JUDGMENT : The petitioner had preferred the writ petition for the following reliefs:- “I. Issue a writ, order of direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the summons issued by the DRT, Dehradun in pursuance of T.A. No. 428 of 2018 (old OA No. 578 of 2015, DRT, Lucknow) filed by the bank, as the summons have been issued without application of mind. II. Issue a writ order of direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the entire proceedings of the T.A. No. 428 of 2018 (old OA No. 578 of 2015, DRT, Lucknow). III. Issue any other writ order or direction, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. IV. Award the cost of the writ petition in favour of the petitioner.” 2. As a matter of fact, the challenge given by the petitioner in the writ petition, was to the summons, which have been issued to the petitioner in T.A. Case No. 428 of 2018, The South Indian Bank Ltd. Vs. Manoj Kumar R. & Ors. after its transfer from the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT), Lucknow. 3. The writ petition was heard on merits on 11.10.2018 and the same was dismissed as being against the summons for appearance, granting liberty to the petitioner to the following effect:- “7. The liberty, as sought for by the petitioner, is granted. Accordingly, it is left open for the petitioner that, after putting in appearance, she may raise her preliminary objection and once she raises the issue with regard to the maintainability of the proceedings, the same would be decided first and then only the matter would be adjudicated on merits.” 4. It is the said judgment of dismissal dated 11.10.2018 which is being sought to be reviewed by the respondent No. 2 by filing a Review Application No. 6 of 2019, supported with a Delay Condonation Application No. 92 of 2019, reporting thereof that there has chanced delay of 42 days in preferring this review petition. 5. It is the said judgment of dismissal dated 11.10.2018 which is being sought to be reviewed by the respondent No. 2 by filing a Review Application No. 6 of 2019, supported with a Delay Condonation Application No. 92 of 2019, reporting thereof that there has chanced delay of 42 days in preferring this review petition. 5. An objection has been filed by the petitioner on the Delay Condonation Application; but, on going through the averments made in the objection to the Delay Condonation Application, which the petitioner had sought to support the objection by placing on record the order sheet and the manner in which the proceedings has been drawn by DRT, Dehradun, this Court is inclined to allow the Delay Condonation Application as the delay has been satisfactorily explained by the review applicant. Consequently, the delay of 42 days which has been reported by the Registry would stand condoned and the Delay Condonation Application would stand allowed. Counsels for both the parties agreed to address the revision on its merits. 6. The provisions of Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides and deals with the provisions for reviewing an order read as under:- “114. Review. –Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved.- (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.” 7. Section 114 of CPC provides that a review would be tenable at the behest of any parties to the proceedings where he is ‘aggrieved’ by an order. The provision of Section 114 of CPC has to be read with provisions contained under Order 47 of the CPC, which, too happens to be the paramateria provision making a review maintainable at the behest of any parties to the proceedings considering himself to be, ‘aggrieved’ by an order passed by the Court can prefer a review on the limited grounds as again mentioned in the provisions contained under Order 47 of CPC which is quoted hereunder:- “1. Application for review of judgment (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved- (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. 2. To whom applications for review may be made. 3. Form of applications for review The provisions as to the form of preferring appeals shall apply mutates mutandis, to applications for review. 4. Application where rejected (1) Where it appears to the Court that there is not sufficient ground for a review, it shall reject the application. (2) Application where granted- Where the Court is of opinion that the application for review should be granted, it shall grant the same Provided that- (a) no such application shall be granted without previous notice to the opposite party, to enable him to appear and be heard in support of the decree or order, a review of which is applied for; and (b) no such application shall be granted on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence which the applicant alleges was not within his knowledge, or could not be adduced by him when the decree or order was passed or made, without strict proof of such allegation. 5. 5. Application for review in Court consisting of two or more judges Where the Judge or Judges, or any one of the judges, who passed the decree or made the order a review of which is applied for, continues or continued attaches to the Court at the time when the application for a review is presented, and is not or not precluded by absence or other cause for a period of six months next after the application from considering the decree or order to which the application refers, such Judge or Judges or any of them shall hear the application, and no other Judge or Judges of the Court shall hear the same. 6. Application where rejected (1) Where the application for a review is heard by more than one judge and the Court is equally divided, the application shall be rejected. (2) Where there is a majority, the decision shall be according to the opinion of the majority. 7. Order of rejection not appealable. Objections to order granting application (1) An order of the Court rejecting the application shall not be appealable; but an order granting an application may be objected to at once by an appeal from the order granting the application or in an appeal from the decree or order finally passed or made in the suit.] (2) Where the application has been rejected in consequence of the failure of the applicant to appear, he may apply for an order to have the rejected application restored to the file, and, where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when such application was called on for hearing, the Court shall order it to be restored to the file upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for hearing the same. (3) No order shall be made under sub-rule (2) unless notice of the application has been served on the opposite party. 8. Registry of application granted, and order for re-hearing When an application for review is granted, a note thereof shall be made in the register and the Court may at once re-hear the case or make such order in regard to the re-hearing as it thinks fit. 9. 8. Registry of application granted, and order for re-hearing When an application for review is granted, a note thereof shall be made in the register and the Court may at once re-hear the case or make such order in regard to the re-hearing as it thinks fit. 9. Bar of certain application No application to review an order made on an application for a review or a decree or order passed or made on a review shall be entertained.” 