ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. Buddhadev Ghosal, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner assisted by Mr. Ashim Kumar Sahani, Advocate in the main matter (C.M.P. No. 298 of 2018) as well as in the petition for condonation of delay being I.A. No. 7157 of 2018. 2. Heard Mr. Prabhash Kumar, counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents assisted by Mr. Arpan Mishra, Advocate in both C.M.P. No. 298 of 2018 as well as in I.A. No. 7157 of 2018. 3. This C.M.P. No. 298 of 2018 has been filed for restoration of First Appeal No. 51 of 1999 (R) to its original position which was dismissed for default on 18.03.2004 for non-compliance of order dated 03.03.2004. The I.A. No. 7157 of 2018 has been filed for condonation of delay of 5191 days in preferring the petition for restoration. 4. Counsel for the petitioner submits that on 19.05.1999, the petitioner preferred First Appeal No. 51 of 1999 (R) against the judgment and decree dated 12.04.1999 (Decree signed on 01.05.1999) passed in Title Suit No. 35 of 1996 by the learned Sub-Judge I at Jamshedpur. He submits that the suit was for specific performance of contract and the suit was decreed directing the petitioner (Defendant in the suit) to execute and register the sale deed in favor of decree holder (Respondent No. 1) in respect of the suit land upon accepting the balance consideration amount. He further submits that the appeal was admitted vide order dated 26.07.1999 and notices were issued to the respondents and after hearing the parties, by an order dated 23.09.1999, the execution of the aforesaid decree passed in Title Suit No. 35 of 1996 was stayed. However, by a subsequent order dated 13.01.2000, this Court was pleased to modify the interim order of stay and again by an order dated 02.02.2000, further modification was allowed in the interim order. A stay vacating petition was also filed in the First Appeal which was dismissed vide order dated 20.11.2000, as this Court did not find any reason to vacate the interim order of stay of delivery of possession of the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. He submits that as the notice remain unserved to some of the proforma respondents and vide order dated 03.03.2004 in F.A. No. 51 of 1999 (R), this Court was pleased to pass order for issuance of notice upon Respondent Nos. He submits that as the notice remain unserved to some of the proforma respondents and vide order dated 03.03.2004 in F.A. No. 51 of 1999 (R), this Court was pleased to pass order for issuance of notice upon Respondent Nos. 1(a), 4, 5 and 6 who are Respondent Nos. 2, 5, 6 and 7 respectively in the instant case and requisites for service of notice through registered post was directed to be filed within a period of two weeks and it was indicated that failing compliance of order dated 03.03.2004, the appeal shall be dismissed without reference to a bench. 5. Counsel for the petitioner further submits that he has made a statement in Para 12 of the Civil Misc. Petition(petition for restoration) that steps for issuance of notice upon Respondent Nos. 1(a), 4, 5 and 6 could not be taken due to inadvertence. Further, a statement has also been made in Para 13 of the Civil Misc. Petition that information regarding steps, which were to be taken in connection with the non-appearing respondents, was communicated to one Advocate, namely, Shri. R. N. Sarkar who was pursuing the matter on behalf of the petitioner, with a request to apprise their present and correct address. Thereafter, no communication was received from the counsel, who subsequently expired about four years back. The counsel submits that as no steps were taken for service of notice upon Respondent Nos. 1(a), 4, 5 and 6 in F. A. No. 51 of 1999 (R), the appeal itself stood dismissed for non-prosecution on 18.03.2004 due to non-compliance of order dated 03.03.2004. He further submits that Opposite Party No. 1 (who was the plaintiff in the suit) is the only contesting party and so far as other respondents to whom the notices were directed to be issued vide order dated 03.03.2004 in F.A. No. 51 of 1999( R) were only proforma defendants in the suit. 6. He submits that the appeal was admitted and stay was granted, the appellant in good faith believed that the stay order in First Appeal No. 51 of 1999 (R) was still continuing. 6. He submits that the appeal was admitted and stay was granted, the appellant in good faith believed that the stay order in First Appeal No. 51 of 1999 (R) was still continuing. He further submits that Opposite Party No. 1 herein had filed an Execution Case No. 15 of 1999 which stood dismissed for default on 24.01.2009 and accordingly, it appears that even the Opposite Party No. 1 herein, was not aware about the dismissal of the First Appeal for non-compliance of order dated 03.03.2004. He submits that subsequently an application for restoration of Execution Case No. 15 of 1999 was filed on 09.12.2009, which gave rise to Misc. Case No. 29 of 2009 and ultimately the execution case was restored vide order dated 14.02.2018, wherein it was mentioned that the First Appeal No. 51 of 1999 (R) has been dismissed for default due to non-compliance of order dated 03.03.2004. 