JUDGMENT : MANISH PITALE, J. 1. Rule. Heard finally with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties. 2. The petitioner herein, an elected Director and Vice-Chairman of the respondent No.2- Agriculture Produce Market Committee, Dhamangaon Railway, (APMC) has challenged order dated 11.06.2018 passed by the respondent no.1 - District Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, whereby he was removed from the said positions by exercise of power under Section 45(1) of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 1963 (for short “Act”). 3. While issuing notice on the present petition on 20.06.2018, this Court had granted interim relief in favour of the petitioner, as a result of which during the pendency of the present petition, the impugned order has remained stayed and the petitioner has continued to work as Vice-Chairman of the respondent no.2- APMC. 4. The facts leading up to the filing of the present writ petition are that on 27.04.2017, the State of Maharashtra issued a Government Resolution (G.R.) in order to operate a scheme for purchase of Tur Dal in view of large scale production of the same, due to which agriculturists were likely to suffer low rates of return for the said Tur Dal. Under the said G.R., it was decided to have market intervention so as to purchase the Tur Dal at Rs.5050/- per quintal and such purchase from agriculturists was to be undertaken at the purchase centers of the APMCs including the respondent no.2 APMC. A Committee under the chairmanship of Tahsidlar was formed with the Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies, Secretary APMC, Manager, Sub Agent Sansthas and representative of the Marketing Federation/Vidarbha Marketing Federation. This Committee was to supervise the process of purchase of Tur Dal at the said price and the FCI and NAFED were appointed as Nodal Agencies for the same. The scheme was to ensure that the agriculturists would not suffer the vagaries of the market and that they would be ensured return of at least Rs.5050/- per quintal for sale of Tur Dal. The scheme was to ensure that the agriculturists would not suffer the vagaries of the market and that they would be ensured return of at least Rs.5050/- per quintal for sale of Tur Dal. In order to ensure that the said scheme was properly implemented, the Maharashtra State Marketing Federation issued directions so as to ensure that the aforesaid Committee took necessary steps to take care of the interests of the agriculturists and it was provided that action would be taken by the Committee against those interfering in the smooth functioning of the same, including registration of criminal cases against persons found responsible for interfering in implementation of the scheme. The District Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Amravati also issued letter to the Secretary of the respondent no.2 APMC giving the details about the manner in which Tur Dal was to be received from Agriculturists in the Centers of the APMC and tokens were to be issued along with recording of details of the vehicles, as also the vehicle numbers in which the Tur Dal was brought to the center. It was also provided as to the manner in which the details of the 7/12 extracts, addresses and other details of the agriculturists were recorded so that only genuine agriculturists enjoyed the benefit of the aforesaid scheme. The entire effort was to make sure that middlemen and traders were excluded from the purchase of Tur Dal from agriculturists at the aforesaid fixed rate. 5. The entire effort was to make sure that middlemen and traders were excluded from the purchase of Tur Dal from agriculturists at the aforesaid fixed rate. 5. In this backdrop, on 15.07.2017 a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner wherein reference was made to enquiry report of District Marketing Officer, as also report of the Tahasildar and it was alleged that Tur Dal was shown to have been purchased under the aforesaid scheme at the center of respondent no.2 APMC from relatives of the petitioner, wherein procedure prescribed in aforesaid communication was followed and it was found that large amounts of Tur Dal were shown to have been purchased from the relatives of the petitioner, when details regarding the vehicles in which the such Tur Dal was transported were not given and even the details of 7/12 extracts and agriculture fields of the said relatives of the petitioner were not divulged, thereby showing that the Tur Dal shown to have been purchased from the relatives of the petitioner was nothing but purchase of large scale Tur Dal from others and later shown to the credit of the said relatives of the petitioner, thereby causing illegal benefits to them. It was alleged that such activity had been undertaken at the behest and under the pressure of the petitioner, thereby showing that he was liable to be removed from office for having abused and misused his position. 6. The petitioner submitted his reply to the said show cause notice, contending that the reports on which reliance was placed while issuing the show cause notice to him, were never supplied by the respondent no.1. It was further submitted that the petitioner belonged to a family of agriculturists and that being efficient farmers they had been able to produce Tur Dal by having succeeded in yielding the maximum from their agriculture lands and that it was because of records that were negligently maintained by the staff of the respondent no.2 APMC ,that false allegations were being made against him, due to political rivalry. It was contended that principles of natural justice had been violated. 7. On 11.06.2018, the respondent no.1 passed the impugned order removing the petitioner from the said position of Director of the respondent no.2 APMC and consequently as Vice-Chairman of the same. It was contended that principles of natural justice had been violated. 