8. The present writ petition was dismissed on 11.10.2018 with a direction to the DRT to decide the question of maintainability of the proceedings first and then only the matter would be adjudicated on merits. It is the second part of direction as given by this Court in the judgment on 11.10.2018 is to the effect that – “then only the matter would be adjudicated on merits”, this has been extracted is the ground for seeking review of the judgment dated 11.10.2018. This Court is of the view that invariably, in any proceedings, if a party to the proceedings questions the maintainability, then obviously it is settled law that it goes to the tenability of the proceedings which has to be decided at the earliest even before the Court endeavors to enter into an adjudication of the rival contentions of the parties on the merits of the matter. This Court does not find any anomaly in the said direction as issued by this Court to the DRT, Dehradun to decide the question of maintainability first and then to adjudicate on merits. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent, in support of his contention submits that such a direction ought not to have been issued, the learned counsel for the respondent places reliance on para Nos. 76 to 79 of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court as reported in (2008) 14 Supreme Court Cases 58, Ramesh Chandra Sankla and others Vs. Vikram Cement and others which are quoted hereunder:- 76. This Court dealing with the provisions of Order XIV Rule 2 (prior to the amendment Act of 1976), in Major S.S. Khanna v. Brigadiar F.J. Dillion, (1964) 4 SCR 409 , stated; (AIR pp. Vikram Cement and others which are quoted hereunder:- 76. This Court dealing with the provisions of Order XIV Rule 2 (prior to the amendment Act of 1976), in Major S.S. Khanna v. Brigadiar F.J. Dillion, (1964) 4 SCR 409 , stated; (AIR pp. 502-03, para 18) "18….Under Order 14 Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure, where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law only, it shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been determined. The jurisdiction to try issues of law apart from the issues of fact may be exercised only where in the opinion of the Court the whole suit may be disposed of on the issues of law alone, but the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the Court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as preliminary issues. Normally all the issues in a suit should be tried by the Court; not to do so, especially when the decision on issues even of law depend upon the decision of issues of fact, would result in a lop-sided trial of the suit". (emphasis supplied) 77. The Law Commission also considered the question and did not favour the tendency of deciding some issues as preliminary issues. Dealing with Rule 2 of Order XIV (before the amendment), the Commission stated; "This rule has led to one difficulty. Where a case can be disposed of on a preliminary point (issue) of law, often the courts do not inquire into the merits, with the result that when, on an appeal against the finding on the preliminary issue the decision of the Court on that issue is reversed, the case has to be remanded to the Court of first instance for trial on the other issues. This causes delay. It is considered that this delay should be eliminated, by providing that a court must give judgment on all issues, excepting, of course, where the Court finds that it has no jurisdiction or where the suit is barred by any law for the time being in force". (emphasis supplied) 78. This causes delay. It is considered that this delay should be eliminated, by providing that a court must give judgment on all issues, excepting, of course, where the Court finds that it has no jurisdiction or where the suit is barred by any law for the time being in force". (emphasis supplied) 78. Apart from the fact that the provisions of Code do not stricto sensu apply to ‘industrial adjudication’, even under the Code, after the Amendment Act, 1976, the normal rule is to decide all the issues together in a civil suit. 79. In the case on hand, the contention of the workmen is that the acceptance of the scheme was not with free consent, and even otherwise they were not given all the benefits to which they were entitled under the scheme. Therefore, they continued to remain employees of the Company. The Labour Court felt that the controversy raised by the workmen can only be decided in the light of the evidence before it. The said decision has been confirmed by the Industrial Court as well as by the learned Single Judge. We find no illegality in this approach which deserves interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. We, therefore, see no substance in the contention of the Company.” 10. Rather, in the aforesaid judgment as relied by the respondent and the paragraphs referred were dealing with the implications of Order XIV Rule 2 which was involved for consideration in a judgment reported in para 18 of the judgment as reported in AIR 1964 SC 497 , Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon, the excerpt of which is quoted hereunder:- “18. We are at this stage not expressing any opinion on the question whether the allegations made by Dillon and Khanna are true ; we are only concerned to point out that what was regarded as an issue of law as to maintainability of the suit could only be determined after several questions of fact in dispute between the parties were determined. In proceeding to decide the third issue merely on the pleadings and on the assumption that the allegations made by the defendant in his written statement were true and those made by the plaintiff were not true, and on that footing treating the- joint account as of the common ownership of the two partners, the trial Judge acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction.” 11. The reference which has been made by respondents’ counsel to the Law Commission’s Report, pertaining to the directions issued by the Court for deciding an issue as a preliminary issue was in the light of the controversy which was involved in the case as reported in AIR 1964 SC 497 , Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon which was absolutely as civil dispute inter se between the parties arising out of a partnership agreement which was entered into between the partners of a construction company, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with the implications as referred in para 18 of the judgment was confining itself to the interpretation to the provisions contained under Order XIV Rule 2. Even the language of Order XIV Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under: “Order XIV : Settlement of issues and determination of suit on issues of law or on issues agreed upon 1. Framing of issues (1) ………………. (2) Material propositions are those propositions of law or fact which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence.” 12. The provisions of Order XIV Rule 2, sub Clause (2) of the said Rule 1 provides that when the issue as contained in sub - Clause (1) of Rule 2 of Order XIV, it is to be decided as a preliminary issue which involves both the questions of law or of facts. It is always a prerogative of the Court to try the issue first pertaining to the maintainability which falls into an exclusive domain of the Court, which is ceased with the matter. This Court is of the view that the directions as given in the judgment sought to be reviewed do not entail an implication of the judgments as relied by the respondent-review applicant, hence, this Court does not find any merit on the review application, the same is accordingly dismissed.