7. Counsel for the petitioner submits that immediately upon knowledge of dismissal of the First Appeal, the petitioner rushed to Ranchi on 15.04.2018 and met his counsel and he was communicated that the appeal has been dismissed for default on 18.03.2004. Thereafter, the steps were taken by the petitioner for filing the instant restoration application which was drafted and filed vide affidavit dated 4th July, 2018. The counsel submits that in the meantime, there was intervening summer vacation also. He submits that a petition for condonation of delay in filing the application for restoration has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 being I.A. No. 7157 of 2018 and a prayer has been made for condonation of delay of 5191 days in preferring the petition for restoration and the aforesaid facts explaining the delay in filing the application for restoration of first appeal has also been mentioned in this petition for condonation of delay. 8. Counsel for the petitioner further submits that it is apparent that the execution case pursuant to the decree is still pending and has remained dismissed for non-prosecution till 14.02.2018 and accordingly, not much water has flown in spite of dismissal of the First Appeal on 18.03.2004. 8. Counsel for the petitioner further submits that it is apparent that the execution case pursuant to the decree is still pending and has remained dismissed for non-prosecution till 14.02.2018 and accordingly, not much water has flown in spite of dismissal of the First Appeal on 18.03.2004. He submits that once the First Appeal was admitted and interim order was passed in favour of the appellant and the execution proceeding was also stayed, therefore, under such circumstances, the appellant did not approach the High Court to find out the status of the case under an impression as stay order was continuing. However, as soon as the petitioner came to know about the dismissal of the First Appeal through the restoration of the execution case, he immediately rushed to the High Court for the needful and was ultimately advised to file the instant restoration application. He further submits that there was no intention and deliberate latches on the part of the petitioner in pursuing the First Appeal and rather due to the communication gap and lack of information, steps could not be taken for restoration of First Appeal No. 51 of 1999 (R). He submits that the action of the petitioner is bonafide and if the appeal is not restored to its original position, then it shall cause serious prejudice to the petitioner. It has also been mentioned in the application for restoration that the appellant in First Appeal has a very good prima facie case and considering all the aspects of the matter, the First Appeal was admitted and interim order was passed. He also submits that after restoration of Execution Case No. 15 of 1999, decree holder is taking steps for issuance of writ of delivery of possession and if the same is allowed, the petitioner will be evicted from his house. He submits that the action of the petitioner is bona fide and accordingly delays in filing the application for restoration be condoned and the application for restoration of first appeal be allowed and he is ready to bear any cost in order to compensate for the respondents for inconvenience, which has been caused to the respondents. Counsel for the petitioner further submits that he is also ready to argue the first appeal on any day that may be fixed by this Court. 9. Counsel for the petitioner further submits that he is also ready to argue the first appeal on any day that may be fixed by this Court. 9. He has referred a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 (N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy) to submit that acceptability of explanation for the delay is the sole criterion, length of delay is not important. It has also held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment that in absence of anything showing mala fide or deliberate delay as a dilatory tactic, court should normally condone the delay. 10. Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, submits that there is enormous delay of 5191 days in filing the application for restoration of First Appeal No. 51 of 1999 (R). He submits that there is no proper explanation for condonation of delay. He refers to his reply to the limitation petition and has made specific reference at Para 9 of his reply, and he submits that although the petitioner has stated that he had sent information to the concerned Advocate Mr. R. N. Sarkar, but the petitioner has not annexed any letter by which he had sent information to the concerned Advocate. Moreover, the appellants’ Advocates of First Appeal No. 51 of 1999 (R) were appearing on his behalf on the basis of Vakalatnama executed by them and as such the appellants’ Advocate have direct responsibility to his client to inform them about the development of the case and it is nowhere stated that Mr. R. N. Sarkar, Advocate was the pairvikar of the appellant. Further, the petitioner has not stated that what was the mode of communication of the order passed by this Court in F.A. No. 51 of 1999 (R) to Mr. R. N. Sarkar, Advocate. The petitioner has not annexed any letter duly sent to Advocate Mr. Sarkar by registered Post or by any other mode. Therefore, vague ground has been formulated for condoning the delay caused in filing the application for restoration and in this background the Respondent No. 1 has denied the statement made by the petitioner in Para 6 of the petition for condonation of delay. 11. Sarkar by registered Post or by any other mode. Therefore, vague ground has been formulated for condoning the delay caused in filing the application for restoration and in this background the Respondent No. 1 has denied the statement made by the petitioner in Para 6 of the petition for condonation of delay. 