7. On 11.06.2018, the respondent no.1 passed the impugned order removing the petitioner from the said position of Director of the respondent no.2 APMC and consequently as Vice-Chairman of the same. It was found by the respondent no.1 that the material on record demonstrated the manner in which the petitioner had violated the provisions of the aforesaid Act and the Rules framed thereunder, particularly Rule 41(1)(h) of the Rules, thereby making him liable for removal from office. 8. Mr. Anil S. Kilor, learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of the writ petition, submitted that if the scheme contemplated under G.R. dated 27.04.2017 was appreciated in the correct perspective, it became obvious that the respondent no.2- APMC had a very minor role and that too of making its premises available for purchase of Tur Dal. It was submitted that the scheme was being implemented by two Nodal Agencies and it was being supervised by the aforesaid Committee under the Chairmanship of the Tahsildar. In this context, reference was made to Section 29 of the aforesaid Act read with Rule 5 of the Rules framed thereunder, to claim that none of the activities undertaken under the said scheme could qualify as action undertaken by the respondent no.2 APMC under its powers and duties. On this basis, it was submitted that when the activity for which action was sought to be taken against the petitioner did not fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent no.2 APMC under the said Act and the Rules, the impugned order passed by respondent no.1 under Section 45(1) of the aforesaid Act was rendered without jurisdiction. It was further submitted that there had been flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice in the present case because the two reports on which reliance was placed by respondent no.1 while issuing show cause notice were admittedly never served on the petitioner. It was submitted that when reliance was placed on the said reports in the impugned order dated 11.06.2018, non-supply of the same vitiated the impugned order and rendered it liable to be set aside. It was further submitted by the learned counsel that the petitioner could not be held responsible for violation of executive instructions when none of the activities under the said scheme could be said to be under the aforesaid Act and the Rules. It was further submitted by the learned counsel that the petitioner could not be held responsible for violation of executive instructions when none of the activities under the said scheme could be said to be under the aforesaid Act and the Rules. The last submission made on behalf of the petitioner was that when removal of an elected person was being contemplated, there ought to have been strict adherence to the principles of natural justice and violation of the same rendered the impugned action unsustainable. The learned counsel placed reliance on judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir .vs. District Collector, Raigad, (2012) 4 SCC 407 , The Rajasthan State Industrial Development and ors. .vs. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society jaipur and ors., (2013) 5 SCC 427 , judgment of this Court in the case of Mir Islam Ali .vs. Panchavat Samiti, Telhare and ors., (1973) MhLJ 867 and judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Nazir Ahmad .vs. Emperor, (1936) AIR PC 253. 9. On the other hand, Mr. H.D. Dangre, learned counsel appearing for respondent no.3 (original complainant in the present case) submitted that a perusal of the provisions of the aforesaid Act and the Rules, particularly Section 29 thereof demonstrated that the activity conducted by the respondent no.2 APMC even under the said G.R. dated 27.04.2017 fell within the powers and duties of the APMC under Section 29(1) of the aforesaid Act. It was submitted that the reliance placed on Rule 5 of the Rules framed under the aforesaid Act was misplaced, because even if it was to be accepted that under the said Rule only a commission agent or trader could indulge in sale/purchase of commodities in the market area of the APMC, the said Rule would still be subservient to the statutory provisions under Section 29(1) of the aforesaid Act and, therefore, the petitioner could not escape liability in the present case. It was further submitted that the petitioner was not justified in claiming that the principles of natural justice had been violated in the present case because he had failed to demonstrate any prejudice suffered by him, in the absence of supply of the aforesaid two reports. It was further submitted that the petitioner was not justified in claiming that the principles of natural justice had been violated in the present case because he had failed to demonstrate any prejudice suffered by him, in the absence of supply of the aforesaid two reports. It was submitted that the nature of explanation sought to be given by the petitioner and the material on record clearly demonstrated that he not only violated instructions issued by the State Government, but he clearly abused his powers in order to cause benefit to his family members. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.3 also placed reliance on the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir .vs. District Collector (supra) in order to contend that if an elected person had betrayed the confidence reposed in him, it clearly amounted to a misconduct or disgraceful conduct inviting an order of removal from office. On this basis, it was contended that the writ petition deserved to be dismissed. 10. Mr. K.L. Dharmadhikari, learned A.G.P. appeared on behalf of respondent no.1 and supported the impugned order passed by the said respondent. 