JUDGMENT : Ramesh Ranganathan, J. The petitioner has invoked the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the decision dated 13.09.2013 taken by the Board of Management through the Vice Chancellor and the Finance Controller, as arbitrary and illegal. 2. The petitioner was appointed as a Member of the Uttarakhand Public Service Commission on 27.08.2013 under Article 316 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner was informed by the Chief Personnel Officer of the University, vide proceedings dated 06.12.2018, that, since the Board of Management had, in its meeting held on 12.09.2013, sanctioned the petitioner extra-ordinary leave only for a period of 5 years, which expired on 12.09.2018, she ought to have joined the University soon thereafter; and her failure to do so by 21.12.2018, would result in action being taken against her in accordance with law. The petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of this Court, by way of Writ Petition (S/B) No. 666 of 2018, seeking to have the said order quashed. 3. We had, in our order in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 666 of 2018 dated 21.12.2018, observed that the petitioner had not questioned the decision of the Board of Management of the University, in its meetings dated 12.09.2013 and 30.03.2018, not to grant her extraordinary leave beyond five years; as it was the Board of Management, which was the governing body of the University, indulgence shown by the Vice-Chancellor of the University, in granting the petitioner one month’s extension, vide proceedings dated 31.08.2018, would not justify the petitioner’s claim that the said period of one month should be extended by one year; and the communication by the Chief Personnel Officer, vide proceedings dated 06.12.2018, was in implementation of the decision taken by the Board of Management of the University in its meetings held on 12.09.2013 and 13.03.2018. On finding no error in the impugned order dated 06.12.2018 passed by the University, the writ petition was dismissed. 4. The petitioner has, thereafter, filed the present writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings of the Board of Management dated 13.09.2013, whereby approval was accorded for sanction of extra-ordinary leave, for a maximum period of five years in the place of deputation, to the petitioner for the post of Member, Uttarakhand Public Service Commission. 5. 4. The petitioner has, thereafter, filed the present writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings of the Board of Management dated 13.09.2013, whereby approval was accorded for sanction of extra-ordinary leave, for a maximum period of five years in the place of deputation, to the petitioner for the post of Member, Uttarakhand Public Service Commission. 5. Sri Ganesh Chandra Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that, in terms of Clause 7(d) of the Statute of the University, the power to grant all kinds of leave, except casual leave to officers of the University and teachers, rests with the Vice-Chancellor; the Board of Management does not have the power to convert the six-year period of deputation granted by the Vice-Chancellor to extra-ordinary leave of five years; the said restriction of leave to five years is also in violation of Article 316(2) of the Constitution of India, whereunder a Member of a Public Service Commission shall hold office for a term of six years from the date on which she enters upon her office or until she attains the age of sixty-two years, whichever is earlier; since the petitioner’s appointment as a Member of the Uttarakhand Public Service Commission was for a period of six years, she was entitled to be granted deputation or extra-ordinary leave for a period of six years; Clause 85-A of the Financial Hand-Book confers power to sanction extra-ordinary leave in special circumstances only where the concerned employee applies in writing for extra-ordinary leave; and since the petitioner had never applied for extra-ordinary leave, the Board of Management had erred in granting her extra-ordinary leave of five years. 6. It must be noted, at the very outset, that the petitioner had earlier invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by way of Writ Petition (S/B) No. 666 of 2018 questioning the order dated 06.12.2018 issued by the Chief Personnel Officer of the University directing her to report back to duty, as the period of deputation of five years granted in her favour had expired. None of the contentions, now urged before us in the present writ petition, were raised by the petitioner earlier when she filed Writ Petition (S/B) No. 666 of 2018. 7. None of the contentions, now urged before us in the present writ petition, were raised by the petitioner earlier when she filed Writ Petition (S/B) No. 666 of 2018. 7. Explanation IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure stipulates that any matter that ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in a former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. Explanation IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been applied to writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in Forward Construction vs. Prabhat Mandal and others : 1986 (1) SCC 100, and the Supreme Court had observed: “……So far as the first reason is concerned, the High Court in our opinion was not right in holding that the earlier judgment would not operate as res judicata as one of the grounds taken in the present petition was conspicuous by its absence in the earlier petition. Explanation IV to Section 11 C.P.C. provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming with the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence. The principle underlying Explanation IV is that where the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a matter that should be taken to be the same thing as if the matter had been actually controverted and decided. It is true that where a matter has been constructively in issue it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard and decided. The first reason, therefore, has absolutely no force.” 8. It is true that where a matter has been constructively in issue it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard and decided. The first reason, therefore, has absolutely no force.” 8. The petitioner ought to have raised all such contentions, as are now urged before us, in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 666 of 2018, and her failure to do so would, in the light of Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC and in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court in Forward Construction, disable her from questioning it in a subsequent writ petition, as she could and ought to have raised them earlier in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 666 of 2018. On this short ground, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 9. Another ground, on which the petitioner is liable to be non- suited, is undue delay and laches. The petitioner seeks to question the proceedings of the Board of Management dated 27.08.2013 and the decision dated 13.09.2013 more than five years thereafter, by way of present writ petition. 10. The Supreme Court in State of M.P. Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal: (1986) 4 SCC 566 observed: “……………..Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent of the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction…..” (emphasis supplied) 11. In view of the inordinate delay and laches, of more than five years in invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in limine. On both the aforesaid grounds, we see no reason to exercise our discretion to entertain this writ petition. 12. Reliance placed by the petitioner on Article 316 of the Constitution of India, to contend that she has a right to be granted extension of the period of deputation of upto six years, is of no avail. Even otherwise, this contention was examined by us in our order in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 666 of 2018, wherein we held that the petitioner’s entitlement, to continue as a Member of the Public Service Commission, is independent of her deputation and grant of extra-ordinary leave by the respondent-University; the mere fact that she was appointed as a Member of the Commission would not confer on her any right to claim that the University should, for the mere asking, extend the period of extra-ordinary leave from 5 years to 6 years. 13. As the order passed by us, in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 666 of 2018 dated 21.12.2018, has attained finality, the petitioner cannot canvass the correctness of the said order in collateral proceeding by way of a fresh writ petition being filed before this Court. Even on merits, we are satisfied that the petitioner has not been able to make out a case for interference. The very order, on which the petitioner seeks to place reliance upon to contend that it is the Vice-Chancellor of the University who had granted the petitioner six-years deputation, specifically stipulates that the said order was subject to the approval of the Board of Management. The very order, on which the petitioner seeks to place reliance upon to contend that it is the Vice-Chancellor of the University who had granted the petitioner six-years deputation, specifically stipulates that the said order was subject to the approval of the Board of Management. The petitioner cannot place reliance on a conditional approval accorded by the Vice-Chancellor to contend that the Board of Management of the University lacked jurisdiction to restrict extra-ordinary leave/deputation only to a period of five years. 14. Clause 7(d) of the Statute of the University, and Clause 85(A) of the Financial Hand-Book, relate to grant of extra-ordinary leave. The petitioner’s contention is that she was granted deputation and not extra-ordinary leave. If that be so, neither Clause 7(d) of the Statute of the University, nor Clause 85(A) of the Financial Hand-Book, are applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case where the petitioner had been sent on deputation. 15. The Board of Management is the highest administrative authority of the University, and is entitled to decide, whether or not an employee should be sent on deputation, and if so for what period. As the Board of Management has chosen to prescribe the period of deputation as only five-years, the action of the respondent, in directing the petitioner to join back as an Assistant Professor of the University after expiry of the five year period of deputation, cannot be faulted. 16. Viewed from any angle, we see no reason to entertain this writ petition. The writ petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.