11. Counsel for the respondents further submits that it is totally incorrect and wrong to state that due to lack of such information and communication gap, the steps for service of notice could not be taken. The statements regarding lack of information and communication gap totally proves about the negligence and latches on the part of the appellant and there is no sufficient ground to condone the delay. He further submits that he had made a specific statement that the affidavit in the instant case has been sworn by Nimai Ghosh i.e. petitioner himself and the reasons have been formulated in connection with someone else i.e. Mr. R. N. Sarkar, Advocate and the petitioner is taking excuse by making statement in connection with the person, though an Advocate, who is no more in the world. He further submits that at Para 15 of the reply it has been stated that there is no explanation by the petitioner for a period from 18.03.2004 to 15.04.2018 and it proves his gross negligence and latches in pursuing his First Appeal and further there is no proper explanation for delay from 15.04.2018 to 25.06.2018. He further submits that there has been gross negligence on the part of the petitioner and there is no proper explanation for condonation of delay and the appellant had practically abandoned the First Appeal and did not take care of his case for long 14 years. 12. Counsel for the respondents has relied upon a judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 (Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others) and has referred to Para 21 of the said judgment to submit that the principles in connection with condonation of delay has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He refers to Judgment reported in (2015) 1 SCC 680 (H. Dohil Constructions Company Private Limited vs. Nahar Exports Limited and Another) and (2005) 3 SCC 752 (STATE OF NAGALAND VS. He refers to Judgment reported in (2015) 1 SCC 680 (H. Dohil Constructions Company Private Limited vs. Nahar Exports Limited and Another) and (2005) 3 SCC 752 (STATE OF NAGALAND VS. LIPOK AO AND OTHERS) and submits that it has been held in Para 10 that there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior motive. He has relied upon another judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 (POSTMASTER GENERAL AND OTHERS VS. LIVING MEDIA INDIA LIMITED AND ANOTHER) and submitted that it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that in absence of any plausible and acceptable explanation, a question is posed as to why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party. 13. The principles governing the judicious approach in connection with condonation of delay has been laid down and summarized in the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 para 21 and 22 which is quoted as follows: “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1. There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6.It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. 21.6.It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9.The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. The entire gamut of facts is to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present-day scenario. They are: 22.1. An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. 22.2. An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 14. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2015) 1 SCC 680 the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment has been followed. 15. In the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2001) 6 SCC 176 the fact of the case was that unaware of the passing of the decree against him, the appellant could not take any proceeding in the form of an appeal or for setting it aside and he came to know about the passing of the decree only when he received the notice for execution proceedings initiated by the respondent. The appellant thereafter filed an application for setting aside the ex parte decree along with an application for condoning the delay. The trial court rejected the prayer of the appellant for condoning the delay of 554 days in filing the application for setting aside ex parte decree. Aggrieved by the order of the trial court, the appellant filed a revision petition in the High Court which was dismissed vide the order impugned before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in appeal. In the said judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered that when an appellant prefers an appeal beyond the period of limitation prescribed, he must show that he acted diligently and that there was some reason which prevented him from preferring the appeal during the period of limitation prescribed. The Supreme Court has also considered that in construing Section 5 of the limitation Act, 1963 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan: ‘Section 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words “sufficient cause” receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant.’ The Hon’ble Supreme Court also observed that the expression “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays be condoned in the interest of justice where gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is not imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. Law of limitation has been enacted to serve the interests of justice and not to defeat it. Acceptability of explanation for the delay is the sole criterion and length of delay is not relevant. In the absence of anything showing mala fide or deliberate delay as a dilatory tactic, the court should normally condone the delay. However, in such a case the court should also keep in mind the constant litigation expenses incurred or to be incurred by the opposite party and should compensate him accordingly. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. However, in such a case the court should also keep in mind the constant litigation expenses incurred or to be incurred by the opposite party and should compensate him accordingly. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter; acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion. In the said case even though the appellant appeared not to be as vigilant as he ought to have been, yet his conduct did not, on the whole, warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. It was observed that he should have been more vigilant but his failure to adopt such extra vigilance should not have been made a ground for ousting him from the litigation with respect to the property, concededly to be valuable. The inconvenience caused to any party for the delay can be compensated by awarding appropriate and exemplary costs. 16. In the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (1987) 1987' corrected as 1998'. 7 SCC 123 (N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy) it was held in para 8 onwards as follows:- “8. The appellant’s conduct does not on the whole warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. What he did in defending the suit was not very much far from what a litigant would broadly do. Of course, it may be said that he should have been more vigilant by visiting his advocate at short intervals to check up the progress of the litigation. But during these days when everybody is fully occupied with his own avocation of life an omission to adopt such extra vigilance need not be used as a ground to depict him as a litigant not aware of his responsibilities, and to visit him with drastic consequences. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So, a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finislitium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” 17. This case is required to be examined by applying the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgments with particular reference to the following principles laid down in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee (supra) :- “21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.” 18. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.” 18. This Court finds following admitted facts: - (a) The suit involved in this case is the suit for specific performance of contract. (b) The sequence of events is as follows:- 01.05.1999 Title Suit No. 35 of 1996 was decreed 19.05.1999 First Appeal No. 51 of 1999 (R) was filed 26.07.1999 First Appeal was admitted and notices were issued. 23.09.1999 After hearing the parties execution of the aforesaid decree passed in Title Suit was stayed 13.01.2000 Stay order was modified. 02.02.2000 Stay order was further modified. 20.11.2000 03.03.2004 The petition for vacating the stay was rejected. on 03.03.2004 and notices were issued upon Respondent Nos. 1(a), 4, 5 and 6 in the first appeal, requisites for service of notice through registered post was directed to be filed within a period of two weeks and it was indicated that failing compliance of order dated 03.03.2004, the appeal shall dismiss. 18.03.2004 no steps were taken for service of notice upon Respondent Nos. 1(a), 4, 5 and 6 and accordingly, the appeal itself stood dismissed for non-prosecution on 18.03.2004 due to non-compliance of order dated 03.03.2004. 24.01.2009 In spite of dismissal of the first appeal on 18.03.2004, Execution Case No. 15 of 1999 was dismissed for default on 24.01.2009. 14.02.2018 The application for restoration of execution case was filed, which was restored. It is the specific case of the petitioner herein that the petitioner came to know about the case having been dismissed for default, when order dated 14.02.2018 was passed restoring the Execution Case No. 15 of 1999 and thereafter he came to Ranchi and contacted his lawyer and ultimately, he was informed by his counsel that the case has been dismissed for default. Thereafter, he came to Ranchi on 30.06.2018 and filed an application for restoration of the First Appeal vide affidavit dated 04.07.2018. Counter affidavit has been filed only to the petition for condonation of delay and no counter affidavit has been filed in the petition for restoration of the first appeal. Thereafter, he came to Ranchi on 30.06.2018 and filed an application for restoration of the First Appeal vide affidavit dated 04.07.2018. Counter affidavit has been filed only to the petition for condonation of delay and no counter affidavit has been filed in the petition for restoration of the first appeal. Opposite Party No. 3,5 and 7 in the C.M.P expired on 14.04.2012, 26.03.2006 and 26.09.2008 respectively and they have been directed to be deleted from the cause title of C.M.P. No. 298 of 2018 vide order dated 01.05.2019. 19. This Court finds that so far as the Advocate is concerned, it has been specifically stated in Para 12 of the petition for restoration that steps for issuance of notice upon Respondent Nos. 1(a), 4, 5 and 6 pursuant to order dated 03.03.2004 in first appeal could not be taken due to inadvertence. There is no dispute that the appeal stood dismissed on account of non-compliance of order dated 03.03.2004. 