11. As regards the first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner, it would be necessary to examine the scheme envisaged under the aforesaid G.R. dated 27.04.2017. It was a scheme of market intervention initiated due to over production of Tur Dal in the year 2016-2017, leading to a situation where agriculturists would have suffered loss of income. The Government issued the said G.R. to ensure that the agriculturists received return of at least Rs.5050/- per quintal for sale of their Tur Dal, so that their interests were protected. A perusal of the said G.R. shows that the Secretary of the Agriculture Produce Market Committee was a member of the Committee headed by the Tahsildar, which was required to supervise implementation of the said scheme. A perusal of the said G.R. shows that the Secretary of the Agriculture Produce Market Committee was a member of the Committee headed by the Tahsildar, which was required to supervise implementation of the said scheme. Although there were two Nodal Agencies identified under the said scheme and the food grains were to be stored with the FCI, a proper appreciation of the documents on record demonstrates that the role of the APMC was not limited to providing its market area for purchase of Tur Dal by the Nodal Agencies, but to ensure that the process of sale and purchase was carried out with transparency and Tur Dal was purchased only from genuine agriculturists, ensuring elimination of middlemen, commission agents or traders. The letter dated 11.05.2017 issued by the District Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Amravati to the APMCs shows the detailed manner in which the scheme was required to be implemented in the market area of the APMC. The communication dated 30.03.2017 issued by the Directorate of Marketing of the State of Maharashtra is also significant because it demonstrates the concern of the authorities towards proper implementation of the scheme in which the APMCs were required to play a major role. 12. In this context, Section 29(1) of the aforesaid Act assumes significance and it reads as follows:- “29. Powers and duties of Market Committee. (1) It shall be the duty of a Market Committee to implement the provisions of this Act, the rules and bye-laws made thereunder in the market area; to provide such facilities for marketing of agriculture produce therein as the Director [the State Marketing Board or the State Government, as the case may be,] may, from time to time, direct; do such other acts as may be required in relation to the superintendence, direction and control of market or for regulating marketing of agriculture produce in any place in the market area, and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid, and for that purpose may exercise such powers and perform such duties and discharges such functions as may be provided by or under this Act.” 13. The said provision makes it clear that the APMC is not only required to implement the provisions of the aforesaid Act, but it is also mandated to provide facilities for marketing agricultural produce as directed by the State Government from time to time. The said provision makes it clear that the APMC is not only required to implement the provisions of the aforesaid Act, but it is also mandated to provide facilities for marketing agricultural produce as directed by the State Government from time to time. Thus, amongst the duties of the APMC is the aforesaid duty as may be directed by the State Government. The G.R. dated 27.04.2017 was clearly a directive issued by the State Government, wherein the APMCs had a major role to play. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner is not justified in claiming that even if the petitioner was alleged to have committed a wrong, since it was not in the context of powers and duties of the APMCs, he could not be hauled up for the same. The reliance placed on Rule 5 of the Rules framed under the aforesaid Act, is also misplaced because even if the said Rule provides that a commission agent or trader would have the permission to sell/purchase commodities in the market area of the APMC, the sale/purchase of the Tur Dal in the present case under the aforesaid G.R. dated 27.04.2017 was under Section 29(1) of the said Act, as it was a scheme framed by the State Government, which the APMC was obliged to implement. Therefore, there is no substance in the aforesaid contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. 14. The next contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the respondent no.1 erred in proceeding under Rule 41(1) (h) of the aforesaid Rules, is also unsustainable because although the impugned order does refer to Rule 41(1)(h) of the said Rules, but it is specifically stated that the petitioner had abused his position as Vice-Chairman of the respondent no.2 -APMC, thereby violating the provisions of the aforesaid Act and the Rules. This demonstrates that not only was the action taken under Rule 41(1)(h) of the aforesaid Rules, but also under the provisions of the Act and the Rules, thereby showing that he was liable to be removed under Section 45(1) of the said Act. This is significant because a perusal of Rule 41(1)(h) of the said Rules demonstrates that the petitioner could not have been held liable for removal under the same and the learned counsel for the respondent no.3 (original complainant) conceded to the same. 15. This is significant because a perusal of Rule 41(1)(h) of the said Rules demonstrates that the petitioner could not have been held liable for removal under the same and the learned counsel for the respondent no.3 (original complainant) conceded to the same. 15. It was vehemently submitted on behalf of the petitioner that there was violation of principles of natural justice because