NARAYANI DEBI DHANANTA @ AGARWAL v. SAWAR DHANANIA
2019-01-18
MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J. 1. The defendant no.10 in the instant suit prays for a final decree in the instant suit in terms of a Report dated 20th December 2017 filed by the learned Commissioner of Partition, who was appointed by way of a preliminary decree dated 20th April, 2005. 2. The instant suit is one for declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to 1/4th share in the premises No. 46 Shakespeare Sarani, Kolkata-17 and for partition of the said premises as described in a Schedule annexed to the plaint together with allotment of the respective divided shares to the parties. There have been various changes in the status of the defendants since 2002 (when the suit was filed) and the only contesting parties today are the plaintiff no. 3 and the defendant no.10. The defendant no.10 claims to have purchased the shares of the other material defendants in relation to the premises in question. A brief statement of the factual background in which the defendant no.10 has made a prayer for decreeing the suit, should first be stated. 3. A preliminary decree was passed on 2oth April 2005 appointing a Commissioner of Partition to partition the property in four equal parts together with a direction to appoint a Surveyor/Valuer for that purpose. 4. By an order dated 15th March 2013, the defendant no.10 was added as a party in the suit on the basis that the defendant no.10 has purchased the shares of some of the co-owners of the property. It was further recorded in the order that the defendant no.10 had earlier filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement dated 13th October 1982 being C.S. No. 619 of 1985 wherein a consent decree was passed on 29th April 2004. In terms of the consent decree, the co-owners were to receive consideration as stated in the consent decree and the defendant no.10 (described as petitioner in the order dated 15th March 2013) came to hold the shares of the defendant nos. 1, 2, 5, 7 and 9 aggregating to 58.33% share in the said property. By reason of the aforesaid, the defendant no.10 became the owner of an undivided 97.73% in the property.
1, 2, 5, 7 and 9 aggregating to 58.33% share in the said property. By reason of the aforesaid, the defendant no.10 became the owner of an undivided 97.73% in the property. The preliminary decree dated 20th April 2015 records that the defendant no.10 bought the shares of the plaintiffs as well as the defendants except the share of the plaintiff no.3 to the extent of 2.27% of the property being the subject matter of the instant partition suit. 5. By an order dated 3rd August 2015, the instant suit was directed to proceed for adjudication regarding passing of a final decree pursuant to the preliminary decree dated 20th April 2005. In this order, a suit filed by the plaintiff no.3 claiming for pre-emption in relation to 25% or 1/4th of the property was taken note of and it was further noted that the partition of the property would proceed leaving aside 25% of the property for adjudication of the suit for preemption filed by the plaintiff no.3. 6. The defendant no.10 filed an application thereafter for partitioning the property in the ratio of 97.73%; 2.27% in which an order was passed on 15th October 2015 whereby the learned Commissioner of Partition was directed to partition the property by metes and bounds keeping aside 25% of the property as claimed in the suit for pre-emption filed y the plaintiff no.3. The order records that no one appeared on behalf of the plaintiff no.3 to oppose the application. 7. The plaintiff no.3 challenged the above order and by an order dated 19th January 2016, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. 8. In the meantime, the plaintiff no.3 filed an appeal from an order passed in an execution proceeding whereby a Division Bench of this Court on 19th April 2016 had been pleased to direct the learned Commissioner of Partition to complete the partition of the property by metes and bounds in terms of the order dated 3rd August 2015 within a period of four weeks. The Division Bench further directed that the shares in the property would have to be demarcated by way of 25% and 75% keeping in view the outcome of the pre-emption suit filed by the plaintiff no.3. 9.
The Division Bench further directed that the shares in the property would have to be demarcated by way of 25% and 75% keeping in view the outcome of the pre-emption suit filed by the plaintiff no.3. 9. The learned Commissioner of Partition thereafter engaged on approved Valuer and prepared his Report taking into account the valuation of the property and of the property was partitioned under two schemes. The Report dated 20th March, 2017 was filed in this court which was recorded by way of an order dated 23rd March, 2017. The learned Commissioner was directed to circulate the Report amongst the parties and the parties were directed to take appropriate steps in relation to the Report. 10. The plaintiff no.3 took exception to the Report on inter-alia the basis that the learned Commissioner did not partition the property in four equal parts and did not consider the objection of the plaintiff no.3 as well as the belting method applied for partitioning the property. The application taking exception to the Report was dismissed by an order dated 10th August 2017 which was corrected by two later orders dated 17th August 2017 and 23rd August 2017. The effect of these orders was that the valuer had given an option to the plaintiff no.3 to either take the front or the rear portion of the land and that the plaintiff had been given a choice to either accept Scheme I or Scheme II. It was also pointed out that the basis of the valuation was reasonable since the valuation of the front portion would be higher than that of the rear portion which in turn determined the allocation of area to the plaintiff no.3. It was further noted that the plaintiff no.3 would be entitled to 25% share in the property if it succeeds in the pre-emption suit. The stand of the plaintiff no.3 in a meeting held on 8th February 2017 in respect of the front and rear portion of the property was also recorded in the order dated 17th August 2017. 11. Thereafter, the learned Commissioner fixed 11th November 2017, as the date for partition of the property. The minutes of the meeting recorded by the learned Commissioner records that despite notice, the plaintiff no.3 did not appear either himself or through his representative.