20. This Court finds that after the dismissal of the first appeal for non-compliance of order dated 03.03.2004 proper steps were not taken by the counsel for the petitioner to communicate the order directly to the petitioner so as to enable the petitioner to take steps for restoration of the first appeal and at the same time the petitioner also never approached the counsel to find out about the status of his case. This Court further finds that the status quo was maintained in connection with the property as the execution case was not pursued by the respondent which stood dismissed in the year 2009 and was restored only in the month of February 2018. The respondent has not raised any plea that any investment etc. was made in connection with the property so as to cause prejudice to the respondent if the first appeal is restored. (c) This Court finds that so far as the petitioner is concerned, a specific stand has been taken that he came to know about the dismissal of the first appeal when the execution case was restored on 14.02.2018 and thereafter he rushed to Ranchi on 15.04.2018 to meet his counsel who confirmed that the case has been dismissed for default on 18.03.2004 .The petitioner returned and came on 25.06.2018 and filed the petition for restoration of the first appeal. This Court finds that it is not the case of the respondent that the petitioner had prior knowledge about the dismissal of the first appeal. The statement of the petitioner that the petitioner that he came to know about the dismissal of the case on default when the execution case was restored on 14.02.2018 has not been denied by the opposite parties. It is not even the case of the opposite parties that the conduct of the petitioner or his counsel is not bonafide or that petitioner or his counsel had undertaken any dilatory tactic in the matter and the petitioner has gained in any manner whatsoever by not approaching this Court in filing the application for restoration of the first appeal within the stipulated time. 21. This Court finds that the specific plea of the opposite parties in reply to the petition for condonation of delay is that the petitioner was totally negligent, in as much as, it was his duty to approach this Court and find out about the status of the case. Further case of the opposite parties is that the plea of the advocate of the petitioner writing letter to another advocate who in turn expired about 4 years back has no basis and is not supported by any document and it is the client who directly engages an advocate. In the instant case, this Court finds that in the entire counter affidavit which has been filed by the respondent, there is no allegation regarding lack of bonafide on the part of the concerned Advocate or on the part of the petitioner. (d) This Court finds that so far as petitioner is concerned, once the case was admitted for final hearing, interim order was passed, there was no occasion for the petitioner to approach the High Court time and again, as it is common knowledge that once the First Appeal is admitted, the same is taken up for final hearing after a long time. This Court also finds that the very fact the execution case was itself dismissed for default in the year 2009 i.e. after five years of the dismissal of the First Appeal, itself indicates that even the opposite party No. 1 herein was not aware about the dismissal of the First Appeal and accordingly no steps were taken even in the execution proceeding and ultimately the execution proceeding stood restored only in the year 2018. In such circumstances, this Court finds that although there is enormous delay in filing the application for restoration, but no development had taken place in connection with execution of the decree since the execution proceeding was restored only in the year 2018. It is the specific plea of the petitioner in para 11 of the petition for condonation of delay that the petitioner was in good faith that the stay order passed by the High Court was continuing. This statement of the petitioner has not been denied in the counter affidavit. 22. Accordingly, this Court finds that in spite of dismissal of the First Appeal, no major development had taken place in connection with the rights of the parties, as the execution case did not proceed at least till 2018. This Court is of the considered view that in such circumstances, in spite of enormous delay, no prejudice will be caused to the opposite parties, if the First Appeal is restored to its original file and is taken up on merits. This Court finds that valuable property is involved in this case and ends of justice will not be served, if this First Appeal is not restored to its original file. This Court finds that certainly, the opposite party No. 1 herein is required to be compensated for the action/non-action on the part of the petitioner even if such action / non action was not deliberate on the part of the petitioner. 23. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2015) 1 SCC 680 the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment was followed and it was found that condonation of delay had caused serious prejudice to the appellant as huge investments were made by the appellant to upkeep the property and various other improvements made in the property during the period wherein the delay in the matter of filing of the appeals and refiling was made by the respondents. In this back ground it was observed that therefore, the principle that the law of limitation is based on a sound public policy and therefore in the absence of bona fide reasons the applications for condonation of delay should be strictly construed assumes significance. In the said case the defects in connection with the proceedings were not removed and there was delay in the matter of filing of the appeals and refiling. The said case also arose out of a proceedings for specific performance of contract and the court had allowed damages instead of asking the defendant to execute sale deed and an appeal was filed which remained defective due to gross negligence of the party as the defects were not removed and there was delay in the matter of filing of the appeal and refiling. By applying those principles of Bhattacharjee case it was held that the failure of the respondents in not showing due diligence in filing of the appeals and the enormous time taken in the refiling was