he was not given copies of the report of the District Marketing Officer and the report of the Tahsildar, although they were adverse to the petitioner and reliance had been placed upon the same by the respondent no.1 while passing the impugned order removing the petitioner from the said positions. It was submitted that the explanation given by the petitioner was also not considered in the proper perspective by the respondent no.1. A perusal of the documents on record shows that the respondent no.1 indeed placed heavy reliance on the aforesaid two reports in the show cause notice dated 15.07.2017 issued to the petitioner. Reference was made to the findings in the said reports against the petitioner while alleging that the petitioner had violated the provisions of the aforesaid Act and the Rules, making him liable for removal from office. There is nothing on record to show that either the District Marketing Officer or the Tahsildar ever issued any notice or asked for any explanation from the petitioner before preparing the said reports, which contained adverse material against him. In the said reports, reference was made to various documents and material that was collected during the process of preparation of the reports. The record does not show that such material was put to the petitioner at any point of time. It has also come on record that while submitting his explanation to the show cause notice, the petitioner had placed on record certain documents in order to explain the circumstances in which his family members had sold Tur Dal in the market area of the respondent no.2 APMC, of which the petitioner was Vice-Chairman. The said reply along with documents has been placed before this Court by the respondent no.3 (original complainant) himself. The said reply along with documents has been placed before this Court by the respondent no.3 (original complainant) himself. A perusal of the same shows that the petitioner did not deny the fact that his relatives had indeed sold Tur Dal in the market area of respondent no.2- APMC, but detailed explanation was given along with the documents, including affidavits and certificates to show as to how the quantum of Tur Dal purchased from his relatives was justified. 16. A perusal of the impugned order passed by respondent no.1 shows that while much reliance has been placed on the findings of the two reports against the petitioner, there is no reference to the detailed explanation sought to be given by the petitioner and the documentary material placed on record before the respondent no.2 by the petitioner along with his reply to the show cause notice. Thus, not only was there violation of principles of natural justice in the present case because the copies of two adverse reports were not supplied to the petitioner, but there was no discussion and consideration of the documents placed on record by the petitioner along with his reply to the show cause notice. This shows that the petitioner was clearly put to prejudice due to the manner in which the respondent no.1 proceeded to issue the show cause notice and then to pass the impugned order removing the petitioner from the aforesaid office. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.3 is not justified in contending that even if the aforesaid two adverse reports were not supplied to the petitioner, he did not suffer any prejudice. In any case, there is no explanation on record as to why the respondent no.1 failed to deal with the documents placed on record by the petitioner along with his detailed reply to the show cause notice. 17. In this context, the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the context of removal of elected persons assumes importance. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is justified in relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir .vs. District Collector (supra) , wherein it has been held as follows:- “34. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is justified in relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir .vs. District Collector (supra) , wherein it has been held as follows:- “34. In a democratic institution, like ours, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law or he is removed by the procedure established under law. The proceedings for removal must satisfy the requirement of natural justice and the decision must show that the authority has applied its mind to the allegations made and the explanation furnished by the elected office bearer sought to be removed. 35. The elected official is accountable to its electorate because he is being elected by a large number of voters. His removal has serious repercussions as he is removed from the post and declared disqualified to contest the elections for a further stipulated period, but it also takes away the right of the people of his constituency to be represented by him. Undoubtedly, the right to hold such a post is statutory and no person can claim any absolute or vested right to the post, but he cannot be removed without strictly adhering to the provisions provided by the legislature for his removal (Vide: Jyoti Basu & Ors. v. Debi Ghosal & Ors., (1982) AIR SC 983; Mohan Lal Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Rai Barelly & Ors., (1993) AIR SC 2042; and Ram Beti etc. etc. v. District Panchayat Rajadhikari & Ors., (1998) AIR SC 1222). 36. In view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallized to the effect that an elected member can be removed in exceptional circumstances giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and holding the enquiry, meeting the requirement of principles of natural justice and giving an incumbent an opportunity to defend himself, for the reason that removal of an elected person casts stigma upon him and takes away his valuable statutory right. Not only the elected office bearer but his constituency/electoral college is also deprived of representation by the person of their choice.” 