, the respondent was aware on 28.5.2019, when the Court concerned passed the order on the same date in said Arb. No. 01/2018 fixing 26.06.2019 for filing reply by the petitioner as a last chance in the said case. 25. It is not the case of the respondent that if time is reasonably extended enabling the petitioner to file its reply in said Arb. No. 01/2018, it would result in injustice to it causing serious prejudice. But its contention is that the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions made by the Court or Tribunal under its jurisdiction. No. 01/2018, it would result in injustice to it causing serious prejudice. But its contention is that the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions made by the Court or Tribunal under its jurisdiction. Respondent's further contention is that in view of the provisions of Sections 5 and 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and that those provisions, being non ostensible clause, bars the exercise of revisional powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, since the power of superintendence is not meant to circumvent statutory law. 26. It is well settled that the High Court while exercising its power under Article 227 of the Constitution and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals, it is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is already noted above that as per the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra), Article 227 of the Constitution of India have been declared as a part of its basic structure and that the power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. 27. Considering all the aspects noted above, this Court is of the view that if the petitioner is allowed a reasonable time to file its reply, it would be proper for effective adjudication of controversy between the parties in Arb. No. 01/2018 and this will not cause any injustice or prejudice to the respondent herein. 28. For the reasons noted above, this Court found that the impugned order dated 26.06.2019 passed by learned District Judge, West Sessions Division, Yupia, Arunachal Pradesh in Arb. No. 01/2018 is arbitrary and perverse that caused failure of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law and justice, where if this Court does not interfere, a grave injustice would be done to the petitioner. 29. Accordingly, in exercise of the power conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the impugned order dated 26.06.2019 passed by the Court of learned District Judge, West Sessions Division, Yupia, Arunachal Pradesh in Arb. 29. Accordingly, in exercise of the power conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the impugned order dated 26.06.2019 passed by the Court of learned District Judge, West Sessions Division, Yupia, Arunachal Pradesh in Arb. No. 01/2018 is hereby set aside and quashed, granting ten days time from today to the petitioner herein to file its reply in said Arb. No. 01/2018, failing which the petitioner shall lost its chance to file its reply in the said case. In the event of filing such reply by the petitioner, within the time so specified, the Court of learned District Judge, West Sessions Division, Yupia, Arunachal Pradesh shall dispose of said Arb. No. 01/2018 in accordance with law. 30. Consequently this petition stands allowed.