construed, in the absence of any valid explanation, as gross negligence and lacking in bona fides as displayed on the part of the respondents. In the instant case the appellant has given cogent explanation for not filing the application for restoration of the first appeal in time as during the period of delay right from 18.3.2004 till February 2018 the petitioner was not aware about the dismissal of the appeal. This fact is not disputed by the respondents. The case of the respondents is that the petitioner was negligent in not approaching the High Court and / or his counsel to find out the status of the case. This aspect of the matter has been explained by the petitioner by stating that the petitioner was under the bonafide impression that the stay was continuing. The explanation appears to be genuine as the execution case itself remained dismissed till February 2018. This aspect of the matter has been explained by the petitioner by stating that the petitioner was under the bonafide impression that the stay was continuing. The explanation appears to be genuine as the execution case itself remained dismissed till February 2018. Further it is apparent from the facts of this case that even the respondent No.1 was not aware about dismissal of the first appeal as in spite of dismissal of appeal , no steps were taken for the execution of the decree of specific performance of contract which was granted by the trial court and the execution was dismissed for default in the year 2009 and was restored only in the month of February 2018.Accordingly this judgment as relied upon by the respondent does not help the respondent and rather the principle on which the case has been decided , is in favour of the petitioner. 24. So far as the judgment which has been relied upon by the counsel for the respondents passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752 (State of Nagaland vs. Lipok Ao and others) is concerned, this Court finds that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior motive. It has also been held that in another Judgment reported in (1979) 4 SCC 365 that mistake committed by the counsel could be bona fide. In the instant case, this Court finds that in the entire counter affidavit which has been filed by the opposite party, there is no allegation regarding lack of bonafide on the part of the concerned Advocate or on the part of the petitioner although some of the facts stated by the petitioner has been denied on account of want of any supporting documents. The fact that the conducting advocate in the court below was one Mr. Sarkar who died about four years back is also not in dispute. Accordingly, the judgment which has been relied upon by the opposite party, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752 (State of Nagaland vs. Lipok Ao and others) does not help the opposite party in any manner. 25. Sarkar who died about four years back is also not in dispute. Accordingly, the judgment which has been relied upon by the opposite party, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752 (State of Nagaland vs. Lipok Ao and others) does not help the opposite party in any manner. 25. This court finds that in this case also as in the case reported in (2001) 6 SCC 176 even though the petitioner appeared not to be as vigilant as he ought to have been, yet his conduct did not, on the whole, warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. It was observed that he should have been more vigilant but his failure to adopt such extra vigilance should not be made a ground for ousting him from the litigation with respect to the property, which valuable. The inconvenience caused to any party for the delay can be compensated by awarding appropriate and exemplary costs. 26. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid findings and after being satisfied that “sufficient cause” has been shown to condone the delay in filing the application for restoration of the first appeal, this Court is inclined to condone the delay in filing the application for restoration of first appeal. Accordingly, I.A NO. 7157 of 2018 is hereby allowed. 27. So far as the main C.M.P is concerned, this Court finds that the fact stated by the petitioner that the notice in terms of order dated 03.03.2004 could not be filed by the advocate due to inadvertence is not in dispute. This court does not find any lack of bonafide on the part of the petitioner or the advocate and it appears to be a bonafide mistake. As already held above, serious prejudice will be caused to the petitioner if the first appeal is not restored to its original file. This Court also finds that vide order dated 01.05.2019 the names of respondent no Respondent No. 3 (Nitai Ghosh); Respondent No. 5 (Amita Ghosh) and Respondent No. 7 (Gita Ghosh) have been deleted on account of their death, therefore the first appeal can be restored only against the existing opposite parties. Accordingly, the First Appeal No. 51/99 is directed to be restored to its original file as against the present opposite parties. A cost of Rs. Accordingly, the First Appeal No. 51/99 is directed to be restored to its original file as against the present opposite parties. A cost of Rs. 1,50,000/- is to be paid by the petitioner within a period of one week by way of demand draft to the Respondent No. 1 through his advocate, namely Mr. Prabhash Kumar, who is representing him in this case. 28. If the receipt regarding tendering of the demand draft in the name of Respondent No. 1 through his Advocate is filed in the registry, then the first appeal is directed to be posted on 18.05.2019 for ‘Orders’. 29. Accordingly, this C.M.P No. 298 of 2018 as well as I.A. No. 7157 of 2018 are allowed.