18. Not only the elected office bearer but his constituency/electoral college is also deprived of representation by the person of their choice.” 18. The said position of law makes it very clear that an elected member can be removed in exceptional circumstances and that too by strict adherence to the statutory provisions and holding the enquiry, meeting the requirement of principles of natural justice. In the present case, the material on record shows that there was indeed violation of principles of natural justice causing prejudice to the petitioner and, therefore, on this ground the impugned order deserves to be set aside. The learned counsel for the respondent no.3 has sought to rely upon the very same judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir .vs. District Collector (supra), to contend that the petitioner had indulged in misconduct and disgraceful conduct as he had abused his position making him liable for removal under Section 45(1) of the aforesaid Act, but when this Court finds that there was indeed violation of principles of natural justice, it cannot be said that the petitioner could be removed only because the allegations against him were of serious nature. 19. The other judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner would not take the case of the petitioner any further because even if it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of The Rajasthan State Industrial Development .vs. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society (supra) that executive instructions which have no statutory force cannot override the law, in the present case, Section 29(1) of the aforesaid Act is the statutory provision under which the APMC did conduct the activities in respect of which allegations were made against the petitioner and, therefore, it could not be said that he could not be proceeded against on the basis of the said activities. As regards judgment of this Court in the case of Mir Islam Ali .vs. Panchavat Samiti (supra), there cannot be any quarrel with the proposition that the aforesaid Act is a complete code in itself. In fact, this Court finds that the action sought to be undertaken against the petitioner in the present case was indeed for having abused his position in respect of an activity of the APMC contemplated under Section 29(1) of the aforesaid Act. In fact, this Court finds that the action sought to be undertaken against the petitioner in the present case was indeed for having abused his position in respect of an activity of the APMC contemplated under Section 29(1) of the aforesaid Act. The judgment in the case of Nazir Ahmad .vs. Emperor (supra) wherein the Privy Council has laid down that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all, cannot come to the aid of the petitioner, because even if in the present case reference was made to Rule 41(1)(h) of the said Rules, while passing the impugned order, the said order was also passed under the provisions of the aforesaid Act and the Rules, thereby justifying invocation of power under Section 45(1) of the aforesaid Act. 20. But, even though the power sought to be exercised by the respondent no.1 in the present case was well within the four-corners of the aforesaid Act and the Rules, since this Court finds that there has been violation of the principles of natural justice, the impugned order deserves to be set aside only on that ground. But, at the same time, the nature of allegations made against the petitioner are serious and they pertain to abuse and misuse of power and position by the petitioner in order to benefit members of his own family. It appears that the material that came on record was not put to the petitioner in order to afford him a proper opportunity to explain and explanation along with the documents submitted by the petitioner was also not taken into consideration by the respondent no.1 while passing the impugned order. In this backdrop, it would be in the interest of justice that while the impugned order is set aside, the respondent no.1 is given liberty to proceed against the petitioner after supplying the copies of the said reports to the petitioner and all such material that might be adverse to him, upon which the respondent no.1 would be relying for supporting its charge of abuse of power by the petitioner. At the same time, the explanation and documents submitted by the petitioner also need to be taken into consideration by the respondent no.1 to come to a proper conclusion in the matter. 21. At the same time, the explanation and documents submitted by the petitioner also need to be taken into consideration by the respondent no.1 to come to a proper conclusion in the matter. 21. In view of the above, the writ petition is partly allowed. The impugned order dated 11.06.2018 is quashed and set aside. The respondent no.1 is granted liberty to proceed against the petitioner after providing copies of the aforesaid two reports and all such other material that the respondent no.1 desires to rely upon, while calling upon the petitioner to explain the charges levelled against him. The respondent no.1 shall give proper opportunity to the petitioner to submit his explanation. The explanation already submitted on record along with documents annexed therewith shall also be taken into consideration by the respondent no.1 before proceeding to pass any order in the matter. The enquiry undertaken afresh by respondent no.1, if any, in pursuance of the liberty granted by this Court, shall be completed expeditiously and in any case within a period of three months from today. 22. Rule in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.