11. Thereafter, the learned Commissioner fixed 11th November 2017, as the date for partition of the property. The minutes of the meeting recorded by the learned Commissioner records that despite notice, the plaintiff no.3 did not appear either himself or through his representative. The minutes also record that the process of demarcation was started at 11.20 a.m. and completed at 12.15 p.m. and was done on a 75%-25% basis. Photographs were taken by the learned Commissioner and the keys of the locks falling within the 75% were handed over to the defendant no.10. The Final Report dated 20th December 2017 on the basis of the property being partitioned by metes and bounds, was filed on 9th January 2018 and recorded by an order was passed of the same day recording the said fact. 12. The plaintiff no.3 challenged the order dated 10th August 2017 as corrected by orders dated 17th August 2017 and 23rd August 2017 by which inter-alia the exception taken to the Report dated 20th March 2017 had been rejected. The Report of the Commissioner dated 20th December 2017 was also part of the appeal. The appeal was dismissed by an order dated 16th August 2018. 13. Mr. Sudip Deb, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff no.3, submits that since no Special Leave Petition (SLP) has been filed and that a final decree in the instant suit may be passed leaving aside 25% for the plaintiff no.3. He relies on the two schemes and the sketch map appearing as part of the valuer's Report and suggests that lot B proposed to be kept aside in Scheme I on the right hand side of the front portion of the property may be changed by keeping aside 25% on the left hand side in the front portion of the property. Mr. Deb further submits that this would have been suggested to the Commissioner of Partition had the plaintiff no.3 appeared before the Commissioner on the day when the property was partitioned. Counsel further points out that there is a difference of 638.9 square feet in the calculation of 25% share in lot B of Scheme I and lot B of Scheme II. 14. Mr. Rajeev Jain, learned counsel for the defendant no.10 vehemently opposes the contentions of Mr.
Counsel further points out that there is a difference of 638.9 square feet in the calculation of 25% share in lot B of Scheme I and lot B of Scheme II. 14. Mr. Rajeev Jain, learned counsel for the defendant no.10 vehemently opposes the contentions of Mr. Deb and submits that after dismissal of the application filed by the plaintiff no.3 in the Division Bench and no SLP having been filed thereafter, no further reasons can remain for rejecting the prayer of the defendant no.10 to have the suit decreed in terms of the last Report. 15. The prayer of the defendant no.10 for passing a final decree on the basis of the Report of the Commissioner dated 20th December 2017 has been resisted over a substantial period of time by the plaintiff no.3, on the ground that the plaintiff no.3 was contemplating filing a Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court from the dismissal of the appeal filed by the plaintiff no.3 by the order dated 16th August 2018. Several opportunities were given to the plaintiff no.3 to test the order of the Division Bench and the order was adjourned from time to time on that basis. 16. I have considered the submissions of counsel appearing for the defendant no.10 and the plaintiff no.3. Shorn of any complexities of division, the fact remains that the learned Commissioner of Partition had been appointed in terms of the preliminary decree dated 20th April 2005 for partitioning the property in four equal parts and for appointing a valuer for that purpose. Several orders were passed thereafter for partitioning the property in question and even as far back as in 2015, the suit was directed to proceed for adjudication by passing a final decree pursuant to the preliminary decree. There have been at least four orders by which the learned Commissioner was directed to partition the property by metes and bounds pursuant to which the learned Commissioner, with the help of the valuer, filed his Report on 23rd March 2017. It is correct that the plaintiff no.3 took exception to such Report on various grounds but such application was dismissed by orders passed in August 2017.
It is correct that the plaintiff no.3 took exception to such Report on various grounds but such application was dismissed by orders passed in August 2017. By these orders, it was noted by Hon'ble Justice Soumen Sen that the Report was a "very well considered Report" and that there was no reason to interfere with such Report and further that the basis of the plaintiff no.3's taking exception to the Report was flawed. 17. Pursuant to the three orders passed in August 2017, the learned Commissioner proceeded to partition the property into parts by metes and bounds. It is not that the plaintiff no.3 was not put on notice by the Commissioner. In fact, the minutes of meeting held by the Commissioner on 11 November 2017, specifically records that the plaintiff no.3 chose to remain unrepresented. As stated above, the plaintiff no.3 chose to challenge the orders dated 10 August 2017, 17 August 2017, 23 August 2017 almost a year after the said orders were passed and after the Report of the Commissioner dated 20 December 2017 was directed to be circulated amongst the parties or 9 January 2018. The appeal Court recorded that the grounds made out by the plaintiff no.3 were completely insufficient and that there was no explanation for the delay of over 11 months in preferring the said appeal. Although aggrieved by the order of dismissal by the Appeal Court, the plaintiff no.3 did not challenge the said order by way of a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. 18. Therefore, as things stand today, the Reports of the Commissioner of Partition dated 20th March, 2017 and 20th December 2017, have attained finality and there is no impediment in fact and in law to pass a final decree in terms of the said Reports. 19. The suggestions put forward by Mr. Deb for considering an alternative site for keeping aside the 25% of the share of the plaintiff no.3's share was taken into account in the order dated 17th August 2017, where the fact of the plaintiff no.3 being given two options in respect of the front and rear portion of the premises was recorded in the order. By the said order, the right of the plaintiff no.3 was restricted to 25% share in the property in the event the plaintiff no.3 succeeds in the pre-emption suit filed by it.
By the said order, the right of the plaintiff no.3 was restricted to 25% share in the property in the event the plaintiff no.3 succeeds in the pre-emption suit filed by it. The only option exercised by the plaintiff and as mentioned in the order dated 17th August 2017 is that the plaintiff no.3 was willing to accept the front portion of the land without the belting method and in the event he was allotted the back portion, then the belting method would have to be used. The second submission was that the plaintiff no.3 sought to have a common passage carved out from the two Lots. The difference in the valuation of the front portion being higher than that of the rear portion was also found thus; "the basis does not appear to be either arbitrary or unreasonable". 20. There are three reasons for this Court not being in a position to accept the proposal of Mr. Deb. First, the proposal could have been made to the Commissioner before the property was partitioned. The plaintiff no.3, despite being informed by notice of such meeting, did not appear or have himself represented. Second, the Report of the Commissioner dated 20th March, 2017 was the subject-matter of challenge in the appeal filed by the plaintiff from the order dated 10th August 2017 (as corrected by two later orders). The appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench. Third, demarcating the 25% in Scheme I and lot B by shifting the area from the right hand side to the left hand side in the front portion of the property would be contrary to the Report of the Commissioner dated 20th March 2017 as well as the Report of the Surveyor dated 26th September 2016 by which the property was partitioned by way of Scheme I and Scheme II, and both the schemes divided into lot A and Lot B. The conduct of the plaintiff no.3 is also required to be mentioned. The Commissioner records in his Report of 20th December, 2017 of at least two attempts made by the plaintiff no.3 to slow-down the partition of the property by seeking unnecessary adjournments. As stated above, the Report dated 20th March 2017 had been challenged by the plaintiff no.3 and the exception dismissed both by the learned Single Judge as well as by the Appeal court.
As stated above, the Report dated 20th March 2017 had been challenged by the plaintiff no.3 and the exception dismissed both by the learned Single Judge as well as by the Appeal court. Permitting such an alteration of the demarcated area would therefore open up the disputed issues once again despite orders of court. 21. The appointment of the Commissioner of Partition and the role given to him would be best explained by a decision cited by counsel appearing for the defendant no.10; Prasad Bubna Vs. Sita Saran Bubna & Ors. reported in, (2009) 9 SCC 689 , where the Supreme Court held that once a court passes a preliminary decree, it is a duty of the court to ensure that the matter is referred to a Commissioner for Division unless the parties themselves agree as to the manner of division. The relevant paragraph from the decision is set out below: "The function of making a partition or separation according to the rights declared by the preliminary decree (in regard to non-agricultural immovable properties and movables) is entrusted to a Commissioner, as it involves inspection of the property and examination of various alternatives with reference to practical utility and site conditions. When the Commissioner gives his report as to the manner of division, the proposals contained in the report are considered by the court; and after hearing objections to the report, if any, the court passes a final decree whereby the relief sought in the suit is granted by separating the property by metes and bounds. It is also possible that if the property is incapable of proper division, the court may direct sale thereof and distribution of the proceeds as per the shares declared." Although this decision was more concerned with whether a litigant after securing a preliminary decree, would have to file an application for final decree, the Supreme Court was of the view that the focus of a court should be on the early disposal of cases and securing relief for the party who has approached the court. It was held that no application for a final decree is called for (and not contemplated under the provisions of The Code of Civil Procedure either).
It was held that no application for a final decree is called for (and not contemplated under the provisions of The Code of Civil Procedure either). Although this decision was cited at the very beginning on the issue whether the defendant no.10 would be required to file a separate application for final decree, there are several passages which serve as effective reminders as to the duty of courts to expedite the process of dispute resolution. 22. In view of the above, the defendant no.10 will be entitled to a final decree in terms of the Report of the Commissioner of Partition dated 20th December, 2017. The property will thus be divided by metes and bounds as per Scheme II of the preliminary Report dated 20th March 2017 in two Lots as indicated in the Plan and the relevant photographs annexed to the Report. 23. The Report of the Commissioner of Partition dated 20th December 2017 is hereby confirmed and C.S. 148 of 2002 is decreed in terms of the said Report. The decree should be expeditiously drawn up and completed. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be delivered to Counsel for the plaintiff, upon compliance of all the usual formalities.